Perseveration of cardiac-rate effects in the rhesus monkey following pavlovian conditioning

The effects of Pavlovian conditioning on diurnal cardiac rate were studied in four rhesus monkeys. A three-hour conditioning period, consisting of 18 CS-UCS pairings with UCS an aversive tail-shock, produced cardiac-rate elevation which persisted for as long as 12 hours after the session.     

Operant conditioning of eye movement in the monkey (Macaca nemestrina)

With the horizontal electrooculographic potential as the operant, four monkeys (Macaca nemestrina) were conditioned to move their eyes at high and low rates by initial use of fixed-ratio schedules of reinforcement, followed by a changeover to multiple schedules of fixed-ratio reinforcement and discriminated differential reinforcement of low rate. These differences in rate of eye movement were not observed in a control animal given the same patterns of discriminative stimuli and deliveries of the reinforcing agent independent of its eye movements.     

Higher-order conditioning and sensory preconditioning of a taste aversion with an exteroceptive CS1

An exteroceptive stimulus compound (context) was employed as CS₁ in higherorder conditioning (H-OC, Experiments I and II), and sensory preconditioning (SPC, Experiment III) of a saccharin (CS₂) aversion in rats. The results indicated that aversions were established with the H-OC as well as with the SPC procedures. Stimulus generalization and first-order conditioning explanations were ruled out by appropriate controls. A CS₁-extinction period, performed prior to testing, did not affect the H-OC aversion, whereas it reduced the SPC aversion at least partially. These findings imply that interoceptive (taste, nausea) and exteroceptive stimuli (context) are readily associable in rats. Implications of the resemblance between the SPC procedure and long-delay taste-aversion learning are discussed.     

A note on ECG changes observed during Pavlovian conditioning in a rhesus monkey following coronary arterial occlusion

Changes in the ECG of a rhesus monkey during a classical aversive conditioning trial conducted 10 minutes after occlusion of the marginal branch of the left circumflex coronary artery have been observed. This appears to reflect an instance where myocardial ischemia following coronary occlusion was exacerbated by presentation of a conditional stimulus.     

Higher-order truths about chmess

Abstract Many projects in contemporary philosophy are artifactual puzzles of no abiding significance, but it is treacherously easy for graduate students to be lured into devoting their careers to them, so advice is proffered on how to avoid this trap.     

Higher-order preferences and the Master Rationality Motive

The cognitive critique of the goals and desires that are input into the implicit calculations that result in instrumental rationality is one aspect of what has been termed broad rationality (Elster, 1983 Elster, J. 1983. Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality, Cambridge, , UK: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). This cognitive critique involves, among other things, the search for rational integration (Nozick, 1993 Nozick, R. 1993. The nature of rationality, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  [Google Scholar])—that is, consistency between first-order and second-order preferences. Forming a second-order preference involves metarepresentational abilities made possible by mental decoupling operations. However, these decoupling abilities are separable from the motive that initiates the cognitive critique itself. I argue that Velleman (1992 Velleman, J. D. 1992. What happens when somebody acts?. Mind, 101: 461–481. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) has identified that motive (“the desire to act in accordance with reasons”), and that it might be operationalisable as a thinking disposition at a very superordinate cognitive level. This thinking disposition, the Master Rationality Motive, is likely to be of particular importance in explaining individual differences in the tendency to seek rational integration. Preliminary research on related constructs suggests that this construct is measurable.     

Higher-order retrospective revaluation in human causal learning

Previous studies demonstrated that participants will retrospectively adjust their ratings about the relation between a target cue and an outcome on the basis of information about the causal status of a competing cue that was previously paired with the target cue. We demonstrate that such retrospective revaluation effects occur not only for target cues with which the competing cue was associated directly, but also for target cues that were associated indirectly with the competing cue. These second-order and third-order retrospective revaluation effects are compatible with certain implementations of the probabilistic contrast model and with a modified, extended comparator model, but cannot be explained on the basis of a revised Rescorla-Wagner model or a revised SOP model.     

Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility

It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been argued that the first attempt is unpromising because a variety of prominent theories of propositional justification don’t imply that we lose propositional justification when gaining higher-order defeaters. This leads some scholars to take the second attempt. In this paper, I criticize this second attempt, and I defend the first attempt by arguing that a theory of propositional justification that requires intellectual responsibility can nicely account for higher-order defeat. My proposal is that we lose doxastic justification when we gain higher-order defeaters because there is no intellectually responsible way for us to maintain our original beliefs due to the defeaters.

