Capitalism, Freedom and Rhetoric: a reply to Tibor R. Machan

ABSTRACT  Tibor R. Machan's 'The virtue of freedom in capitalism', which recently appeared in this journal, seeks to defend the currently fashionable view that capitalism and freedom are closely linked. I concentrate upon three aspects of his argument. First, Machan holds that capitalism is the only system capable of facilitating the exercise of moral responsibility effectively. Against this, I show that his argument rests upon a systematic confusion between two distinct theses. Secondly, I deal with his attempt to rest an argument upon the allegedly 'uncoercive' nature of market exchanges. Thirdly, I show that his analysis of the concept of freedom, which closely follows Hayek, logically cannot be deployed in support of the free market. Machan has a tendency to appeal to 'tradition', and so, in conclusion, I briefly consider his relation to the 'analytic' movement in philosophy.     

Explication Defended

How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy.     

Well-being Monism Defended

Journal of Happiness Studies - In “Well-Being and Pluralism” (2021), Polly Mitchell and Anna Alexandrova defend conceptual pluralism about well-being. Conceptual pluralism about...     

Perceptual Content Defended

Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.     

Modal Fictionalism Generalized and Defended

In this paper, I will defend modalfictionalism. The paper has two parts. In thefirst part, I will suggest a revised version ofmodal fictionalism which can avoid certaintechnical problems. In the second part, I willpropose a nominalized version of modalfictionalism and a general scheme offictionalism for the nominalist.