Children's Use of Social Categories in Thinking About People and Social Relationships

A series of studies investigated White U.S. 3- and 4-year-old children's use of gender and race information to reason about their own and others’ relationships and attributes. Three-year-old children used gender- but not race-based similarity between themselves and others to decide with whom they wanted to be friends, as well as to determine which children shared their own preferences for various social activities. Four-year-old (but not younger) children attended to gender and racial category membership to guide inferences about others’ relationships but did not use these categories to reason about others’ shared activity preferences. Taken together, the findings provide evidence for three suggestions about these children's social category-based reasoning. First, gender is a more potent category than race. Second, social categories are initially recruited for first-person reasoning but later become broad enough to support third-person inferences. Finally, at least for third-person reasoning, thinking about social categories is more attuned to social relationships than to shared attributes.     

Another Look at Sex Differences in Preferred Mate Characteristics: The Effects of Endorsing the Traditional Female Gender Role

This research used an individual differences approach to test Eagly and Wood's (1999) claim that sex differences in the characteristics that people prefer in mates reflect the tendency for men and women to occupy different social roles in a society. The study related the extent to which participants endorsed the traditional female gender role to their preferences for their future mate's traits and age relative to their own age. In general, the sex–differentiated preferences that are consistent with the traditional division of labor were more pronounced, especially in male participants, to the extent that they endorsed the traditional female role.     

Race preferences in children: insights from South Africa

Minority-race children in North America and Europe often show less own-race favoritism than children of the majority (White) race, but the reasons for this asymmetry are unresolved. The present research tested South African children in order to probe the influences of group size, familiarity, and social status on children's race-based social preferences. We assessed South African children's preferences for members of their country's majority race (Blacks) compared to members of other groups, including Whites, who ruled South Africa until 1994 and who remain high in status. Black children (3-13 years) tested in a Black township preferred people of their own gender but not race. Moreover, Black, White, and multiracial children (4-9 years) tested in a racially diverse primary school showed in-group bias by gender but not by race: all favored people who were White. Relative familiarity and numerical majority/minority status therefore do not fully account for children's racial attitudes, which vary with the relative social status of different racial groups.     

Categorization,categorical perception,and asymmetry in infants’ representation of face race

The present study examined whether 6‐ and 9‐month‐old Caucasian infants could categorize faces according to race. In Experiment 1, infants were familiarized with different female faces from a common ethnic background (i.e. either Caucasian or Asian) and then tested with female faces from a novel race category. Nine‐month‐olds were able to form discrete categories of Caucasian and Asian faces. However, 6‐month‐olds did not form discrete categories of faces based on race. In Experiment 2, a second group of 6‐ and 9‐month‐olds was tested to determine whether they could discriminate between different faces from the same race category. Results showed that both age groups could only discriminate between different faces from the own‐race category of Caucasian faces. The findings of the two experiments taken together suggest that 9‐month‐olds formed a category of Caucasian faces that are further differentiated at the individual level. In contrast, although they could form a category of Asian faces, they could not discriminate between such other‐race faces. This asymmetry in category formation at 9 months (i.e. categorization of own‐race faces vs. categorical perception of other‐race faces) suggests that differential experience with own‐ and other‐race faces plays an important role in infants’ acquisition of face processing abilities.     

Young children's automatic encoding of social categories

The present research investigated young children's automatic encoding of two social categories that are highly relevant to adults: gender and race. Three‐ to 6‐year‐old participants learned facts about unfamiliar target children who varied in either gender or race and were asked to remember which facts went with which targets. When participants made mistakes, they were more likely to confuse targets of the same gender than targets of different genders, but they were equally likely to confuse targets within and across racial groups. However, a social preference measure indicated that participants were sensitive to both gender and race information. Participants with more racial diversity in their social environments were more likely to encode race, but did not have stronger racial preferences. These findings provide evidence that young children do not automatically encode all perceptible features of others. Further, gender may be a more fundamental social category than race.     

Effects of Victim and Defendant Race on Jurors' Decisions in Child Sexual Abuse Cases1

We examined the influence of victim and defendant race, victim age, juror gender, and juror prejudice on jurors' decisions in child sexual abuse cases. In Experiments 1 and 2, mock jurors judged Black and Hispanic child victims to be more responsible for their sexual abuse than White victims. In Experiment 2, jurors assigned more guilt to defendants in cases involving victims and perpetrators of the same race compared to different races. Experiment 3 illustrated that laypeople believe same‐race cases to be more plausible generally. Experiment 2 revealed that high‐prejudiced White mock jurors made no more racially biased judgments than low‐prejudiced mock jurors. Finally, women were generally more pro‐victim in their case judgments than were men, and older victims were disadvantaged compared to younger victims in terms of perceived credibility and responsibility, and their cases were less likely to draw convictions.     

