Change blindness blindness: beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in change detection

Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants' beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants predicted equal levels of change detection for both types of changes across scene complexity. In Experiment 2, emphasizing the differences between intentional and incidental tasks allowed participants to make predictions that were less inaccurate. In Experiment 3, using more sensitive measures and accounting for individual differences did not further improve predictions. These findings suggest that adults do not fully understand the role of intention and scene complexity in change detection.     

Memory error in recognizing a pre-change object

People often fail to detect a change between two visual scenes and retrieval failure has been suggested as a reason. We investigated the possibility that retrieval blocking underlies this failure by examining the error pattern in recognizing the pre-change object. The results of Experiment 1 showed that participants were biased toward selecting the lure that was similar to the post-change object when they failed to recognize the pre-change object. This bias was also observed in Experiment 2 when there was sufficient time to encode and consolidate the pre-change object and the bias was as strong as correct recognition in Experiment 3 when participants divided attention during encoding and comparison. The bias in memory error remained significant even when participants had the option to select an “I don’t remember” response in Experiment 4. In Experiment 5, the bias was observed after participants successfully detected a change at an invalidly cued location and after they failed to detect a change at a validly cued location. These findings suggest that blocking can lead to retrieval failure in change detection when participants are aware of a change yet unable to retrieve verbatim traces and also when participants are unaware of a change and use the post-change object to retrieve the identity of the previous object at the same location.     

A response-discrimination account of the Simon effect

Simon effects might partly reflect stimulus-triggered response activation. According to the response-discrimination hypothesis, however, stimulus-triggered response activation shows up in Simon effects only when stimulus locations match the top-down selected spatial codes used to discriminate between alternative responses. Five experiments support this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, spatial codes of each response differed by horizontal and vertical axis position, yet one axis discriminated between alternative responses, whereas the other did not. Simon effects resulted for targets on discriminating axes only. In Experiment 2, both spatial axes discriminated between responses, and targets on both axes produced Simon effects. In Experiment 3, Simon effects resulted for a spatial choice-reaction task but not for a go/no-go task. Even in the go/no-go task, a Simon effect was restored when a two-choice reaction task preceded the go/no-go task (Experiment 4) or when participants initiated trials with responses spatially discriminated from the go response (Experiment 5).     

Anomalous Evidence,Confidence Change,and Theory Change

A novel experimental paradigm that measured theory change and confidence in participants' theories was used in three experiments to test the effects of anomalous evidence. Experiment 1 varied the amount of anomalous evidence to see if “dose size” made incremental changes in confidence toward theory change. Experiment 2 varied whether anomalous evidence was convergent (of multiple types) or replicating (similar finding repeated). Experiment 3 varied whether participants were provided with an alternative theory that explained the anomalous evidence. All experiments showed that participants' confidence changes were commensurate with the amount of anomalous evidence presented, and that larger decreases in confidence predicted theory changes. Convergent evidence and the presentation of an alternative theory led to larger confidence change. Convergent evidence also caused more theory changes. Even when people do not change theories, factors pertinent to the evidence and alternative theories decrease their confidence in their current theory and move them incrementally closer to theory change.     

Implicit change identification: a replication of Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2003)

Using a simple change detection task involving vertical and horizontal stimuli, I. M. Thornton and D. Fernandez-Duque (2000) showed that the implicit detection of a change in the orientation of an item influences performance in a subsequent orientation judgment task. However, S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) were not able to replicate this finding after correcting for confounds and thus attributed Thornton and Fernandez-Duque's results to methodological artifacts. Because Mitroff et al.'s failure to replicate might in turn have stemmed from several methodological differences between their study and those of Thornton and Fernandez-Duque (2000) and Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, the current authors set out to conduct a further replication in which they corrected all known methodological biases identified so far. The results suggest that implicit change detection indeed occurs: People's conscious decisions about the orientation of an item appear to be influenced by previous undetected changes in the orientation of other items in the display. Implications of this finding in light of current theories of visual awareness are discussed.     

Changing your mind

When individuals detect an inconsistency in a set of propositions, they tend to change their minds about at least one proposition to resolve the inconsistency. The orthodox view from William James (1907) onward has been that a rational change should be minimal. We propose an alternative hypothesis according to which individuals seek to resolve inconsistencies by explaining their origins. We report four experiments corroborating the explanatory hypothesis. Experiment 1 showed that participants’ explanations revised general conditional claims rather than specific categorical propositions. Experiment 2 showed that, when explanations did revise the categorical proposition, participants also tended to deny the consequences of a second generalization. Experiment 3 showed that this tendency persists when participants previously affirmed these consequences explicitly. Experiment 4 showed that, when participants could easily explain an inconsistency by revising a generalization, they were more likely to accept the consequences of a second generalization. All four results contravene minimalism but support the explanatory hypothesis.     

