Putting Pluralism in its Place

Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti‐realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems.     

Putting Liberty in its Place: Rawlsian Liberalism without the Liberalism

To be a liberal is, among other things, to grant basic liberties some degree of priority over other aspects of justice. But why do basic liberties warrant this special treatment? For Rawls, the answer has to do with the allegedly special connection between these freedoms and the ‘two moral powers’ of reasonableness and rationality. Basic freedoms are said to be preconditions for the development and exercise of these powers and are held to warrant priority over other justice‐relevant values for that reason. In the first half of the article I mount an internal critique of this Rawlsian line, arguing that it is flawed in two main ways. First, it overestimates the contribution of basic freedom to moral personality. Second, it underestimates the contribution of non‐liberty resources (such as basic material necessities, but also opportunities for culture, education, leisure, and social contribution) to moral personality. In the second half of the article I repair these flaws (thus putting liberty in its proper place, if you like). The result is a new, intriguingly radical version of justice as fairness, one with surprising—yet plausible—implications for economic and gender justice.     

朴素物理观和朴素心理观--进化心理学视角

人类在进化过程中解决生存与繁衍问题需要适应物理环境和社会环境。进化心理学认为人类适应物理环境与社会环境的心理机制分别称为朴素物理观和朴素心理观。文章首先阐述了朴素物理观和朴素心理观的有关内容,并指出两性差异的一个重要方面在于移情和系统化的不同组合,同时对其进化意义做了分析。     

地方认同：环境心理学视角下的分析

Proshansky提出的“地方认同” (place identity, 1978)一词, 是环境心理学研究中的重要概念。它指的是人对居住环境的自我认同, 用于理解和测量“人-地关系”。已有研究分别从认知、情感和行为等方面论证了“地方认同”与“地方依恋”、“地方感”及“地方依赖”等概念之间的区别; 并在个体、社会和文化三个层面上均发现了影响地方认同的因素。未来的研究将采用社会认知的实验技术、以及纵向研究设计方法等, 一方面探讨地方认同的内在心理机制, 另一方面则利用此概念探索解决有关的现实问题。     

Understanding Happiness: A Look into the Chinese Folk Psychology

This qualitative study using a folk psychology approach explored what Chinese people think about happiness. One hundred and forty-two undergraduate students wrote free-format essays in response to a simple open-ended question, “What is happiness?” Using thematic analysis, four main themes were found. (1) Happiness can be defined in terms of (a) a mental state of satisfaction and contentment; (b) positive feelings/emotions; (c) a harmonious homeostasis; (d) achievement and hope; and (e) freedom from ill-being. (2) Happiness is a harmonious state of existence, under the following conditions: (a) the individual is satisfied or content; (b) the individual is the agent of his own happiness; (c) spiritual enrichment is emphasized more than material satisfaction; and (d) the individual maintains a positive outlook for the future. (3) The relationship between happiness and unhappiness is dialectical. These two distinct entities are locked in a never-ending relationship of interdependence: each depends on the other for contrast and meaning. Moreover, this relationship between the two opposites is also dynamic and constantly changing. (4) Happiness can be achieved, provided that one has the following abilities: (a) the wisdom of discovery; (b) the wisdom of contentment and gratitude; (c) the wisdom of giving; and (d)the wisdom of self-cultivation. These themes were discussed in the contexts of Chinese philosophical and folk views of happiness.     

Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?

It is widely assumed that legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof are ubiquitous: that in all cases in which opposing views are being debated, one side has the responsibility of proving their claim and if they fail, the opposing view wins by default. We argue that the cases in which one party has the burden of proof are exceptions. In general, participants in reasoned discourse are all required to provide reasons for the claims they make. We distinguish between truth‐directed and non‐truth‐directed discourse, argue that the paradigm contexts in which there are legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof (law and formal debate) are non‐truth‐directed, and suggest that in truth‐directed contexts, except in certain special cases, differential allocation of the burden of proof is not warranted.     

The Place and Role of Psychology in Cognitive Science: An International Survey

This paper reports the results of an international survey on the place and role of psychology in cognitive science (CS). The respondents were psychological societies from 31 countries illustrating a variety of situations, from countries where psychology has been established as a science for a long time to countries where it has been established more recently and is still developing. The paper reviews topics covered by the CS approach, as well as research operations and initiatives taken in this domain. The analysis of responses reflects the belief that psychology, in general, has a central role in CS. This is based on epistemological considerations, as well as on the recognition of the methodological expertise of psychology for collecting and analyzing empirical data. Psychology is reported to have a unique integrative capacity and to take care to maintain the place of the human being at the centre of CS. Limitations and obstacles to the development of pluridisciplinary research on cognition are also reported, and information is provided on the training programmes in CS and the institutions that support research in this domain.     

The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology

It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool used in prediction, explanation and control or whether it has been shaped in fundamental ways by some other aspect of its use.