Rejoinder to Ekman,O'Sullivan,and Matsumoto

Each of the issues raised by Ekman, O'Sullivan, and Matsumoto is discussed. The relativity thesis, and the evidence on which it is based, emphasizes the issue of ecological validity. In the study of judgments of emotion from facial expression, the question of what occurs spontaneously in natural settings, rather than the question of the accuracy of those judgments, will lead to studies capable of resolving current debates.This study was funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I am grateful to the editor and the journal for the opportunity given to me and to Ekman, O'Sullivan, and Matsumoto to exchange views. I thank Darrin Lehman for his advice.     

‘God … or a Bad,or Mad,Man’: C.S. Lewis's Argument for Christ – A Systematic Theological,Historical and Philosophical Analysis of Aut Deus Aut Malus Homo

The proposition that Jesus was ‘Bad, Mad or God’ is central to C.S. Lewis's popular apologetics. It is fêted by American Evangelicals, cautiously endorsed by Roman Catholics and Protestants, but often scorned by philosophers of religion. Most, mistakenly, regard Lewis's trilemma as unique. This paper examines the roots of this proposition in a two thousand year old theological and philosophical tradition (that is, aut Deus aut malus homo), grounded in the Johannine trilemma (‘unbalanced liar’, or ‘demonically possessed’, or ‘the God of Israel come amongst his people’). Jesus can only be understood in the context of the Jewish religious categories he was born into; therefore, for Lewis, Jesus is who he reveals himself to be. Jesus' self‐understanding reflects his identity, his triune salvific role; this is for Lewis, the transposed reality of divine Sonship. Reason and logic are paramount here, reflected in the structure of Lewis's argument. Lewis's trilemma is not so much a proof of God's existence, but a question, a dilemma, where each and every person must come to a decision. For all its perceived faults, its simplistic language, Lewis's trilemma still is a very successful piece of Christian apologetic, grounded in a serious philosophical and theological tradition.     

A Parsons Tale: Tractarian Reflections on a Semantical Paradox

According to Charles Parsons, a liar sentence does not express a proposition at the level of its primary use but does at the level where it is subjected to semantic interpretation. Thus, richer ontological resources unavailable at the level of primary use are available at the level of interpretation. In response to the objection that the correct semantic interpretation of a liar sentence is thereby distorted, I explain how Wittgenstein’s repudiation of “logical objects” and the Tractarian notion of an intrinsically iterative operation show that the liar sentence’s primary use anticipates but does not presuppose the richer interpretive ontology.     

Philosophy,and teaching (as) transformation

Abstract

This paper explores a paradox constitutive of transformation discourse in South Africa: the transformation of a fragmented society presupposes the existence of a collective Will; but the creation of a collective will can only result from a process of transformation. While politicians and higher education administrators debate how best to conceive and implement transformation, committed lecturers have to find ways of teaching the reality of that ideal full knowing that it is in part through teaching that this ideal is achieved. The 2010 HE Summit (HES) called on all universities to ‘purposefully address the issue of social cohesion as part of their transformation agenda’ (2010: 20). In this paper the learning encounter is posited as the paradoxical site where the assumption of a national subjectivity (‘social cohesion’) becomes reproductive of that subjectivity. This suggests a degree of ‘bootstrapping’ in the sense that the learning encounter necessarily posits a historical Subject that is paradoxically both cause and effect of transformation. This is an interpretative paper that reflects on what it means to practise philosophy in such a context. Taking Readings’s The University in Ruins (1996) as point of departure it starts with a general, historical reflection on the telos of higher education which is then contextualised with reference to the post-colonial university. Towards the end I briefly consider aspects of my own philosophy teaching praxis in light of that theoretical frame. I engage the ‘bootstrapping’ paradox by suggesting that teaching (as) transformation comprises four moments: making students aware of 1) the fact that they belong to specific socio-epistemic communities; 2) that this sense of community is an historical construct which 3) implies limitations on the possibility of knowing and being that can 4) only be questioned through an encounter with what is other to that socio-epistemic community. In short, it is argued that in a university context the possibility of ‘social cohesion’ is first and foremost a confrontation with the conditions for the possibility of inter-subjective learning.     

Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ‘must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not’. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition.     

Video Methods,Green Cultural Criminology,and the Anthropocene: SANCTUARY as a Case Study

Documentary criminology is a burgeoning, open-ended methodological technique that crafts and depicts sensuous knowledge from the lived experiences of crime, transgression, and harm. This ‘video ethnography paper’ examines my 74 minute documentary, SANCTUARY, as a case study to demonstrate how documentary criminology draws upon green cultural criminology, video methods, and sensory studies to provide an experiential understanding of crime (in this case, against donkeys) and rehabilitation in the contested notion of an ‘anthropocene’ epoch. I trace how documentary criminology can evoke and enact the lived experiences of “donkey rehabilitation” as sensuous scholarship.     

