Integrating the global neuronal workspace into the framework of predictive processing: Towards a working hypothesis

Hohwy (2013) proposed an account of conscious access that integrates the global neuronal workspace (GNW) into the framework of predictive processing, a view that I term the predictive global neuronal workspace (PGNW). Whilst promising, the PGNW is theoretically underdeveloped and empirically underexplored. The aim of this article is to outline the empirical predictions that distinguish the PGNW from other workspace models. I do so by (i) placing the PGNW in close contact with experimental work and cashing out a set of predictions that distinguish it from the standard formulation of the GNW, (ii) exploring the evidence for the first of these predictions in the context of bistable perception and the conscious processing of auditory regularities, and (iii), contrasting the PGNW with Chanes and Barrett (2016) limbic workspace. Combined, these arguments show that the PGNW is both testable and supported by current evidence.     

A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness

According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is to determine priorities for the processing of information and subsequent entrance in the global neuronal workspace.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

Extending the global workspace theory to emotion: phenomenality without access

Recent accounts on the global workspace theory suggest that consciousness involves transient formations of functional connections in thalamo-cortico-cortical networks. The level of connectivity in these networks is argued to determine the state of consciousness. Emotions are suggested to play a role in shaping consciousness, but their involvement in the global workspace theory remains elusive. In the present study, the role of emotion in the neural workspace theory of consciousness was scrutinized by investigating, whether unconscious (masked) and conscious (unmasked) display of emotional compared to neutral facial expressions would differentially modulate EEG coherence. EEG coherence was measured by means of computing an average EEG coherence value between the frontal, parietal, and midline scalp sites. Objective awareness checks evidenced that conscious identification of the masked facial expressions was precluded. Analyses revealed reductions in EEG coherence in the lower frequency range for the masked as compared to unmasked neutral facial expressions. Crucially, a decline in EEG coherence was not observed for the emotional facial expressions. In other words, the level of EEG coherence did apparently vary as a function of awareness, but not when emotion was involved. The current finding suggests that EEG coherence is modulated by unconscious emotional processes, which extends common views on the global workspace architecture of consciousness.     

A neuro-cognitive defense of the unified self

The topic of the self remains one of considerable controversy, and many arguments have been put forth suggesting the intuitive concept of self must be in some way mistaken – in part based on results in the cognitive and neural sciences. In this article I offer the alternative positive proposal that “the self” may indeed refer to a physical/computational system within the brain. To do this, I draw on empirical work regarding the neural basis of consciousness and decision-making, and on philosophical work regarding ecological control, unified group perspectives, and functional/mechanistic explanation. The work I review jointly supports the conclusion that a “core-circuit” of interacting cortical regions – the global workspace network – can be understood as a unified system for consciously perceiving and deciding, and thus fulfills many of the roles intuitively assigned to the self. I conclude that this self-concept need not be mistaken given current empirical knowledge.     

The temporally-integrated causality landscape: A theoretical framework for consciousness and meaning

Theoretical approaches to understanding consciousness have begun to converge upon areas of general agreement, yet substantive differences remain. Here, I introduce a new theoretical framework for the emergence of consciousness from the functional integration of the thalamocortical system: the Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape (TICL). TICL presents a novel perspective which addresses important phenomenological characteristics of consciousness that other frameworks, such as IIT, do not. First, the TICL is based upon the observation that conscious experiences are temporally continuous, not discrete. Secondly, the TICL establishes a thalamocortical basis for the point-of-view. According to TICL, consciousness is composed of contents that arise from neuronal subsystems that have meaning from the point-of-view of the larger, integrated system in which they are nested. Meaningful contents emerge from the subsystems because they exhibit a level of temporally-integrated causality (TIC) that is distinguishable from that of the larger system.     

