Balint After Lacan ... and After

This paper examines Balint and Lacan's views about regression and symbolism, language, and transference. The author points out their similarities, their differences, and then proposes a synthesis through his approach of history, genealogy, trauma, and crisis. Freud's notions of masochism, of fixation (innate or phylogenetic) may thus be renewed, leading to the analyst's capacity to cope with deep regression and borderline (Balint) psychosis and perversion (Lacan) or to psychosomatics, including epilepsy.     

After Moral Error Theory,After Moral Realism

Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and judgement are committed to the existence of moral properties, and that no such properties exist. After error theory is established, abolitionism is one potential way to proceed. However, many error theorists suggest that we retain moral discourse as a sort of fiction. I evaluate some attractions of both fictionalism and abolitionism, arguing that abolitionism is a plausible position. No one doubts that error theorists can be abolitionists. However, what has gone largely undiscussed is that it is open to others to be abolitionists as well. I argue that moral realists of a metaphysically robust sort can and perhaps should be abolitionists. ‘Realist abolitionism’ makes for a surprisingly neat theoretical package, and I conclude that it represents an interesting new option in the theoretical landscape.     

After Evil

Books reviewed: Geoffrey Scarre, After Evil, Responding to Wrongdoing Ashgate. Aldershot. 2004 pp. vii + 202 Price 42.50
Reviewed by R. A. Sharpe, University of Wales, Lampeter     

After MacIntyre

In his influential book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre identifies Kierkegaard's view of ethics with that of Kant. Both Kant and Kierkegaard, according to MacIntyre, accept the modern paradigm of moral activity for which freedom of the will is the ultimate basis. Ronald M. Green, in Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, accepts and deepens this alignment between the two thinkers. Green argues that Kierkegaard deliberately obscured his debt to Kant by a systematic “misattribution” of his ideas to other thinkers, and to classical philosophy in particular. This essay argues that MacIntyre and Green are mistaken in identifying Kierkegaard with the Kantian tradition of moral autonomy and that they overlook his debt to the classical conception of virtue. In casting Kierkegaard in the role of the quintessential exponent of a modern conception of freedom, they have perhaps overlooked one of the greatest critics of moral autonomy who has ever lived.     

After Lakatos

The work of the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos has been highly influential upon scholars of science and religion, especially persons who want to demonstrate how theological inquiry may meet the intellectual standards of science. I first argue against Lakatos' position, showing how it fails to meet its own ambitions of providing clear and public criteria for assessing scientific theories. I then argue that the same weaknesses will manifest themselves in the work of his followers, using Nancey Murphy's early work as an example. I conclude by affirming Murphy's recent shift towards Alasdair MacIntyre's theory of rationality.     

After the Violence

Journal of Religion and Health - The Easter 2019 bombings in Sri Lanka signified how religious frictions could result in violence whose mental health impacts linger. Against the backdrop of...