Explanation and Evidence in Informal Argument

A substantial body of evidence shows that people tend to rely too heavily on explanations when trying to justify an opinion. Some research suggests these errors may arise from an inability to distinguish between explanations and the evidence that bears upon them. We examine an alternative account, that many people do distinguish between explanations and evidence, but rely more heavily on unsubstantiated explanations when evidence is scarce or absent. We examine the philosophical and psychological distinctions between explanation and evidence, and show that participants use explanations as a substitute for missing evidence. Experiment 1 replicates the results of other researchers, but further shows that participants generate more evidence when they are not constrained by their lack of data. Merely mentioning a source of data can alter both their evaluation (Experiment 2) and their production (Experiment 3) of explanations and evidence. In Experiment 4, we show that participants can explicitly consider the availability of evidence and other pragmatic factors when evaluating arguments. Finally, we consider the implications of using explanations to replace missing evidence as a strategy in argument.     

Individual Differences in Arousal and Accessibility to Information in Memory

The authors conducted 9 experiments to test the hypothesis (S. Schwartz, 1975) that arousal influences the accessibility of information stored in memory. They investigated the relationship between arousal levels (as indexed by personality types) and the type of stimuli or cues presented during study or test. They predicted that low-arousal individuals (stable extroverted individuals in Experiments 1-3 and 5-9 and high-impulsive individuals in Experiment 4) would be influenced by semantic stimuli, whereas high-arousal individuals (neurotic introverted individuals in Experiments 1-3 and 5-9 and low-impulsive individuals in Experiment 4) would be influenced by physical (i.e., graphic, phonetic, or both) stimuli. They tested the arousal-accessibility hypothesis by using a variety of tasks including verbal discrimination, false recognition, cued recall, and paired associates. With the exception of the finding that stable extroverted participants performed better than neurotic introverted participants on an incidental associative-matching task (Experiment 3), the results from the verbal discrimination studies (1-5) did not support the hypothesis. In Experiment 6, the authors tested the hypothesis by using a false-recognition task. False alarms varied as a function of phonetic and semantic stimuli, but personality types were not differentially sensitive to the manipulation. The same was true for the cued-recall studies (Experiments 7 and 8); personality types were not differentially sensitive to the semantic and phonetic stimuli. Experiment 9 (paired-associate learning) was a replication of Schwartz's study. The authors found some support for the Schwartz hypothesis: Extraverted participants were adversely affected by semantic similarity. Overall, the findings did not provide much support for the arousal-accessability hypothesis.     

Thermoregulation and performance of heat-reinforced autoshaped keypecking in chicks

Performance of autoshaped keypecking reinforced by heat was found to increase and then to decrease when chicks were exposed to training under a constant thermal load on a daily basis over the first 1-2 weeks after hatching. The decline in performance was not affected by variation in US duration (Experiment 1). No decline in performance was observed when food reinforcement was used (Experiment 2), suggesting that the effect depended on the use of thermal motivation. When thermoregulation was disrupted by pharmacological blockade using propranolol hydrochloride (10 mg/kg), keypecking was reinstated (Experiment 3). The increase in keypecking produced by propranolol was not due to a nonspecific energization of behavior inasmuch as the drug depressed autoshaped keypecking established with food reinforcement (Experiment 4). These findings support the conclusion that the decline in autoshaped keypecking reinforced by heat is due to development of the chick's thermoregulatory system. Various physical changes (e.g., feathering) and the increasing effectiveness of autonomic and behavioral thermoregulatory responses reduce the net motivational value of external heat sources, thus leading to a decline in the likelihood of approach and contact with signals for heat.     

Changing scenes: memory for naturalistic events following change blindness

Research on scene perception indicates that viewers often fail to detect large changes to scene regions when these changes occur during a visual disruption such as a saccade or a movie cut. In two experiments, we examined whether this relative inability to detect changes would produce systematic biases in event memory. In Experiment 1, participants decided whether two successively presented images were the same or different, followed by a memory task, in which they recalled the content of the viewed scene. In Experiment 2, participants viewed a short video, in which an actor carried out a series of daily activities, and central scenes' attributes were changed during a movie cut. A high degree of change blindness was observed in both experiments, and these effects were related to scene complexity (Experiment 1) and level of retrieval support (Experiment 2). Most important, participants reported the changed, rather than the initial, event attributes following a failure in change detection. These findings suggest that attentional limitations during encoding contribute to biases in episodic memory.     