Multiple paths to transfer and constraint relaxation in insight problem solving

In two experiments participants received various training methods designed to relax constraints present in the Four-Tree problem (deBono, 1967 deBono, E. 1967. The use of lateral thinking, London: Jonathan Cape.  [Google Scholar]), a difficult insight problem. Geometry misconceptions were corrected via direct instruction. Participants’ difficulty with developing three-dimensional representations was addressed via spontaneous analogical transfer (Experiment 1) or via cued analogical transfer (Experiment 2). We found that, while both training methods were effective, alleviating multiple constraints was more effective than the alleviation of single constraints via training programmes (c.f. Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004 Kershaw, T. C. and Ohlsson, S. 2004. Multiple causes of difficulty in insight: The case of the nine-dot problem. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 30: 3–13. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.30.1.3[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Providing single difficulty hints was ineffective in promoting solution. Implications for multiple paths to transfer (Nokes, 2009 Nokes, T. J. 2009. Mechanisms of knowledge transfer. Thinking & Reasoning, 15: 1–36. doi: 10.1080/13546780802490186[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Nokes & Ohlsson, 2005 Nokes, T. J. and Ohlsson, S. 2005. Comparing multiple paths to mastery: What is learned?. Cognitive Science, 29: 769–796. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_32[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and multiple constraints are discussed.     

Open and closed cortico-subcortical loops: A neuro-computational account of access to consciousness in the distractor-induced blindness paradigm

How the brain decides which information to process ‘consciously’ has been debated over for decades without a simple explanation at hand. While most experiments manipulate the perceptual energy of presented stimuli, the distractor-induced blindness task is a prototypical paradigm to investigate gating of information into consciousness without or with only minor visual manipulation. In this paradigm, subjects are asked to report intervals of coherent dot motion in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream, whenever these are preceded by a particular color stimulus in a different RSVP stream. If distractors (i.e., intervals of coherent dot motion prior to the color stimulus) are shown, subjects’ abilities to perceive and report intervals of target dot motion decrease, particularly with short delays between intervals of target color and target motion.We propose a biologically plausible neuro-computational model of how the brain controls access to consciousness to explain how distractor-induced blindness originates from information processing in the cortex and basal ganglia. The model suggests that conscious perception requires reverberation of activity in cortico-subcortical loops and that basal-ganglia pathways can either allow or inhibit this reverberation. In the distractor-induced blindness paradigm, inadequate distractor-induced response tendencies are suppressed by the inhibitory ‘hyperdirect’ pathway of the basal ganglia. If a target follows such a distractor closely, temporal aftereffects of distractor suppression prevent target identification. The model reproduces experimental data on how delays between target color and target motion affect the probability of target detection.     

When intuitions are helpful: Prior beliefs can support reasoning in the bat-and-ball problem

Intuitions are often considered suboptimal because they can bias people's thinking. The bat-and-ball problem is a celebrated example of this potentially detrimental aspect of intuitions since it elicits a very appealing and prepotent intuitive but incorrect response. We propose to show that certain kinds of intuitions (i.e., prior beliefs) can help people to reason better on this task. In two experiments, participants answered either a classic congruent version of the bat-and-ball problem in which the intuitively cued response fitted with prior knowledge (i.e., was believable) or a modified incongruent version in which the intuitively cued response conflicted with prior knowledge (i.e., was unbelievable). Results indicate that participants who solved the modified unbelievable version performed better than participants who solved the classic believable version. Our data highlight that prior beliefs, even in the bat-and-ball problem, can accidentally make people perform better, probably because they encourage them to adopt a more effortful processing strategy.     

The Role of Reasoning and Pragmatics in the Modifier Effect

The modifier effect refers to the fact that the perceived likelihood of a property in a noun category is diminished if the noun is modified. For example, “Pigs live on farms” is rated as more likely than “Dirty pigs live on farms.” The modifier effect has been demonstrated in many studies, but the underlying cognitive mechanisms are still unclear. This paper reports two series of experiments that jointly point to the conclusion that the modifier effect is the result of a superposition of three cognitive mechanisms: (a) probabilistically softened default inheritance, (b) pragmatic implicatures due to Gricean relevance assumptions, and (c) inference based on world knowledge. We present evidence that the pragmatic effects operate largely on an unconscious level and that their influence can be reduced by changing the presentation format of the cognitive task.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

A child-centred exploration of the relevance of family and friends to theory of mind development

