Forgiveness and the Holocaust

This paper considers whether we have any reason to forgive the perpetrators of the most terrible atrocities, such as the Holocaust. On the face of it, we do not have reason to forgive in such cases. But on examination, the principal arguments against forgiveness do not turn out to be persuasive. Two considerations in favour of forgiveness are canvassed: the presence of rational agency in the perpetrators, and the common human nature which they share with us. It is argued that the presence of rational agency does not generate a reason to forgive. However, our common human nature may be sufficient to provide such a reason, and evidence for its general reason-giving power can be seen in phenomena such as vicarious shame, and the moral significance which we attach to the notion of crimes against humanity. A reason for forgiveness based on common human nature will not be a strong one, but a weak reason still has some force.     

On Taking Back Forgiveness

I argue that the effectiveness of forgiveness in the healing of relationships is dependent on both the givers and recipients of forgiveness understanding that once it has been granted, forgiveness is not normally able to be retracted. When we forgive, we make a firm commitment not to return to our former state of moral resentment against the offender, replacing it by good-will. This commitment can be broken only where the forgiving party makes some significant cognitive adjustment to her appraisal of either the offender or the offence, believing that her original forgiveness was granted in error. I reject the view (defended, for example, by Anthony Bash) that forgiveness can lapse or be withdrawn on the basis of a return of hurt or disappointed feelings, arguing that these do not amount to a restoration of the resentment that is extinguished when forgiveness is granted. I contend that a person who ‘forgives’ and later takes back that ‘forgiveness’ because certain negative feelings have returned either did not genuinely forgive in the first place or shows that she has not fully grasped the nature of forgiveness.     

Is It Possible and Sometimes Desirable for States to Forgive?

After discussing at some length the nature of interpersonal forgiveness and its relation to punishment, the author addresses the main question of the essay: are states the sorts of entities that can forgive; and if they are, is it sometimes desirable that they forgive? The author argues that states can forgive and very often do; and that sometimes it is desirable that they do so. The essay closes by considering the complexities that arise when the state wants to forgive but the victim does not, and conversely.     

Self-Construal and Forgiveness Revisited: Replication and Extension

Evidence suggests that people who have greater interdependent self-construal forgive others more often because they are motivated to forgive to maintain the relationship. Furthermore, such forgiveness might lead to greater emotional well-being. In this study, we examined the relationship between interdependent self-construal and (a) decisional forgiveness and (b) emotional well-being. We also tested models that included trait forgivingness and the motivation to forgive to maintain relationships. Results indicated that (a) trait forgivingness and relational motivations to forgive uniquely mediate the relationship between interdependent self-construal and decisional forgiveness and (b) trait forgivingness may be a pathway from interdependent self-construal to emotional well-being.     

Supererogatory Forgiveness 1

While forgiveness is widely recognised as an example of a supererogatory action, it remains to be explained precisely what makes forgiveness supererogatory, or the circumstances under which it is supererogatory to forgive. Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is supererogatory, but most of the time they do so without offering an adequate explanation for why it is supererogatory to forgive. Accordingly, the literature on forgiveness lacks a sufficiently nuanced account of the supererogatory status of forgiveness. In this paper, I seek to remedy this shortcoming by offering a systematic account of forgiveness as an example of a supererogatory action. In terms of explaining the supererogatory status of forgiveness, I will argue that, to qualify as supererogatory, a forgiving action must fulfil three conditions: (i) it must be permissible; (ii) it must not be obligatory; and (iii) it must be good or praiseworthy, that is, it must have a certain moral value. Moreover, a distinction is drawn between “unconditional” and “conditional” forgiveness. I argue that conditional forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of repentant wrongdoers) is sometimes a duty and sometimes supererogatory, whereas unconditional forgiveness (i.e., forgiveness of unrepentant wrongdoers) is typically supererogatory or beyond duty.     

An Analyst Has a Birthday - Can Forgiveness Heal?

Forgiveness is a challenging endeavor in human experience and in clinical work. Is it an important and/or legitimate analytic concept? Long the province of theologians and philosophers, forgiveness has had little theoretical place in the psychoanalytic lexicon. This paper considers the analytic place of forgiveness through a treatment that was shadowed by two lost mothers – the patient’s and analyst’s - in the consulting room. The patient’s question, “must we forgive to heal?” will be examined in this story of healing for both him and his analyst.     

Forgiveness: origins, dynamics, psychopathology, and technical relevance

This paper integrates a diverse and scattered literature to describe the psychodynamic underpinnings of granting and seeking forgiveness. The evolutionary foundations and the developmental substrate of these capacities are elucidated. An individual who fails to make certain intrapsychic achievements may be vulnerable to psychopathological development, as is evident in those who cannot forgive or forgive too readily, constantly or never seek others' forgiveness, cannot accept forgiveness, or show an imbalance between their capacities to forgive themselves and to forgive others. The relevance of various developmental and phenomenological concepts to psychoanalytic technique, including the patient's need to forgive and to be forgiven, is also discussed.     

