Religion and Science: The Embodiment of the Conversation: A Postmodern Sociological Perspective

In this paper I present a model of analysis of religion and science as forms of social construction of knowledge from the perspective of postmodern sociology. Numerous works have been recently published on the possible relations between religion and science. Most authors address this relationship from the perspectives of theology, philosophy, or selected disciplines of natural sciences (Ian Barbour, John Haught, John Polkinghorne). My goal is to add to that discussion a voice from the perspective of social sciences, specifically postmodern sociology. The model I propose brings the religion-science conversation down to earth, that is, to the level of people who "live" religion and science on a daily basis. The theoretical frame-work for my analysis of religion and science and of their relationship is constructed on the basis of selected works of leading postmodern sociologists Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens, and Piotr Sztompka. I begin with a brief summary of the basic ontological and methodological presuppositions of the postmodern approach to reality. This summary is followed by a clarification of meanings of certain concepts that are crucial for the understanding of my model. Then, I present the model of analysis of religion and science and, finally, make some suggestions for sociology of religion and sociology of science that might open new opportunities and challenges for future research of the interface between religion and science in the postmodern culture.     

Public Opinion and Political Philosophy: The Relation between Social-Scientific and Philosophical Analyses of Distributive Justice

This paper considers the relation between philosophical discussions of, and social-scientific research into popular beliefs about, distributive justice. The first part sets out the differences and tensions between the two perspectives, identifying considerations which tend to lead adherents of each discipline to regard the other as irrelevant to its concerns. The second discusses four reasons why social scientists might benefit from philosophy: problems in identifying inconsistency, the fact that non-justice considerations might underlie distributive judgments, the way in which different principles of justice can yield the same concrete distributive judgments, and the ambiguity of key terms. The third part distinguishes and evaluates three versions of the claim that normative theorising about justice can profit from empirical research into public opinion: that its findings are food for thought, that they amount to feasibility constraints, and that they are constitutive of normatively justified principles of justice. The view that popular opinion about justice has a strongly constitutive role to play in justifying principles of distributive justice stricto sensu is rejected, but it is argued that what the people think (and what they can reasonably be expected to come to think) on distributive matters can be an important factor for the political theorist to take into account, for reasons of legitimacy, or feasibility, or both.     

Rawlsian social-contract theory and the severely disabled

Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view, one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue. Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues, but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles. This extension to Rawls’s device clearly departs to some extent from his intentions; but the paper argues that the ideal of reciprocity, which might be thought to pose the biggest obstacle to applying his social-contract device to issues pertaining to the severely disabled (those who are not capable of being cooperative members of society), is not an independently essential commitment of his mature social-contract view, central though it was to Rawls’s thought in the 1950s.     

Global basic structure and institutions: The WTO as a practical example

In this article, I discuss the location of the sources of global poverty and injustice. I take it as granted that the members of the globally lowest income group live in unacceptable conditions and suffer from injustice. Yet the source of this injustice is a debatable question. Often the existing global institutions are seen as major causes behind this injustice. By taking the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations as a practical example, I aim to show that blaming the institutions as such can lead to misguided conclusions. The WTO, in fact, is quite just if one merely analyses its institutional structure. I argue that the major source of injustice are rather the prevailing power structures and the conduct of individual governments within this institutional framework, in other words the metaprocedural unfairness in the trade negotiations. I further argue that applications of Rawlsian theory of justice tend to be misleading at the global institutional level, as they focus disproportionately on the institutional structure, and tend to underestimate the relevance of the conduct of governments and the existing power structures, which allow powerful countries to use the institutional framework unjustly in their favour.     

The relevance of Rawls' principle of justice for research on cognitively impaired patients

An ethical conflict arises when we must performresearch in the interest of future patients,but that this may occasionally injure theinterests of today's patients.In the case of cognitively impaired persons, thequestion arises whether it is compatible withhumane healthcare not only to treat, but alsoto use these patients for research purposes.Some bioethicists and theologians haveformulated a general duty of solidarity, alsopertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as ajustification for research on these persons. Ifone examines this thesis from the theory ofjustice according to John Rawls, it is revealedthat such a duty of solidarity cannotnecessarily be extrapolated from Rawls'conception of justice. This is at least true ofRawls' difference principle, because accordingto the difference principle only those measuresare justifiable which serve the interest of therespective least well off. Those measures whichwould engender additional injury for the leastwell off could not be balanced by any utilityaccording to Rawls.However, John Rawls' difference principleis subordinate to the first principle,which is that each person has an equalright to the most extensive basic libertycompatible with the same liberty for others.These primary goods are determined by thefreedom and integrity of the person.This integrity of decisionally impaired personswould be in danger if one would abstain fromresearch and thus forego the increase inknowledge related to their disease. Thus onecould conclude, at least from Rawls' firstprinciple, that society must take on a duty toguarantee the degrees of freedom forcognitively impaired persons and thus alsosupport the efforts for their healing.     

