Judging judges: How do children weigh the importance of capability and objectivity for being a good decision maker?

Two studies examined developmental differences in how children weigh capability and objectivity when evaluating potential judges. In Study 1, 84 6‐ to 12‐year‐olds and adults were told stories about pairs of judges that varied in capability (i.e., perceptual capacity) and objectivity (i.e., the relationship to a contestant) and were asked to predict which judge would be more accurate. Participants generally preferred capable over incapable judges. Additionally, 10‐ and 12‐year‐olds adjusted their preferences for the most capable judge based on objectivity information. Seventy 6‐ and 8‐year‐olds participated in Study 2, which was similar to Study 1 except that the judges could both seem incapable unless children understood how different decisions require different kinds of perceptual capabilities. While 8‐year‐olds chose judges based on the relevance of the perceptual capability, 6‐year‐olds struggled, seeming to be distracted by the valence of the judges’ relationships to the contestants. Overall, these results support that there are important shifts in how children evaluate decision makers from early to middle childhood.     

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind‐relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three‐year‐old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non‐pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., ‘No, not like that’), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non‐conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend – at least for their strength – on the nature of the acquisition process.     

Two‐year‐old children preferentially transmit simple actions but not pedagogically demonstrated actions

Children are sensitive to both social and non‐social aspects of the learning environment. Among social cues, pedagogical communication has been shown to not only play a role in children's learning, but also in their own active transmission of knowledge. Vredenburgh, Kushnir and Casasola, Developmental Science, 2015, 18, 645 showed that 2‐year‐olds are more likely to demonstrate an action to a naive adult after learning it in a pedagogical than in a non‐pedagogical context. This finding was interpreted as evidence that pedagogically transmitted information has a special status as culturally relevant. Here we test the limits of this claim by setting it in contrast with an explanation in which the relevance of information is the outcome of multiple interacting social (e.g., pedagogical demonstration) and non‐social properties (e.g., action complexity). To test these competing hypotheses, we varied both pedagogical cues and action complexity in an information transmission paradigm with 2‐year‐old children. In Experiment 1, children preferentially transmitted simple non‐pedagogically demonstrated actions over pedagogically demonstrated more complex actions. In Experiment 2, when both actions were matched for complexity, we found no evidence of preferential transmission of pedagogically demonstrated actions. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between our results and previous literature showing an effect of pedagogical cues on cultural transmission, and conclude that our results are compatible with the view that pedagogical and other cues interact, but incompatible with the theory of a privileged role for pedagogical cues.     

Children's recognition of time in the causes and cures of physical and emotional reactions to illnesses and injuries

The present set of studies examined children's and college students' recognition of the role of time in the manifestation of causes and cures for illnesses and injuries. In Study 1, participants ranging from 4‐year‐olds through college students were presented with biological, moral, psychological, and irrelevant causes for illness symptoms and were asked how much time elapsed between the cause and the symptom. They were also asked if medicine would make the person feel better and if so how much time elapsed between taking the medicine and feeling better. Study 2 replicated Study 1 with 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds. Study 3 examined whether 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds and college students could differentiate between physical and emotional reactions to illnesses and injuries, with regard to time course. Overall, young children underestimate how long it takes for illness symptoms to emerge (expecting them to result right away following exposure to contamination). Nonetheless, children generated longer timelines for biological cures than biological causes. Moreover, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds expect physical and emotional reactions to follow different time courses. These results suggest that young children have a nascent expectation that biological events are distinct from non‐biological events, in how they unfold over time.     

Children with autism are impaired in the understanding of teaching

Children learn novel information using various methods, and one of the most common is human pedagogical communication or teaching – the purposeful imparting of information from one person to another. Neuro‐typically developing (TD) children gain the ability to recognize and understand teaching as a core method for acquiring knowledge from others. However, it is not known when children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) acquire the ability to recognize and understand teaching. This study (total N = 70) examined whether children with ASD recognize the two central elements that define teaching: (1) that teaching is an intentional activity; and (2) that teaching requires a knowledge difference between teacher and learner. Theory of mind understanding was also tested. Compared to individually matched TD children, high cognitively functioning children with ASD were impaired in their comprehension of both components of teaching understanding, and their performance was correlated with theory of mind understanding. These findings could have broad implications for explaining learning in children with autism, and could help in designing more effective interventions, which could ultimately lead to improved learning outcomes for everyday life skills, school performance, health, and overall well‐being.     

