Ordinary morality does not imply atheism

Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering.     

The SNARC effect does not imply a mental number line

In this study, we directly contrast two approaches that have been proposed to explain the SNARC effect. The traditional direct mapping account suggests that a direct association exists between the position of a number on the mental number line and the location of the response. On the other hand, accounts are considered that propose an intermediate step in which numbers are categorized as either small or large between the number magnitude and the response representations. In a magnitude comparison task, we departed from the usual bimanual left/right response dimension and instead introduced the unimanual close/far dimension. A spatial-numerical association was observed: small numbers were associated with a close response, while large numbers were associated with a far response, regardless of the movement direction (left/right). We discuss why these results cannot be explained by assuming a direct mapping from the representation of numbers on a mental number line to response locations and discuss how the results can be explained by the alternative accounts.     

Human capital and the Matthew effect: Description does not imply prescription

This article presents a philosophical perspective on creativity as described in the writings of George Sudarshan, a highly accomplished theoretical physicist and natural philosopher whose vision of creativity was influenced by “the direct experience of transcendence.” The article reviews his conceptualization of the various mental states modeling the mind as a superfluid and as a collection of harmonic oscillators, which include feelings, consciousness, and altered states. Based on Sudarshan's experiences of discovering knowledge and expressing creativity, this article examines several philosophical assertions about the sources of creative impulse and the nature of the creative process. In addition, the significance of philosophical issues, such as the role of experienced and transcendent time, “critical opalescence,” intuition, grace, ideal states of being and awareness, joy, and illumined perception are also reviewed. The significance of witnessing pure awareness (distinct from individuated ego awareness) in the emergence of the creative self is described and a philosophical framework relating to reconciliation of diverse conforming and creative modes of awareness is outlined. Borrowing from science and philosophy, the article discusses the role of wisdom, use of analogies, metaphors, and moral responsibility in creative functioning. A philosophical conceptualization underlying the rishi model of a creative scientist is presented. The article concludes that transcendence is the key to becoming a fulfilled, actualized, creative being.     

When causality does not imply correlation: more spadework at the foundations of scientific psychology

Experimental research in psychology is based on an open-loop causal model which assumes that sensory input causes behavioral output. This model was tested in a tracking experiment where participants were asked to control a cursor, keeping it aligned with a target by moving a mouse to compensate for disturbances of differing difficulty. Since cursor movements (inputs) are the only observable cause of mouse movements (outputs), the open-loop model predicts that there will be a correlation between input and output that increases as tracking performance improves. In fact, the correlation between sensory input and motor output is very low regardless of the quality of tracking performance; causality, in terms of the effect of input on output, does not seem to imply correlation in this situation. This surprising result can be explained by a closed-loop model which assumes that input is causing output while output is causing input.     

Algorithmic responding on the radial maze in rats does not always imply absence of spatial encoding

Two experiments were conducted to determine whether consistent algorithmic response patterning on 8- and 10-arm versions of the radial maze is independent of spatial encoding. On the 8-arm version well-trained hooded rats were tested in darkness, after maze rotation that rendered room cues ambiguous with respect to arm positions, or with room cues unsystematically relocated. Ambiguous maze rotation was also used with well-trained subjects on the 10-arm version. If algorithmic patterning is a learned, non-spatial strategy, animals using it consistently ought not to have been affected by changes in the spatial layout of the test environment, and the type of pattern used by each subject would have remained constant. On the 8-arm radial maze, responses were most often made to arms 2 or 3 from that just visited. In many animals patterns were interchangeable, switching occurring between preferred angles of turn from day to day. Performance fell when animals were tested in darkness and upon ambiguous maze rotation early (but not later) in training. Testing in darkness increased the angle through which animals turned when responding, perhaps due to the disturbance of intramaze cue use. On the 10-arm maze the “consecutive arm” pattern was used persistently by several animals and appeared to protect their performance from disruption by ambiguous maze rotation. Animals not using rigid patterning were adversely affected. However, on both mazes animals using patterning correctly identified maze arms that had been omitted from otherwise patterned choice sequences. Animals adopted continuous patterning only when spatial encoding had been established. Response patterning appears to serve a mnemonic function and in rats complements rather than replaces the use of a spatial representation of the environment. It was concluded that a complex, flexible relationship exists between spatial functioning and its expression via motor responses.     