The perception of time heals all wounds: temporal distance affects willingness to forgive following an interpersonal transgression

Prior research has assessed the temporal unfolding of forgiveness and found that forgiveness becomes more likely as time distances the victim from the transgression. These findings lend credence to the axiom "time heals all wounds." This research examines the effect of time perception on forgiveness of others by experimentally manipulating temporal distance. In Experiment 1, respondents reported greater willingness to forgive the transgressor when more time had elapsed since the transgression. Experiments 2 and 3 determined the influence of subjective temporal distance on willingness to forgive. Participants who perceived a hypothetical (Experiment 2) or real (Experimental 3) transgression to be farther away in time were more willing to forgive the target than were participants who perceived the event to be temporally closer. Results suggest that temporal appraisals of an event are central to the forgiveness process.     

Interrelationship Among Injured Parties' Attributions of Responsibility,Appraisal of Appropriateness to Forgive the Transgressor,Forgiveness, and Repentance

The purpose of this research was to examine the interrelationship among attributions of responsibility, repentance, victims' appraisal of the appropriateness of forgiving the transgressor, and forgiveness. It is argued that an injured party's appraisal of how appropriate it is to forgive the transgressor is important in understanding discrepant theoretical and empirical observations regarding the relationship between responsibility judgments and forgiveness. In one nonexperimental/naturalistic study and 2 experiments, we confirmed predictions that responsibility attributions would positively relate with a victim's appraisal of how appropriate it is to forgive the transgressor, and negatively with forgiveness. In addition, all 3 studies confirmed that a victim's appraisal of the appropriateness to forgive the transgressor explains the relationship between responsibility judgments and forgiveness.     

Thinking Relationally About Forgiveness: Commentary on Paper by Stephen Wangh

This author examines the concept of forgiveness as a psychological construct. He argues that it is an error to conceive of the capacity to forgive in exclusively intrapsychic terms, pointing to the mutual influence of psychic and interpersonal experience in the struggle to forgive. He suggests that we can meaningfully consider the psychic challenges involved in any instance of forgiving only when we can fully understand the relational context in which the wrongdoing has taken place. The author then considers the concept of forgiveness when applied to hate crimes in general and Matthew Shepard's murder in particular, exploring some psychic alternatives to forgiveness that may be useful in thinking about the human struggle to resolve the mental anguish and desire for revenge that can threaten to undo us. He argues against an agenda-based approach to psychotherapeutic treatment that is biased toward encouraging forgiveness and seeing it as an indispensable component of psychological health. If forgiveness is to function as a viable psychological construct with real healing potential in human relationships, psychoanalysts must work to free it from its moralistic and religious moorings.     

Blame After Forgiveness

When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But I forgave him!” In other cases, however, forgiveness seems irrelevant: B can forgive A, but it can still seem that third parties can aptly blame A for the wrong against B. This perplexity adds a dimension to ongoing discussion regarding criteria for apt blame and the related issues of standing and fittingness. This paper explores the status of third party blame after forgiveness. I argue that while post forgiveness blame is often inapt, in many other cases forgiveness is irrelevant. This difference is explained by appeal to the various relationships third parties might have to wronged parties, and how these differences affect the ways we blame and thereby blame’s aptness.     

An empathy-humility-commitment model of forgiveness applied within family dyads

Forgiveness is described as requiring empathy for the offender, the humility to see oneself as being as fallible and needy as the offender, and courage to commit publicly to forgive. Research supports the model in individual therapy and psychoeducational groups in which the forgiver does not have to confront the offender. Family therapy, in which partners, parent–child dyads or siblings must confess their need for forgiveness and forgive face to face provides special challenges. Processes of forgiveness – empathy, humility and commitment – are understood to be the same as in any interpersonal forgiveness context; that is, they are thought to occur within dyads. Techniques compatible with several varieties of family therapies are summarized for applying the model in family therapy to encourage family members to forgive.     

The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of whether we have a duty to forgive those who repent and apologize for the wrong they have done. I shall argue that we have a pro tanto duty to forgive repentant wrongdoers, and I shall propose and consider the norm of forgiveness. This norm states that if a wrongdoer repents and apologizes to a victim, then the victim has a duty to forgive the wrongdoer, other things being equal. That someone has a pro tanto duty to forgive a repentant wrongdoer means that he or she ought to forgive unless other considerations outweigh the norm of forgiveness. Furthermore, a distinction is made between what are termed ‘general considerations’ and ‘case‐relative considerations’, and it is argued that only after all the relevant considerations have been examined can it be determined whether there is a duty to forgive, all things considered.     

Forgiveness and Standing

Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical literature on this topic has made little progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be “articulate” and “uncompromising.” I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi’s proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing.     

Intentional Forgiving as a Counseling Intervention

Forgiveness has been represented in counseling literature as an effective means of promoting personal and relational development. Despite this, a concise set of guidelines to direct counselors in the use of forgiveness has yet to be proposed. The author presents theological and counseling understandings of forgiveness and delineates contexts in which counselors have promoted forgiveness in clients. Drawing on the increasing base of counseling-related literature concerning the importance of forgiveness, the author defines and proposes guidelines for a counseling approach called “intentional forgiving,” an intervention in which clients are directed to forgive someone who has wounded them.     

The Narrative Architecture of Political Forgiveness

Although there is widespread agreement with the argument that Hannah Arendt made more than half a century ago, that forgiveness is “one of the human faculties that make social change possible” (Misztal, 2011, p. 201), beyond this, there is little consensus of what it means. Applying a narrative structure to this discussion, there is a lack of clarity around questions of who, what, where, when, and why to forgive. This article will explore the politics of forgiveness in East Germany, where these issues have been hotly contested for more than 25 years. The data examined in this article suggest that the fraught process of forgiveness embodies not consensus but contest, as people disagree on key questions such as who has the right to forgive whom, for what, how long the window for the opportunity of forgiveness stays open, and even why these questions matter, not only for individuals but for the whole of society.     

Apology with and Without a Request for Forgiveness

The offender who desires to restore or maintain a relationship after a conflict apologises to his or her victim. Not only an individual but also a group can make apology. Groups do it through their representatives who are recognised as such by both sides. Sometimes offenders acknowledge wrongdoing and express regret for it. At other times while apologising, they may also ask for forgiveness. Does apology without a request for forgiveness mean the same as apology with such a request? Are there any cases where apology may be appropriate, but not a request for forgiveness? Do those who apologise without asking for forgiveness really not want to be forgiven? This article answers these questions by exploring the notion of apology and its relation to forgiveness.     

The tendency to forgive in dating and married couples: The role of attachment and relationship satisfaction

Given the positive benefits associated with interpersonal forgiveness, the current investigation examined the tendency to forgive in romantic relationships. Two studies tested the hypothesis that the tendency to forgive mediates the association between attachment models of self and other and relationship satisfaction in dating (n = 184) and marital relationships (n = 96). In addition, the extent to which the tendency to forgive predicts forgiveness of an actual transgression was examined among married couples. The tendency to forgive partially mediated the relation between model of other (relationship partner) and satisfaction for those in dating relationships and for husbands. For those in marital relationships, the tendency to forgive partially mediated the relation between model of self and satisfaction. In addition, for wives, endorsing a greater tendency to forgive was related to forgiveness of an actual transgression, regardless of the severity of that transgression. For husbands, endorsing a greater tendency to forgive was related to forgiveness of an actual transgression, but only for more severe transgressions. Results are discussed in terms of who is more likely to forgive and the role that the tendency to forgive plays in romantic relationships.     

Forgiveness: The Victim’s Prerogative

Abstract

This article explores and offers a qualified defence of the claim that the entitlement to forgive a wrongdoer belongs to the victim of the wrong. A summary account of forgiveness is given, followed by arguments in favor of the victim’s prerogative to forgive. Primary, or direct victims are then distinguished from secondary and tertiary ones, which point to a plurality of prerogatives to forgive. In cases of conflicts between these prerogatives it is emphasized that special care should be taken to protect the primary victim’s entitlement, without giving an absolute and exclusive status to the latter prerogative. Grounds for limiting the primary victim’s prerogative regarding forgiveness include (a) cases where harm to secondary and/or tertiary victims are greater than the harm resulting from the original wrong committed against the primary victim, (b) the social dimensions of the elements of forgiveness, and (c) the need for self-forgiveness when a repentant wrongdoer is not forgiven by any of the victims. The practical significance of these arguments are illustrated by considering the criticism that the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission have forgiven perpetrators in ways that inappropriately pre-empted the primary victims’ entitlement to forgive.     

Religion and unforgivable offenses

ABSTRACT The value of forgiveness is emphasized in many religions, but little is known about how members of distinct religious cultures differ in their views of forgiveness. We hypothesized and found that Jews would agree more than Protestants that certain offenses are unforgivable and that religious commitment would be more negatively correlated with belief in unforgivable offenses among Protestants than among Jews (Studies 1 and 2). Dispositional forgiveness tendencies did not explain these effects (Studies 1 and 2). In Study 3, Jews were more inclined than Protestants to endorse theologically derived reasons for unforgivable offenses (i.e., some offenses are too severe to forgive, only victims have the right to forgive, and forgiveness requires repentance by the perpetrator). Differential endorsement of these reasons for nonforgiveness fully mediated Jew-Protestant differences in forgiveness of a plagiarism offense and a Holocaust offense.