Election Outcome and Tax Compliance: The Role of Political Party Affiliation,Affect Balance,and Trust in Government

The present study examines partisan reactions to presidential election outcomes. Our model investigates the interactive role of political party affiliation on the relationship between identification with the winning party and affect balance. We subsequently examine how tax compliance intentions are influenced by this moderation relationship through affect balance and trust in government. We conducted a quasi-experiment one week prior to the first mass 2016 presidential primary, where 12 of the 50 US states voted to decide which candidates would represent the Republican and Democratic parties in the 2016 US presidential election. Our sample consisted of 205 Republicans and Democrats. We manipulated press releases showing various presidential candidates winning the presidency to examine how matches / mismatches between partisans’ political party affiliation and the party winning the election influence citizens’ overall feelings, beliefs, and intentions. We find election outcomes generate significant overall positive or negative feelings (i.e., affect balance) among partisans, which influences beliefs about trust in government, and subsequently their tax compliance intentions. Political party moderates the relationship between election outcomes and affect balance in such a way that Democrats experience greater overall positive affect balance when their party wins the election compared to Republicans.     

Judging a Book by its Cover: The Effects of Candidate Party Label and issue Stands on Voting Behavior

Americans vote party lines; nothing predicts election outcomes as well. People may vote party lines because party candidates have views that accurately reflect the positions of their members, because party identification acts as a convenient cue that eliminates the need for greater information search or cognitive processing, or because party classification biases interpretation of other information people have about the candidates. To investigate these competing hypotheses for party effects on voter decision making, participants were presented with a choice between 2 candidates whose policy positions were more inconsistent than consistent with their party identification (Study l), or completely inconsistent with their party identification (Study 2). People voted as a function of party label in Study I, but issue stand emerged as a stronger predictor in Study 2 (although Democrats were more likely to cross party lines than Republicans). These results suggest that party identification influences how other information about the candidate is perceived and processed. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

If they were to vote, they would vote for us

In two field studies, we examined whether voters overestimate support for their political party among nonvoters. In Study 1, voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive in an upcoming election, and this percentage increased when voters estimated the percentage of votes their party would receive if nonvoters also were to vote. In Study 2, participants overestimated support for their party even when we made them explicitly aware of current levels of this support by presenting them with poll-based forecasts of election results. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrated that commitment to vote for a specific party predicted the degree of overestimation. Our results imply that highly committed voters are particularly likely to project support for their party onto nonvoters. Implications for the literature on social projection and social identity are discussed.     

The two faces of dominance: The differential effect of ingroup superiority and outgroup inferiority on dominant-group identity and group esteem

The present paper provides evidence that dominant-group members distinguish dominance framed as ingroup superiority from dominance framed as outgroup inferiority, and that ingroup superiority enhances esteem for, and thus identification with, the group more than outgroup inferiority. In Experiment 1, Democrats report higher levels of party identification after being told that Democrats won an election than after being told that Republicans lost the election. These effects are attenuated among dominant group members whose values are in conflict with how dominance was achieved. In Experiments 2a and 2b, unearned dominance framed as ingroup superiority resulted in higher levels of White identification than unearned dominance framed as outgroup inferiority among Whites who did not value meritocracy. In contrast, Whites who valued meritocracy did not increase their levels of identification with the group. In Experiment 2b, this interactive effect on racial identification was mediated by esteem for the group.     

On the Subjectivity of the Experience of Victory: Who Are the Election Winners?

Elections represent key moments in democratic countries, and an established finding from the existing literature is that winners of elections display higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. Yet we know almost nothing about the times when voters feel like winners of an election. Using panel data in four countries, this article finds that while the objective performance of the supported party—measured using vote share and changes in vote share from the previous election—has a very important effect on feeling like an election winner, prior expectations regarding the election’s outcome as well as preferences for the supported party significantly moderate the effect of party performance on voter feelings. It seems also that the identification of the winners and losers of elections are clearer in majoritarian‐style democracies than in proportional systems with coalition governments. Ultimately, the findings indicate that measuring who are the winners of an election using exclusively objective measures of party performance may provide a distorted view of public opinion following the elections.     

