THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE

Abstract: We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this article, I argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called “aesthetic judgements.” Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called “secondary sense.” Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one's ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice.     

EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN CAPACITY FOR BELIEFS

Abstract. Evolution of the human capacity for beliefs is considered in relation to the emergence in human phylogeny of the ability to formulate propositions, evaluate their worth as bases for action, and make emotional attachments to them. Most of the relevant capabilities had appeared in primate evolution before the emergence of the Hominidae. The combination of capabilities peculiar to evolving hominines was that involved in the development of language, which ontogenetic evidence suggests began as a tool for implementing intentionality in social interaction and whose subsequent elaboration was associated with later reportorial and narrative uses.     

FOUNDATIONALLY JUSTIFIED PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HEN

Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to its antecedent the requirement that the subject have a recognitional capacity with respect to the given property.     

THE PREVENIENCE AND PHENOMENALITY OF GRACE, OR, THE ANTERIORITY OF THE POSTERIOR

This article argues the possibility of a phenomenology of Grace on the basis of response. Its key phenomenological interlocutor is Emmanuel Levinas.
The theology of grace might be said to be the fundamental theological doctrine, embracing as it does all other theologies, yet the theology of grace has been a focus of theological debate and dispute throughout history.
This article suggests that Levinas' ethical metaphysics, when applied to theology, gives theology a new phenomenological voice in which the theology of grace might be articulated.
It begins by arguing the significance of the ordinary and the everyday and the sincerity of intentional life in the world, and then proceeds to develop the notion of the prevenience of grace ( gratia praeveniens ) in terms of Levinas notion of the posteriority of the anterior/anteriority of the posterior. Grace is known in its effects.