Reinhold Niebuhr in Contemporary Scholarship

Recent studies of Reinhold Niebuhr's life and work demonstrate his continued importance in theology, ethics, and political thought. Historical studies by Heather Warren, Mark Kleinman, and Normunds Kamergrauzis provide new assessments of Niebuhr's role as a political and religious leader in his own time and trace the consequences of the movements in which he participated. They also show us more clearly how his work was connected to the ideas and programs of his contemporaries. Colm McKeogh offers a more systematic treatment of Niebuhr's political realism in relation to just war theory. Niebuhr's intellectual legacy remains disputed, with Stanley Hauerwas and Langdon Gilkey offering radically different assessments of his theology. Hauerwas sees in Niebuhr a close connection to the religious liberalism of William James that precludes any authentic Christian witness. Niebuhr's empiricism reduces God to a necessary feature of human consciousness. Gilkey notes Niebuhr's early use of James' psychology, but discerns a theology of history that is central to Niebuhr's mature work. In that theology, the ground of hope necessarily lies beyond human consciousness, and indeed beyond history itself.     

IS A MESSIANIC POLITICAL ETHIC POSSIBLE? Recent Work by and about John Howard Yoder

In his landmark monograph, The Politics of Jesus, John Howard Yoder challenged mainstream Christian social ethics by arguing that the New Testament account of Jesus's founding of a messianic community entails a normative politics, not only for early Christianity but for the contemporary church. This challenge is further elaborated in several important posthumous publications, especially Preface to Theology, in which Yoder examines the development of early Christology with attention to its political and ethical implications, and The Jewish‐Christian Schism Revisited, Yoder's proposal for a renewed Jewish–Christian dialogue around the moral meaning of messianism. This article interprets these writings with reference to a range of critical scholarship on and about Yoder, Yoder and Augustine, and Jewish and Christian messianism, paying particular attention to questions of political ethics.     

On the Relationship between Truth and Liberal Politics

This paper examines the relationship between truth and liberal politics via the work of Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty. I argue that Williams is right to think that there are positive relations between truth, specifically a realist understanding of truth, and liberal politics that Rorty's abandonment of the realist vocabulary of truth undermines. At the heart of this concern is the worry that abandoning the realist vocabulary opens up the possibility that the standards of justification for our true beliefs can be manipulated by those with the power to do so in order to further their own political ends. The political benefit of realism is that it fixes the standards of justification and makes them immune to manipulation by the use of power. However, I suggest that there is a form of realism available that Rorty can accept which would deliver the political benefits of the realist vocabulary without requiring him to accept the thick realist metaphysics that he wants to avoid. My conclusion is that there is a positive and important relationship between truth and liberal politics, a relationship that can be sustained without any necessary commitment to realist metaphysics.     

NOT EXPLANATION BUT SALVATION: SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY, CHRISTOLOGY, AND SUFFERING

The view that Christian belief is explanatory is widespread in contemporary theology, apologetics, and philosophy of religion and it has received particular impetus from attempts to correlate science and Christianity. This article proposes an account of explanatory thinking in theology based on the principle that theological explanations should be disciplined by the internal logic of Scripture. Arthur Peacocke's biologically construed Christology and Alister McGrath's argument that suffering is an anomaly in the Christian explanatory scheme are shown to yield theological results which are inconsistent with this principle. This article's theological argument complements philosophical criticisms of the view that religious belief is explanatory.     

GLOBAL JUSTICE AFTER THE FALL Christian Realism and the "Law of Peoples"

In The Law of Peoples John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls “political realism.” Here, I contend that a certain version of “Christian political realism” survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of “empirical political realism” is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of “normative political realism” is in tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in The Law of Peoples. That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work.     

Embodied Critical Realism

Christian Smith's What Is a Person? provides an account of the person from the perceptive of critical realism. As a fellow critical realist, I support that philosophical position and in this response I seek to support it by connecting it to the embodied realism developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. In order to bring the two forms of realism together, I critique both the relativism of embodied realism and the idea, found in Smith, that the person's awareness of the world is mediated by her experience. The goal of this paper, then, is an embodied critical realism, a more coherent realist position that combines the best parts of each.     

Can power be self‐legitimating? Political realism in Hobbes,Weber, and Williams

Political realists seek to provide an alternative to accounts of political legitimacy that are based on moral standards. In this endeavor, they face the challenge of how to interpret the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating. In this paper, we argue that work by Bernard Williams sheds light on the possible answers to this challenge. While Williams aligns himself with the realist tradition, his account of legitimacy contains an implicit critique of political realism. This is evident, we show, in his rejections of the views of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber. Williams is not satisfied with Hobbes because he conflates legitimacy and political order, eliminating space for criticizing power. Weber's view, however, offers a non‐moralist standard of legitimacy that has critical purchase. This critical purchase emerges from the demands made on rulers to uphold the values that underlie their legitimation, combined with the ethic of responsibility. The resulting grounds for criticism are thus consistent with the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating—the very maxim that Williams puts at the heart of his realism. By showing that Williams's partial rejection of Hobbes and Weber cannot be sustained only on realist grounds, our analysis clarifies the limits of political realism.     

