SELF‐DECEPTION AND THE EXPERIENCE OF FICTION

Sartre's commentary on bad faith is the starting‐point for an exploration of self‐deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it's always wrong. The proffered analysis of self‐deception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self‐deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real.     

SELF‐DECEPTION ABOUT EMOTION

In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self‐deception—instances in which one is self‐deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self‐deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self‐deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self‐deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two variants of self‐deception about emotion: cognitively motivated self‐deception and phenomenologically motivated self‐deception. After providing an account of each variant, I discuss the importance of the role that perception plays in cases of self‐deception about emotion. I conclude with a comment on the relevance of this discussion for contemporary debates in moral theory.     

POSTMODERN THOUGHT AND RELIGION: OPEN‐TRADITIONALISM AND RADICAL ORTHODOXY ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND EXPERIENCE

This paper considers some of the ways in which ‘postmodernism’ is construed, before turning to several important representative examples of religious postmodern thought. It highlights some common features possessed by prominent examples of religious postmodern thought within Judaism and Christianity. Much postmodern religious thought is characterised by the separation of religious belief from religious experience, and is marked by the tendency to emphasise the latter at the expense of the former. This paper argues that, despite this tendency, the work of certain key postmodern religious thinkersparticularly those associated with open‐traditionalism and radical orthodoxy—does not conform to this characterisation and needs to be understood in a broader cultural and theological context.     

ALSTON ON BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE IN RELIGIOUS FAITH1

In this paper, I shall examine William Alston's influential view that the cognitive element in religious faith should be identified with ‘acceptance’ rather than ‘belief’. Although I am sympathetic to Alston's reluctance to regard belief as essential to faith, I shall argue that one can redescribe the cases that Alston invokes in support of his claim in terms of the standard notion of degrees‐of‐belief without loss. It will be further argued that, given Alston's constraints, his notion of acceptance, if not identical to belief, is at least a species of belief.     

PREFERENTISM AND SELF‐SACRIFICE

According to the argument from self‐sacrifice, standard, unrestricted desire‐based theories of welfare fail because they have the absurd implication that self‐sacrifice is conceptually impossible. I attempt to show that, in fact, the simplest imaginable, completely unrestricted desire‐based theory of well‐being is perfectly compatible with the phenomenon of self‐sacrifice – so long as the theory takes the right form. I go on to consider a new argument from self‐sacrifice against this simple theory, which, I argue, also fails. I conclude that, contrary to popular opinion, considerations of self‐sacrifice do not pose a problem for preferentist theories of welfare.     

SELF‐FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVENESS

If the notion of a victim's forgiveness encounters scepticism in today's world, more so the notion of self‐forgiveness by the offender. However, a failure to forgive oneself, when self‐forgiveness is appropriate, may be detrimental to one's moral and psychological well‐being. Self‐forgiveness is called for when guilt, self‐hatred and shame reach high levels. Further, a third party's assurance that the offence is forgivable may contribute considerably to the completion of the self‐forgiveness process. This article explores the notion of forgiveness of self and compares it with the notion of forgiveness of others. In addition, guilt and shame, right and wrong, repentance and dealing with the consequences of harmful actions are examined in the context of self‐forgiveness.     

SELF‐OWNERSHIP AND THE STATE: A DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE

Libertarians often invoke the principle of self‐ownership to discredit distributive interventions authorized by the more‐than‐minimal state. But if one takes a democratic approach to the justification of ownership claims, including claims of ownership over oneself, the validity of the self‐ownership principle is theoretically inseparable from the normative justification of the state. Since the idea of the state is essential to the very assertion (not just the positive enforcement) of the principle of self‐ownership, invoking the principle to discredit a distribution of ownership authorized by the state commits libertarians also to weakening that principle's validity. Put differently, appealing to the self‐ownership principle to circumscribe the state's power to distribute property is problematic when the state is necessary to assert the validity of that principle. This is because anytime the self‐ownership principle is used to undermine a state‐based distribution of property it is also implicitly eroding the ground for asserting its own validity. 1     

MONKEYS,MIRRORS, AND ME: GORDON GALLUP AND THE STUDY OF SELF‐RECOGNITION

This article explores the work of psychologist Gordon Gallup, Jr., during the 1960s and 1970s on mirror self‐recognition in animals. It shows how Gallup tried to integrate the mental “self‐concept” into an otherwise strictly behaviorist paradigm. By making an argument from material culture, the article demonstrates how Gallup's adoption of a self‐concept is best understood as a product of his sustained analysis of the workings of the mirror as a piece of experimental apparatus. In certain situations, the stimulus properties of the mirror changed dramatically, a shift that Gallup thought legitimated the positing of a self‐concept. For this reason, Gallup supposed he could use a mirror to provide an operationalized concept of the self, that is, produce a definition that was compatible with behaviorist experimental norms. The article argues that behaviorism was more supple and productive than is often assumed, and contained resources that could align it with the “cognitive revolution” to which it is most often opposed.     

SELF‐KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL STUPIDITY

Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous – a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self‐deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perception‐distorting self‐absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self‐knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the presence or absence of particular desires and beliefs can an agent have authority over them or exercise responsibility for their absence. But what is the connection between self‐knowledge and moral development? I argue that accounts (such as Kant's and Richard Moran's) which construe instances of self‐knowledge as like the verdicts of a judge cannot explain its potential role in moral development, and claim that it must be conceived of in a way that makes possible a process of self‐refinement and self‐regulation. Making use of Buddhist moral psychology, I argue that when self‐knowledge plays a role in moral development, it includes a quality of attention to one's experience best modeled as the work of the craftsperson, not as judge.     

DECREASING SELF‐INJURIOUS BEHAVIOR AND FADING SELF‐RESTRAINT IN A STUDENT WITH AUTISM AND TOURETTE SYNDROME

This clinical case study was conducted with a student diagnosed with autism and Tourette syndrome who displayed severe self‐injurious behavior (SIB). Behavioral assessments and observations suggested that the student demonstrated less SIB during a self‐restraint, where he wrapped his hands tightly in a large blanket. We used an ABAB design with fading to reduce the size of the blanket to keep rates of SIB low. In addition, we also used a fixed interval reinforcement schedule and extinction during the intervention/restraint phases. Results indicated that the student maintained near‐zero rates of SIB for 6 months after use of the blanket was eliminated. Results and implications for practice and future research are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.