Nothing compares 2 views: change blindness can occur despite preserved access to the changed information

Change blindness, the failure to detect visual changes that occur during a disruption, has increasingly been used to infer the nature of internal representations. If every change were detected, detailed representations of the world would have to be stored and accessible. However, because many changes are not detected, visual representations might not be complete, and access to them might be limited. Using change detection to infer the completeness of visual representations requires an understanding of the reasons for change blindness. This article provides empirical support for one such reason: change blindness resulting from the failure to compare retained representations of both the pre- and postchange information. Even when unaware of changes, observers still retained information about both the pre- and postchange objects on the same trial.     

Causal structure learning over time: observations and interventions

Seven studies examined how people learn causal relationships in scenarios when the variables are temporally dependent - the states of variables are stable over time. When people intervene on X, and Y subsequently changes state compared to before the intervention, people infer that X influences Y. This strategy allows people to learn causal structures quickly and reliably when variables are temporally stable (Experiments 1 and 2). People use this strategy even when the cover story suggests that the trials are independent (Experiment 3). When observing variables over time, people believe that when a cause changes state, its effects likely change state, but an effect may change state due to an exogenous influence in which case its observed cause may not change state at the same time. People used this strategy to learn the direction of causal relations and a wide variety of causal structures (Experiments 4-6). Finally, considering exogenous influences responsible for the observed changes facilitates learning causal directionality (Experiment 7). Temporal reasoning may be the norm rather than the exception for causal learning and may reflect the way most events are experienced naturalistically.     

Learning artificial phonotactic constraints: time course, durability, and relationship to natural constraints

G. S. Dell, K. D. Reed, D. R. Adams, and A. S. Meyer (2000) proposed a "breadth-of-constraint" continuum on phoneme errors, using artificial experiment-wide constraints to investigate a putative middle ground between local and language-wide constraints. The authors report 5 experiments that test the idea of the continuum and the location of the experiment-wide constraints within it. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the findings of Dell et al. on the experiment-wide constraints but showed only chance adherence to the local positional constraints. Experiment 3 showed that the latter constraints are uniquely affected by the form of practice used. Experiments 4 and 5 investigated the time course and robustness of the experimental constraints by reversing them during testing. This caused no difficulty when occurring between blocks (Experiment 4) but caused short-lived disruption when occurring within block (Experiment 5). The authors propose that the results do not support the idea of a continuum, but that the experiment-wide constraints reflect a local biasing of language-wide constraints, probably related to the need for rapid learning.     

Abrupt luminance change pops out; abrupt color change does not

The present studies investigated whether an isoluminant color change pops out, indicating that it can be detected preattentively in parallel. The results of Experiment 1 show that an abrupt color change presented on an equiluminant background does not pop out. However, when the color change is accompanied by a small luminance change, it does pop out. The results of Experiment 2 show that the pop-out is fully due to the luminance change and not to the color change. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 show that the failure to find a pop-out at equiluminance cannot be attributed to the limited temporal resolution for chromatic stimuli. The results of Experiment 5 show that particular search strategies cannot be responsible for the obtained results. The results are in agreement with physiological findings regarding the parvo and magno systems.     

Spatial and temporal separation fails to counteract the effects of low prevalence in visual search

Recent research has shown that, in visual search, participants can miss 30-40% of targets when they only appear rarely (i.e. on 1-2% of trials). Low target prevalence alters the behavior of the searcher. It can lead participants to quit their search prematurely (Wolfe et al., 2005), to shift their decision criteria (Wolfe et al., 2007) and/or to make motor or response errors (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007). In this paper we examine whether the LP Effect can be ameliorated if we split the search set in two, spreading the task out over space and/or time. Observers searched for the letter "T" among "L"s. In Experiment 1, the left or right half of the display was presented to the participants before the second half. In Experiment 2, items were spatially intermixed but half of the items were presented first, followed by the second half. Experiment 3 followed the methods of Experiment 2 but allowed observers to correct perceived errors. All three experiments produced robust low prevalence (LP) effects with higher errors at 2% prevalence than at 50% prevalence. Dividing up the display had no beneficial effect on errors. The opportunity to correct errors reduced but did not eliminate the LP effect. Low prevalence continues to elevate errors even when observers are forced to slow down and permitted to correct errors.     

