Measurement and the mental map

In order to test between subtractive and ratio theories of stimulus comparison, judges were asked to estimate “ratios” and “differences” of easterliness and westerliness of U.S. cities. “Difference” judgments fit the subtractive model, and “ratio” judgments fit the ratio model. However, “ratios” and “differences” were monotonically related, contrary to the theory that judges compute both relations on a common scale. Results are consistent with the theory that there is but one operation for both “ratios” and “differences.” To assume that the single operation is a ratio requires the complex interpretation that easterliness and westerliness are nonlinearly related. A simpler interpretation is provided by a subtractive theory, in which all four types of judgments are monotonically related to subjective differences on a single cognitive map.     

Loudness “ratios” and “differences” involve the same psychophysical operation

Subjects judged both “atios” of loudness and “differences” in loudness between pairs of tones that varied in intensity. The pairs were constructed from factorial designs, permitting separation of stimulus and response scaling for each subject. Ratings of “differences” and estimations of “ratios” were monotonically related, inconsistent with the hypothesis that subjects perform both subtractive and ratio operations on a common scale. Instead, the data suggest that both tasks involve the same psychophysical comparison operation with different response transformations. If the operation can be represented by the subtractive model, then category ratings involve a nearly linear transformation and magnitude estimations involve a nearly exponential transformation.     

Scale convergence as a criterion for rescaling: Information integration with difference,ratio, and averaging tasks

Ss lifted pairs of weights simultaneously, one in each hand, and judged either the difference, ratio, or average heaviness of the two weights. Data for the difference and ratio tasks were in general agreement with subtractive and ratio models, but the averaging data showed discrepancies from the constant-weight averaging model similar to those reported in previous psychophysical research. Rescaling was ruled out for the averaging data, because responses to pairs of equal weight were a linear function of subtractive model scale values derived from the difference task data. Scale values for the ratio and difference task data were related exponentially, as were the responses to the pairs, consistent with Torgerson’s conjecture that Ss do not distinguish “differences” from “ratios.” They appear to use the same composition rule but different output functions, depending on the procedures for responding. The scale convergence criterion can thus prevent inappropriate rescaling when a model fails and can dictate rescaling even when a model fits.     

Judgments of differences and ratios of numerals

Each subject performed two tasks, dividing a line segment so that either (a) theratio of subjective lengths corresponded to the ratio of the magnitudes of two numerals or (b) thedifference in length was proportional to the numerical difference. Had subjects actually performed two operations on the same scale, the responses would have been nonmonotonically related. Instead, data for the two tasks were nearly identical and ordinally compatible with either a ratio or a subtractive model. The ratio model implied scale values for numerals that were a positively accelerated function of numerical value, inconsistent with previous results. With a nonlinear response function for graphic length, the subtractive model fit well, yielding scale values that were a negatively accelerated function of numerical value and a linear function of previously obtained scales. These results, together with other recent findings, suggest that subjects may perform the same operation in spite of instructions to judge “ratios” or “differences” and that this operation can be best represented by a subtractive model.     

Comparison of two theories of "ratio" and "difference" judgments

This article examines the hypothesis that judges compare stimuli by ratio and subtractive operations when instructed to judge" "ratios" and "differences." Rule and Curtis hold that magnitude estimations are a power function of subjective values, with an exponent between 1.1 and 2.1. Accordingly, the two-operation model tested assumes magnitude estimations of "ratios" are a comparable power function of subjective ratios. In contrast, Birnbaum and Veit theorize that judges compare two stimuli by subraction for both "ratio" and "difference" instructions and that magnitude estimations of "ratios" are approximately an exponential function of subjective differences. Three tests were used to compare the theory of one operation with the two-operation theory for the data of nine experiments. The results strongly favor the theory that observers use the same operation for both instructions.     

Ordinal properties of subjective ratios and differences: Comment on Veit

Because nonmetric analyses of judged ratios and differences in sensory magnitude have yielded similar scales, some investigators have concluded that a single perceived relation underlies both judgment tasks. Issues rasied by this interpretation are considered in this article. Simulated data based on the assumption that subjects evaluate both perceived relations were computed for stimulus values used by Veit to investigate judgments of ratios and differences in grayness. A nonmetric analysis of both sets of simulated data in terms of a difference model yielded a solution such that each set of data was a weak monotonic transformation of the model's values, and the scale values were approximately linear with those obtained by Veit from empirical data. This result leaves open the question of whether one or two perceived relations underly the data. Ordinal properties of ratios and differences for a finite set are discussed together with their relation to systematic biases in psychophysical judgment tasks.     

