Lies,lies, and more lies: A plea for propositions

To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductios of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liarsentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence — does not expression a true proposition are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research.     

蛋的秘密鸭蛋升天鸡蛋自走鹅蛋相搏

这里揭示蛋的秘密,也被称之为是特异功能的项目,其实不过是一些魔术表演.     

Conflict,compromise formation,and structural theory

Evidence is put forth to support the previously presented view (Brenner 1994, 1998) that present knowledge of mental conflict and compromise formation renders invalid the widely accepted theory of mind as functionally separable structures called id, ego, and superego. The nature, origins, and timing of conflict and compromise formation in mental development are discussed, as well as their relation to psychic trauma.     

Detecting children's lies: comparing true accounts about highly stressful injuries with unprepared, prepared, and coached lies

In this investigation, 514 university students judged whether children were telling the truth about highly emotional events. Eight children (half female, half 8-9 and the remainder 12-14 years old) had been injured seriously enough to require emergency room treatment and were interviewed a few days later. Each was yoked to three other children matched in age and gender who fabricated accounts under one of three conditions: lies that were unprepared, prepared (24 hours to prepare), and coached by parents. Participants were at chance when judging true accounts as well as unprepared and prepared lies. However, 74% of the coached lies were judged as true. Participants' confidence in their judgments, age, experience with children, and relevant coursework/training did not improve judgments.     

Telling lies

Men and women (20 each) were videotaped while describing someone they liked, someone they disliked, someone they were ambivalent about, someone they were indifferent about, someone they liked as though they disliked him or her, and someone they disliked as thought they like him or her. Accuracy at detecting that some deception had occurred was far greater than accuracy at detecting the true underlying affect, and people who were good at detecting that deception was occurring were not particularly skilled at reading the speakers' underlying affects. However, people whose deception attempts were more easily detected by others also had their underlying affects read more easily. Speakers whose lies were seen more readily by men also had their lies seen more readily by women, and observers better able to see the underlying affects of women were better able to see the underlying affects of men. Skill at lying successfully was unrelated to skill at catching others in their lies. A histrionic strategy (hamming) was very effective in deceiving others, and this strategy was employed more by more Machiavellian people, who also tended to get caught less often in their lies. Methodological considerations and systematic programs for future research are discussed.     

Unconscious fantasies, structural theory, and compromise formation

Although the existence of unconscious fantasies is an empirical assumption, in the clinical situation unconscious fantasies are treated as if they have a concrete existence. Unconscious fantasies form intermediate links in causal chains of which clinical observations constitute one end, and the components of unconscious conflicts, the other. Like all clinical material, fantasies may be affected by actual experiences; they may also be revised, layered, and can function to alter and disguise other fantasies as well as provide gratification. From a technical standpoint, it is most important to analyze their constituents and to adduce their primary purposes in the clinical situation of the moment. The nature of the evidence that identifies the presence of particular unconscious fantasies is discussed. Although a single analytic session is presented by way of illustration, I am convinced that the analyst's entire understanding of the patient inevitably channels his or her interpretive focus on the associational material of each analytic hour.     

Disbelief,lies, and manipulations in a transactional discourse model

Disbelief, lies, and manipulations have been objects of scholarly consideration from widely different perspectives: historical, sociological, philosophical, ethical, logical, and pragmatic. In this paper, these notions are re-examined in the framework of a Transactional Discourse Model which operates in terms of the location and relocation of various knowledge items within two sets of knowledge, A and B, representing two interlocators A and B, and two of their subsets C_a and C_b, which constitute the sets of the matters of A's and B's current concern. This approach reveals certain formal features shared by lies, disbelief, and manipulations that indicate that these three types of discourse behavior constitute a deviation from successful interpersonal communication as defined in the proposed model. The model, moreover, enables us to explicitly capture both the similarities and the differences of lies and manipulations with other pragmatic phenomena, such as jokes, impersonating, role-acting, memory failure, politeness expressions, and tact; the comparison suggests that certain modifications of Gricean conversational maxims may be in order.     

Discretionary power,lies, and broken trust: Justification and discomfort

This paper explores the relationship between the bonds of practitioner/patient trust and the notion of a justified lie. The intersection of moral theories on lying which prioritize right action with institutional discretionary power allows practitioners to dismiss, or at least not take seriously enough, the harm done when a patient's trust is betrayed. Even when a lie can be shown to be justified, the trustworthiness of the practitioner may be called into question in ways that neither theories of right action nor contemporary discourse in health care attends to adequately. I set out features of full trustworthiness along Aristotelian lines.     

Chicken,Eggs, and Speciation 1

Standard biological and philosophical treatments assume that dramatic genotypic or phenotypic change constitutes instantaneous speciation, and that barring such saltation, speciation is gradual evolutionary change in individual properties. Both propositions appear to be incongruent with standard theoretical perspectives on species themselves, since these perspectives are (a) non‐pheneticist, and (b) tend to disregard intermediate cases. After reviewing certain key elements of such perspectives, it is proposed that species‐membership is mediated by membership in a population. Species‐membership depends, therefore, not on intrinsic characteristics of an organism, but on relationship of an organism to others. A new definition of speciation is proposed in the spirit of this proposal. This definition implies that dramatic change is neither necessary nor sufficient for speciation. It also implies, surprisingly, that an organism can change species during its lifetime.     

Cross-cultural differences in children's choices, categorizations, and evaluations of truths and lies

This study examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in children's moral understanding of individual- or collective-oriented lies and truths. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old Canadian and Chinese children were read stories about story characters facing moral dilemmas about whether to lie or tell the truth to help a group but harm an individual or vice versa. Participants chose to lie or to tell the truth as if they were the character (Experiments 1 and 2) and categorized and evaluated the story characters' truthful and untruthful statements (Experiments 3 and 4). Most children in both cultures labeled lies as lies and truths as truths. The major cultural differences lay in choices and moral evaluations. Chinese children chose lying to help a collective but harm an individual, and they rated it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rated truth telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children did the opposite. These findings suggest that cross-cultural differences in emphasis on groups versus individuals affect children's choices and moral judgments about truth and deception.     

The future lies open

Recently retired as Dean of Students and Professor of Psychology at the University of Minnesota, he has held offices in many organizations in the student personnel field. He was president of apga in 1967–1968.