Arrow’s theorem and theory choice

In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83–115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow’s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow’s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow’s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow’s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow’s theorem may be dismissed as a problem.     

A comparison of two estimation algorithms for Samejima’s continuous IRT model

This study compares two algorithms, as implemented in two different computer softwares, that have appeared in the literature for estimating item parameters of Samejima’s continuous response model (CRM) in a simulation environment. In addition to the simulation study, a real-data illustration is provided, and CRM is used as a potential psychometric tool for analyzing measurement outcomes in the context of curriculum-based measurement (CBM) in the field of education. The results indicate that a simplified expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm is as effective and efficient as the traditional EM algorithm for estimating the CRM item parameters. The results also show promise for using this psychometric model to analyze CBM outcomes, although more research is needed in order to recommend CRM as a standard practice in the CBM context.     

Kuhn’s Legacy: Theoretical and Philosophical Study of History

This paper considers the legacy of Kuhn and his Structure with regard to the current history and philosophy of science. Kuhn can be seen as a myth breaker, whose contribution is the way he connected historical and philosophical studies of science, questioning the cumulativist image and demanding historical responsibility of the views of science. I build on Kuhn’s legacy and outline a suggestion for theoretical and philosophical study of history (of science), which can be subdivided into three categories. The first is the philosophical analysis of historical interpretation and its relation to the historical record. The second is ‘theoretical history’ in which one tries to infer philosophically relevant interpretations on the nature of science on the basis of historical evidence. The third is the conceptual reflection of the assumptions and implications of the contemporary historiography of science. At the end I suggest that theoretical and philosophical study of history offers a fresh way to make history and philosophy relevant to each other.     

Torgerson’s conjecture and Luce’s magnitude production representation imply an empirically false property

The prediction presented is based upon the empirically well sustained magnitude production representation that arose in both of Luce’s global psychophysical theories for subjective intensity of binary and unary continua coupled with Torgerson’s (1961) conjecture that respondents fail to distinguish subjective differences from subjective ratios. When applied to eqisections and fractionation the conjecture implies that the cognitive distortion function of the magnitude production representation is the identity function, which is firmly rejected by existing data.     

Incommensurability,incomparability, and God’s choice of a world

Anselmian theism holds that there necessarily exists a being, God, who is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. This being is also understood to be the creator and sustainer of all that is. In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, this role is generally understood as follows: God surveys the array of possible worlds, and in his wisdom selects exactly one for actualization, based on its axiological properties. In this paper, I discuss an under-appreciated challenge for this account of the Anselmian God’s selection of a world. In particular, I urge that there are failures of comparability between various possible worlds, and I argue that, given certain assumptions, these failures threaten the rationality of God’s choice of a world. To the extent that rationality is deemed necessary for unsurpassability, this result also challenges the core Anselmian notion that God is an unsurpassable being.     

The role of entrenchment in children’s and adults’ performance on grammaticality judgment tasks

Between the ages of 3 and 7 years, children have been observed to produce verb argument structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., Don’t giggle me; Bowerman, 1982, 1988; Pinker, 1989). A number of recent studies have begun to find evidence that the precise distributional properties of the input may provide an important part of the explanation for why children retreat from overgeneralization errors (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999; Brooks, Tomasello, Dodson, & Lewis, 1999). The current study evaluates the role of entrenchment (Braine & Brooks, 1995) in constraining argument structure overgeneralization errors using a grammaticality judgment task. The 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with examples of argument structure errors containing high and low frequency verbs matched for semantic class and asked to indicate whether, or the extent to which they found the sentences to be grammatical. The data show that across all groups, sentences with argument structure errors containing low frequency verbs were judged to be significantly more grammatical than those containing high frequency verbs. These findings provide further support for the entrenchment hypothesis and suggest that verb frequency plays an important and continuing role in determining a speaker’s choice of verb argument structure.     

Robert Hooke’s model of memory

In 1682 the scientist and inventor Robert Hooke read a lecture to the Royal Society of London, in which he described a mechanistic model of human memory. Yet few psychologists today seem to have heard of Hooke’s memory model. The lecture addressed questions of encoding, memory capacity, repetition, retrieval, and forgetting—some of these in a surprisingly modern way. Hooke’s model shares several characteristics with the theory of Richard Semon, which came more than 200 years later, but it is more complete. Among the model’s interesting properties are that (1) it allows for attention and other top-down influences on encoding; (2) it uses resonance to implement parallel, cue-dependent retrieval; (3) it explains memory for recency; (4) it offers a single-system account of repetition priming; and (5) the power law of forgetting can be derived from the model’s assumptions in a straightforward way.     

Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference

A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. However, this view on human reasoning is unable to explain human accomplishments like technological innovations or scientific progress. David Papineau offers a theory of human theoretical rationality that is consistent with the psychological view on human reasoning but that can also explain how humans sometimes are able to transcend the limitations of their biologically quick and dirty modes of thought and thereby reach a high level of accuracy. Papineau claims that the abilities that constitute theoretical rationality are unique to the human species and thus, that human reasoning is fundamentally distinctive after all. In this paper I am going to discuss to what extent these abilities in fact are unique to our species and whether this theoretical rationality can be called an anthropological difference.     

Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position.     

Smith’s practicality requirement meets dual-process models of moral judgment

In The Moral Problem, Michael Smith argues that only motivational internalists can offer an adequate explanation of why changes in moral judgment tend to be accompanied by changes in motivation in morally virtuous people. Smith argues that the failure of motivational externalism to account for this phenomenon amounts to a reductio of the view. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models of moral judgment to develop an externalist response to Smith’s argument. The key to my proposal is that motivationally efficacious states are often the source of our moral judgments, and changes in judgment are typically the result of changes in these states. However, moral judgments can also be formed via an alternative pathway that does not necessarily affect motivation, and so motivation and judgment can come apart. This response not only defuses Smith’s objections to externalism, but challenges Smith to square his internalist proposal with the empirical details of moral judgment.     

Children’s choice strategies: the effects of age and task demands

Two experiments examined the effect of age and cognitive demands on children’s choice strategies. Children aged 8–9 and 12–13 years were asked to choose among either two or four products that differed in several attributes of varying importance to them. Choice tasks were designed to differentiate between the lexicographic and the equal-weighting strategies that the children used. The results showed that older children use the two strategies more appropriately than younger children do. The choice of strategies reflects the demands of the task. All children were more likely to use the strategies correctly when choosing between two alternatives and tended to rely on the relatively less cognitive-demanding lexicographic strategy to choose among four alternatives. However, they were less likely to employ the lexicographic strategy in simpler tasks and when its use was difficult to justify, indicating an adaptive use.     

An empirical comparison of theZ-variance and Box-Scheffé tests for homogeneity of variance

This brief report provides a comparison of theZ-variance and Box-Scheffé tests for homogeneity of variance. Both procedures are relatively simple to perform and both may be readily utilized in complex, multifactor designs. TheZ-variance test is not robust against non-normality; the Box-Scheffé test is robust against non-normality but is not nearly as powerful as theZ-variance test.     

The categorical interpretation of Guo Xiang’s “independent genesis”

Seemingly, “independent genesis” refers to the independent existence and changes of each thing, but it is clear that there cannot be any truly “independent” things at all. Each thing in the world has to stay in connection or relationship with other things outside itself if it wants to represent its own “independence” and “genesis” in terms of form; and inevitably such connection or relationship itself has to be embodied in the internal nature of each thing. In the metaphysical thought of Guo Xiang, the former was known as the quality of “interdependence”; and the latter the characteristics of “quality” or “quality image.” Such characteristics of “quality” or “quality image” were interdependent, which constituted the essence of each thing itself as “beingness” and “beinglessness,” and thus resulted in the independent manifestation and change of things in terms of their external forms. The grasping of essence of things as “beingness” and “beinglessness” depended upon comprehension or rational intuition, and that was the realm of “profundity” in Guo Xiang’s terms.     

Olfaction and young children’s preferences: A comparison of odor and visual cues

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics - This research compared the relative contributions of odor and visual cues in determining young children’s preferences. Thirty-two children were...     

Children’s reading skills: A comparison of traditional and computerized assessment

Student’s ability to read computer text was investigated by comparing reading performance on decoding and phonetics tests of the Woodcock-Johnson (Revised) Tests of Achievement, Forms A and B. Fifty-one students completed one form of the reading tests through the traditional administration method and a second form using computer administration. Initial form and administration order were counterbalanced. Coefficients of equivalence of .91 and .86 were obtained for traditional and computer administration methods of the two tests. The results are interpreted as indicating that computer-administered reading tests can assess the same domains as traditional measures, and that they may become increasingly important in the complete assessment of functional reading skills.     

Kant and the problem of existential judgment: critical comments on Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment

The paper assesses Martin’s recent logico-phenomenological account of judgment that is cast in the form of an eclectic history of judging, from Hume and Kant through the 19th century to Frege and Heidegger as well as current neuroscience. After a preliminary discussion of the complex unity and temporal modalities of judgment that draws on a reading of Titian’s “Allegory of Prudence” (National Gallery, London), the remainder of the paper focuses on Martin’s views on Kant’s logic in general and his theory of singular existential judgment in particular. The paper argues against Martin’s key claims of the primacy of formal logic over transcendental logic and of the synthetic nature of judgment in Kant. It also takes issue with each of the four interpretations of singular existential judgment in Kant offered by Martin: existence as logical predicate, as copula, as thesis and as logical subject.     

Communicative functions of directional verbal probabilities: Speaker’s choice,listener’s inference,and reference points

Verbal probabilities have directional communicative functions, and most can be categorized as positive (e.g., “it is likely”) or negative (e.g., “it is doubtful”). We examined the communicative functions of verbal probabilities based on the reference point hypothesis According to this hypothesis, listeners are sensitive to and can infer a speaker’s reference points based on the speaker’s selected directionality. In four experiments (two of which examined speakers’ choice of directionality and two of which examined listeners’ inferences about a speaker’s reference point), we found that listeners could make inferences about speakers’ reference points based on the stated directionality of verbal probability. Thus, the directionality of verbal probabilities serves the communicative function of conveying information about a speaker’s reference point.     

The “new categorical imperative” and Adorno’s aporetic moral philosophy

This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae.