Social tuning of automatic racial attitudes: the role of affiliative motivation

Consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, this study showed that the desire to get along with another person shifted participants' automatic attitudes toward the ostensible attitudes of that person. In Experiment 1, the automatic racial attitudes of women but not men emulated those of an experimenter displaying race-egalitarian attitudes or attitudes neutral with respect to race. Mediational analysis revealed that the gender difference in social tuning was mediated by liking for the experimenter. In Experiment 2, the likability of the experimenter was manipulated. Individuals who interacted with a likable experimenter exhibited social tuning more so than did those who interacted with a rude experimenter. These findings suggest that affiliative motives may elicit malleability of automatic attitudes independent of manipulations of social group exemplars.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Mere belonging: the power of social connections

Four experiments examined the effect on achievement motivation of mere belonging, a minimal social connection to another person or group in a performance domain. Mere belonging was expected to increase motivation by creating socially shared goals around a performance task. Participants were led to believe that an endeavor provided opportunities for positive social interactions (Experiment 1), that they shared a birthday with a student majoring in an academic field (Experiment 2), that they belonged to a minimal group arbitrarily identified with a performance domain (Experiment 3), or that they had task-irrelevant preferences similar to a peer who pursued a series of goals (Experiment 4). Relative to control conditions that held constant other sources of motivation, each social-link manipulation raised motivation, including persistence on domain-relevant tasks (Experiments 1-3) and the accessibility of relevant goals (Experiment 4). The results suggest that even minimal cues of social connectedness affect important aspects of self.     

Accountability as a deterrent to self-enhancement: the search for mechanisms

Although self-enhancement is linked to psychological benefits, it is also associated with personal and interpersonal liabilities (e.g., excessive risk taking, social exclusion). Hence, structuring social situations that prompt people to keep their self-enhancing beliefs in check can confer personal and interpersonal advantages. The authors examined whether accountability can serve this purpose. Accountability was defined as the expectation to explain, justify, and defend one's self-evaluations (grades on an essay) to another person ("audience"). Experiment 1 showed that accountability curtails self-enhancement. Experiment 2 ruled out audience concreteness and status as explanations for this effect. Experiment 3 demonstrated that accountability-induced self-enhancement reduction is due to identifiability. Experiment 4 documented that identifiability decreases self-enhancement because of evaluation expectancy and an accompanying focus on one's weaknesses.     

Conversation memory: the effects of speaker status on memory for the assertiveness of conversation remarks

We conducted three experiments to examine the effects of information about a speaker's status on memory for the assertiveness of his or her remarks. Subjects either read (Experiments 1 and 2) or listened to a conversation (Experiment 3) and were later tested for their memory of the target speaker's remarks with either a recognition (Experiment 1) or a recall procedure (Experiments 2 and 3). In all experiments the target speaker's ostensible status was manipulated. In Experiment 1, subjects who believed the speaker was high in status were less able later to distinguish between remarks from the conversation and assertive paraphrases of those remarks. This result was replicated in Experiment 2, but only when the status information was provided before subjects read the conversation and not when the information was provided after the conversation had been read. Experiment 2's results eliminate a reconstructive memory interpretation and suggest that information about a speaker's status affects the encoding of remarks. Experiment 3 examined this effect in a more ecologically representative context.     

We can do it: the interplay of construal orientation and social comparisons under threat

The authors investigated how a collective self-construal orientation in combination with positive social comparisons "turns off" the negative effects of stereotype threat. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that stereotype threat led to increased accessibility of participants' collective self ("we"). Experiment 2 showed that this feeling of "we-ness" in the stereotype threat condition centered on the participants' stereotyped group membership and not on other important social groups (e.g., students). Experiment 3 indicated that in threat situations, when participants' collective self is accessible, positive social comparison information led to improved math test performance and less concern, whereas in nonthreat situations, when the collective self is less accessible, positive comparison information led to worse test performance and more concern. Our final experiment revealed that under stereotype threat, only those comparison targets who are competent in the relevant domain (math), rather than in domains unrelated to math (athletics), enhanced participants' math test performance.     