Individuation training with other‐race faces reduces preschoolers’ implicit racial bias: a link between perceptual and social representation of faces in children

The present study examined whether perceptual individuation training with other‐race faces could reduce preschool children's implicit racial bias. We used an ‘angry = outgroup’ paradigm to measure Chinese children's implicit racial bias against African individuals before and after training. In Experiment 1, children between 4 and 6 years were presented with angry or happy racially ambiguous faces that were morphed between Chinese and African faces. Initially, Chinese children demonstrated implicit racial bias: they categorized happy racially ambiguous faces as own‐race (Chinese) and angry racially ambiguous faces as other‐race (African). Then, the children participated in a training session where they learned to individuate African faces. Children's implicit racial bias was significantly reduced after training relative to that before training. Experiment 2 used the same procedure as Experiment 1, except that Chinese children were trained with own‐race Chinese faces. These children did not display a significant reduction in implicit racial bias. Our results demonstrate that early implicit racial bias can be reduced by presenting children with other‐race face individuation training, and support a linkage between perceptual and social representations of face information in children.     

Artifacts and natural kinds: children's judgments about whether objects are owned

People's behavior in relation to objects depends on whether they are owned. But how do people judge whether objects are owned? We propose that people expect human-made objects (artifacts) to be more likely to be owned than naturally occurring objects (natural kinds), and we examine the development of these expectations in young children. Experiment 1 found that when shown pictures of familiar kinds of objects, 3-year-olds expected artifacts to be owned and inanimate natural kinds to be non-owned. In Experiments 2A and 2B, 3-6-year-olds likewise had different expectations about the ownership of unfamiliar artifacts and natural kinds. Children at all ages viewed unfamiliar natural kinds as non-owned, but children younger than 6 years of age only endorsed artifacts as owned at chance rates. In Experiment 3, children saw the same pictures but were also told whether objects were human-made. With this information provided, even 3-year-olds viewed unfamiliar artifacts as owned. Finally, in Experiment 4, 4- and 5-year-olds chose unfamiliar artifacts over natural kinds when judging which object in a pair belongs to a person, but not when judging which the person prefers. These experiments provide first evidence about how children judge whether objects are owned. In contrast to claims that children think about natural kinds as being similar to artifacts, the current findings reveal that children have differing expectations about whether they are owned.     

Infant perception of causal motion produced by humans and inanimate objects

Both the movements of people and inanimate objects are intimately bound up with physical causality. Furthermore, in contrast to object movements, causal relationships between limb movements controlled by humans and their body displacements uniquely reflect agency and goal-directed actions in support of social causality. To investigate the development of sensitivity to causal movements, we examined the looking behavior of infants between 9 and 18 months of age when viewing movements of humans and objects. We also investigated whether individual differences in gender and gross motor functions may impact the development of the visual preferences for causal movements. In Experiment 1, infants were presented with walking stimuli showing either normal body translation or a “moonwalk” that reversed the horizontal motion of body translations. In Experiment 2, infants were presented with unperformable actions beyond infants’ gross motor functions (i.e., long jump) either with or without ecologically valid body displacement. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with rolling movements of inanimate objects that either complied with or violated physical causality. We found that female infants showed longer looking times to normal walking stimuli than to moonwalk stimuli, but did not differ in their looking time to movements of inanimate objects and unperformable actions. In contrast, male infants did not show sensitivity to causal movement for either category. Additionally, female infants looked longer at social stimuli of human actions than male infants. Under the tested circumstances, our findings indicate that female infants have developed a sensitivity to causal consistency between limb movements and body translations of biological motion, only for actions with previous visual and motor exposures, and demonstrate a preference toward social information.     

Do infants show social preferences for people differing in race?

Do infants develop meaningful social preferences among novel individuals based on their social group membership? If so, do these social preferences depend on familiarity on any dimension, or on a more specific focus on particular kinds of categorical information? The present experiments use methods that have previously demonstrated infants’ social preferences based on language and accent, and test for infants’ and young children’s social preferences based on race. In Experiment 1, 10-month-old infants took toys equally from own- and other-race individuals. In Experiment 2, 2.5-year-old children gave toys equally to own- and other-race individuals. When shown the same stimuli in Experiment 3, 5-year-old children, in contrast, expressed explicit social preferences for own-race individuals. Social preferences based on race therefore emerge between 2.5 and 5 years of age and do not affect social choices in infancy. These data will be discussed in relation to prior research finding that infants’ social preferences do, however, rely on language: a useful predictor of group or coalition membership in both modern times and humans’ evolutionary past.     

