From demonstration to theory in embodied language comprehension: A review

Recent findings in psychology, psycholinguistics, and neuroscience present a challenge to current amodal theories by suggesting that cognitive states are not disembodied in language comprehension. Accumulating behavioral evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on processing of language describing concrete and abstract concepts. The extant embodied theories that support either a strong or a moderate embodied view are then presented, as are the perspectives that define how the researchers discuss the role of sensory-motor grounding in language processing. The article concludes by discussing several lines of research that might help distinguish between various theoretical approaches and resolve some of the fundamental issues that fuel much of the debate in the field.     

Cognitive and Neural Contributions to Understanding the Conceptual System

ABSTRACT— The conceptual system contains categorical knowledge about experience that supports the spectrum of cognitive processes. Cognitive science theories assume that categorical knowledge resides in a modular and amodal semantic memory, whereas neuroscience theories assume that categorical knowledge is grounded in the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and affect. Neuroscience has influenced theories of the conceptual system by stressing principles of neural processing in neural networks and by motivating grounded theories of cognition, which propose that simulations of experience represent knowledge. Cognitive science has influenced theories of the conceptual system by documenting conceptual phenomena and symbolic operations that must be grounded in the brain. Significant progress in understanding the conceptual system is most likely to occur if cognitive and neural approaches achieve successful integration.     

Perceptual symbol systems

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.     

感知运动信息在概念表征中的作用

研究概念的表征问题对理解概念的本质非常重要,传统认知和具身认知视角下的概念表征理论争议的焦点在于感觉运动信息在表征中的作用。传统认知视角下的离身认知认为感知觉运动信息会转化成抽象的符号,概念表征不包含感知觉运动信息。概念表征的具身观点认为感知觉运动信息是概念表征的基础。对感知运动信息在概念表征中起作用这一命题已经达成共识。未来研究应该关注感知运动信息起作用的机制,以及抽象概念表征等问题,进一步完善发展概念表征理论。     

When senses meet functions: an amodal stage in conceptual processing

Research has shown that concepts are associated with modality-specific features widely distributed in the brain and that semantic hubs or convergence zones may exist to mediate or integrate distributed representations. Although much neuropsychological and neuroimaging literature has provided support for the existence of hubs/convergence zones from the spatial perspective, opinions differ as to whether the representations in the hubs/convergence zones are modality-specific or amodal. The current ERP study aimed to explore whether there is an amodal stage in conceptual processing from the temporal perspective. Participants were presented with prime-target pairs and were asked to judge whether the prime (a sensory or functional feature) could be an attribute of the target (a noun in a natural or artifactual category). The results revealed that a semantic hub or convergence zone may be reached no later than 350–450?ms in conceptual processing and that the representations in the hub may be amodal.     

Linking somatic and symbolic representation in semantic memory: the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework

Biological plausibility is an essential constraint for any viable model of semantic memory. Yet, we have only the most rudimentary understanding of how the human brain conducts abstract symbolic transformations that underlie word and object meaning. Neuroscience has evolved a sophisticated arsenal of techniques for elucidating the architecture of conceptual representation. Nevertheless, theoretical convergence remains elusive. Here we describe several contrastive approaches to the organization of semantic knowledge, and in turn we offer our own perspective on two recurring questions in semantic memory research: (1) to what extent are conceptual representations mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (i.e., to what degree is semantic memory embodied)? (2) How might an embodied semantic system represent abstract concepts such as modularity, symbol, or proposition? To address these questions, we review the merits of sensorimotor (i.e., embodied) and amodal (i.e., disembodied) semantic theories and address the neurobiological constraints underlying each. We conclude that the shortcomings of both perspectives in their extreme forms necessitate a hybrid middle ground. We accordingly propose the Dynamic Multilevel Reactivation Framework—an integrative model predicated upon flexible interplay between sensorimotor and amodal symbolic representations mediated by multiple cortical hubs. We discuss applications of the dynamic multilevel reactivation framework to abstract and concrete concept representation and describe how a multidimensional conceptual topography based on emotion, sensation, and magnitude can successfully frame a semantic space containing meanings for both abstract and concrete words. The consideration of ‘abstract conceptual features’ does not diminish the role of logical and/or executive processing in activating, manipulating and using information stored in conceptual representations. Rather, it proposes that the materials upon which these processes operate necessarily combine pure sensorimotor information and higher-order cognitive dimensions involved in symbolic representation.     