Replies

John Fischer challenges me to defend my arguments regarding the badness of death; I sharpen my position, but make some concessions, discussing the possibility of postmortem harm. In response to John Deigh, I defend the account of disgust given in Hiding from Humanity, together with the research of Paul Rozin that I follow there. I discuss Patrick Devlin’s conservative position, agree that we need to object to its emphasis on solidarity, not only to its emphasis on disgust, and argue that Deigh’s statement of Devlin’s position is too kind to Devlin. In response to Henry Richardson, I summarize my reasons for thinking that the classical social contract tradition cannot handle well the problems posed by the issue of justice for people with disabilities, and that even Rawls’s position requires major modification if it is to do so. I explore differences between Richardson’s position and my own on the issues of self-respect, liberty, and primary goods.     

Privacy and Justification*

In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the face of Nagel’s claim that respect for privacy requires liberals to withdraw from their ‘control of the culture’. The paper starts by outlining a pluralist conception of privacy. I then proceed to examine whether there really is liberal cultural control, as Nagel affirms it, and whether such control truly involves a violation of privacy. Moreover, I argue that Nagel’s desire to leave the social and cultural space radically neutral is incompatible with Rawls’ conception of public reason and clashes with the need to justify liberal institutions.*Winner of the inaugural Res Publica Postgraduate Essay Prize, 2005.     

他人财富情绪:妒忌的社会评估比较与认知加工分析

妒忌是指意识到自己缺乏他人更优越的品质、成就或所有物而产生的自卑、敌意和怨恨等混合情绪,妒忌者渴望得到妒忌目标的优势或希望妒忌目标失去优势。作为一种指向他人财富的复杂情绪,善意妒忌和恶意妒忌会引发不同的行为结果,这主要取决于个体对他人财富的认知评估过程。妒忌通常由向上的社会比较而产生,社会事件应得性、主观公平感、核心自我评价等认知都会对妒忌产生影响。本文从社会比较判断、认知加工过程和神经生理功能等角度来分析妒忌的产生过程和认知机制。基于现有不足,未来的研究可以在妒忌情绪的发展特征、妒忌体验的测量方法和妒忌功能的分化等方面进一步完善。     

不公平感及相关决策的认知神经机制

公平是人类社会生活的基本规范之一,不公平感及其相关决策则是研究者们关注的重要课题。长期以来,该领域的研究一般采用最后通牒博弈或其变式展开。大量脑成像研究探查了关于不公平感及相关决策的认知神经机制,尤其集中探讨了最后通牒博弈的回应者对不公平提议进行反应的脑区及其对应功能。经常得到关注的脑区包括了前脑岛、前扣带皮层、背外侧前额叶、内侧前额叶、杏仁核和颞顶交界等。对特殊人群的不公平感及相关决策进行研究可以帮助检验或澄清上述重要脑区及脑网络在不公平感及相关决策中扮演的角色,同时也阐释特殊人群的社会认知功能的特点。近年来,相当数量的研究关注了不同情境因素(包括分配方案相关因素和社会情境相关因素)调制不公平感及相关决策的过程,并讨论其背后的认知神经机制。未来的研究更应利用多模态数据分析方法,同时结合基因和激素层面的研究,以期深入对不公平感及相关决策的心理和生理机制的理解。     

高校知识女性心理素质结构测查问卷的编制

本文根据心理素质涵义的分析,结合高校知识女性的实际情况,将高校知识女性心理素质结构的测查问卷划分为六个维度：智能素质、个性素质、心理健康素质、社会心理素质、职业心理素质、女性角色心理素质。以1430名高校女教师为被试,对编制的高校知识女性心理素质结构的测查问卷进行了信度、效度分析,确定高校知识女性心理素质结构问卷有较高的信度、效度。     

