Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.     

Human recognition memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

For many years the cognitive processes underlying recognition memory have been the subject of considerable interest in experimental psychology. To account for a broad range of behavioral findings, psychologists have put forward a variety of 'dual-process' models, all of which propose that recognition memory is supported by two forms of memory - familiarity and recollection - that differ in their speed of operation and the specificity of the retrieved information. More recently, the dual-process framework has been extended to encompass findings from studies investigating the neural basis of recognition memory. Results from neuropsychological, ERP and functional neuroimaging studies can be accommodated within the framework, and suggest that familiarity and recollection are supported by distinct neural mechanisms.     

Facial expressions of emotion: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Facial expressions are one example of emotional behavior that illustrate the importance of emotions to both basic survival and social interaction. Basic facial responses to stimuli such as sweet and bitter taste are important for species fitness and governed by simple rules. Even at this basic level, facial responses have communicative value to other species members. During evolution simple facial responses were extended for use in more complex nonverbal communications; the responses are labile. The perception and production of facial expressions are cognitive processes and numerous subcortical and cortical areas contribute to these operations. We suggest that no specific emotion center exists over and above cognitive systems in the brain, and that emotion should not be divorced from cognition.     

The development of reading impairment: a cognitive neuroscience model

This review discusses recent cognitive neuroscience investigations into the biological bases of developmental dyslexia, a common disorder impacting approximately 5 to 17 percent of the population. Our aim is to summarize central findings from several lines of evidence that converge on pivotal aspects of the brain bases of developmental dyslexia. We highlight ways in which the approaches and methodologies of developmental cognitive neuroscience that are addressed in this special issue-including neuroimaging, human genetics, refinement of cognitive and biological phenotypes, neural plasticity and computational model-can be employed in uncovering the biological bases of this disorder. Taking a developmental perspective on the biological bases of dyslexia, we propose a simple cascading model for the developmental progression of this disorder, in which individual differences in brain areas associated with phonological processing might influence the specialization of visual areas involved in the rapid processing of written words. We also discuss recent efforts to understand the impact of successful reading interventions in terms of changes within cortical circuits associated with reading ability.     

Dreaming and the brain: toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states

Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states.     

Developmental cognitive neuroscience: progress and potential

Developmental cognitive neuroscience is an evolving field that investigates the relations between neural and cognitive development. Lying at the intersection of diverse disciplines, work in this area promises to shed light on classic developmental questions, mechanisms subserving developmental change, diagnosis and treatment of developmental disorders, and cognitive and neuroscientific topics traditionally considered outside the domain of development. Fundamental questions include: What are the interrelations between developmental changes in the brain (e.g. in connectivity, chemistry, morphology) and developmental changes in children's behavior and cognitive abilities (e.g. representational complexity, ability to sustain selective attention, speed of processing)? Why, and how, is learning enhanced during certain periods in development? How is our knowledge organized, and how does this change with development? We discuss preliminary investigations of such questions and directions for future work.     

The cognitive neuroscience of creativity

This article outlines a framework of creativity based on functional neuroanatomy. Recent advances in the field of cognitive neuroscience have identified distinct brain circuits that are involved in specific higher brain functions. To date, these findings have not been applied to research on creativity. It is proposed that there are four basic types of creative insights, each mediated by a distinctive neural circuit. By definition, creative insights occur in consciousness. Given the view that the working memory buffer of the prefrontal cortex holds the content of consciousness, each of the four distinctive neural loops terminates there. When creativity is the result of deliberate control, as opposed to spontaneous generation, the prefrontal cortex also instigates the creative process. Both processing modes, deliberate and spontaneous, can guide neural computation in structures that contribute emotional content and in structures that provide cognitive analysis, yielding the four basic types of creativity. Supportive evidence from psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific studies is presented and integrated in this article. The new theoretical framework systematizes the interaction between knowledge and creative thinking, and how the nature of this relationship changes as a function of domain and age. Implications for the arts and sciences are briefly discussed.     

Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases - sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation - and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the self-experience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.     

Feelings you can't imagine: towards a cognitive neuroscience of alexithymia

Alexithymia, or 'no words for feelings', refers to an impairment of the ability to identify and communicate one's emotional state, in addition to diminished affect-related fantasy and imagery. A recent study by Mantani et al. reported reduced activation of the posterior cingulate cortex in people with alexithymia when they imagined a future happy event. This finding augments the emerging understanding of the neural basis of alexithymia, and potentially provides valuable insights into brain systems underlying normal emotion processing.     

Translating cognitive neuroscience to the driver's operational environment: a neuroergonomic approach

Neuroergonomics provides a multidisciplinary translational approach that merges elements of neuroscience, human factors, cognitive psychology, and ergonomics to study brain structure and function in everyday environments. Driving safety, particularly that of older drivers with cognitive impairments, is a fruitful application domain for neuroergonomics. Driving makes demands on multiple cognitive processes that are often studied in isolation and so presents a useful challenge in generalizing findings from controlled laboratory tasks to predict safety outcomes. Neurology and the cognitive sciences help explain the mechanisms of cognitive breakdowns that undermine driving safety. Ergonomics complements this explanation with the tools for systematically exploring the various layers of complexity that define the activity of driving. A variety of tools, such as part task simulators, driving simulators, and instrumented vehicles, provide a window into cognition in the natural settings needed to assess the generalizability of laboratory findings and can provide an array of potential interventions to increase driving safety.     

Cognitive neuroscience: the biology of the mind and findings and current opinion in cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind by Michael Gazzaniga, Richard Ivry and George Mangun, W.W. Norton, 1998. ￡24.95 (xv+587 pages) ISBN 0 393 97219 4 Findings and Current Opinion in Cognitive Neuroscience by Larry Squire and Stephen Kosslyn, MIT Press, 1998. $35.00 (vii+381 pages) ISBN 0 262 69204 X.     

Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these 'workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace.     

Effects of alcohol on person perception: a social cognitive neuroscience approach

The acute effects of alcohol on cognitive processing of expectancy violations were investigated using event-related brain potentials and a cued recall task to index attentional and working memory processes associated with inconsistency resolution. As predicted, expectancy-violating behaviors elicited larger late positive potentials (LPP) and were recalled better than expectancy-consistent behaviors. These effects were moderated by alcohol and the valence of initial expectancies. For placebo group participants, positive targets performing negative behaviors elicited the largest LPP responses and were recalled best. For those in the alcohol groups, negative targets behaving positively elicited the largest LPP and recall responses. These findings suggest that alcohol does not globally impair working memory processes in person perception but instead changes the nature of valenced information processing. Findings are discussed in the context of alcohol's effects on working memory processes, reward sensitivity, and the prefrontal cortical structures thought to mediate them.     

The cognitive neuroscience of auditory distraction

We are often aware of the content of distracting sound, although typically remain unaware of the processes by which that sound is disruptive. Disruption can occur even when the sound is ignored and unrelated to the task being performed. In a recent major development, Gisselg?rd et al. have used positron emission tomography to reveal how distracting sounds recruit the involvement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.