The role of target gender and race in children's encoding of category‐neutral person information

Two studies are reported that examine whether children encode category‐neutral information about target persons with respect to gender and race categories. In Study 1, using a semi‐naturalistic adaptation of the ‘who said what?’ technique (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), children of 5, 8 and 11 years were asked to recall peers' choices in a preference task. For all three age groups, significantly more within‐sex than between‐sex confusions were found, indicating that children had encoded neutral information about targets with respect to their sex. In Study 2, 5‐, 8‐ and 11‐year‐old children were presented with a conventional ‘who said what?’ task in which they were shown four photographs, two of black children and two of white children, along with 16 statements attributed to the target children (i.e. four statements to each child). Following this, 16 statement cards had to be assigned to photographs of the four target persons to indicate ‘who said what’. Across all age groups there were significantly more within‐ than between‐race confusions. The evidence from these two studies indicates that even for category‐neutral information, gender and race play an important role in children's initial encoding of others' behaviour.     

How children know the relevant properties for generalizing object names

Young children’s novel word extensions indicate that their animal categories, like those of adults, are characterized by multiple similarities among instances; whereas their artifact categories, again like those of adults, are characterized more simply by commonalities among instances in shape. Three experiments shed light on the nature and development of a mechanism that enables children to organize novel lexical categories differently for different kinds of objects. Experiment 1 shows that, by adult judgments, animals and artifacts present different category organizations. Experiment 2 shows relations between both age and the number of nouns young children have acquired, and children’s kind‐specific generalizations of newly learned nouns. Experiment 3 is a training study in which even younger children show an ability to learn and then generalize highly abstract relations between different contextual cues and different category structures; and importantly, to learn more than one set of such relations at a time. Together, these three findings indicate one way in which children are able to rapidly and accurately form lexical categories that parallel those of adults in their language community.     

Truck Driver or Nurse? The Impact of Gender Roles and Occupational Status on Children’s Occupational Preferences

Three experiments examined how US children perceive occupational status and gender roles. In Experiment 1, 107 6-to-12-year-olds rated the status and gender roles of 54 occupations. Feminine occupations were underrepresented among the perceived high status jobs. In Experiment 2, 28 6-to-8-year-olds, and in Experiment 3, 36 9-to-12-year-olds, reported their preferences for equally high status masculine and feminine occupations and low status masculine and feminine occupations. In both experiments, girls preferred feminine to masculine occupations and status only affected preferences for masculine occupations. The younger boys’ preferences were based on both variables, whereas older boys’ preferences were based on status. These findings imply that occupational status may influence boys’ vocational preferences more than pressure to conform to masculine gender roles.     

Categorising intersectional targets: An “either/and” approach to race- and gender-emotion congruity

Research on the interaction of emotional expressions with social category cues in face processing has focused on whether specific emotions are associated with single-category identities, thus overlooking the influence of intersectional identities. Instead, we examined how quickly people categorise intersectional targets by their race, gender, or emotional expression. In Experiment 1, participants categorised Black and White faces displaying angry, happy, or neutral expressions by either race or gender. Emotion influenced responses to men versus women only when gender was made salient by the task. Similarly, emotion influenced responses to Black versus White targets only when participants categorised by race. In Experiment 2, participants categorised faces by emotion so that neither category was more salient. As predicted, responses to Black women differed from those to both Black men and White women. Thus, examining race and gender separately is insufficient to understanding how emotion and social category cues are processed.     