“Ratios” and “differences” in perceived sweetness intensity

For a number of perceptual continua, it has been shown in previous studies that subjects use only one quantitative comparison between two sensory impressions of a pair of stimuli, irrespective of whether they are instructed to judge “ratios” or “differences”. This comparison can be described by algebraic subtraction. The present study was designed to investigate whether this one-operation theory for psychophysical judgment also applied to the sensory continuum of sweetness. Subjects were presented with pairs of fructose solutions, and judged “ratios” of, or “differences" in, perceived sweetness intensities. The pairs were constructed on the basis of a factorial judgment design. The results showed that the reported “differences” could be adequately described by a difference response model, and that the reported “ratios” could be adequately described by a ratio response model. However, the reported “ratios” and reported “differences” were monotonically related, and the marginal means of the log-transformed response matrix of “ratios” were a linear function of the marginal means of the response matrix of “differences”. These results are incompatible with the notion that subjects judged differences when instructed to judge “differences”, but ratios when instructed to judge “ratios”. The consistency of the ratio response model with “ratio” judgments is probably caused by a comparative operation based on “differences” in combination with an exponential response output function. It may be concluded that subjects judge only “differences”, and not “ratios”, between perceived sweetness intensities.     

Subjective ratios and differences in perceived heaviness

In previous studies, judgments of ratios and differences in subjective magnitude have yielded similar orders, consistent with a hypothesis that a single perceived relation underlies both judgment tasks. In the present research, 15 subjects estimated heaviness differences between 28 pairs of eight weights and each of 8 groups of 10 subjects evaluated heaviness ratios of eight variable stimuli with respect to a different standard stimulus. Presenting stimuli that were equally spaced on a cube-root scale of weight enhanced expected ordinal discrepancies between ratio and difference estimates, and employing independent groups for each standard stimulus in ratio estimation eliminated a possible bias due to varying standards within the presentation sequence. Differences in orders of ratio and difference estimates together with differences in scales obtained from non-metric analyses in terms of a difference model indicated that the judgments were based on two perceived relations that are ordinally consistent with arithmetic operations of ratios and differences. A ratio scale of heaviness was derived from the combined orders of subjective ratios and differences.     

Two operations for "ratios" and "differences" of distances on the mental map

Ss judged "ratios of distances" and "differences of distances" between pairs of U.S. cities. Results fit the theory that Ss used two comparison processes as instructed. A ratio scale of distances between cities was constructed from the 2 rank orders. From this scale, an interval scale of the city locations on an east-west continuum was derived. This scale agrees with the subtractive model fit to "ratios" and "differences" of easterliness and westerliness, and it also agrees with multidimensional scaling of judged distances between cities. These findings are consistent with the theory that Ss use subtraction when instructed to judge either "ratios" or "differences," but that they can use both ratio and difference operations when the stimuli (in this case, distances) constitute a ratio scale on the subjective continuum.     

Dissimilarities as indices of individual perceptual structure

The generality of dissimilarity judgments and of configurations obtained by multidimensional scaling (MDS) as indices of perceptual structure was examined. The Ss made magnitude estimates of dissimilarity of pairs of photos, and MDS configurations were constructed separately for each S. The compatability of dissimilarities (judgments or distances in MDS configurations) with two other tasks Ss performed was then examined. These additional tasks, an “encoding” and a “decoding” task, required the S to first construct a message by making use of a set of four photos and, a week later, to decode the messages. Results obtained were interpreted as indicating a degree of generality of the dissimilarities and supporting a hypothesis of individual differences in perceptual structure for the stimulus set. A “data-purification” hypothesis for MDS was discussed and examined.

     

A theory of relative judgment

This paper is concerned with the scaling method of “ratio estimation.” The simple theory that equates reported ratio judgments to ratios of psychological magnitudes is first considered, then two close relatives of this theory are formulated, each of which places weaker constraints on the structure of the data. Structural conditions are stated that express the relations that must hold among observed ratio judgments for each of the models. The models proposed are “cumulative” in the sense that the second is a weakened version of the first, and the third a weakened version of the second. A special feature of the models is that they may be tested entirely in terms of observables, avoiding the necessity of scale construction prior to testing. Tests were carried out on data from 9 published studies. The strongest model, typically used in scale construction using ratio estimation data, was generally inadequate, showing large systematic errors. However, the weakest version generally passed the tests of internal consistency, and the model equation provided a basis for constructing ratio scales utilizing bias parameters.     

Subtractive versus Ratio Model of “Fair” Allocation: Can the Group Level Analyses Be Misleading?