Social loafing and social compensation: the effects of expectations of co-worker performance

Previous research has suggested that people tend to engage in social loafing when working collectively. The present research tested the social compensation hypothesis, which states that people will work harder collectively than individually when they expect their co-workers to perform poorly on a meaningful task. In 3 experiments, participants worked either collectively or coactively on an idea generation task. Expectations of co-worker performance were either inferred from participants' interpersonal trust scores (Experiment 1) or were directly manipulated by a confederate coworker's statement of either his intended effort (Experiment 2) or his ability at the task (Experiment 3). All 3 studies supported the social compensation hypothesis. Additionally, Experiment 3 supported the hypothesis that participants would not socially compensate for a poorly performing co-worker when working on a task that was low in meaningfulness.     

Violations of implicit theories and the sense of prediction and control: implications for motivated person perception

Beginning with the assumption that implicit theories of personality are crucial tools for understanding social behavior, the authors tested the hypothesis that perceivers would process person information that violated their predominant theory in a biased manner. Using an attentional probe paradigm (Experiment 1) and a recognition memory paradigm (Experiment 2), the authors presented entity theorists (who believe that human attributes are fixed) and incremental theorists (who believe that human attributes are malleable) with stereotype-relevant information about a target person that supported or violated their respective theory. Both groups of participants showed evidence of motivated, selective processing only with respect to theory-violating information. In Experiment 3, the authors found that after exposure to theory-violating information, participants felt greater anxiety and worked harder to reestablish their sense of prediction and control mastery. The authors discuss the epistemic functions of implicit theories of personality and the impact of violated assumptions.     

The effect of incidental experiences of regulatory fit on trust

Two experiments provide support for the hypothesis that when people assess how much they trust another person, feelings of rightness from an initial, brief experience of regulatory fit (consistency between prevention or promotion regulatory focus of goals and strategic means) can suggest the other person is trustworthy, relative to feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonfit. This regulatory-fit effect on trust was stronger for acquaintances than for individuals participants knew well (Experiment 1) and was eliminated by drawing participants' attention to how right the earlier, trust judgment-irrelevant event made them feel (Experiment 2). Implications are discussed for regulatory-fit theory, possible applications to applied settings and to other populations, and possible effects of other types of regulatory fit.     

Social influence effects on automatic racial prejudice.

Although most research on the control of automatic prejudice has focused on the efficacy of deliberate attempts to suppress or correct for stereotyping, the reported experiments tested the hypothesis that automatic racial prejudice is subject to common social influence. In experiments involving actual interethnic contact, both tacit and expressed social influence reduced the expression of automatic prejudice, as assessed by two different measures of automatic attitudes. Moreover, the automatic social tuning effect depended on participant ethnicity. European Americans (but not Asian Americans) exhibited less automatic prejudice in the presence of a Black experimenter than a White experimenter (Experiments 2 and 4), although both groups exhibited reduced automatic prejudice when instructed to avoid prejudice (Experiment 3). Results are consistent with shared reality theory, which postulates that social regulation is central to social cognition.     

Distinctiveness-based stereotype threat and the moderating role of coaction contexts

Two experiments, using computer avatars, examined the role of coaction contexts (competition versus cooperation) in distinctiveness-based stereotype threat. In Experiment 1, African-American participants performed an anagram-solving task with two ostensible coactors either in a high-distinctiveness (participant being a numerical minority with two Caucasian coactors) or in a low-distinctiveness (racial-cues absent with silhouette-image avatars) environment; coaction contexts were structured either in terms of competition or in terms of cooperation. Participants situated in the high-distinctiveness environment performed better when they engaged in cooperation than in competition whereas those in the low-distinctive environment did not show a significant difference. In Experiment 2, which was conducted to replicate and extend Experiment 1 with a different social category/domain, females took a mathematics test with two ostensible coactors. Whereas the competition versus cooperation difference was not significant among participants placed in a low-distinctiveness (female-majority or all-female) environment, participants situated in a high-distinctiveness (female-minority) environment showed significantly lower levels of stereotype-associated concerns and better performance on the math test in cooperation than in competition. Our findings suggest that distinctiveness-based stereotype threat is less likely to occur when the context of group performance is framed as cooperation as opposed to competition.     