The illusion of courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one's own behavior in embarrassing situations

People exhibit an “illusion of courage” when predicting their own behavior in embarrassing situations. In three experiments, participants overestimated their own willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances in exchange for money when those performances were psychologically distant: Hypothetical or in the relatively distant future. This illusion of courage occurs partly because of cold/hot empathy gaps. That is, people in a relatively “cold” unemotional state underestimate the influence on their own preferences and behaviors of being in a relative “hot” emotional state such as social anxiety evoked by an embarrassing situation. Consistent with this cold/hot empathy gap explanation, putting people “in touch” with negative emotional states by arousing fear (Experiments 1 and 2) and anger (Experiment 2) decreased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distant embarrassing public performances. Conversely, putting people “out of touch” with social anxiety through aerobic exercise, which reduces state anxiety and increases confidence, increased people's willingness to engage in psychologically distance embarrassing public performances (Experiment 3). Implications for self‐predictions, self‐evaluation, and affective forecasting are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Diversity-Based Reasoning in Children

One of the hallmarks of inductive reasoning by adults is the diversity effect, namely that people draw stronger inferences from a diverse set of evidence than from a more homogenous set of evidence. However, past developmental work has not found consistent diversity effects with children age 9 and younger. We report robust sensitivity to diversity in children as young as 5, using everyday stimuli such as pictures of objects with people. Experiment 1 showed the basic diversity effect in 5- to 9-year-olds. Experiment 2 showed that, like adults, children restrict their use of diversity information when making inferences about remote categories. Experiment 3 used other stimulus sets to overcome an alternate explanation in terms of sample size rather than diversity effects. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that children more readily draw on diversity when reasoning about objects and their relations with people than when reasoning about objects' internal, hidden properties, thus partially explaining the negative findings of previous work. Relations to cross-cultural work and models of induction are discussed.     

Identifying unreliable informants: do children excuse past inaccuracy?

In three experiments (N = 123; 148; 28), children observed a video in which two speakers offered alternative labels for unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds endorsed the label given by a speaker who had previously labeled familiar objects accurately, rather than that given by a speaker with a history of inaccurate labeling, even when the inaccurate speaker erred only while blindfolded. In Experiments 2 and 3, 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds showed no preference for the label given by a previously inaccurate but blindfolded speaker, over that given by a second inaccurate speaker with no obvious excuse for erring. Children based their endorsements on speakers’ history of accuracy or inaccuracy irrespective of the speakers’ information access at the time, raising doubts that children made mentalistic interpretations of speakers’ inaccuracy.     

Children's selective trust in native-accented speakers

Across two experiments, preschool-aged children demonstrated selective learning of non-linguistic information from native-accented rather than foreign-accented speakers. In Experiment 1, children saw videos of a native- and a foreign-accented speaker of English who each spoke for 10 seconds, and then silently demonstrated different functions with novel objects. Children selectively endorsed the silent object function provided by the native-accented speaker. In Experiment 2, children again endorsed the native-accented over the foreign-accented speaker, even though both informants previously spoke only in nonsense speech. Thus, young children demonstrate selective trust in native-accented speakers even when neither informant's speech relays meaningful semantic content, and the information that both informants provide is non-linguistic. We propose that children orient towards members of their native community to guide their early cultural learning.     

Does Children's Colour Use Reflect the Emotional Content of their Drawings?

When children draw in clinical contexts, clinicians sometimes rely on children's colour use to make inferences about their emotional reaction to the subject of the drawing. Here, we examined whether children use colour to portray emotion in their drawings. In Experiment 1, children indicated their colour preferences and then coloured in outlines of figures characterized as nasty or nice. Children also drew complex, multi‐coloured pictures about their own happy or sad experiences. In Experiment 2, hospitalized children drew about being worried or scared in hospital and about their positive experiences. In both experiments, we examined the relation between children's colour use and their colour preferences. Three‐ to 10‐year‐old children used more preferred colours to colour in the nice outline. Although they were more likely to use non‐preferred colours to colour in the nasty outline, they tended to used a mix of preferred and non‐preferred colours. When both normal and hospitalized children produced drawings about positive and negative events, there was no relation between children's colour choices and their colour preferences; children primarily used preferred colours. These data suggest that clinicians should exercise extreme caution when interpreting the meaning of colour in children's drawings. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Monitoring and Control of Learning Own‐Race and Other‐Race Faces

The own‐race bias refers to the finding that individuals are better able to recognize faces of the same race or ethnicity compared with faces of another race or ethnicity. The current study examined whether the own‐race bias was also evident in participants' predictions of memory performance and their self‐regulation of learning. In three experiments, participants studied own‐race and other‐race faces and predicted the likelihood of recognizing each face on a future test. Experiment 1 showed that participants provided similar predictions for own‐race and other‐race faces, despite superior recognition of own‐race faces. Experiments 2 and 3 permitted participants to control their study of faces and revealed better self‐regulation of learning for own‐race relative to other‐race faces. Collectively, these experiments suggest that the own‐race bias may partially reflect a metacognitive deficiency, as participants are less able to effectively self‐regulate learning for other‐race faces. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.