Realism,Utopianism, and Radical Values

One of the more debated topics in the recent realist literature concerns the compatibility of realism and utopianism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to utopian political thought comes from Bernard Williams' realism, which argues, among other things, that political values should be subject to what he calls the ‘realism constraint’, which rules out utopian arguments based on values which cannot be offered by the state as unrealistic and therefore inadmissible. This article challenges that conclusion in two ways. First, it argues that the rationale for accepting Williams' original argument for the ‘realism constraint’ fails. Secondly, it argues that there is at least one genuinely political value of liberty available which is both compatible with realism and something that cannot be offered by the state, namely that of the political anarchist. This opens the way for far more ambitious and utopian forms of realist political thought and implies that the arguments of what we call political anarchists must be met by (realist) political argumentation, not simply ruled out by methodological stipulation.     

Samesaying, Propositions and Radical Interpretation

Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation preserves the apparent relational structure of indirect speech but without assuming, in the Fregean manner, that the thing said by a sayer is a proposition. I argue that this is a mistake. As has been recognised by some critics, Davidson's account suffers from analytical shortcomings which can be overcome by redeploying the paratactic strategy as a means of referring to propositions. I offer a quick and comprehensive survey of these difficulties and a concise propositional solution. Further, I argue that Davidson's more general philosophical commitments provide no reason not to embrace the propositional strategy: despite appearances, to invoke propositions in the way suggested is consistent with Davidson's holism and consequent doctrine of semantic indeterminacy.     

Feminist Radical Empiricism,Values, and Evidence

Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender (among other social factors) influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism (where the empiricism, not the feminism, is radical). I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open‐mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value‐change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think.     

Radical Behaviorism,Stimulus Equivalence,and Human Cognition

The current paper represents an attempt to clarify the nature of the radical behaviorist’s perspective on human cognition. This attempt will involve an examination of recent behavioral research into the relationship between stimulus equivalence phenomena and symbolic behavior, and language more generally. This form of behavior analysis is offered as an alternative to, but not a replacement for, other methodological and conceptual approaches to psychology.

     

Radical Moral Imagination: Courage,Hope, and Articulation

This paper develops the basis for a new account of radical moral imagination, understood as the transformation of moral understandings through creative response to the sensed inadequacy of one's moral concepts or morally significant appraisals of lived experience. Against Miranda Fricker, I argue that this kind of transition from moral perplexity to increased moral insight is not primarily a matter of the “top‐down” use of concepts. Against Susan Babbitt, I argue that it is not primarily a matter of “bottom‐up” intuitive responsiveness to experience. Beyond courage and hope, radical moral imagination involves the articulation of inchoate experience, which allows individuals to make new kinds of moral moves and to lay claim to others' acknowledgment of the meaning of these moves.     

Radical psychology networks: a review and guide

Movements of psychologists with a liberatory agenda have emerged in a number of countries. A guide and overview is offered here. These networks have not yet developed into a particularly strong movement. Some of the reasons for this will be discussed in relation to the contradictory role of mainstream psychology as both loyal critic and as resource for the ruling order. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Radical Orthodoxy, Luther, and the Challenge of Western Secularization

This "Theology Update" analyzes the Radical Orthodoxy of John Milbank in light of Martin Luther's dialectic between Law and Gospel. Milbank and his colleagues attack contemporary secularized culture in a manner parallel to Luther's attack on the 16^th century Holy Roman Empire for being soulless, aggressive, litigious, materialistic, and finally nihilistic. By re–engaging the battle between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, the radical orthodox party seeks to become post–modern by making a half turn back to the pre–modern Thomas, for whom philosophy and theology were integrated, subject was united to object, and being could be understood as relational because the Trinity is relational. Luther is mistakenly dismissed when reducing him to Scotus' nominalism, however. Lutheranism complements radical orthodoxy's analysis of secularized culture; yet Lutheranism maintains an integrity to faith–as the presence of Christ–that this new school fails to grant.     

Radical Scepticism,How-Possible Questions and Modest Transcendental Arguments

According to radical scepticism, knowledge of the external world is impossible. Transcendental arguments are supposed to be anti-sceptical, but can they provide a satisfying response to radical scepticism? Especially, when radical scepticism is cast as posing a how-possible question, there is a concern that transcendental arguments are neither sufficient nor necessary for answering such question. In light of this worry, I argue that we can take a modest transcendental argument as a stepping stone for a diagnostic anti-sceptical proposal, and I use a Wittgensteinian modest transcendental argument to illustrate my point.     

Radical anti-realism, Wittgenstein and the length of proofs

After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.     

Radical Listening: Transdisciplinarity,Restorative Justice and Change

This article explores transdisciplinarity within childhood studies at the intersection of restorative justice and counseling psychology. It is argued that at this juncture the nexus of radical listening may be uncovered. Radical listening, a term first coined by the critical pedagogue J.L. Kincheloe, is used here to aid in the project of both decolonizing restorative justice practices and deconstructing the hegemonic positioning of psychology in childhood studies through an intersectional understanding of childhood. This is a move toward complexity thinking and a valuing of Indigenous ways of knowing in response to the epistemicide of minoritized voices and the domination of White Western scholarship in childhood studies over the past century. Linkages established among transdisciplinarity, restorative justice, and counseling reorients the scholar/practitioner toward a nuanced understanding of a rights-based perspective and an appreciation of the intersections of social, political, and cultural worlds.     

Emmanuel Levinas,Radical Orthodoxy,and an Ontology of Originary Peace

Radical Orthodoxy, a growing movement among contemporary Christian theologians, argues that the prominent philosophical paradigms of modern and postmodern thought lack transcendence, are ultimately nihilistic, and are guided by an ontology of violence. Among the thinkers Radical Orthodoxy criticizes are Hegel, Nietzsche, and Hobbes, but surprisingly also the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, whom they claim offers an ethics for nihilists. In this essay, I analyze the claims of two prominent thinkers in Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, and argue that their account of Levinas is not only unfounded but point out the ways in which Levinas himself is also just as critical of the prevailing ontology of violence that figures in modern accounts of intersubjectivity and politics. Indeed, in his own way, Levinas also offers an ontology of peace, making him an important dialogue partner for Radical Orthodoxy's construction of an alternative ethics and politics.     

主体、他者与正义:激进思潮中的列维纳斯初论

列维纳斯与阿多诺在思想上都对西方理性主义传统尤其是其核心概念“主体”持颠覆态度。不同的是以阿多诺为其代表之一的法兰克福学派更多地关注现实历史,而列维纳斯则更为关注被传统存在论思维所压抑的差异性层面的形而上解放。这个层面有助于解决激进左派的深层的理论悖结,并构成了现实政治解放斗争中常常是隐含着的背面。     

Luther's Radical Conception of Faith: God,Christ, and Personhood in a Post‐Metaphysical Age

Luther's exposition of Paul's letter to the Galatians offers a premier window into a deconstruction of the tandem God, ego and symbolic order of the law by proposing a radical “technology of the self,” a new understanding of what it means to be a person in light of God's own becoming in the flesh—a new subjective perspective. This places the event of belief as a displacement of a socially and ecclesiastically constructed ego‐consciousness and the emergence of a new (social) center of subjectivity—Christ consciousness, that is, faith. For Luther the “person” emerges as a radical break with the self‐referentiality of the ego and through the perspectival assimilation of God's own subjective experience in the flesh.