Two Unpublished Contributions by Alfred Tarski

This article presents an historical and conceptual overview on different approaches to logical abstraction. Two main trends concerning abstraction in the history of logic are highlighted, starting from the logical notions of concept and function. This analysis strictly relates to the philosophical discussion on the nature of abstract objects. I develop this issue further with respect to the procedure of abstraction involved by (typed) λ-systems, focusing on the crucial change about meaning and predicability. In particular, the analysis of the nature of logical types in the context of Constructive Type Theory allows elucidation of the role of the previously introduced notions. Finally, the connection to the analysis of abstraction in computer science is drawn, and the methodological contribution provided by the notion of information is considered, showing its conceptual and technical relevance. Future research shall focus on the notion of information in distributed systems, analysing the paradigm of information hiding in dependent type theories.     

Re-framing the characteristics of concepts and their relation to learning and cognition in artificial agents

In this work, the problems of knowledge acquisition and information processing are explored in relation to the definitions of concepts and conceptual processing, and their implications for artificial agents.The discussion focuses on views of cognition as a dynamic property in which the world is actively represented in grounded mental states which only have meaning in the action context. Reasoning is understood as an emerging property consequence of actions-environment couplings achieved through experience, and concepts as situated and dynamic phenomena enabling behaviours.Re-framing the characteristics of concepts is considered crucial to overcoming settled beliefs and reinterpreting new understandings in artificial systems.The first part presents a review of concepts from cognitive sciences. Support is found for views on grounded and embodied cognition, describing concepts as dynamic, flexible, context-dependent, and distributedly coded.That is argued to contrast with many technical implementations assuming concepts as categories, whilst explains limitations when grounding amodal symbols, or in unifying learning, perception and reasoning.The characteristics of concepts are linked to methods of active inference, self-organization, and deep learning to address challenges posed and to reinterpret emerging techniques.In a second part, an architecture based on deep generative models is presented to illustrate arguments elaborated. It is evaluated in a navigation task, showing that sufficient representations are created regarding situated behaviours with no semantics imposed on data. Moreover, adequate behaviours are achieved through a dynamic integration of perception and action in a single representational domain and process.     

情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉的相互影响

通过3个实验探讨情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉是否存在相互影响, 以及加工深度对两者关系的影响。实验1采用情绪面孔启动范式, 探讨较深的情绪概念加工层面对情绪概念与情绪面孔的关系的影响。实验2更改概念任务, 探讨较浅的概念加工层面对两者关系的影响。实验3缩短启动面孔呈现时间, 探讨较浅的面孔知觉层面对两者关系的影响。通过研究主要得出以下结论：(1)情绪概念加工与情绪面孔知觉确实存在相互影响; (2)概念加工深度影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的概念加工层面, 两者的关系是单向的; (3)知觉加工深度也影响两者关系的方向性, 在较深的知觉加工层面, 两者的关系是双向的, 在较浅的知觉加工层面, 没有发现两者的相互影响。本研究为抽象概念的具身表征提供了实证支持。     

具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。     

Semantic approaches in the philosophy of science

In this article I give an overview of some recent work in philosophy of science dedicated to analysing the scientific process in terms of (conceptual) mathematical models of theories and the various semantic relations between such models, scientific theories, and aspects of reality. In current philosophy of science, the most interesting questions centre around the ways in which writers distinguish between theories and the mathematical structures that interpret them and in which they are true, i.e. between scientific theories as linguistic systems and their non-linguistic models. In philosophy of science literature there are two main approaches to the structure of scientific theories, the statement or syntactic approach—advocated by Carnap, Hempel and Nagel—and the non-statement or semantic approach—advocated, among others, by Suppes, the structuralists, Beth, Van Fraassen, Giere, Wójcicki. In conclusion, I briefly review some of the usual realist inspired questions about the possibility and character of relations between scientific theories and reality as implied by the various approaches I discuss in the course of the article. The models of a scientific theory should indeed be adequate to the phenomena, but if the theory is ‘adequate’ to (true in) its conceptual (mathematical) models as well, we have a model-theoretic realism that addresses the possible meaning and reference of ‘theoretical entities’ without relapsing into the metaphysics typical of the usual scientific realist approaches.     

COHERENTISM AND THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL BELIEFS: A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO DO PRACTICAL ETHICS WITHOUT APPEAL TO A MORAL THEORY

This paper defends a coherentist approach to moral epistemology. In “The Immorality of Eating Meat” (2000), I offer a coherentist consistency argument to show that our own beliefs rationally commit us to the immorality of eating meat. Elsewhere, I use our own beliefs as premises to argue that we have positive duties to assist the poor (2004) and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong (2012). The present paper explores whether this consistency‐based coherentist approach of grounding particular moral judgments on beliefs we already hold, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on our core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory‐based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustrating the approach, I briefly recapitulate my consistency‐based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks.     