Two models of equity judgments are ratio and subtraction. Proponents of the former assume a linear relationship between the subjective feelings of equity and their overt expressions; those of the latter assume a monotonic relationship. Consequently, the ratio and subtractive rules are tested with the raw and monotonically rescaled data, respectively. I evaluated these two approaches with managers and students from India. Experiment 1 varied merit and pay of two persons and obtained judgments of difference between unfairness to them. Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated two inputs of two persons and studied “fair” reward for them. I analyzed both the raw and rescaled data at the group and individual levels. The group analyses supported the ratio model; the individual analyses showed that majority was consistent with the subtractive model. Discrepant results from these analyses were due to individual differences in the models employed and use of the response scale. Implications of the findings are discussed for cross-cultural and developmental research in “fair” allocation.     

Contextual effects in difference judgments

Manipulating stimulus spacing, stimulus frequency, or stimulus range usually affects intensity judgments. In six experiments, I investigated the locus of analogues of these contextual effects in a “difference” estimation task. When all stimuli elicited the same taste quality, stimulus distribution affected the scale values only when water was included in the stimulus set (Experiments 1–3). When the subjective ranges of two taste qualities were manipulated, different scale values were obtained for the separate qualities in the two conditions (Experiment 4). Manipulation of the expected response distribution did not affect the scale values or the responses (Experiments 5–6). It is concluded that shifts in stimulus distributions or stimulus ranges result in shifts in subjective scale values. The contextual effects can be interpreted as relative shifts of a number of gustatory continua, with water lying on a separate continuum. Proposed is a model for context-dependent judgments, consisting of four stages: stimulus classification, stimulus placement, continuum placement, and continuum projection.     

The effect of instructional bias on listener ratings of specific disfluency types in children

This study evaluated the influence of instructional bias on severity ratings of children's disfluencies. Normal speaking children were trained to simulate specific types of disfluency and severity judgments were made by judges who had been exposed to instructional bias. The 75 judges who participated in the study were divided into three groups of 25 each and were given a bias “toward stuttering,” bias “toward fluency,” and a “neutral” bias toward neither perceptual set. Both univariate and multivariate analyses were employed for data analysis.Although predictable differences were found between the specific types of speech disfluency, no significant differences were found for the experimental bias conditions. These findings, based on molecular analyses, differ from previous results based on molar speech samples. Molecular approaches to understanding the nature of stuttering were found to be powerful modes of assessment, and it is suggested that the type of disfluency emitted by children may be more important than the instructional bias or perceptual set of the listener.     

Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences

Computational theories of mind assume that participants interpret information and then reason from those interpretations. Research on interpretation in deductive reasoning has claimed to show that subjects' interpretation of single syllogistic premises in an “immediate inference” task is radically different from their interpretation of pairs of the same premises in syllogistic reasoning tasks (Newstead, 1989, 1995; Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001). Narrow appeal to particular Gricean implicatures in this work fails to bridge the gap. Grice's theory taken as a broad framework for credulous discourse processing in which participants construct speakers' “intended models” of discourses can reconcile these results, purchasing continuity of interpretation through variety of logical treatments. We present exploratory experimental data on immediate inference and subsequent syllogistic reasoning. Systematic patterns of interpretation driven by two factors (whether the subject's model of the discourse is credulous, and their degree of reliance on information packaging) are shown to transcend particular quantifier inferences and to drive systematic differences in subjects' subsequent syllogistic reasoning. We conclude that most participants do not understand deductive tasks as experimenters intend, and just as there is no single logical model of reasoning, so there is no reason to expect a single “fundamental human reasoning mechanism”.     

A theory of bidirectional judgments

This paper is concerned with a scaling theory for “bidirectional” judgments, for which the order of judgment is reversible, as in fractional and multiple ratio estimation judgments. With the assumption that judgments are mediated by perceived relations of pairs of stimuli, the theory is developed for judgments of comparison stimuli in relation to standards, taking explicit account of the location of the comparison stimulus relative to the standard. The theory of bidirectional judgments, based on a theory of relative judgment by Fagot (1978, 1979), entails a partial nesting of models characterized by a progressive weakening of the constraints placed on the structure of the data. The weakest model, the relative bias/directional standard (RBDS) model, allows each standard to have two biasing effects, depending on the location of the standard above or below the comparison stimulus. Tests of the theory were carried out on the ratio estimation of brightness and weight data of Engen and Levy (1955) and the part-sum estimation data of Goude (1962). Only the RBDS model was found acceptable for all three data sets     

Processing of geometrical dimensions in a binary classification task: Evidence for a dual process model

Confirming the findings in search tasks with letters and digits, the typical RT_same < RT_diff result was obtained in a matching paradigm requiring the classification of geometrical stimuli that were given in pairs. The study supports a dual process model that is based on an identity reporter for the faster “same” response and a difference detector for the slower “different” responses, both operating with equal accuracy. Subjects appeared to perceive outline aspects of figures, formed by size and form, holistically. An internal characteristic, such as an interior line, was apparently processed as a separate attribute. However, the outlines of the stimulus configurations appeared to be much more salient and interfered with the judgment of the orientation of the interior line. Moreover, the latter stimulus aspect could be easily ignored as the task required.     