Articulatory constraints on interpersonal postural coordination

Cooperative conversation has been shown to foster interpersonal postural coordination. The authors investigated whether such coordination is mediated by the influence of articulation on postural sway. In Experiment 1, talkers produced words in synchrony or in alternation, as the authors varied speaking rate and word similarity. Greater shared postural activity was found for the faster speaking rate. In Experiment 2, the authors demonstrated that shared postural activity also increases when individuals speak the same words or speak words that have similar stress patterns. However, this increase in shared postural activity is present only when participants' data are compared with those of their partner, who was present during the task, but not when compared with the data of a member of a different pair speaking the same word sequences as those of the original partner. The authors' findings suggest that interpersonal postural coordination observed during conversation is mediated by convergent speaking patterns.     

Automatic Activation and Use of Gender Subgroups

Two experiments tested whether, similarly to global gender categories, gender subgroups are activated and applied on an automatic basis. In Experiment 1 (N?=?90) the female subgroup career woman was activated in a subliminal priming procedure. Experiment 2 (N?=?40) contrasted the subliminal priming of career woman with the activation of the global category woman. In both experiments the activated subgroup was applied to a target person in an ostensibly unrelated judgment task: Judgments of the target person were significantly higher on features typical for the subgroup than on untypical features. Activating the global category led to clearly different judgments than when the subgroup was activated. Results are discussed with respect to the use of global and subordinate gender categories in social categorization.     

Learned helplessness and learned resourcefulness: effects of noncontingent success and failure on individuals differing in self-control skills

We designed two experiments to investigate the role of self-control processes in learned-helplessness studies by assessing the differential reactions to uncontrollability of subjects who presumably had either a rich (high resourceful, or HR) or poor (low resourceful, or LR) repertoire of self-control skills. HR and LR subjects received noncontingent success feedback, failure feedback, or no feedback on a task that ostensibly assessed "therapeutic abilities." Subjects were subsequently tested on insolvable puzzles (Experiment 1) or on solvable anagrams (Experiment 2). According to Kanfer and Hagerman's (1981) self-regulation model, self-regulatory activities are evoked primarily in situations in which subjects are faced with repeated failure. Hence we predicted that individual differences in self-control would influence performance on the insolvable puzzles and not anagram performance after exposure to noncontingent failure. This prediction was confirmed: Only the performance of LR subjects on the insolvable puzzles was debilitated by the helplessness induction, whereas HR and LR subjects showed equal helplessness-induced deficits on the anagrams. The latter finding was interpreted in terms of the learned-helplessness model without the mediating effects of self-regulatory processes. As predicted from the self-control model, HR subjects more frequently checked statements indicating positive self-evaluations and task-oriented thoughts and less frequently checked negative self-evaluations than did LR subjects during exposure to uncontrollability in both experiments. We concluded that the self-control model accounts best for subjects' self-reactions during exposure to uncontrollability or failure, whereas the learned-helplessness model accounts for the generalization of helplessness from uncontrollable situations to controllable ones.     

Experimental Tests of Normative Group Influence and Representation Effects in Computer‐Mediated Communication

Two experiments addressed the questions of if and how normative social influence operates in anonymous computer‐mediated communication (CMC) and human‐computer interaction (HCI). In Experiment 1, a 2 (public response vs. private response) × 2 (one interactant vs. four interactants) × 3 (textbox vs. stick figure vs. animated character) mixed‐design experiment (N = 72), we investigated how conformity pressure operates in a simulated CMC setting. Each participant was asked to make a decision in hypothetical social dilemmas after being presented with a unanimous opinion by other (ostensible) participants. The experiment examined how the visual representation of interaction partners on the screen moderates this social influence process. Group conformity effects were shown to be more salient when the participant's responses were allegedly seen by others, compared to when the responses were given in private. In addition, participants attributed greater competence, social attractiveness, and trustworthiness to partners represented by anthropomorphic characters than those represented by textboxes or stick figures. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, replacing interaction with a computer(s) rather than (ostensible) people, to create an interaction setting in which no normative pressure was expected to occur. The perception of interaction partner (human vs. computer) moderated the group conformity effect such that people expressed greater public agreement with human partners than with computers. No such difference was found for the private expression of opinion. As expected, the number of computer agents did not affect participants' opinions whether the responses were given in private or in public, while visual representation had a significant impact on both conformity measures and source perception variables.     