The Effects of US Presidential Elections on Work Engagement and Job Performance

We predicted that presidential election results would spill over to influence the work domain. Individuals who voted for the winning candidate were expected to experience increased engagement, whereas individuals who voted for the losing candidate were expected to experience decreased engagement. We tested these predictions within the context of the 2016 US presidential election. Using a sample of 232 working Americans, work engagement and job performance were assessed one week prior to the election, the day after the election, and one week after the election. Contrary to our prediction, individuals who voted for Trump (the winning candidate) did not report increased work engagement, thereby providing no evidence of positive spillover. However, individuals who voted for Clinton (the losing candidate) were less engaged on the day after the election compared to baseline, demonstrating negative spillover. Downstream, work engagement was positively related to job performance. However, these effects were relatively short-lived, as engagement returned to baseline levels within one week following the election. Our results suggest that elections can have important implications for work-related outcomes. From a practical perspective we suggest that to the extent possible it may be prudent to avoid scheduling important work tasks for the days following presidential elections.     

The Importance of Context in the Genetic Transmission of U.S. Party Identification

In this study, we discuss one example where behavior genetic findings vary greatly across political contexts. We present original findings on how party identification is heritable around the 2008 election on a sample of twins from Minnesota. As this is in contrast with findings from the late 1980s and with how a mid‐2000 study interpreted their results, we explain how the increasing partisan ideological polarization could be responsible for these seemingly contradictory findings. In the Minnesota sample, we show a genetic correlation between party identification and ideology, a finding consistent in the political science literature. We highlight how heritability of political characteristics, like all others, is population specific and highly context dependent stressing its nondeterministic nature.     

Perception of political candidates based on their stand on abortion and taxes.

This study investigated whether young voters would vote for and volunteer to work for the election campaign of a presidential candidate, given the candidate's background and positions on two major campaign issues. Findings indicate that, although voter-candidate agreement on a single issue may be enough for a voter to vote for a candidate, agreement on both issues may be necessary before a voter agrees to volunteer to work for the candidate's election campaign.     

Regulatory Fit and Voting1

The problem of many democracies is low voter turnout. One reason is the voting procedure, which only allows voting for a party or candidate. Introduction of voting against could bring more voters to the polls. The concept of regulatory focus ( Higgins, 1998 ) suggests that people who focus on prevention would vote more eagerly if they are given the opportunity to blackball disliked candidates. This article describes 2 studies that verify this hypothesis. In the first study, over two thirds of participants declared that they would vote more willingly if they had a “for or against” choice at the election. The second study shows that the “pro or anti” formula is especially attractive to participants with a prevention regulatory focus.     

POLITICS AND THE GLASS CLIFF: EVIDENCE THAT WOMEN ARE PREFERENTIALLY SELECTED TO CONTEST HARD-TO-WIN SEATS

Recent archival and experimental research has revealed that women are more likely than men to be appointed to leadership positions when an organization is in crisis. As a result, women often confront a "glass cliff" in which their position as leader is precarious. Our first archival study examined the 2005 UK general election and found that, in the Conservative party, women contested harder to win seats than did men. Our second study experimentally investigated the selection of a candidate by 80 undergraduates in a British political science class to contest a by-election in a seat that was either safe (held by own party with a large margin) or risky (held by an opposition party with a large margin). Results indicated that a male candidate was more likely than a woman to be selected to contest a safe seat, but there was a strong preference for a female rather than a male appointment when the seat was described as hard to win. Implications for women's participation in politics are discussed.     

