Self‐Awareness Part 2: Neuroanatomy and Importance of Inner Speech

The present review of literature surveys two main issues related to self‐referential processes: (1) Where in the brain are these processes located, and do they correlate with brain areas uniquely specialized in self‐processing? (2) What are the empirical and theoretical links between inner speech and self‐awareness? Although initial neuroimaging attempts tended to favor a right hemispheric view of self‐awareness, more recent work shows that the brain areas which support self‐related processes are located in both hemispheres and are not uniquely activated during self‐reflective tasks. Furthermore, self‐awareness at least partially relies on internal speech. An activation of Broca’s area (which is known to sustain inner speech) is observed in a significant number of brain‐imaging studies of self‐reflection. Loss of inner speech following brain damage produces self‐awareness deficits. Inner speech most likely can internally reproduce social mechanisms leading to self‐awareness. Also, the process of self‐reflection can be seen as being a problem‐solving task, and self‐talk as being a cognitive tool the individual uses to effectively work on the task. It is noted that although a large body of knowledge already exists on self‐awareness, little is known about individual differences in dispositional self‐focus and types of self‐attention (e.g., rumination versus self‐reflection).     

On Reinstating “Part I” and “Part II” to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and in particular of their inclusion and titling of the material in “Part II”. I argue, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that the Editors have failed to refute the editorial decisions of Rhees and Anscombe – a failure born both of a neglect of the historical circumstances and Wittgenstein's own expressed hopes and intentions for his writings, and of a myopic understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein's legacy has not been well served by their interventions, which should be undone in future editions.     

Interpolation and Amalgamation; Pushing the Limits. Part II

This is the second part of the paper [Part I] which appeared in the previous issue of this journal.     

Interpolation and Amalgamation; Pushing the Limits. Part I

Continuing work initiated by Jónsson, Daigneault, Pigozzi and others; Maksimova proved that a normal modal logic (with a single unary modality) has the Craig interpolation property iff the corresponding class of algebras has the superamalgamation property (cf. [Mak 91], [Mak 79]). The aim of this paper is to extend the latter result to a large class of logics. We will prove that the characterization can be extended to all algebraizable logics containing Boolean fragment and having a certain kind of local deduction property. We also extend this characterization of the interpolation property to arbitrary logics under the condition that their algebraic counterparts are discriminator varieties. We also extend Maksimova's result to normal multi-modal logics with arbitrarily many, not necessarily unary modalities, and to not necessarily normal multi-modal logics with modalities of ranks smaller than 2, too.The problem of extending the above characterization result to no n-normal non-unary modal logics remains open.Related issues of universal algebra and of algebraic logic are discussed, too. In particular we investigate the possibility of extending the characterization of interpolability to arbitrary algebraizable logics.     

“Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1

X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?     

Part I: Psychoanalysis and Undergraduate Education

ABSTRACT

Part I consists of two articles by the professors who invented the Chicago course, articulating why they think that teaching psychoanalysis to undergraduates is crucial. Marcia Dobson, who is a clinician along with being a professor of Classics, gives some personal history as to why she is so invested in psychoanalysis and offers a clinical understanding for why she thinks undergraduates need psychoanalysis to help them understand themselves better. John Riker, a philosopher, concentrates on why the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis are crucial for undergraduates as they think about who they are, who they want to be, and how they are going to negotiate adult life.     

Self‐Awareness Part 1: Definition,Measures, Effects,Functions, and Antecedents

Self‐awareness represents the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention. In this state one actively identifies, processes, and stores information about the self. This paper surveys the self‐awareness literature by emphasizing definition issues, measurement techniques, effects and functions of self‐attention, and antecedents of self‐awareness. Key self‐related concepts (e.g., minimal, reflective consciousness) are distinguished from the central notion of self‐awareness. Reviewed measures include questionnaires, implicit tasks, and self‐recognition. Main effects and functions of self‐attention consist in self‐evaluation, escape from the self, amplification of one’s subjective experience, increased self‐knowledge, self‐regulation, and inferences about others’ mental states (Theory‐of‐Mind). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self‐awareness is described in which the role of face‐to‐face interactions, reflected appraisals, mirrors, media, inner speech, imagery, autobiographical knowledge, and neurological structures is underlined.