Christology in the Meeting Between Science and Religion. A Tribute to Ian Barbour

While Ian Barbour's methodological contributions to science and religion and his use of process metaphysics are often noted, it is also important to consider his own theology of nature as a significant contribution to Christian theology. This article calls attention to both his reformulation of Christology and to the way Christology functions in his understanding of divine action. It goes on to suggest that Christology is important for three aspects of continuing work in science and theology     

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

A main thread of the debate over mathematical realism has come down to whether mathematics does explanatory work of its own in some of our best scientific explanations of empirical facts. Realists argue that it does; anti-realists argue that it doesn't. Part of this debate depends on how mathematics might be able to do explanatory work in an explanation. Everyone agrees that it's not enough that there merely be some mathematics in the explanation. Anti-realists claim there is nothing mathematics can do to make an explanation mathematical; realists think something can be done, but they are not clear about what that something is.

I argue that many of the examples of mathematical explanations of empirical facts in the literature can be accounted for in terms of Jackson and Pettit's [1990] notion of program explanation, and that mathematical realists can use the notion of program explanation to support their realism. This is exactly what has happened in a recent thread of the debate over moral realism (in this journal). I explain how the two debates are analogous and how moves that have been made in the moral realism debate can be made in the mathematical realism debate. However, I conclude that one can be a mathematical realist without having to be a moral realist.     

Spinoza’s Christology A Brief Summary

Abstract

This article summarizes a number of Spinoza texts relating to his Christology and soteriology based on his Christology. The texts show that Spinoza’s Christology underpins his formulation of human nature or the constitution of the essence of the human mind. Considering Spinoza’s texts concerning God or Nature, “Christ according to the spirit”, the spirit or mind of Christ, and human salvation or blessedness; this article illustrates that given the texts, the study of Spinoza’s Christian religion is skewed and ought to be more balanced. The author’s reading of Spinoza and its application to his work presented in this article provides a coherent and tenable understanding of Spinoza’s efforts “to commend and establish the authentic purpose of the Christian Religion”.     

Heidegger and scientific realism

This paper describes Heidegger as a robust scientific realist, explains why his view has received such conflicting treatment, and concludes that the special significance of his position lies in his insistence upon linking the discussion of science to the question of its relation with technology. It shows that Heidegger, rather than accepting the usual forced option between realism and antirealism, advocates a realism in which he embeds the antirealist thesis that the idea of reality independent of human understanding is unintelligible. This reading is defended against Rorty's antirealist interpretation, as well as Dreyfus' depiction of him as a deflationary realist, and his assessment of background realism is contrasted with Fine's. Further, the robustness of Heidegger's realism is laid out across several texts from 1912 to 1976, in order to show that he is neither an instrumental realist nor an internal realist. Finally, the point is made that the development of his view concerning realism gives rise to a critique of objectivity that is now being similarly advocated by numerous thinkers from a variety of disciplines, and that this critique is inevitably ethical and political.     

Some aspects of explanation in Boškovič

Bo?kovi?'s explanatory procedure and his concept of explanation represents a certain departure from Newton's causal theory and his theory of explanation. Apart from particular elements of causal explanation, Bo?kovi? developed an alternative, non‐causal explanatory strategy. In this paper two different elements of this strategy are discussed: (i) the micro‐reductive explanatory strategy based on Bo?kovi?'s idea of determination, and (ii) a type of explanation of a theory by means of a more general law, through a thought‐experiment. In addition, an outline of the proposed (iii) ‘argument theory’ of explanation in his mature period is made. These aspects are considered with respect to the realist and anti‐realist elements in Bo?kovi?'s epistemology.     

The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism

Many of the arguments for and against robust moral realism parallel arguments for and against theism. In this article, I consider one of the shared challenges: the explanatory challenge. The article begins with a presentation of Harman's formulation of the explanatory challenge as applied to moral realism and theism. I then examine two responses offered by robust moral realists to the explanatory challenge, one by Russ Shafer‐Landau and another by David Enoch. Shafer‐Landau argues that the moral realist can plausibly respond to the challenge in a way unavailable to theists. I argue that Shafer‐Landau's response is implausible as it stands and that once revised, it will apply to theism just as well. I then argue that Enoch's response, to the extent that it is plausible, can be used to defend theism as well.     