Motivated to Forgive? Partisan Scandals and Party Supporters

In this study, we investigate how partisan motivations shape voters' reactions to a political scandal by drawing on a unique survey experiment fielded immediately after Justin Trudeau's brownface/blackface scandal broke during the 2019 Canadian election. We thus explore motivated reasoning in real time in a competitive and highly partisan election context. Are voters more willing to forgive politicians for past behavior when their own party leader's impropriety is cued? To what extent do personal interests, such as cross-pressures or electoral concerns, affect the motivation to forgive? Our findings show that partisan-motivated reasoning is overwhelmingly powerful, producing politically biased judgments of politicians implicated in scandals. Furthermore, voters' willingness to forgive scandals is also influenced by “strategic” considerations, in that preferences over which political party wins or loses in the election affect opinions about whether someone should be forgiven or whether the scandal is considered important at all. However, we find no evidence that personal involvement in the issue raised by the scandal conditions partisan motivations. We posit that the environment—in this case, a competitive election—is an important consideration for understanding the extent and limits of partisan-motivated reasoning.     

Republican Voters Prefer Candidates Who Have Conservative‐Looking Faces: New Evidence From Exit Polls

Research shows people share common political facial stereotypes: They associate faces with political ideologies. Moreover, given that many voters rely on party affiliation, political ideology, and appearances to select political candidates, we might expect that political facial stereotypes would sway voting preferences and, by extension, the share of votes going to each candidate in an election. And yet few studies have examined whether having a stereotypically conservative‐looking (or liberal‐looking) face predicts a candidate's vote shares. Using data from U.S. election exit polls, we show that the Republican voters within each state are more likely to vote for a candidate (even a Democrat) the more that person has a stereotypically Republican‐looking face. By contrast, the voting choices of the Democratic voters within each state are unrelated to political facial stereotypes. Moreover, we show that the relationship between political facial stereotypes and voting does not depend on state‐level ideology: Republican voters in both right‐leaning (“red”) and left‐leaning (“blue”) states are more likely to vote for candidates with conservative‐looking faces. These results have several important practical and theoretical implications concerning the nature and impact of political facial stereotypes, which we discuss.     

Revoking a leader's “license to fail”: downgrading evaluations of prototypical in‐group leaders following an intergroup failure

Drawing on the social identity theory of leadership, we examined how leadership as an identity function alters perceptions and evaluations of in‐ and out‐group political leaders over time. Participants responded to two online questionnaires, before and after the 2012 U.S. Presidential election between Democrat Barack Obama and Republican Mitt Romney. We assessed respondents' strength of party identification, perceptions of each candidate's prototypicality, and evaluations of each candidate. Results supported the hypothesis: after his loss, Romney was presumably perceived as less prototypical of the Republican Party among strong identifiers, who symbolically revoked Romney's “license to fail.” Weakly identified Republicans were unaffected by his defeat, granting him a “license to fail.” Unexpectedly, Democrats and Republicans following his electoral success evaluated Obama more harshly.     

Moral Conviction and Political Engagement

The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election—indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left.     

Politics, schadenfreude, and ingroup identification: The sometimes happy thing about a poor economy and death

Political campaigns are often characterized by the various events occurring that move the tide in favor of one candidate or another. Each event, depending on which candidate it favors or harms, produces either happiness or sadness for those who care about the outcome. This research examined whether such reactions would hold for events that are misfortunes for other people and even when they negatively affect society more broadly regardless of political party affiliation. Ingroup (i.e. political party) identification was examined as an important moderating variable. In four studies, undergraduate participants gave their emotional reactions to news articles describing misfortunes happening to others (e.g. poor economic news and house foreclosures). Party affiliation and the intensity of ingroup identification strongly predicted whether these events produced schadenfreude.     

