A note on Dasgupta’s Generalism

Philosophical Studies - Dasgupta (Philos Stud Int J Philos Anal Tradit 145(1):35–67, 2009) has argued that material individuals, such as particles and laptops, are metaphysically...     

A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding

Synthese - Horwich (Deflationism and paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 75–84, 2005) proposes a solution to the liar paradox that relies on a particular notion of...     

On the validity of Raven’s matrices test: Does spatial ability contribute to performance?

The paper reports on an investigation of the convergent and discriminant validity of Raven’s matrices in considering reasoning and spatial abilities. Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (APM) and four scales representing reasoning, visualization, mental rotation and closure were applied to a sample of N = 280 university students. The data were investigated by means of structural equation modeling. The results demonstrated convergent validity of APM with respect to reasoning. In contrast, in investigating discriminant validity substantial correlations of moderate size between APM and the scales representing spatial abilities were observed. However, the investigation of the structure of the prediction of APM revealed that the scales representing spatial abilities did not improve the prediction based on the reasoning scale alone at the latent level. Consequently, it is suggested that Raven’s matrices show good convergent validity and slightly impaired discriminant validity.     

Apparent movement and metacontrast: A note on Kahneman’s formulation

Recently metacontrast has been described as a case of “impossible” apparent motion. Kahneman (J 967) has supported this hypothesis with a study showing that apparent motion and metacontrast functions resemble one another. However, when visual angle, luminance, and duration vary from the values used in the Kahneman study, the resemblance between the two effects breaks down. Since the apparent motion explanation for metacontrast assumes an identity between apparent motion and metacontrast, these present results indicate that the apparent motion hypothesis for metacontrast is untenable. Metacontrast and apparent motion may not be unrelated, however; they might both have something to do with single units in the visualcortex. For each effect, however, different functional units would be involved.     

On Smilansky’s Defense of Prepunishment: A Response to Robinson

Philosophia - In a 2010 paper published in this journal, Robinson responded to Smilansky’s argument that compatibilists do not have a principled reason to reject prepunishment. Smilansky...     

Exploring the ability to identify visual search differences when observing drivers’ eye movements

How can we improve learner drivers’ visual skills? Much research has demonstrated that learner drivers have an impoverished spread of search during driving and that this is partly due to lack of knowledge of where and when to look, rather than simply an issue of cognitive load. Several training interventions have tried to improve scanning in these drivers with limited success. We propose that exposing drivers to examples of good and bad scanning behaviour may prove to be a useful tool in training visual search. The success of this approach, however, requires drivers to be able to distinguish between examples of good and bad scanning. To this end, two studies were undertaken where video clips of simulated driving with an overlaid eye movement trace were presented to participants who had to judge whether the eye movements were that of a learner driver or a driving instructor. Overall, participants found this discrimination task very difficult. However, the findings suggested that novice and learner drivers were able to correctly classify those eye movement traces of other learner drivers better than chance. It was also demonstrated that the ability to distinguish between the eye movements of learner drivers and driving instructors improved as the number of objective differences between the two groups increased across specific scenarios (as determined by frame-by-frame analysis using a priori categories). The results suggest that, under certain situations, drivers can extract information about the appropriateness of a particular scanning strategy just by watching a video of the eye movement trace. The implications for training interventions are discussed.     

A Psychoanalytic Reader’s Commentary: On Erasure and Negation as a Barrier to the Future

This paper is a psychoanalytically informed critical race theoretical commentary on Daniel Gaztambide’s paper, “A Preferential Option for the Repressed: Psychoanalysis Through the Eyes of Liberation Theology,” which received the 2014 Multiculturalism and Psychoanalysis Award by the NYU Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis’ Committee on Ethnicity, Race, Culture, Class & Language. This discussion is an attempt to utilize psychoanalytic and literary techniques to explore some of the ways psychoanalysis continues to inscribe cultural practices and normative thinking that foreclose opportunities to expand its margins to be more inclusive. I selected one sentence and used it to suggest how it affected this Black American reader who is also a psychoanalyst.     

A connectionist modeling study of the neural mechanisms underlying pain’s ability to reorient attention

Connectionist modeling was used to investigate the brain mechanisms responsible for pain’s ability to shift attention away from another stimulus modality and toward itself. Different connectionist model architectures were used to simulate the different possible brain mechanisms underlying this attentional bias, where nodes in the model simulated the brain areas thought to mediate the attentional bias, and the connections between the nodes simulated the interactions between the brain areas. Mathematical optimization techniques were used to find the model parameters, such as connection strengths, that produced the best quantitative fits of reaction time and event-related potential data obtained in our previous work. Of the several architectures tested, two produced excellent quantitative fits of the experimental data. One involved an unexpected pain stimulus activating somatic threat detectors in the dorsal posterior insula. This threat detector activity was monitored by the medial prefrontal cortex, which in turn evoked a phasic response in the locus coeruleus. The locus coeruleus phasic response resulted in a facilitation of the cortical areas involved in decision and response processes time-locked to the painful stimulus. The second architecture involved the presence of pain causing an increase in general arousal. The increase in arousal was mediated by locus coeruleus tonic activity, which facilitated responses in the cortical areas mediating the sensory, decision, and response processes involved in the task. These two neural network architectures generated competing predictions that can be tested in future studies.     