Categorical results do not imply categorical perception

Categorical perception refers to the ability to discriminate between- but not within-category differences along a stimulus continuum. Although categorical perception was thought to be unique to speech, recent studies have yielded similar results with nonspeech continua. The results are usually interpreted in terms of categorical, as opposed to continuous, perception of both speech and nonspeech continua. In contrast, we argue that these continua are perceived continuously, although they are characterized by relatively large increases in discrim-inability near the category boundary. To support this argument, the amplitude rise time of a tone was varied to produce either an increase or a decrease in the intensity during the initial portion of the tone. A bipolar continuum of onset times increasing and decreasing in amplitude yielded traditional categorical results. However, when only half of this continuum was tested, subjects perceived the same sounds continuously. The finding of traditional categorical results along the bipolar continuum, when the sounds were shown to be perceived continuously in another context, argues against the use of traditional categorical results as evidence for categorical perception.     

A gentle reminder that mean does not imply modal behavior: Few are in-group biased in minimal groups

Previous research reports that people organized into newly formed, arbitrary groups (i.e., minimal groups) are on average in-group biased. However, that people on average behave in a certain way does not imply that most people behave that way. Here, I report four studies (n = 224) demonstrating in-group biased average behaviors driven by a minority of about 30% participants. Further, only 14% reported allocating resources in a group-biased manner because they “favored the in-group.” I investigate and discuss how methodological issues related to non-normally distributed data, not taking participants’ intentions into account, and using fixed response matrices can lead to overestimations of how widespread in-group bias is in minimal groups.     

Grouping does not require attention

Many theories of visual perception stipulate that Gestalt grouping occurs preattentively. Subjects' failure to report perceiving even salient grouping patterns under conditions of inattention challenges this assumption (see, e.g., Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992), but Moore and Egeth (1997) showed that although subjects are indeed unable to identify grouping patterns outside the focus of attention, effects of these patterns on visual perception can be observed when they are assessed using implicit, rather than explicit, measures. However, this finding, which is the only one to date demonstrating grouping effects without attention, is open to an alternative account. In the present study, we eliminated this confound and replicated Moore and Egeth's findings, using the Müller-Lyer illusion (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, we found converging evidence for these findings with a variant of the flanker task (Experiment 3), when the amount of available attentional resources was varied (Experiments 4 and 5). The results reinforce the idea that, although grouping outside the focus of attention cannot be the object of overt report, grouping processes can occur without attention.     

Evidence does not equal knowledge

Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition.     

Caffeine does not modulate inhibitory control

The effects of a 3mg/kg body weight (BW) dose of caffeine were assessed on behavioral indices of response inhibition. To meet these aims, we selected a modified AX version of the Continuous Performance Test (CPT), the stop task, and the flanker task. In three double-blind, placebo-controlled, within-subjects experiments, these tasks were administered to healthy participants. While the results for the AX-CPT were indicative of improved response inhibition after caffeine, they might also reflect caffeine-induced changes in mechanisms other than response inhibition (e.g., attentional processes). The results for the stop task and flanker task were more straightforward. That is, the effects of caffeine on overall flanker performance and selective response suppression as revealed by distribution-analytical techniques were negligible. In the stop task a global effect of caffeine on processing speed was seen, rather than specific effects on response inhibition. Taken together, these experiments showed that both active and reactive inhibition were not significantly modulated by caffeine. The present results are linked to neural circuits that underlie inhibitory control and the role of caffeine-induced strategic changes.     

Action does not resist visual illusions

Recent TICS articles1, 2 discussed the psychophysical evidence in favor of Goodale and Milner's action vs. perception hypothesis³. Carey argued that most of the studies investigating the effects of visual illusions on grasping can be reconciled with the notion that the action system resists visual illusions¹. Bruno suggested a new interpretation of the action vs. perception hypothesis in order to incorporate most of the empirical findings². Here, I argue that action does not resist visual illusions. Even more, the effects on the motor system seem to be comparable to the effects on the perceptual system. This challenges the action vs. perception hypothesis in its current form.     