Developmental changes in automatic rule‐learning mechanisms across early childhood

Infants’ ability to learn complex linguistic regularities from early on has been revealed by electrophysiological studies indicating that 3‐month‐olds, but not adults, can automatically detect non‐adjacent dependencies between syllables. While different ERP responses in adults and infants suggest that both linguistic rule learning and its link to basic auditory processing undergo developmental changes, systematic investigations of the developmental trajectories are scarce. In the present study, we assessed 2‐ and 4‐year‐olds’ ERP indicators of pitch discrimination and linguistic rule learning in a syllable‐based oddball design. To test for the relation between auditory discrimination and rule learning, ERP responses to pitch changes were used as predictor for potential linguistic rule‐learning effects. Results revealed that 2‐year‐olds, but not 4‐year‐olds, showed ERP markers of rule learning. Although, 2‐year‐olds’ rule learning was not dependent on differences in pitch perception, 4‐year‐old children demonstrated a dependency, such that those children who showed more pronounced responses to pitch changes still showed an effect of rule learning. These results narrow down the developmental decline of the ability for automatic linguistic rule learning to the age between 2 and 4 years, and, moreover, point towards a strong modification of this change by auditory processes. At an age when the ability of automatic linguistic rule learning phases out, rule learning can still be observed in children with enhanced auditory responses. The observed interrelations are plausible causes for age‐of‐acquisition effects and inter‐individual differences in language learning.     

Fearful faces drive gaze‐cueing and threat bias effects in children on the lookout for danger

Most developmental studies of face emotion processing show faces in isolation, in the absence of any broader context. Here we investigate two types of interactions between expression and threat contexts. First, in adults, following of another person's direction of social attention is increased when that person shows fear and the context requires vigilance for danger. We investigate whether this also occurs in children. Using a Posner‐style eye‐gaze cueing paradigm, we tested whether children would show greater gaze‐cueing from fearful than happy expressions when the task was to be vigilant for possible dangerous animals. Testing across the 8–12‐year‐old age range, we found this fear priority effect was absent in the youngest children but developed to reach adult levels in the oldest children. However, even the oldest children were unable to sustain fear‐prioritization when the onset of the target was delayed. Second, we addressed the development of ‘threat bias’ – namely faster identification of dangerous animals than safe animals – in the social context provided by expressive faces. In our non‐anxious samples (i.e. with typical‐population levels of anxiety), adults showed a threat bias regardless of the expression or looking direction of the just‐seen cue face whereas 8–12‐year‐olds only showed a threat bias when the just‐seen cue face displayed fear. Overall, the results argue that some, but not all, aspects of expression–context interactions are mature by 12 years of age.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Biased decision‐making: developing an understanding of how positive and negative relationships may skew judgments

The current experiment examines if and when children consider the possibility of relationships skewing judgments when evaluating judgments in different contexts. Eighty‐seven 6‐year‐olds, 8‐year‐olds, 10‐year‐olds, and adults heard stories about judges who made decisions matching or mismatching possible relationship biases (e.g. a judge choosing a friend or an enemy as the winner) in contests with objective or subjective criteria. While even 6‐year‐olds distinguished between subjective and objective contests, neither children nor adults focused on the objectivity of the contest criteria when evaluating a judge's claims. Instead, by age 8, if not earlier, children focused on relationships, trusting judgments that mismatched someone's relationship biases and discounting judgments that matched someone's relationship biases. The findings also suggested that children are better at recognizing that a judgment may have been biased than predicting that one will be, and that they may understand that negative relationships may skew judgments before positive ones.     

The Development of the Ability to Semantically Integrate Information in Speech and Iconic Gesture in Comprehension

We examined whether children's ability to integrate speech and gesture follows the pattern of a broader developmental shift between 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children (Ramscar & Gitcho, 2007) regarding the ability to process two pieces of information simultaneously. In Experiment 1, 3‐year‐olds, 5‐year‐olds, and adults were presented with either an iconic gesture or a spoken sentence or a combination of the two on a computer screen, and they were instructed to select a photograph that best matched the message. The 3‐year‐olds did not integrate information in speech and gesture, but 5‐year‐olds and adults did. In Experiment 2, 3‐year‐old children were presented with the same speech and gesture as in Experiment 1 that were produced live by an experimenter. When presented live, 3‐year‐olds could integrate speech and gesture. We concluded that development of the integration ability is a part of the broader developmental shift; however, live‐presentation facilitates the nascent integration ability in 3‐year‐olds.     

