Lies,lies, and more lies: A plea for propositions

To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductios of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liarsentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence — does not expression a true proposition are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research.     

"蛋"的秘密鸭蛋升天鸡蛋自走鹅蛋相搏

这里揭示"蛋"的秘密,也被称之为是"特异功能"的项目,其实不过是一些魔术表演.     

Conflict,compromise formation,and structural theory

Evidence is put forth to support the previously presented view (Brenner 1994, 1998) that present knowledge of mental conflict and compromise formation renders invalid the widely accepted theory of mind as functionally separable structures called id, ego, and superego. The nature, origins, and timing of conflict and compromise formation in mental development are discussed, as well as their relation to psychic trauma.     

Detecting children's lies: comparing true accounts about highly stressful injuries with unprepared, prepared, and coached lies

In this investigation, 514 university students judged whether children were telling the truth about highly emotional events. Eight children (half female, half 8-9 and the remainder 12-14 years old) had been injured seriously enough to require emergency room treatment and were interviewed a few days later. Each was yoked to three other children matched in age and gender who fabricated accounts under one of three conditions: lies that were unprepared, prepared (24 hours to prepare), and coached by parents. Participants were at chance when judging true accounts as well as unprepared and prepared lies. However, 74% of the coached lies were judged as true. Participants' confidence in their judgments, age, experience with children, and relevant coursework/training did not improve judgments.     

Telling lies

Men and women (20 each) were videotaped while describing someone they liked, someone they disliked, someone they were ambivalent about, someone they were indifferent about, someone they liked as though they disliked him or her, and someone they disliked as thought they like him or her. Accuracy at detecting that some deception had occurred was far greater than accuracy at detecting the true underlying affect, and people who were good at detecting that deception was occurring were not particularly skilled at reading the speakers' underlying affects. However, people whose deception attempts were more easily detected by others also had their underlying affects read more easily. Speakers whose lies were seen more readily by men also had their lies seen more readily by women, and observers better able to see the underlying affects of women were better able to see the underlying affects of men. Skill at lying successfully was unrelated to skill at catching others in their lies. A histrionic strategy (hamming) was very effective in deceiving others, and this strategy was employed more by more Machiavellian people, who also tended to get caught less often in their lies. Methodological considerations and systematic programs for future research are discussed.     

Unconscious fantasies, structural theory, and compromise formation

Although the existence of unconscious fantasies is an empirical assumption, in the clinical situation unconscious fantasies are treated as if they have a concrete existence. Unconscious fantasies form intermediate links in causal chains of which clinical observations constitute one end, and the components of unconscious conflicts, the other. Like all clinical material, fantasies may be affected by actual experiences; they may also be revised, layered, and can function to alter and disguise other fantasies as well as provide gratification. From a technical standpoint, it is most important to analyze their constituents and to adduce their primary purposes in the clinical situation of the moment. The nature of the evidence that identifies the presence of particular unconscious fantasies is discussed. Although a single analytic session is presented by way of illustration, I am convinced that the analyst's entire understanding of the patient inevitably channels his or her interpretive focus on the associational material of each analytic hour.     

Detecting lies in young children,adolescents and adults

The ability of teachers, social workers, police officers and laypersons (undergraduate and postgraduate students) to detect truths and lies told by 5–6 year‐olds, adolescents and adults was tested in the present experiment. Lie detectors judged the veracity of statements from 18 liars and 18 truth tellers belonging to these three age groups. Accuracy scores were around 60% for each of these three age groups, both for detecting truths and for detecting lies. No occupational differences emerged. Moreover, judgements made by teachers, social workers and police officers showed an overlap, suggesting that an erroneous decision made by a member of one group may not easily be detected by a member of the other groups. The lie detectors were inclined to judge cues of nervousness, cognitive demand and attempted behavioural control as cues to deceit, even when truth tellers were displaying these cues. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Disbelief,lies, and manipulations in a transactional discourse model

Disbelief, lies, and manipulations have been objects of scholarly consideration from widely different perspectives: historical, sociological, philosophical, ethical, logical, and pragmatic. In this paper, these notions are re-examined in the framework of a Transactional Discourse Model which operates in terms of the location and relocation of various knowledge items within two sets of knowledge, A and B, representing two interlocators A and B, and two of their subsets C_a and C_b, which constitute the sets of the matters of A's and B's current concern. This approach reveals certain formal features shared by lies, disbelief, and manipulations that indicate that these three types of discourse behavior constitute a deviation from successful interpersonal communication as defined in the proposed model. The model, moreover, enables us to explicitly capture both the similarities and the differences of lies and manipulations with other pragmatic phenomena, such as jokes, impersonating, role-acting, memory failure, politeness expressions, and tact; the comparison suggests that certain modifications of Gricean conversational maxims may be in order.     

Discretionary power,lies, and broken trust: Justification and discomfort

This paper explores the relationship between the bonds of practitioner/patient trust and the notion of a justified lie. The intersection of moral theories on lying which prioritize right action with institutional discretionary power allows practitioners to dismiss, or at least not take seriously enough, the harm done when a patient's trust is betrayed. Even when a lie can be shown to be justified, the trustworthiness of the practitioner may be called into question in ways that neither theories of right action nor contemporary discourse in health care attends to adequately. I set out features of full trustworthiness along Aristotelian lines.     

Detecting true lies: police officers' ability to detect suspects' lies

Ninety-nine police officers, not identified in previous research as belonging to groups that are superior in lie detection, attempted to detect truths and lies told by suspects during their videotaped police interviews. Accuracy rates were higher than those typically found in deception research and reached levels similar to those obtained by specialized lie detectors in previous research. Accuracy was positively correlated with perceived experience in interviewing suspects and with mentioning cues to detecting deceit that relate to a suspect's story. Accuracy was negatively correlated with popular stereotypical cues such as gaze aversion and fidgeting. As in previous research, accuracy and confidence were not significantly correlated, but the level of confidence was dependent on whether officers judged actual truths or actual lies and on the method by which confidence was measured.     

Legitimate lies: The relationship between omission,commission, and cheating

Across four experiments, we show that when people can serve their self‐interest, they are more likely to refrain from reporting the truth (lie of omission) than actively lie (lie of commission). We developed a novel online “Heads or Tails” task in which participants can lie to win a monetary prize. During the task, they are informed that the software is not always accurate, and it might provide incorrect feedback about their outcome. In Experiment 1, those in the omission condition received incorrect feedback informing them that they had won the game. Participants in commission condition were correctly informed that they had lost. Results indicated that when asked to report any errors in the detection of their payoff, participants in the omission condition cheated significantly more than those in the commission condition. Experiment 2 showed that this pattern of results is robust even when controlling for the perceived probability of the software error. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that receiving incorrect feedback makes individuals feel more legitimate in withholding the truth, which, in turn, increases cheating.     

Chicken,Eggs, and Speciation 1

Standard biological and philosophical treatments assume that dramatic genotypic or phenotypic change constitutes instantaneous speciation, and that barring such saltation, speciation is gradual evolutionary change in individual properties. Both propositions appear to be incongruent with standard theoretical perspectives on species themselves, since these perspectives are (a) non‐pheneticist, and (b) tend to disregard intermediate cases. After reviewing certain key elements of such perspectives, it is proposed that species‐membership is mediated by membership in a population. Species‐membership depends, therefore, not on intrinsic characteristics of an organism, but on relationship of an organism to others. A new definition of speciation is proposed in the spirit of this proposal. This definition implies that dramatic change is neither necessary nor sufficient for speciation. It also implies, surprisingly, that an organism can change species during its lifetime.