Spiritualists,Aliens and UFOs: Extraterrestrials as spirit guides

One of the most striking innovations within contemporary North American Spiritualism is the adoption of extraterrestrials as spirit guides by some contemporary Spiritualists. It is here that the New Age fascination with extraterrestrials and UFOs has taken on a uniquely Spiritualist form. Extraterrestrials have come to represent for many Spiritualists the successful achievement of the ultimate Spiritualist goal: the union between spirituality and science. Extraterrestrials are seen as spiritually superior to us because their science exceeds our own; their ‘science’ is perceived superior because it incorporates recognition of spiritual ‘truth’. Consequently, within the North American Spiritualist context, the adoption of extraterrestrials as spirit guides can be seen both as a ‘rationalisation’ of Spiritualist belief through a strong idealisation of ‘science’, and as a critique of orthodox science for ignoring the ‘spiritual’ realm. For several of the Spiritualists with whom I worked, extraterrestrials have consequently become excellent choices for spirit guides.     

The End(s) of Philosophy: Rhetoric, Therapy and Wittgenstein's Pyrrhonism

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for’. The desire for such conceptual tranquillity is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work, and especially in his later ‘grammatical‐therapeutic’ philosophy. Some commentators (notably Rush Rhees and C. G. Luckhardt) have cautioned that emphasising this facet of Wittgenstein's work ‘trivialises’ philosophy – something which is at odds with Wittgenstein's own philosophical ‘seriousness’ (in particular his insistence that philosophy demands that one ‘Go the bloody hard way’). Drawing on a number of correlations between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and that of the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, in this paper I defend a strong ‘therapeutic’ reading of Wittgenstein, and show how this can be maintained without ‘trivialising’ philosophy.     

The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence

A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.     

Telling and detecting lies in a high‐stake situation: the case of a convicted murderer

All deception studies published to date have been laboratory studies. In such studies people lied only for the sake of the experiment, consequently the stakes were usually low. Although research has shown that most spontaneous lies told in real life are trivial, such studies tell us little about lies where the stakes are high (such as police/suspect interviews). In Study 1, we discuss the behaviour of an actual suspect while he was interviewed by the police in a murder case. Although the man initially denied knowing and killing the victim, substantial evidence obtained by the police showed that he was lying. On the basis of this evidence, the man confessed to killing the victim and was later convicted for murder. To our knowledge there has been no other study published that has analysed the behaviour of a liar in such a high‐stake realistic setting. The analysis revealed several cues to deception. In Study 2, we exposed 65 police officers to six fragments (three truthful and three deceptive) of the interview with the murderer and asked them to indicate after each fragment whether the man was lying or not. The findings revealed that the participants were better at detecting truths (70% accuracy) than lies (57% accuracy). We also found individual differences among observers, with those holding popular stereotypical views on deceptive behaviour, such as ‘liars look away’ and ‘liars fidget’ performing least effectively as lie catchers. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Towards a theory of communicative competence

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ‘Linguistic competence’ for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ‘monologism’, ‘a priorism’, and ‘elementarism’. The author offers an outline of a theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ‘performative utterance’, the author elucidates the role of dialogue‐constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a”; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis.     

Formalized historiography,the structure of scientific and literary texts: Part I. some issues posed by computational methodology

The examination of theorizing and techniques for scientific language analysis applied to ‘history’ clearly generalizes to imply a domain of applicability potentially coextensive for behavioral scientists with the scope of cultural behavior. It is argued that the computer and related science and technology are moving toward a relationship vis-à-vis symbolic acts analogous to microscopy for the ‘sub-visual’ in scale and telescopes for astronomic phenomena. Content analysis is one of the points of departure, as also contemporary syntactic analysis, from which present ideas and algorithms have moved on. How ‘far’ — both at present and in prospect — is the subject of these articles.     

Fichte,Hegel, and the Life and Death Struggle

Several commentators have argued that Hegel's account of ‘self-consciousness’ in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as an ‘immanent critique’ of Fichte's idealism. If this is correct, it raises the question of whether Hegel's account of ‘recognition’ in Chapter IV can be interpreted as a critique of Fichte's conception of recognition as expounded in the Foundations of Natural Right. A satisfactory answer to this question will have to provide a plausible interpretation of the ‘life and death struggle’ as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition. This paper aims to provide such an interpretation. The first part of the paper provides a discussion of Fichte's account of recognition that emphasizes its ‘epistemic’ concerns. The second part argues that Hegel's account of the ‘life and death struggle’ can be read plausibly as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition.     

Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single,Objective World

Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject‐matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.     