Children show limited movement repertoire when learning a novel motor skill

Examining age differences in motor learning using real‐world tasks is often problematic due to task novelty and biomechanical confounds. Here, we investigated how children and adults acquire a novel motor skill in a virtual environment. Participants of three different age groups (9‐year‐olds, 12‐year‐olds, and adults) learned to use their upper body movements to control a cursor on a computer screen. Results showed that 9‐year‐old and 12‐year‐old children showed poorer ability to control the cursor at the end of practice. Critically, when we investigated the movement coordination, we found that the lower task performance of children was associated with limited exploration of their movement repertoire. These results reveal the critical role of motor exploration in understanding developmental differences in motor learning.     

Choosing your informant: weighing familiarity and recent accuracy

In two experiments, children aged 3, 4 and 5 years (N= 61) were given conflicting information about the names and functions of novel objects by two informants, one a familiar teacher, the other an unfamiliar teacher. On pre‐test trials, all three age groups invested more trust in the familiar teacher. They preferred to ask for information and to endorse the information that she supplied. In a subsequent phase, children watched as the two teachers differed in the accuracy with which they named a set of familiar objects. Half the children saw the familiar teacher name the objects accurately and the unfamiliar teacher name them inaccurately. The remaining half saw the reverse arrangement. In post‐test trials, the selective trust initially displayed by 3‐year‐olds was minimally affected by this intervening experience of differential accuracy. By contrast, the selective trust of 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds was affected. If the familiar teacher had been the more accurate, selective trust in her was intensified. If, on the other hand, the familiar teacher had been the less accurate, it was undermined, particularly among 5‐year‐olds. Thus, by 4 years of age, children trust familiar informants but moderate that trust depending on the informants’ recent history of accuracy or inaccuracy.     

Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers' transmission of recently demonstrated functions to unfamiliar adults

Young children use pedagogical cues as a signal that others' actions are social or cultural conventions. Here we show that children selectively transmit (enact in a new social situation) causal functions demonstrated pedagogically, even when they have learned and can produce alternative functions as well. Two‐year‐olds saw two novel toys, each with two functions. One experimenter demonstrated one function using pedagogical cues (eye contact and child‐directed speech) and a second experimenter demonstrated the alternative function using intentional actions towards the object, but without pedagogical cues. Children imitated both functions at equal rates initially, indicating equal causal learning from both types of demonstration. However, they were significantly more likely to enact the pedagogical function for a new adult not present during the initial demonstrations. These results indicate that pedagogical cues influence children's transmission of information, perhaps playing a role in the dissemination of cultural conventions from a young age.     

Mental reinstatement of the misinformation context and the misinformation effect in children and adults

The present study investigated the effects of mental reinstatement of the context in which misleading information about an event was presented on later recognition memory for the event. Five‐year‐olds, 7‐year‐olds and adults were shown a short video depicting a children's adventure and were asked a set of misleading questions to introduce misinformation one week later. Before the recognition memory test was administered another week later, half of the participants were given instructions to mentally reinstate the context of the misleading interview. Memory was assessed with a set of forced‐choice recognition questions once in the misleading interview context and for the children a second time at home one week later. When participants were instructed to mentally reinstate the context of the misleading interview prior to the recognition test, false memory reports occurred more often for adults than for children and had a stronger impact on peripheral information than on central information for both 7‐year‐olds and adults. When 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds were tested at home, false memory reports decreased. Thus, reinstating the context of an interview introducing misinformation can reduce the accuracy of memory reports; the context dependence of both accurate and inaccurate memory reports in children and adults is discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who knows best? Preschoolers sometimes prefer child informants over adult informants

