Meehl and the ex post facto design

Paul E. Meehl's problem of systematic unmatching is discussed, and it is argued that his reasoning and conclusion are incorrect. Unmatching will probably occur seldom in empirical cases, and if it does take place, it will constitute some sort of undercorrection. Moreover, his attempt at interpretation of statistical control in terms of so-called "counterfactuals" is found to be misleading.     

Role-playing as an experimental strategy in social psychology

It is argued that the efficacy of role playing as an experimental strategy should be assessed in terms of its ability to resolve the problems of experimentation in social psychology. Via an epistemological and methodological analysis of the laboratory experiment in social psychology, it is argued that ‘active-experimental’ role playing constitutes a promising experimental strategy, because it can potentially overcome the fundamental experimental problem that arise in virtue of the relational nature of social psychological phenomena. It is stressed that in the end the question of the efficacy of role playing as an experimental strategy is an empirical one, but also that most empirical evaluations are inadequate for two reasons. Most of the role playing groups lack realism and involvement, and the congruence of results in role playing studies of deception experiments (whose validity is questionable) is uncritically taken as both the standard and the criterion for the efficacy of role playing. Both role playing and deception techniques should be assessed in terms of their capacity to achieve experimental realism.     

Safety,Risk Acceptability,and Morality

The primary aim of this article is to develop and defend a conceptual analysis of safety. The article begins by considering two previous analyses of safety in terms of risk acceptability. It is argued that these analyses fail because the notion of risk acceptability is more subjective than safety, as risk acceptability takes into account potential benefits in a way that safety does not. A distinction is then made between two different kinds of safety-safety qua cause and safety qua recipient-and both are defined in terms of the probability of a loss of value, though the relationship between safety and the probability of loss varies in each case. It is then shown that although this analysis is less subjective than the previously considered analyses, subjectivity can still enter into judgments of safety via the notions of probability and value. In the final section of this article, it is argued that the difference between safety and risk acceptability is important because it corresponds in significant ways to the difference between consequentialist and deontological moral viewpoints.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.     

Are religious people nicer people? Taking a closer look at the religion–empathy relationship

It has been argued that an empathically mediated, kin-specific, altruistic impulse is part of the human genetic heritage, and that one of the functions of religion is to extend the range of this impulse beyond the kinship circle. However, it is clear that religion does not always succeed in this. The present study reconsiders the religiosity–empathy relation in a Flemish student sample (n?=?375), using the Post-Critical Belief Scale, which allows to distinguish between being religious or not (Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence) from the way in which religious contents are processed (Literal versus Symbolic). It is argued that the religiosity–empathy relation should be understood in terms of how people process religious contents rather than in terms of whether or not people are religious. In line with this reasoning, results show that, whereas empathy is unrelated to being religious, it is positively related to processing religious contents in a symbolic way. Social desirability did not influence these relationships.     

Constraints on children's color term acquisition

Kowalski and Zimiles (2006) and O'Hanlon and Roberson (2006) address an age-old question: Why do children find it difficult to learn color terms? Here these articles are reflected on, providing a focused examination of the issues central to this question. First, the criteria by which children are said to find color naming difficult are considered. Although the age of color term acquisition is decreasing, and color naming might not be more difficult than other abstract attributes, several stages of difficulty are identified. Second, it is argued that there are potentially multiple constraints (e.g., conceptual, attentional, and linguistic) for these multiple stages of difficulty with color term acquisition. Third, it is argued that the validity and reliability of techniques for identifying constraints need to be considered and that converging evidence for the constraints should be provided. Finally, a series of new questions that need to be asked to provide a well-rounded explanation of the difficulties children face when learning color terms is outlined.     

The methodology of genuine modal realism

David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.     

Causality, Propensity, and Bayesian Networks

This paper investigates the relations between causality and propensity. Aparticular version of the propensity theory of probability is introduced, and it is argued that propensities in this sense are not causes. Some conclusions regarding propensities can, however, be inferred from causal statements, but these hold only under restrictive conditions which prevent cause being defined in terms of propensity. The notion of a Bayesian propensity network is introduced, and the relations between such networks and causal networks is investigated. It is argued that causal networks cannot be identified with Bayesian propensity networks, but that causal networks can be a valuable heuristic guide for the construction of Bayesian propensity networks.     

Radical Intersubjectivity: Reflections on the “Different” Foundation of Education

This article addresses the question how educational theory can overcome the assumptions of the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness, a tradition which can be seen as the foundation of the modern project of education. While twentieth century philosophy has seen several attempts to make a shift from consciousness to intersubjectivity (Dewey, Wittgenstein, Habermas) it is argued that this shift still remains within the humanistic tradition of modern thought in that it still tries to define, still tries to develop a theory about the human subject. Foucault's thesis of the end of man is interpreted as an attempt to move beyond humanism, an attempt motivated by a sincere concern for the humanity of the subject. Starting from the question as to who comes after the subject, several answers to this question, which all share an interest in the question as to where the subject comes into presence, are discussed (referring to the writings of Tschumi, Arendt and Levinas). In the concluding section it is argued that one way to move beyond the humanistic tradition of modern thought is to conceive of the subject in terms of responsibility and ethics (Levinas) and to conceive of the very task of theory in terms of justice, and not in terms of truth. This, so it is argued, should be the final concern for educational theory and curriculum theory.     

CAN CHRISTIAN TALK ABOUT GOD BE LITERAL?

