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1.
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
2.
In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito ( 2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation
18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson ( 1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis
31, 113–117), Sorensen ( 1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis
56, 51–55) and Teng ( 1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis
57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. 相似文献
3.
This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based
account. We argue that an agent’s narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but
that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible
for action-production. 相似文献
5.
Stanley and Williamson (The Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–444 2001) reject the fundamental distinction between what Ryle once called ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. They claim that knowledge-how
is just a species of knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge, and try to establish their claim relying on the standard
semantic analysis of ‘knowing-how’ sentences. We will undermine their strategy by arguing that ‘knowing-how’ phrases are under-determined
such that there is not only one semantic analysis and by critically discussing and refuting the positive account of knowing-how
they offer. Furthermore, we argue for an extension of the classical ‘knowing-how’/‘knowing-that’-dichotomy by presenting a
new threefold framework: Using some core-examples of the recent debate, we will show that we can analyze knowledge situations
that are not captured by the Rylean dichotomy and argue that, therefore, the latter has to be displaced by a more fine-grained
theory of knowledge-formats. We will distinguish three different formats of knowledge we can have of our actions, namely (1)
propositional, (2) practical, and (3) image-like formats of knowledge. Furthermore, we will briefly analyze the underlying
representations of each of these knowledge-formats. 相似文献
6.
It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world. 相似文献
7.
Fairness is a central, but under-theorized, notion in moral and political philosophy. This paper makes two contributions.
Firstly, it criticizes Broome’s seminal account of fairness in ( 1990–1991) Proc Aristotelian Soc 91:87–101, showing that there are problems with restricting fairness to a matter of relative satisfaction
and holding that it does not itself require the satisfaction of the claims in question. Secondly, it considers the justification
of lotteries to resolve cases of ties between competing claims, which Broome claims as support for his theory, and contrasts
random procedures to contests of skill, which may also be considered lotteries in a broader sense. I offer no alternative
account of fairness of my own, but hope to point the way for future research on the nature of fairness. 相似文献
8.
This research examined token-mediated tool-use in a tufted capuchin monkey ( Cebus apella). We conducted five experiments. In experiment 1 we examined the use of plastic color-coded chips to request food, and in
experiments 2–5 we examined the use of color-coded chips to request tools. Our subject learned to use chips to request tools
following the same general pattern seen in great apes performing analogous tasks, that is, initial discrimination followed
by an understanding of the relationship among tokens, tools, and their functions. Our findings are consistent with the view
that parallel representational processes underlie the tool-related behavior of capuchins and great apes.
Received: 11 March 1998 / Accepted after revision: 19 August 1998 相似文献
9.
This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question
for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism.
Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist
and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology
are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism and the nature of
the self; and problems with pluralism and the goals of epistemology. Moral objections to virtue theory are identified––specifically,
both the idea that there can be a radical axiological priority to character and the anti-enlightenment tendencies in virtues
approaches. Finally, some strengths to virtue theory are conceded, while the role of epistemic luck is identified as an important
topic for future work. 相似文献
10.
This essay is concerned with the fulfillment of ordination commitments through a pastoral role in medical education and review of medical research with human subjects. Stylistically, it combines memoir with the genre known as “creative non-fiction.” Its major issues have to do with the identity formation and transformation of the author, the function and ethics of institutional review boards, the teaching of medical ethics to medical students, and courses involved in the doctor–patient relationship and in palliative care intended to increase the sensitivity and self-awareness of physicians-in-becoming. This essay was presented in its initial form at the Annual Fellows Meeting of the Society for Values in Higher Education in 2010. 相似文献
11.
Human–computer interaction (HCI) is the discipline concerned with the design, evaluation, and implementation of interactive
computing systems. Unlike many empirical sciences, HCI researchers do not typically solely study existing technologies, styles
of interaction, or interface solutions. On the contrary, one of the core activities in contemporary HCI is to design new technologies
– in the form of software and hardware prototypes – that act as vehicles through which HCI researchers’ ideas materialize
and take on concrete form. Despite this situation, there is a very modest discussion in the discipline on the role of design
as an activity in the research process; whether or not HCI could in fact be better understood as a design discipline than
as an empirical science; and if, and if so how, the design element in HCI goes with its empirical claims.
This paper is specifically about the element of design as currently manifest in HCI research. We dig deeper into HCI as a
design discipline by suggesting, analyzing, and discussing what appear to be tensions between two competing traditions in
the relationship between design and research. 相似文献
12.
The extent to which we generalize a novel property from a sample of familiar instances to novel instances depends on the sample composition. Previous property induction experiments have only used samples consisting of novel types (unique entities). Because real-world evidence samples often contain redundant tokens (repetitions of the same entity), we studied the effects on property induction of adding types and tokens to an observed sample. In Experiments 1–3, we presented participants with a sample of birds or flowers known to have a novel property and probed whether this property generalized to novel items varying in similarity to the initial sample. Increasing the number of novel types (e.g., new birds with the target property) in a sample produced tightening, promoting property generalization to highly similar stimuli but decreasing generalization to less similar stimuli. On the other hand, increasing the number of tokens (e.g., repeated presentations of the same bird with the target property) had little effect on generalization. Experiment 4 showed that repeated tokens are encoded and can benefit recognition, but appear to be given little weight when inferring property generalization. We modified an existing Bayesian model of induction (Navarro, Dry, & Lee, 2012) to account for both the information added by new types and the discounting of information conveyed by tokens. 相似文献
13.
Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers
the questions of “when, how, and to what degree” norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper
is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence
game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37:1–27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political scientists, 1994), the paradigmatic
model of conflict initiation in International Relations. The deterrence game is modeled here as a sequential decision problem.
As such, our analysis is an adaptation of Bicchieri’s game-theoretic formalization of norms to what we will call the norms
account of the game. We find that the standard account of the traditional deterrence game is a special case of the norms account
of the game. We also show that the adaptation of Bicchieri’s analysis of social norms yields new and interesting claims regarding
when, how, and to what degree norms operate as a constraint on risk-related behavior in the traditional deterrence game. Moreover,
we discuss how the results of the model provide testable propositions of relevance to the role of norms in international interactions. 相似文献
14.
Focusing attention to a location in 3–D space operates much the same as in 2–D space. Attending a location in 2–D space is
followed by a selective inhibitory aftereffect known as inhibition of return (IOR). Here, we report the results of two 3–D
reflexive cuing studies in which depth was defined by binocular disparity. As has been shown before, attentional cuing was
specific for x–y–z locations. However, the present results show that IOR is not depth specific. After a specific location
in x–y–z is cued, IOR occurs for the depth plane in front of and behind the cued location. The finding that IOR spreads across
depth planes may be related to how inhibited locations are encoded in the superior colliculus. We argue that the functional
role of a depth–blind IOR is to bias attention against going back to any part of a previously attended object. 相似文献
15.
When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most (non-depressed) people are subject to a distorting bias.
We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we
learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an
uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are supported by
our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated
to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not. 相似文献
16.
According to Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach, the two-dimensional tense operators “now” and “then” are ineliminable in quantified
tense logic. This is often adduced as an argument against tense logic, and in favor of an extensional account that makes use
of explicit quantification over times. The aim of this paper is to defend tense logic against this attack. It shows that “now”
and “then” are eliminable in quantified tense logic, provided we endow it with enough quantificational structure. The operators might not
be redundant in some other systems of tense logic, but this merely indicates a lack of quantificational resources and does
not show any deep-seated inability of tense logic to express claims about time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of
the modal analogue of this issue, which concerns the role of the actuality operator in quantified modal logic. 相似文献
17.
In “Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Analysis 62:191–7, ( 2002), Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker–Lewis comparative world
similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. In “Tooley on Backward Causation,” Analysis 63:157–62, ( 2003), Paul Noordhof argues that Tooley’s example can be reconciled with a Stalnaker–Lewis account of counterfactuals if the comparative
world similarity relation on which the Stalnaker–Lewis account relies is allowed to be antecedent-relative. In this paper
I show that taking comparative world similarity to be antecedent-relative results in a formal semantics which is a comparative
world similarity semantics in name only. 相似文献
18.
According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions
are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that
moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive
moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that
Mackie’s approach can be vindicated by a fictionalist account of moral discourse. And Mark Kalderon has argued that moral
fictionalism is attractive quite independently of Mackie’s error-theory. Kalderon argues that the Frege–Geach problem shows
that we need moral propositions, but that a fictionalist can and should embrace propositional content together with a non-cognitivist
account of acceptance of a moral proposition. Indeed, it is clear that any fictionalist is going to have to postulate more
than one kind of acceptance attitude. We argue that this double-approach to acceptance generates a new problem – a descendent
of Frege–Geach – which we call the acceptance–transfer problem. Although we develop the problem in the context of Kalderon’s
version of non-cognitivist fictionalism, we show that it is not the non-cognitivist aspect of Kalderon’s account that generates
the problem. A closely related problem surfaces for the more typical variants of fictionalism according to which accepting
a moral proposition is believing some closely related non-moral proposition. Fictionalists of both stripes thus have an attitude
problem.
相似文献
19.
Though largely unnoticed, in “Two Dogmas” Quine (1951, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted
in From a Logical Point of View, 20–46) himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths.
Unlike analytic statements equating ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’, strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens
of the same word-type, e.g., ‘bachelor’ and ‘ bachelor’ are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization
or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural language phonemic categorization is not entirely free of interpretive semantic considerations.
“Phonemic reductionism” in both its linguistic (Bloch 1953, Contrast, Language 29, 59–61) and behavioral (Quine 1990, The
Phoneme’s Long Shadow, Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate, T. Headland, K. Pike and M. Harris, (eds.), Newbury Park,
CA, Sage Publications, 164–167) guise is false. The semantic basis of phonological equivalence, however, has repercussions
vis-à-vis Quine’s critique of analyticity. A consistent rejection of meaning-based equivalencies eliminates not only analyticity,
but imposes a form of phonological eliminativism too. Phonological eliminativism is the reductio result of applying Quinean meaning skepticism to the phonological typing of natural language. But unlike analyticity, phonology
is presumably not subject to philosophical dismissal. The semantic basis of natural language phonology serves to neutralize
Quine’s argument against analyticity: without the semantics of meaning, more than just synonymy is lost; basic phonology must
also be forfeited.
Let’s begin with the fact that even Quine has to admit that it is possible for two tokens of the same orthographic type to
be synonymous, for that much is presupposed by his own account of logical truth. Paul Boghossian (1999, 343) 相似文献
20.
Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction
fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion
as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and
scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they
do not actually undermine our point of view if properly construed. Finally, we will foster such a claim by means of some novel
data. 相似文献
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