If you can't join them, beat them: effects of social exclusion on aggressive behavior.

Social exclusion was manipulated by telling people that they would end up alone later in life or that other participants had rejected them. These manipulations caused participants to behave more aggressively. Excluded people issued a more negative job evaluation against someone who insulted them (Experiments 1 and 2). Excluded people also blasted a target with higher levels of aversive noise both when the target had insulted them (Experiment 4) and when the target was a neutral person and no interaction had occurred (Experiment 5). However, excluded people were not more aggressive toward someone who issued praise (Experiment 3). These responseswere specific to social exclusion (as opposed to other misfortunes) and were not mediated by emotion     

Audience-tuning effects on memory: the role of shared reality

After tuning to an audience, communicators' own memories for the topic often reflect the biased view expressed in their messages. Three studies examined explanations for this bias. Memories for a target person were biased when feedback signaled the audience's successful identification of the target but not after failed identification (Experiment 1). Whereas communicators tuning to an in-group audience exhibited the bias, communicators tuning to an out-group audience did not (Experiment 2). These differences did not depend on communicators' mood but were mediated by communicators' trust in their audience's judgment about other people (Experiments 2 and 3). Message and memory were more closely associated for high than for low trusters. Apparently, audience-tuning effects depend on the communicators' experience of a shared reality.     

Do not prime hawks with doves: the interplay of construct activation and consistency of social value orientation on cooperative behavior

Low and high consistent pro-socials and pro-selfs were primed with neutral, morality, or might concepts in mixed-motive situations. The authors expected participants' social value orientation to influence cooperative behavior among (a) high consistent individuals in all prime conditions and (b) low consistent individuals in the neutral prime condition only. The authors also expected the primes to influence cooperative behavior more among low than high consistent individuals. Four experiments using supra-liminal (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or subliminal (Experiment 3) priming and 2-person (Experiments 1-3) or N-person (Experiment 4) social dilemmas partially supported these initial predictions. One intriguing exception was that morality primes reduced cooperation among high consistent pro-selfs. Experiments 2-4 allowed testing for the potential role of expectations in shaping participants' cooperative behavior.     

The generalization of shared reality: When communication about one target shapes evaluations of other targets

Communicators often tune their message about a target to the audience's attitude toward that target. This tuning can shape a communicator's own evaluation of the target, which reflects the creation of a shared reality with the audience. So far, evidence for shared‐reality creation has been confined to one specific target. In two experiments, we examined whether and when a shared reality would generalize to other targets. In Experiment 1, shared‐reality creation about an ambiguous sexist target generalized to the evaluation of a new ambiguous sexist target for which no audience attitude was provided. However, this happened only when there was high (vs. low) commonality with the audience regarding previous judgments. In Experiment 2, we investigated conditions for the temporal persistence of generalization. One week after message tuning to a high‐commonality audience, a shared reality generalized to a new ambiguous sexist target when participants recalled the shared‐reality creation about the initial target, but it did not generalize in conditions without such recall. Also, no generalization occurred for non‐ambiguous or non‐sexist targets. Results suggest that shared reality generalization depends on perceived commonality with the audience, recollection of shared reality at time of judgment, and similarity between new and initial targets.     

After-affects: How automatic evaluations influence the interpretation of subsequent, unrelated stimuli

Findings from three experiments suggest that participants’ automatic evaluations of subliminally presented objects influenced how they interpreted subsequent, unrelated objects. Participants defined homographs (Experiment 1), categorized objects and people (Experiment 2), and made person judgments (Experiment 3) that all could be disambiguated in either a positive or negative way. Participants’ responses to the ambiguous targets were evaluatively consistent with their automatic evaluations of preceding, semantically unrelated objects. The findings suggest that one’s automatic evaluations can influence deliberate judgments of subsequent stimuli, even when the only shared dimension between the initially evaluated objects and the judged objects is an evaluative one. The implications of these findings are discussed with regard to possible mechanisms of evaluative priming as well as previous research concerning evaluative priming effects on social judgment.