On the distinction between Peirce’s abduction and Lipton’s Inference to the best explanation

I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton’s thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference.     

A note on the ω-incompleteness formalization

The paper studies two formal schemes related to -completeness.LetS be a suitable formal theory containing primitive recursive arithmetic and letT be a formal extension ofS. Denoted by (a), (b) and (c), respectively, are the following three propositions (where (x) is a formula with the only free variable x): (a) (for anyn) ( _T (n)), (b) _{T x} Pr _T (^–(x)^–) and (c) _T x(x) (the notational conventions are those of Smoryski [3]). The aim of this paper is to examine the meaning of the schemes which result from the formalizations, over the base theoryS, of the implications (b) (c) and (a) (b), where ranges over all formulae. The analysis yields two results overS : 1. the schema corresponding to (b) (c) is equivalent to ¬Cons _T and 2. the schema corresponding to (a) (b) is not consistent with 1-CON _T. The former result follows from a simple adaptation of the -incompleteness proof; the second is new and is based on a particular application of the diagonalization lemma.Presented byMelvin Fitting     

On Failing to be Cartesian: Reconsidering the ‘Impurity’ of Descartes’s Meditation

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the ‘pure’, thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes’s inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the ‘Cartesian’ ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian ‘project of pure inquiry’ to which he aspired.     

A note on ‘scepticism and absurdity’

In ‘Scepticism and Absurdity’ (Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 2) Ingemund Gullvag concludes that recent attempts to counter scepticism have failed. It is suggested that where the attempts Gullvåg investigates are complex theories of a sociological and linguistic‐psychological nature, we need only refer to a simple and inspectable fact of language to counter scepticism.     

The Meontic and the Militant: On Merleau-Ponty’s Relation to Fink∗

Abstract

This paper clarifies the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation with regard to ‘the idea of a transcendental theory of method’. Although Fink’s text played a singularly important role in the development of Merleau-Ponty’s postwar thought, contrary to recent claims made by Ronald Bruzina this influence was not positive. Reconstructing the basic methodological claims of each text, in particular with regard to the being of the phenomenologist, the nature of the productivity that makes phenomenology possible, and the problem of methodological self-reference, I show that Phenomenology of Perception is premised on a decisive rejection of the main theses affirmed in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In contrast to Fink’s speculative reinterpretation of phenomenology as an absolute science, Merleau-Ponty viewed it as participating in the historical realization of the world, and hence as ultimately based on a practical faith. Albeit with a Marxian inflection, Merleau-Ponty thus related phenomenology much more closely to Kant. This may not be a better philosophical position, but circa 1945 it was Merleau-Ponty’s, whose work must be approached accordingly.     

A response to Penrose’s “Sandel on enhancement: A response to Van Niekerk”

In this article the author responds to Brian Penrose’s critical response to his (Van Niekerk’s) article “Biomedical enhancement and the pursuit of mastery and perfection: a critique of the views of Michael Sandel” that appeared in the PSSA conference edition of the SAJP 33(2), 2014. While Van Niekerk is appreciative of the opportunity for spirited dialogue that Penrose’s response provides, he nevertheless takes issue with several charges Penrose raises. He responds to Penrose’s claims that Van Niekerk does not fully understand “the Sandel project” and thus that Van Niekerk creates and shoots down a straw man in his argument against Sandel. Van Niekerk argues that Penrose’s claims are indicative of significant methodological differences between their respective approaches. Penrose acknowledges the “fuzziness” of Sandel’s arguments with regards to biomedical enhancement. He then develops an interpretation of Sandel’s views that claims to have “filled in the complete picture” of what Sandel attempts to do, and then reproaches Van Niekerk for not responding to that “completed picture”, i.e. the “Sandel project”. Van Niekerk finds this to be an unreasonable and methodologically highly problematic demand on him. Van Niekerk responds to a number of Penrose’s arguments, and then concludes that while there are, of course, good reasons to exercise caution at the prospect of biomedical enhancement with regard to its risks, the possibilities offered by enhancement need not elicit a prima facie reaction of pessimism. Rather, such prospects can also be regarded in a positive light as an exciting opportunity to take our own evolution in hand.     

A note on the proof theory the λII-calculus

The II-calculus, a theory of first-order dependent function types in Curry-Howard-de Bruijn correspondence with a fragment of minimal first-order logic, is defined as a system of (linearized) natural deduction. In this paper, we present a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the II-calculus and prove the cut-elimination theorem.The cut-elimination result builds upon the existence of normal forms for the natural deduction system and can be considered to be analogous to a proof provided by Prawitz for first-order logic. The type-theoretic setting considered here elegantly illustrates the distinction between the processes of normalization in a natural deduction system and cut-elimination in a Gentzen-style sequent calculus.We consider an application of the cut-free calculus, via the subformula property, to proof-search in the II-calculus. For this application, the normalization result for the natural deduction calculus alone is inadequate, a (cut-free) calculus with the subformula property being required.This paper was written whilst the author was affiliated to the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, U.K. and revised for publication whilst he was affiliated to the University of Birmingham, England, U.K.Presented byDaniele Mundici     

Laplace’s demon tries on Aristotle’s cloak: on two approaches to determinism

Synthese - The paper describes two approaches to determinism: one focuses on the features of global objects, such as possible worlds or models of a theory, whereas the other’s concern is the...