Explaining the Feelings of Justice

Philosophical theories about justice feelings and axiological feelings generally suffer from the fact that they look for simple criteria of justice, legitimacy, fairness. For this reason, they appear as of little help to account for the findings from sociological empirical studies. Weber's notion of "axiological rationality" can be interpreted as suggesting a "cognitivist" theory of axiological feelings. According to this theory, the causes responsible for the fact that a social actor endorses an axiological statement would not be basically different from the causes responsible for his endorsement of a representational statement. He would endorse the statement "X is fair" as he endorses "X is true", because these statements appear to him as grounded on strong reasons, though he may not perceive these reasons explicitly. This cognitivist theory was used by analysts of collective moral sentiments, as Adam Smith, before Max Weber. A careful examination of two empirical studies shows that the cognitivist theory can make the observational findings more easily understandable. The "cognitivist theory" eliminates the weaknesses of the major general philosophical and sociological theories of axiological feelings. It shows notably that these feelings can be context-dependent without this contextuality making them irrational. This theory includes two major principles: that instrumental rationality does not overlap with rationality shortly; that there are no simple criteria of "fairness", "legitimacy", etc.     

Social Scientists in Times of Crisis: The Structural Transformations Within the Disciplinary Organization and Thematic Repertoire of the Social Sciences

This is a contribution to thesociology and social epistemology of knowledgeproduction in Russian social sciences today. Inthe initial section, the epistemic status andsocial function of Soviet social scientificdiscourse are characterized in terms of textualforms and their modes of (re-)production. Theremaining sections detail the course of therestructuration of social scientific discoursesince the fall of the Soviet Union and draw onextant empirical sources, in particular studiesof bibliographical rubrics, thematicrepertoires, and current textual formsthroughout the public sphere and the academicestablishment in Russia. An underlying concernis the shifting status of the intellectual inthe wider socio-cultural context as reflectedin language usage and its textualembodiments.     

THOG问题的演译结构及其非Wason-Brooks判定方法

本文探讨THOG问题的演绎结构及其非Wason-Brooks判断方法,据于Wason-Brooks判断程序和THOG问题逻辑结构的分析导致如下结论：1．Wason-BrooksTHOG判定方法并非判定THOG的唯一方法;2、被试选择那一种演绎判定模式取决于被试如何对原问题进行等效表征转换;3．判断失败可能意味着被试存在短时记忆容量障碍或者等效表征转换障碍。     

社会称许性对16PF测验因素结构的影响

本研究采用共同方法偏差控制法研究在应聘情境下,社会称许性(SD)因素是否存在于16PF测验的二级因素结构中,对人格测量产生影响,并探索SD对15个分量表的影响程度。结果表明:在应聘情境下,16PF的二级因素结构中存在SD因素,SD普遍对13个分量表有显著的影响,其中分量表C、Q4和G受到的影响较大,分量表A、E、F、M、NI、、Q1和Q2受到的影响较小。本研究为探索如何矫正SD对16PF人格测量的影响提供参考。     

INTRODUCTION: RETHINKING PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUMPTIONS IN LIGHT OF COGNITIVE DISABILITY

Abstract: This Introduction to the collection of essays surveys the philosophical literature to date with respect to five central questions: justice, care, agency, metaphilosophical issues regarding the language and representation of cognitive disability, and personhood. These themes are discussed in relation to three specific conditions: intellectual and developmental disabilities, Alzheimer's disease, and autism, though the issues raised are relevant to a broad range of cognitive disabilities. The Introduction offers a brief historical overview of the treatment cognitive disability has received from philosophers, and explains the specific challenges that cognitive disability poses to philosophy. In briefly summarizing the essays in the collection, it highlights the distinctive contributions the collection makes to ethics, political philosophy, bioethics, and the philosophy of disability. We hope that the richness of the topics explored by these essays will be a spur to further investigation.     

Alterity,Intimacy, and the Cultural Turn in Religious Ethics

This essay responds to four critics of Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics and Culture: Diana Fritz Cates, Eric Gregory, Ross Moret, and Atalia Omer. Focusing on the book’s organizing concepts of intimacy and alterity, engagement with empirical sources, discussion of Augustine’s thought, and attention to moral psychology and political morality, these interlocutors take up various strands in the book’s argument and extend them into metaethical, normative, and metadisciplinary domains. The author organizes his response under three rubrics: Metaethics and Personal Relationships; Political Morality; and Multidisciplinary Horizons.