The curious,context‐dependent case of anger: Explaining voting intentions in three different national elections

Collective action is typically studied in social protest contexts and predicted by different motivations (i.e., ingroup identification and efficacy beliefs, and outgroup‐directed anger). Assuming that voting to some extent reflects a form of collective action, we tested whether these three different motivations predicted voting in Dutch, Israeli, and Italian national election contexts. Based on previous meta‐analyses on voting and collective action, we hypothesized that identification with and efficacy beliefs regarding this party would motivate voting across the different elections (i.e., context‐independent effects). As for anger, we predicted more context‐dependent effects, depending on whether the anger is targeting the previous government or at the political system at large. Results were largely in line with predictions, showing the relatively context‐independent motivational power of party identification and efficacy beliefs, and clearly context‐dependent effects for anger. Specifically, we found little support for a similar motivational power of anger targeting previous government policies, but anger targeting politics in general demotivated Dutch and Israeli participants to vote (interpreted as an expression of political cynicism), while curiously motivating Italian participants to vote (interpreted as a desire for system change from “old” to “new” politics). We discuss these findings in the context of voting in national elections, and recommend further integration of the voting and social protest literatures.     

In Love With Hatred: Rethinking the Role Hatred Plays in Shaping Political Behavior1

This paper addresses the problem of isolating and measuring the influence of hatred on political behavior by analyzing a nationwide panel study conducted during the 2006 election campaign in Israel. We argue that collective hatred is composed of 2 distinct emotional aspects: chronic and immediate. The core of this paper is an analysis of the influence of these 2 types of group‐based hatred on 3 aspects of political behavior: political learning, party identification stability, and partisan support. The results indicate that both aspects of collective hatred—chronic and immediate—are incongruously crucial for the understanding of political outcomes, particularly political learning. We discuss the broader implications of these findings in assessing the impact of group‐based hatred on the political process.     

Group Distinctiveness,Political Identification,and the Third-Person Effect: Perceptions of a Political Campaign in the 2004 Greek National Election

The present study examined the effects of political identification and group distinctiveness on perceptions of media influence during an election campaign. Participants estimated the effect of political communication on self and on voters of two large, nondistinctive political parties and two small, distinctive political parties. Nondistinctive party members showed an ingroup bias (i.e., greater perceived media influence on the outgroup) irrespective of strength of identification compared to the nondistinctive outgroups, whereas they did not show any bias (high identifiers) or even reverse bias (low identifiers) toward the distinctive outgroups. Distinctive party members showed an ingroup bias (irrespective of strength of identification) against the nondistinctive outgroups and an ingroup bias (high identifiers) or no bias (low identifiers) toward the distinctive outgroups. Ingroup assimilation (i.e., lack of difference in perceived influence between self and ingroup) was evident for distinctive party members, but not for nondistinctive party members. Results highlight the importance of group distinctiveness and identification in third-person perceptions.     

“Where You Lead,I Will Follow”: Partisan Cueing on High-Salience Issues in a Turbulent Multiparty System

The ability of parties to not only reflect, but actually shape, citizens' preferences on policy issues has been long debated, as it corresponds to a fundamental prediction of classic party identification theory. While most research draws on data from the United States or studies of low-salience issues, we exploit the unique opportunity presented by the 2013 Italian election, with the four major parties of a clear multiparty setting holding distinct positions on crucial issues of the campaign. Based on an experimental design, we test the impact of party cues on citizens' preferences on high-salience issues. The results are surprising: Despite a party system in flux (with relevant new parties) and a weakening of traditional party identities, we find large, significant partisan-cueing effects in all the three experimental issues, and for voters of all the major Italian parties—both old and new, governmental and opposition, ideologically clear or ambiguous.     

Survey Experiments on Candidate Religiosity,Political Attitudes,and Vote Choice

Because identification with and affect toward social groups is a primary heuristic for citizens, the social group profiles of candidates are important for electoral behavior. We focus on an increasingly important element of candidates’ social characteristics: their levels of religiosity and secularism. We argue that as religious groups and identities become structured less by what religion they are and more by how religious they are (or are not), candidate religiosity and secularism should condition the impact of political orientations such as partisanship and cultural policy attitudes on vote choice. Highly religious candidates should attract more support from Republicans and from cultural conservatives, while overtly secular candidates should appeal more to Democrats and cultural liberals. Using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate a state legislative candidate with varying levels of religiosity and secularism, we find strong support for our argument.