Theory of Mind (ToM) is said to develop at around 4 years old. But some studies suggest it develops considerably earlier than this, with others suggesting it develops much later. Although several recent studies have found that social factors (like gender, family size, number of siblings, and number of friends) can impact on ToM, other studies contradict those findings. We wondered whether addressing several procedural issues and ensuring the task concerns real protagonists in real time, would bear on the above issues. Here, 114 children of 3-6 years completed four ToM tasks incorporating controls from experimental psychology, including randomly varying the order of ToM and non-ToM questions across participants. Now, children passed ToM tasks from around 5 years old, rather than 4 years or earlier. Girls did not develop ToM any earlier than boys. There was clear correlational evidence for the older-sibling effect and effects of friends but no reliable effects of nuclear or extended family. However, when these factors were set in the context of one another, the sibling effect was driven by a negative influence from younger siblings (as opposed to older siblings) and the friends effect was driven by friends at school (as opposed to friends at home). Finally, "friends" was a stronger predictor than siblings but memory (a cognitive factor) and age (a maturational factor) were the strongest predictors of all.     

The pattern theory of self in artificial general intelligence: A theoretical framework for modeling self in biologically inspired cognitive architectures

In an attempt to provide a unified account for a vast literature discussing a multiplicity of selves, Gallagher (2013) has proposed a pattern theory of self. Subsequent discussion on this account has led to a concern that the pattern theory, as originally presented, stands as a mere list of aspects that fails to explain how they are related in real-time. We suggest that one way to address these criticisms, and further develop the pattern theory of self is by exploring how it can be used to aid research on self in artificial general intelligence, especially in the context of biologically inspired cognitive architectures. We furthermore propose a conceptual implementation for actualizing such research in regards to the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) cognitive model.     

Applying theory to the black box: A model for empirically scoring biodata

Despite being an effective predictor of job performance, empirically keyed biodata assessments have been criticized as black box empiricism unlikely to generalize to new contexts. This paper introduces a model that challenges this perspective, explicating how biodata content, job demands, and criterion variables collectively influence the construct validity, and generalizability of empirically scored biodata. Across two field studies, expected changes in scale correlations with external measures were found that coincided with changes in the contextual similarity between calibration and holdout contexts, the criteria used, and the content validity of biodata items. Collectively, this paper offers a framework that helps understand and optimize empirical biodata keying in practice, furthering confidence for their use in applied settings.     

Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness

Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.     

Applying signal-detection theory to the study of observer accuracy and bias in behavioral assessment

We evaluated the feasibility and utility of a laboratory model for examining observer accuracy within the framework of signal-detection theory (SDT). Sixty-one individuals collected data on aggression while viewing videotaped segments of simulated teacher-child interactions. The purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine if brief feedback and contingencies for scoring accurately would bias responding reliably. Experiment 2 focused on one variable (specificity of the operational definition) that we hypothesized might decrease the likelihood of bias. The effects of social consequences and information about expected behavior change were examined in Experiment 3. Results indicated that feedback and contingencies reliably biased responding and that the clarity of the definition only moderately affected this outcome.     

Applying self-determination theory to understand the motivational impact of cash rewards: New evidence from lab experiments

We investigated, based on self-determination theory (SDT), the impact of the functional meaning of monetary rewards on individuals' motivation and performance and further tested the role of the psychological needs as the underlying mechanism. In two experimental studies, we show that when presented in an autonomy-supportive way, rewards lead participants to experience greater intrinsic motivation, which leads them to perform better, than when monetary rewards are presented in a controlling way. This is mediated by greater psychological need satisfaction, indicating that through greater feelings of competence, autonomy, and relatedness, individuals experience greater intrinsic motivation for the task at hand. Our findings suggest that rewards can have a distinct effect on individuals' motivation and performance depending on whether they take on an autonomy-supportive or controlling meaning, thus providing empirical evidence for the theoretical and practical implications of SDT's concept of functional meaning of rewards. By highlighting the importance of this concept, this research contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of such rewards in the workplace, suggesting that they can foster employee motivation and performance if organisations present them to employees in an autonomy-supportive way to convey an informational meaning and positively contribute to their psychological need stisfaction.     

概化理论在绩效评估中的应用

概化理论借助其理论上的优势在很大程度上克服了基于经典测量理论绩效评估存在的缺陷。它可以对绩效评估中的信度进行更全面的估计,更好地预测和控制误差,并且概化理论的独特视角和方法还为360度绩效评估的效度求取提供了理论支持。