Metacognition in psychophysical judgment: An unfolding view of comparative judgments of mental workload

An experiment is reported in which it was found that when subjects were required to indicate which of two visual extents was more difficult to categorize as “long” or “short,” they executed these categorizations and then measured the distance of the representation of each stimulus from the long-short category boundary; the stimulus nearer the boundary was judged to be the more difficult. When they were requested to indicate which was easier to categorize, they selected the alternative that was farther. Coombs’s theory of data (1952, 1964) and his unfolding theory of preferential choice (1950, 1964) provided the conceptualization of metacognition in this psychophysical task context. Strong support for the probabilisitic version of unfolding theory was obtained from the observed selective effects of laterality on the levels of stochastic transitivity attained for various classes of triples and the reliably longer times for comparisons with bilateral pairs than with unilateral pairs. The semantic congruity effects obtained, together with the changes in the form of the relationship between probability and response time as a function of practice, can be best accounted for by an evidence accrual theory in which the distances from the active reference point are measured and compared with a criterion on each evidence accrual. No support is provided for the view that propositionally based semantic “ease”- “difficulty” codes serve as the basis for these metacognitive comparative judgments of ease and difficulty.     

Weight of evidence supports one operation for "ratios" and "differences" of heaviness

This paper investigates an apparent contradiction between recent studies of "ratios" and "differences" of heaviness. Birnbaum and Veit (1974) found a single rank order for judgments in the two tasks, whereas Rule, Curtis, and Mullin (1981), who used a different stimulus set, procedure, and experimental design, reported two orders. To investigate the cause of this discrepancy, the present study manipulated the experimental design using the same stimuli and procedure as Rule et al. (1981). In one experiment (within-subject designs), each subject judged all combinations of the standard and comparison stimulus; in the other experiment (between-subjects designs) each subject received only one standard, and different groups of subjects were given different standards. "Ratios" and "differences" of heaviness were monotonically related for the majority of subjects who judged all combinations of standards and comparisons. Variations in the modulus and response examples did not affect the rank order of "ratios" within subjects. These results suggest that the contradiction in results is due to the difference in experimental design rather than differences in stimuli or procedure. In the between-subjects designs, the rank order of the "ratio" judgments depended on the standards and examples. Both previous and present results are consistent with the theory that subjects use one operation, subtraction, for both tasks and that the judgment function varies with between-subjects manipulations of the standard, examples, and modulus.     

On Judgments of Approximately Equal

Although precision is often important in quantitative judgment, sometimes, it is valuable to recognize that two quantities are roughly the same. Fuzzy‐trace theory suggests that approximately equal judgments rely on gist representations (i.e., meaningful fuzzy categories of quantity). We conducted three experiments to investigate approximately equal judgments with number pairs presented in different formats, both with and without semantic content (breast cancer statistics). In each study, the ratio of the smaller divided by larger number predicted approximately equal judgments. Experiment 1 also examined how knowledge of breast cancer, presentation format (frequencies vs. percentages), and differences in gist comprehension of breast cancer information influence fuzzy equality judgments. As predicted by the fuzzy‐trace theory concept of denominator neglect, approximately equal judgments were more sensitive, as measured by signal detection theory (SDT) analyses, when presented as percentages. In both experiments with breast cancer statistics, people were more likely to judge number pairs approximately equal when they were embedded in sentences about breast cancer, and breast cancer knowledge predicted increased perception of equality, when appropriately consistent with reliable sources, and increased judgment sensitivity. In Experiment 2, a simple intervention focusing on gist meaning increased source‐consistent approximately equal judgments, increased SDT judgment sensitivity, and decreased SDT response bias. In Experiment 3, using number pairs devoid of semantic context spanning four orders of magnitude, we further examined ratio similarity. Overall, more knowledgeable judges and those who better understood the gist of meaningful numbers were more likely to judge literally different numbers as “approximately equal” rather than make precise discriminations that were meaningless. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.