Do preschoolers think adults know more about everything than children? Or do they recognize that there are some things that children might know more about than adults? Three‐, four‐, and five‐year olds (N=65) were asked to decide whether an adult or child informant would better be able to answer a variety of questions about the nutritional value of foods and about toys. Children at all ages chose to direct the food questions to the adult and the toy questions to the child. Thus, there are some kinds of information for which preschoolers expect that a child would be a better informant than an adult. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Young children separate multiple pretend worlds

Each fictional world that adults create has its own distinct properties, separating it from other fictional worlds. Here we explore whether this separation also exists for young children's pretend game worlds. Studies 1 and 1A set up two simultaneous games and encouraged children to create appropriate pretend identities for coloured blocks. When prompted with a situation that required the use of a Game 1 object in Game 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds were reluctant to move pretend objects between games, even when the alternative‐world object was explicitly highlighted as a possible choice. Study 2 found the same effect when the two game worlds were presented sequentially. This suggests that, even for young children, multiple pretend game worlds are kept psychologically separate.     

Sensitivity to sampling in Bayesian word learning

We report a new study testing our proposal that word learning may be best explained as an approximate form of Bayesian inference (Xu & Tenenbaum, in press). Children are capable of learning word meanings across a wide range of communicative contexts. In different contexts, learners may encounter different sampling processes generating the examples of word-object pairings they observe. An ideal Bayesian word learner could take into account these differences in the sampling process and adjust his/her inferences about word meaning accordingly. We tested how children and adults learned words for novel object kinds in two sampling contexts, in which the objects to be labeled were sampled either by a knowledgeable teacher or by the learners themselves. Both adults and children generalized more conservatively in the former context; that is, they restricted the label to just those objects most similar to the labeled examples when the exemplars were chosen by a knowledgeable teacher, but not when chosen by the learners themselves. We discuss how this result follows naturally from a Bayesian analysis, but not from other statistical approaches such as associative word-learning models.     

Development of gaze aversion: Qualitative changes over the early school years

Looking away from an interlocutor's face during demanding cognitive activity can help adults and children answer challenging mental‐arithmetic and verbal‐reasoning questions ( Glenberg, Schroeder, & Robertson, 1998 ; Phelps, Doherty‐Sneddon, & Warnock, 2006 ). Whilst such ‘gaze aversion’ (GA) is used far less by 5‐year‐old schoolchildren, its use increases dramatically during the first years of primary education, reaching adult levels by 8 years of age ( Doherty‐Sneddon, Bruce, Bonner, Longbotham, & Doyle, 2002 ). The current study investigates whether developmental changes also occur in a qualitative aspect of GA – the direction of movement involved in GA shifts. Video data from eighteen 5‐year‐olds and nineteen 8‐year‐olds answering verbal and arithmetic questions were analysed for direction of GA. We found very different profiles of direction of GA across the two ages: whilst the 5‐year‐olds used predominantly rapid multidirectional ‘flicking’ movements and some sustained left lateral movements, the 8‐year‐olds used predominantly sustained rightward movements. It is concluded that there are concomitant qualitative changes in the nature of GA shifts as well as quantitative increases in the use of GA across these age groups. A model of human attention in face‐to‐face interaction is discussed, as are implications for the assessment of children's learning and development.     

Children's and adults' recall of children's news stories in both print and audio‐visual presentation modalities

Research into adults' recall from different presentation modalities has demonstrated a recall advantage for print over television yet recent research indicates that children remember television news better than print news. An experiment was conducted by comparing children's and adults' recall of children's news stories presented in two different modalities, television and print, in order to establish whether children's recall advantage for television is dependent on their age or level of reading proficiency. A sample of 40 adults, 40 13‐year‐olds and 40 11‐year‐olds were presented with children's news stories, either in their original televised form or in a print version. All participants were aware they would be tested for recall. The results of the cued recall test indicated that children from both age groups learned more from the television news than from the print versions, regardless of age or reading proficiency and that adults remembered equal amounts from both presentation modalities. For the 11‐year‐olds the advantage of television was only found for information that had been accompanied by redundant pictures in the televised version, providing support for the dual‐coding hypothesis. For 13‐year‐olds the recall of television was not dependent on the addition of redundant visual information. Viewers and readers were found to invest the same amounts of mental effort, but reported levels of invested mental effort were found to be dependent on age and level of reading proficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.