Toward a unifying model of identification with groups: integrating theoretical perspectives.

Building on the contributions of diverse theoretical approaches, the authors present a multidimensional model of group identification. Integrating conceptions from the social identity perspective with those from research on individualism-collectivism, nationalism- patriotism, and identification with organizations, we propose four conceptually distinct modes of identification: importance (how much I view the group as part of who I am), commitment (how much I want to benefit the group), superiority (how much I view my group as superior to other groups), and deference (how much I honor, revere, and submit to the group's norms, symbols, and leaders). We present an instrument for assessing the four modes of identification and review initial empirical findings that validate the proposed model and show its utility in understanding antecedents and consequences of identification.     

On the generality and limits of abstraction in rats and humans

In this review, we address the question, central to cognition, of whether nonhuman animals such as rats are capable of extracting and extending information from a given learning situation to a new learning situation without generalizing through a physical dimension of the stimuli. This capacity underlies abstraction, which is a hallmark of human cognition and necessary for complex information processing such as language acquisition. We selectively review recent experiments with rats in which systematic changes in information processing of new stimuli are observed after training with different stimuli. These results strongly suggest that this capacity is present in rats. We also review two articles in which clear limitations to this capacity are detected. We conclude that, within specified limits, rats are capable of using prior experience when faced with a learning situation that involves new stimuli. We interpret this ability as a rudimentary form of abstraction. In the face of these provocative results, new theories of learning should be designed to account for these findings.     

多元表征假设：概念表征机制的新观点

传统的认知主义认为概念表征是与主体的感知系统无关的抽象符号。而具身理论则认为,概念表征以主体的感觉、知觉运动系统为基础的,感知系统在概念表征中具有中心作用。然而,具身性假设无法恰当的解释抽象概念表征这一问题。这种局限性说明主体的概念系统可能具有多元表征机制：既包括感知表征以加工与身体经验相关的具体知识,也包括抽象符号表征以加工与身体经验无关的抽象知识。来自病理学、认知神经科学和行为实验的实证研究证明了不同类型的概念会涉及不同的表征机制,证实了多元表征存在的合理性。今后的研究应探讨各种表征机制之间的关系等问题。     

The moral status of animals and their use in research: a philosophical review.

In this article I offer a philosophical review of (1) leading theories of the moral status of animals, (2) pivotal theoretical issues on which more progress needs to be made, and (3) applications to the setting of animal research. Such an examination demonstrates, I believe, that the practical implications of leading theories converge far more than might be expected. In addition, I hope this review helps to clarify particularly troubling issues that remain so they can be treated adequately.     

An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of (modal or amodal) format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate.     

Mental representation in visual/haptic crossmodal memory: evidence from interference effects

Two experiments used visual-, verbal-, and haptic-interference tasks during encoding (Experiment 1) and retrieval (Experiment 2) to examine mental representation of familiar and unfamiliar objects in visual/haptic crossmodal memory. Three competing theories are discussed, which variously suggest that these representations are: (a) visual; (b) dual-code—visual for unfamiliar objects but visual and verbal for familiar objects; or (c) amodal. The results suggest that representations of unfamiliar objects are primarily visual but that crossmodal memory for familiar objects may rely on a network of different representations. The pattern of verbal-interference effects suggests that verbal strategies facilitate encoding of unfamiliar objects regardless of modality, but only haptic recognition regardless of familiarity. The results raise further research questions about all three theoretical approaches.     

Mental representation in visual/haptic crossmodal memory: evidence from interference effects

Two experiments used visual-, verbal-, and haptic-interference tasks during encoding (Experiment 1) and retrieval (Experiment 2) to examine mental representation of familiar and unfamiliar objects in visual/haptic crossmodal memory. Three competing theories are discussed, which variously suggest that these representations are: (a) visual; (b) dual-code—visual for unfamiliar objects but visual and verbal for familiar objects; or (c) amodal. The results suggest that representations of unfamiliar objects are primarily visual but that crossmodal memory for familiar objects may rely on a network of different representations. The pattern of verbal-interference effects suggests that verbal strategies facilitate encoding of unfamiliar objects regardless of modality, but only haptic recognition regardless of familiarity. The results raise further research questions about all three theoretical approaches.