Examining stimuli paired with alternative reinforcement to mitigate resurgence in children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and pigeons

In two laboratory experiments, we examined whether stimuli paired with alternative reinforcers could mitigate resurgence of a previously reinforced target response with pigeons (Experiment 1) and children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (Experiment 2). In Phase 1, we arranged food reinforcement according to a variable-ratio schedule for engaging in a target response. In Phase 2, we arranged extinction for target responding and differentially reinforced alternative responding according to a fixed-ratio schedule, with every alternative-reinforcer delivery paired with a change in keylight color (Experiment 1) or automated verbal (praise) statement (Experiment 2). In Phase 3, we assessed resurgence during extinction of target and alternative responding in the presence versus absence of continued presentation of the paired stimulus. Despite variation across sessions, resurgence on average was lower when continuing to present the paired stimuli in all pigeons and children while maintenance of alternative responding did not differ between assessments. These findings indicate that stimuli paired with alternative reinforcement can modestly decrease resurgence, but further examination of their efficacy and a better understanding of the underlying processes are necessary before they can be recommended for clinical use in reducing resurgence of clinically relevant problem behavior.     

Line segments are perceived better in a coherent context than alone: An object-line effect in visual perception

In a series of four experiments, observers identified a briefly flashed line segment more accurately when it was part of a drawing that looked unitary and three-dimensional than when the line segment was presented alone. This extends earlier findings of better identification of a line segment when it is part of an apparently unitary, three-dimensional drawing than when it is in a less coherent flat design; and these results demonstrate a visua1 effect analogous to the word-letter effect which uses nonlinguistic materials. Experiment 1 demonstrates the existence of the object-line effect and shows that it does not depend on the presence of a subsequent mask; Experiment 2 shows that the effect holds up with two-altemative forcedchoice presentation; Experiment 3 demonstrates that the effect is not due to bright end points which may occur when the target line appears with a context; and Experiment 4 shows that the effect is as strong when the target line segments occupy widely separated spatial locations as it is when they occupy nearby, potentially confusable locations.     

The Development of Infants' Perception of Object Movement Along Inclines

Three experiments investigated 10- and 16-month-old infants' perceptions of events involving a computer-generated ball rolling up or down an incline. Experiment 1 demonstrated that infants do not have a priori preferences for either impossible or possible events. In Experiments 2 and 3, infants were habituated to either a possible or an impossible event and then shown three novel events that involved changes in individual features that may or may not correspond to changes in possibility. Ten-month-old infants responded to changes in individual features when habituated to downward movement and did not discriminate among any changes when habituated to upward movement. Sixteen-month-old infants responded to possibility changes that were accompanied by a change in direction when habituated to downward movement, and responded to changes in individual features when habituated to upward movement. These findings are discussed in terms of a framework by which infants first attend to individual features in events and later respond on basis of the combination of those features.     

Why don't we see changes?: The role of attentional bottlenecks and limited visual memory

Seven experiments explore the role of bottlenecks in selective attention and access to visual short-term memory in the failure of observers to identify clearly visible changes in otherwise stable visual displays. Experiment One shows that observers fail to register a color change in an object even if they are cued to the location of the object by a transient at that location as the change is occurring. Experiment Two shows the same for orientation change. In Experiments Three and Four, attention is directed to specific objects prior to making changes in those objects. Observers have only a very limited memory for the status of recently attended items. Experiment Five reveals that observers have no ability to detect changes that happen after attention has been directed to an object and before attention returns to that object. In Experiment Six, attention is cued at rates that more closely resemble natural rates and Experiment Seven uses natural images. Memory capacity remains very small (<4 items).     

Perceived effort in sniffing: The effects

Previous research has shown that perceived odor strength does not vary with flow rate of an odorant vapor entering the naris when that variation is produced by subject-controlled changes in sniff pressure, but that it does vary with flow rate when the variation is produced by experimenter-controlled changes in the resistance of the olfactometric system. We have suggested an odor-constancy model in which invariance of perceived odor strength is linked to perceived effort of sniffing, and have hypothesized that changed resistance will have its effect because there is no corresponding change in perceived effort when sniff pressure is held constant. In two studies, subjects made magnitude estimations of the perceived effort of sniffing; sniff pressure was controlled by having the subject match his sniff, displayed on a storage oscilloscope face, to a pattern specifying its required shape, duration, and level. In Experiment 1, resistance was fixed while sniff pressure varied; perceived effort grew as the .8 power of the required sniff pressure. In Experiment 2, sniff pressure and resistance were varied in a factorial design; perceived effort grew as the .8 power of pressure at fixed resistance, but remained unchanged when resistance varied at fixed pressure. This outcome provides indirect support for the odor-constancy model, since it shows that perceived effort covaries with flow rate under the condition in which constancy is found but does not change under the condition in which constancy fails.