Familiar words can serve as a semantic seed for syntactic bootstrapping

Young children can exploit the syntactic context of a novel word to narrow down its probable meaning. But how do they learn which contexts are linked to which semantic features in the first place? We investigate if 3‐ to 4‐year‐old children (n = 60) can learn about a syntactic context from tracking its use with only a few familiar words. After watching a 5‐min training video in which a novel function word (i.e., ‘ko’) replaced either personal pronouns or articles, children were able to infer semantic properties for novel words co‐occurring with the newly learned function word (i.e., objects vs. actions). These findings implicate a mechanism by which a distributional analysis, associated with a small vocabulary of known words, could be sufficient to identify some properties associated with specific syntactic contexts.     

Sporting Integrity,Coherence, and Being True to the Spirit of a Game

Abstract

The term ‘sporting integrity’ is widely used in the normative assessment of sports. The term, however, suffers from a lack of conceptual precision. Alfred Archer’s ‘coherence-view’ of sporting integrity goes a long way to help clarify what ‘sporting integrity’ actually means and the specific institutional and individual obligations that it generates. Archer argues that ‘sporting integrity’ essentially means that the constraints athletes face ‘cohere’, in the sense of applying consistent inefficiencies between athletic competitors. For example, those who use performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) are less constrained than those who do not use PEDs, and thus PED use undermines sporting integrity. This paper presents the argument that over and above competitive coherence, sporting integrity means living up to the ‘spirit’ or ‘ethos’ of a game. The implications of this view are that a sport could have ‘coherent’ competitive constraints and still lack sporting integrity; additionally, a sport could have ‘incoherent’ competitive constraints and still demonstrate sporting integrity. These implications are drawn out relative to the three specific cases that Archer uses to illustrate his coherence view; namely, PED use in professional cycling, ‘tanking’ in Olympic badminton, and the prospect of allowing the Rangers Football Club entrance into the Scottish Premier League without playing through and first winning/qualifying in the lesser leagues.     

Unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) as clinical concept

A clinical phenomenology of the concept ‘unconscious fantasy’ attempts to describe it from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective, that is, from the immediate experience of the analyst working in session. Articles of psychoanalytic authors from different persuasions are reviewed, which taken as a whole would shed some light on how the concept of unconscious fantasy takes shape in the analyst's mind during the session with the patient. A clinical phenomenology in three steps is described. Each step is illustrated by clinical material. Current controversies around the concept of unconscious fantasy (or phantasy) are still trapped in the discussion about if and how they are really unconscious. The strategy to describe from a ‘bottom‐up’ perspective the process of how the analyst's mind embraces the idea that an emerging phenomenon in the relationship with the patient can be defined as ‘unconscious fantasy’, allows us to elude the question as to whether or not we believe that unconscious fantasies exist at all, since we are neither required to assert or deny such a prior existence in order to describe the process of elaboration which, in the end, does formulate a fantasy as fantasy.     

The analyst as a citizen in the world

Beginning with a ‘big dream’ from almost fifty years ago, this paper tracks movement back and forth from an inner/individual adaptation to life to outer/collective adaptations through various stages of a life's journey. The rhythm between more inner orientation at one stage gives way to more outer adaptation at another stage and vice versa. This same movement can be paralleled by an exclusive emphasis on analysis at one stage and more of a mixture of analysis and activism at another stage. At the heart of this narrative is the realization that an inner big dream of decades before, symbolised both an inner path of developing a relationship with life‐promoting energies and an outer path represented by facilitating others’ discovery and participation in those energies. The dream therefore anticipated a more activist future of connecting inner and outer, individual and collective in various professional projects. This has resulted in occasional glimpses of the fact that the ‘spirit of the depths’ and ‘the spirit of the times’ can have a common meeting ground.     

II. Virtues,Human Good,and the Unity of a Life

Maclntyre's ‘disquieting suggestion’ concerning the apparently irretrievably anarchic state of contemporary moral discourse begs the crucial questions in any argument over the notion of ‘incoherence’ in moral thought and practice. Thus his attempt to establish the canonical authority of Aristotelianism fails. Nonetheless, the attempt to reconstruct a plausible Aristotelianism is of independent interest. Maclntyre introduces the quasi‐technical notion of a ‘practice’ to locate a non‐reductive teleology of the virtues. Though certain teleological expressions come naturally in a deepened understanding of the place of the virtues in a human life, they will not, at crucial points, bear the philosophically motivated teleological emphasis that Maclntyre places on them. This emphasis is a mistaken reaction to the inadequacies of expressions like ‘intrinsic’ and ‘for its own sake’, as often used by philosophers who argue against teleological construals of morality. It is also prompted by the mistaken belief that it is required to reveal the connection between morality and a person's good. For a non‐reductive construal of that connection we must focus on the meaning of action and of a life. This is in accord with some things Aristotle said. It is not in easy accord with the claim that moral judgments are factual or truth‐valued, nor with the claim that such a concern with meaning can be discursively underwritten by showing it to be a requirement of any sound philosophy of action and of personal identity. This does not lead to what Maclntyre calls ‘emotivism’, nor to ‘non‐cognitivism’.