This article discusses whether Christian talk about God can be literal. First, it is argued that the meaning of a word cannot be reduced to its use, that metaphorical language is indirect in its use of words, and that the change of meaning of a word by analogical extension differs from the change of meaning by repeated metaphorical use. Next, it is shown that in Christian talk about God, God can be literally referred to by God's proper name, “YHWH,” and by words that in contexts of prayer and praise function as proper names. Then it is argued that terms for non‐basic actions can be literally applied to the Christian God, and that some of God's essential properties can be literally described on the basis of his self‐revealing actions.     

The Marxian theory of social change∗

This essay is a logico‐philosophical critique of the Marxian system of sociology with special reference to the theory of social change. To every change in the natural order (taken in conjunction with the technological order) corresponds an appropriate change in the human order, that is, in the system of social relations. This, it is shown, is the fundamental Marxian thesis regarding social equilibrium. And accordingly the key idea regarding social change is that a gradually maturing inherent disproportion between the two orders is the basic condition of social change, eventually leading to the establishment of a new social equilibrium at a higher level.

A close examination of the concept of mode of production and changes therein is attempted in the course of elucidating the above thesis. It is argued that the technological interpretation of the concept of mode of production conflicts with the Marxian anthropology and that we should have a structural interpretation according to which it will refer to the economy as a whole and will include among other elements production relations. This interpretation leads the discussion into one of the central problems of Marxism, namely, the relation between the mode of production and the social system. It is argued that the social system is basic to Marx and after a close analysis of the concept of system it is shown that the Marxian theory of base and superstructure rests mainly on confusion of conceptual orientations. This, it is shown, is connected with a fundamental idea of Marxism, viz., that of a system without a transcendent centre. This essay endeavours to prove that such an idea is logically untenable. Hence the Marxian Laws of Transformation of Quantity into Quality and Negation of Negation are examined and shown logically untenable.

The last section discusses the question about the determinant of technological change and eventually of social change. Three possible Marxian solutions are examined: (a) in terms of needs — it is argued that this is inconsistent with Marx's theory of man and labour; (b) in terms of science and new ideas — it is shown that this ultimately goes contrary to Marxian materialism and positivism; and finally, (c) the systemic solution in terms of the dialectic of nature and man is subjected to logical scrutiny and it is shown that this cannot be consistent and valid without involving a trans‐historical standpoint; for, it is argued, the idea of the self‐directing Humanity on which it rests is a self‐contradictory notion.     

On deriving essence from existence

A definition of ‘alienation’ is proposed which is a rational reconstruction of the term as it is used in primarily moral contexts. Special attention is given to the Marxist tradition. It is argued that the earliest, moral form of Marx's economic determinism can be expressed in terms of the principle of the sufficiency of unalienated labor. In this connection four main kinds of alienation are distinguished. In the final section, it is argued that while ‘alienation’ has and should have an important theoretical role in the context of moral discourse, social scientists, and in particular sociologists, would be better off if they eliminated ‘alienation’ from their scientific vocabulary.     

Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Several philosophers claim that the phenomenology of one's own agency conflicts with standard causal theories of action, couched in terms of causation by mental events or states. Others say that the phenomenology is prima facie incompatible with such a theory, even if in the end, a reconciliation can be worked out. Here, it is argued that the type of action theory in question is consistent with what can plausibly be said to be presented to us in our experience of our agency. Several routes to a claim that there is nevertheless a prima facie incompatibility are examined, and all are found wanting. The phenomenology of agency, it is argued, is no threat to a standard causal theory of action.     

Transitivity and the ontology of causation

It is argued that it is very hard to analyse causation in such a way that prevents everything from causing everything else. This is particularly true if we assume that the causal relation is transitive, for it all too often happens that causal chains that we wish to keep separate pass through common intermediate events. It is also argued that treating causes as aspects of events, rather than the events themselves, will not solve this problem. This is because aspects have to be highly disjunctive, and disjunctive conditions tend to undermine causal connections, a fact that is most clearly seen when causation is analysed in terms of INUS conditions. It is concluded that reductive analyses of causation do not work, and that transitivity can only be guaranteed in cases where the elements of the causal chain constitute an independently understood causal process.     

FROM VIRTUE TO DECENCY

Abstract: In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one to make sense of the centrality of negative precepts in commonsense morality.     

The Semantics of Rigid Designation

Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators.     

Quine on translation

Against Quine's thesis of the ‘indeterminacy of translation’, in Word and Object, it is argued that the extension of terms, where determinable at all except by arbitrary decision, is determinable by empirical means other than comparison of ‘stimulus meaning’, that translation of terms does not presuppose prior translation of syncategoremata, that parallelisms of function of syncategoremata in different languages can in part be discovered on the basis of stimulus meanings, that it is incorrect to speak of bilinguals’ necessarily using ‘analytical hypotheses’, that in one form the thesis is correct and uncontroversial, that in another it is controversial but both unacceptable and at variance with Quine's own views on language.     

THEORIZING RELIGION AND QUESTIONING THE FUTURE OF ISLAM AND SCIENCE

Will there be any joint future for science and Islam? Although such questions have recently received considerable attention, more basic questions are often ignored. This article aims at addressing some of those more basic questions through exploring the assumptions that underlie different possible understandings of the question about the future of Islam and science. By investigating the relation between conceptualizations of religion and the question about the future of Islam and science, it will be argued that different understandings of the concept of religion (i.e., whether it denotes real objects, whether it is universal, and whether it is belief centered) lead to extremely different readings of the question. Besides, it will be argued that different answers to the question about the future of Islam and science can be understood in terms of the inference to best theological explanation; thus, the criteria that one assumes for the best theological explanation result in different criteria for evaluation of the answers.     

Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: the case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air

The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.