Time does not heal all wounds

Cross-sectional studies show that divorced people report lower levels of life satisfaction than do married people. However, such studies cannot determine whether satisfaction actually changes following divorce. In the current study, data from an 18-year panel study of more than 30,000 Germans were used to examine reaction and adaptation to divorce. Results show that satisfaction drops as one approaches divorce and then gradually rebounds over time. However, the return to baseline is not complete. In addition, prospective analyses show that people who will divorce are less happy than those who stay married, even before either group gets married. Thus, the association between divorce and life satisfaction is due to both preexisting differences and lasting changes following the event.     

Stimulus uncertainty does not impair stereopsis

The effect of stimulus uncertainty on the stereoscopic resolution of letters was examined for two classes of letters: (1) letters presented stereoscopically as random-element stereograms, and (2) letters presented as two-dimensional physical contours. The variables of stimulus discriminability (stereoscopic vs. physical contours) and stimulus uncertainty (number of alternative letter targets) were combined factorially. Stereoscopically presented letters were more difficult to resolve, but stimulus uncertainty had the same effect for both stereoscopic and physically defined letters. The additivity of these two variables suggests that the perception of stereoscopic forms is an automatic process not impaired by uncertainty about the form to be resolved.     

What the analyst does not hear

In the clinical situation, the analyst fails to hear more than he or she hears and spends much time working in the dark. The author raises questions about how we can take cognizance of that state of affairs in our thinking about analytic work. A clinical example illustrates how, in an analytic atmosphere, a patient will correct an analyst's failure to hear. Some ideas are offered about how to maximize the patient's participation in that effort. The author suggests that the problem may not fall precisely under the heading of technique so much as reflecting the analyst's attitude.     

Intuitionistic mathematics does not needex falso quodlibet

We define a system IR of first-order intuitionistic relevant logic. We show that intuitionistic mathematics (on the assumption that it is consistent) can be relevantized, by virtue of the following metatheorem: any intuitionistic proof of A from a setX of premisses can be converted into a proof in IR of eitherA or absurdity from some subset ofX. Thus IR establishes the same inconsistencies and theorems as intuitionistic logic, and allows one to prove every intuitionistic consequence of any consistent set of premisses.This paper grew out of discussion of a survey talk, on earlier work, that I gave to the 5th A.N.U. Paraconsistency Conference in January 1988. I am greatly indebted to the suggestion by Michael MacRobbie on that occasion that I investigate the so-called non-Ketonen form of the sequent rule for on the right. That suggestion inspired the correspondingly modified rule of Introduction in the system of natural deduction given above.     

Letter familiarity does not aid feature extraction

Summary Familiarity effects in visual letter processing were examined by means of a mutilation detection task. The uppercase E was used as the non-mutilated letter. One or two horizontal bars of the E were delected, to produce an upright or inverted F or L. These four mutilations of the E were assigned to the same response. In Experiment 1, brief exposure of the stimuli was followed by a backward mask. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that the display duration of the stimulus was increased and the backward mask was omitted. In Experiment 3, the overall luminance of the stimuli (luminance per point times length of the constituent line segments) was held constant. In Experiment 4, the upright and inverted non-E letter occurred in different blocks to encourage a normal (upright) letter processing strategy in the upright letter blocks. Accuracy (Experiment 1) and mean correct response times (all experiments) were not different for the upright and inverted F or for the upright and inverted L. These findings and converging results from other studies indicate that the higher familiarity of the upright letters did not aid feature extraction.     

Change blindness and priming: When it does and does not occur

In a series of three experiments, we explored the nature of implicit representations in change blindness (CB). Using 3 x 3 letter arrays, we asked subjects (Ss) to locate changes in paired arrays separated by 80 ms ISIs, in which one, two or three letters of a row in the second array changed. In one testing version, a tone followed the second array, signaling a row for partial report (PR). In the other version, no PR was required. After Ss reported whether a change had been detected and the PR had been completed (if required), they were asked to identify a degraded letter trigram that was either novel, or from a previously shown row (repetition priming). Our findings indicate that when CB occurs, both the pre-change and post-change stimulus information primes despite its unavailability to consciousness. Surprisingly, findings also indicate that when change detection occurs only the post-change information primes.     

The adolescent who does not finish anything

Practical information for therapists who deal with adolescents who do not finish tasks is presented. The relationship of task incompletion to neurosis, psychosis, depression, homosexuality, and drug abuse is described, and techniques and guidelines for treatment are provided.