DEFENDING NIEBUHR FROM HAUERWAS

In his 2001 book, With the Grain of the Universe, Stanley Hauerwas has made an extended case for Karl Barth as the model for how to do Christian ethics, and for Reinhold Niebuhr as the model for how not to do it. Though Barth's closer and deeper theological connection to the Christian tradition appeals to a Jewish traditionalist by analogy, nevertheless, Niebuhr's approach to social ethics, based as it is on a version of natural law, is of greater appeal. That is because it is more philosophically arguable in a secular society and culture, and because it is more politically effective there. It is what made Niebuhr a more effective opponent of Nazism than was Barth. Also, Niebuhr's version of natural law is not a christianized version of Stoic natural law teaching but, rather, a profound use of the biblical prohibition of idolatry, having heretofore unnoticed affinities with rabbinic developments of that prohibition.     

Rortian Realism

This paper motivates and defends “Rortian realism,” a position that is Rortian in respect of its underlying philosophical theses but non‐Rortian in terms of the lessons it draws from these for cultural politics. The philosophical theses amount to what the paper calls Rorty's “anti‐representationalism” (AR), arguing that AR is robust to critique as being anti‐realist, relativist, or sceptical, invoking Rorty's historicism/ethnocentrism as part of the defence. The latter, however, creates problems for Rorty in so far as his reformative views on the nature of philosophical and academic activity are meant to be foisted on an academy that ex hypothesi holds views different from these. The paper suggests we can motivate a different conception of the consequences of AR more amenable to the academy: Rortian realism, a view that makes greater concessions to realism and a kind of scientific naturalism than Rorty would like, but that for those very reasons is more likely to allow AR to prevail.     

Niebuhr One More Time

In this essay Stanley Hauerwas offers a response to Edmund Santurri's review of Reinhold Niebuhr's An Interpretation of Christian Ethics.     

I. Frege as a Realist

H. Sluga (Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975], No. 4) has criticized me for representing Frege as a realist. He holds that, for Frege, abstract objects were not real: this rests on a mistranslation and a neglect of Frege's contextual principle. The latter has two aspects: as a thesis about sense, and as one about reference. It is only under the latter aspect that there is any tension between it and realism: Frege's later silence about the principle is due, not to his realism, but to his assimilating sentences to proper names. Contrary to what Sluga thinks, the conception of the Bedeutung of a name as its bearer is an indispensable ingredient of Frege's notion of Bedeutung, as also is the fact that it is in the stronger of two possible senses that Frege held that Sinn determines Bedeutung. The contextual principle is not to be understood as meaning that thoughts are not, in general, complex; Frege's idea that the sense of a sentence is compounded out of the senses of its component words is an essential component of his theory of sense. Frege's realism was not the most important ingredient in his philosophy: but the attempt to interpret him otherwise than as a realist leads only to misunderstanding and confusion.     

The Contemporary Relevance of Schillebeeckx's Political Theology: On Ecclesial Participation in the Saving Work of Christ

In this article I explore the relation between God's absolute governance of the world and ecclesial dominion over other communities in a shared political forum that seeks the greatest good of all. On this question I compare the positions of Colin Gunton, Robert Jenson, and Edward Schillebeeckx as representatives of three distinct political theologies. Whereas Gunton's reservation regarding the participation of the church's politics in divine governance shows excessive deference to human sinfulness, Jenson on the contrary tends to absorb God's Rule into ecclesial politics. Drawing upon Schillebeeckx's Christology, I argue that God's absolute Rule is compatible with ecclesial sovereignty; however, this does not allow for unilateral ecclesial dominion over others, inasmuch as God's Rule is disclosed as forgiveness.     

Bazin,an Early Late Modernist

This article argues that there are inflections of modernism in André Bazin's realist aesthetics and that he should be considered an early champion of post–World War II modernism in cinema. Within classical film theory, which took its point of departure in the silent cinema era, modernism is taken to be incompatible with realism. Moreover, both modernism and realism are seen to rely on the principle of medium specificity in this context, whereas Bazin argued that aesthetic progress in cinema is intrinsically related to the medium's capability to be impure. Recently, we have seen several attempts at connecting Bazin's aesthetics with high‐modernism in the visual arts. However, I argue that it is more instructive to focus on their differences. This comparison is relevant for developing a deeper understanding of the form of modernism at stake in Bazin's aesthetics, especially when it comes to the question of the spectator's role in the constitution of meaning. Furthermore, Bazin's proto‐modernist aesthetics must be discussed with an eye to his ardent support of what he considered a new avant‐garde in narrative cinema and his lasting, but often misunderstood, interest in ambiguity as an aesthetic category.     

Reading Reinhold Niebuhr against Himself Again: On Theological Language and Divine Action

Since 1937, when Reinhold Niebuhr articulated his most developed understanding of the function of theological language, there has been debate about how his approach should be understood. Recent readings of Niebuhr have assumed that Niebuhr's account of theological language rests upon dualistic presuppositions. While acknowledging manifestations of post‐Cartesian dualism in Niebuhr's thought, this article argues that Niebuhr's thought also reflects a more compelling strain of Augustinian/Kierkegaardian anti‐dualism, and that reading Niebuhr through the lens of this anti‐dualism allows for a fruitful account of his treatment of theological language.