     

Higher-order factors of the Big Five in a multi-informant sample

In a large community sample (N=490), the Big Five were not orthogonal when modeled as latent variables representing the shared variance of reports from 4 different informants. Additionally, the standard higher-order factor structure was present in latent space: Neuroticism (reversed), Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness formed one factor, labeled Stability, and Extraversion and Openness/Intellect formed a second factor, labeled Plasticity. Comparison of two instruments, the Big Five Inventory and the Mini-Markers, supported the hypotheses that single-adjective rating instruments are likely to yield lower interrater agreement than phrase rating instruments and that lower interrater agreement is associated with weaker correlations among the Big Five and a less coherent higher-order factor structure. In conclusion, an interpretation of the higher-order factors is discussed, including possible neurobiological substrates.     

Higher-order factors in the differential emotions scale (DES-III)

The 30-item version of Izard's Differential Emotions Scale (DES-III) was submitted to an iterative principal factoring plus oblique (direct Oblimin) rotation to simple structure, on a sample of 204 University of Delaware undergraduates. The intercorrelation matrix for the eight primary emotional-state factors derived, was subsequently subjected to a higher-order factoring. Four second-order factors accounted readily for the variance measured in the DES-III scales and this suggests that the multivariate mood-state instrument might be more profitably scored for secondary factors, in certain instances. This conclusion in no way detracts from the importance of the DES-III primaries, but adds to the usefulness of the instrument in applied studies.     

Higher-order omissions and the stacked view of agency

Omissions are puzzling, and theyraise myriad questions for many areas of philosophy. In contrast, omissions ofomissions are not usually taken to be very puzzling since they are oftenthought to just be a fancy way of describing ordinary “positive” events, statesof affairs, or actions. This paper contends that – as far as agency isconcerned – at least some omissions of omissions are omissions, not actions. First,this paper highlights how our actions are accompanied by many first-orderomissions - i.e., omissions to act – and that there already are many strongreasons to think that at least some of these first-order omissions are agentiallydistinct from simultaneous actions and from other first-order omissions. Itthen argues that our actions and first-order omissions are also accompanied byhigher-order omissions – i.e., omissions to omit to act – and that higher-orderomissions are distinct from actions and first-order omissions for similarreasons. Higher-order omissions also illuminate a more holistic picture of agency,which involves recognizing that our exercises of agency at a moment in timeinclude all of our overlapping behaviors – our actions, first-order omissions,and higher-order omissions. This paper concludes by exploring the impacts ofhigher-order omissions.     

Reevaluating evaluative conditioning: a nonassociative explanation of conditioning effects in the visual evaluative conditioning paradigm.

In 2 studies, the authors investigated whether evaluative conditioning (EC) is an associative phenomenon. Experiment 1 compared a standard EC paradigm with nonpaired and no-treatment control conditions. EC effects were obtained only when the conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) were rated as perceptually similar. However, similar EC effects were obtained in both control groups. An earlier failure to obtain EC effects was reanalyzed in Experiment 2. Conditioning-like effects were found when comparing a CS with the most perceptually similar UCSs used in the procedure but not when analyzing a CS rating with respect to the UCS with which it was paired during conditioning. The implications are that EC effects found in many studies are not due to associative learning and that the special characteristics of EC (conditioning without awareness and resistance to extinction) are probably nonassociative artifacts of the EC paradigm.     

Aversive conditioning in the sociopath

Results of two experiments on differential conditioning of the skin conductance (SCR) in sociopaths and normal control subjects are described. In the first experiment it was found that an equal number of sociopaths and control subjects were aware of the conditioning contingency. However, only the normal subjects displayed reliable differential SCR conditioning. Sociopaths showed a dissociation between verbal learning and conditioning of a physiological change. The second experiment examined the differential conditioning of normal subjects and sociopaths in partial remission. The number of aware subjects in the two groups did not differ. Aware subjects in both groups showed differential SCR conditioning. Differential conditioning in sociopaths did not persist over trials as it did in control subjects. A deficiency in ACTH 4–10 as well as neurological dysfunctions were considered possible factors in the etiology of sociopathy. Further research on the relation of neuropeptides to the etiology and treatment of sociopathy is suggested.