On the general form of Stevens’ law for loudness and softness

The loudness of a 1000-Hz tone at weak sound pressures and its softness at intense ones were scaled by the method of magnitude estimation. Estimates of loudness plotted as a function of sound pressure on double logarithmic coordinates showed the well-documented steepening near threshold. A similar steepening occurred in the softness function at high intensities. Stevens’ law, which is linear on these coordinates, could be recovered either by translating the pressure scale to a new origin, or by translating the response scale. Translations of the response scale were preferred because they produced functions in which loudness and softness were reciprocally related, whereas transformations of the stimulus made the softness function almost three times as steep as the loudness function.     

Pitch strength and Stevens’s power law

Recent studies have suggested that the saliency or the strength of pitch of complex sounds can be accounted for on the basis of the temporal properties in the stimulus waveform as measured by the height of the first peak in the waveform autocorrelation function. We used a scaling procedure to measure the pitch strength from 15 listeners for four different pitches of complex sounds in which the height of the first peak in the autocorrelation function systematically varied. Pitch strength judgments were evaluated in terms of a modification of Stevens’s power law in which temporal information was used from both the waveform fine structure and the envelope. Best fits of this modified power law to the judged pitch strengths indicate that the exponent in Stevens’s power law is greater than 1. The results suggest that pitch strength is primarily determined by the waveform fine structure, but the stimulus envelope can also contribute to the pitch strength.     

Nonconceptualism,Hume’s Problem,and the Deduction

Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an answer to Hume’s problem about our entitlement to use a priori concepts when thinking about the objects of empirical intuition. If the Deduction is to provide a response to Hume, Allais’s interpretation must be rejected.     

Benjamin’s Children’s Theater and the Problem of Pure Means

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Rabern’s Semantics for Metaphysical and Epistemic Modalities and the Nesting Problem

Journal of Philosophical Logic - In a recent paper, Brian Rabern suggests a semantics for languages with two kinds of modality, standard Kripkean metaphysical modality as well as epistemic...     

Rea’s Revenge and the Persistent Problem of Persistence for Realism

Realism about material objects faces a variety of epistemological objections. Recently, however, some realists have offered new accounts in response to these long-standing objections; many of which seem plausible. In this paper, I raise a new objection against realism vis-à-vis how we could empirically come to know mind-independent essential properties for objects. Traditionally, realists hold kind-membership and persistence as bound together for purposes of tracing out an object’s essential existence conditions. But I propose kind-membership and persistence for objects can conceptually come apart and function epistemologically distinctly from one another—in which case the usual reliance by realists on an assumption of persistence to determine kind-membership conditions is unjustified. Thus, present realist attempts to explain how empirical detection of mind-independent essential properties for objects could possibly occur inevitably results in circularity. The charge against the realist is to explain why we don’t have to first discover persistence conditions for an object before we can ascertain kind-membership conditions for an object. If no answer is forthcoming, then it seems the weight of the epistemological objection to realism is back in full force.     

Technology and Freudian Discontent: Freud’s‘Muffled’ Meliorism and the Problem of Human Annihilation

This paper is a comprehensive investigation of Freud’s views on technology and human well-being, with a focus on ‘Civilization and Its Discontents’. In spite of his thesis in ‘Civilization and Its Discontents’, I shall argue that Freud, always in some measure under the influence of Comtean progressivism, was consistently a meliorist: He was always at least guardedly optimistic about the realizable prospect of utopia, under the ‘soft dictatorship’ of reason and guided by advances in science and technology, in spite of due recognition in his later years of the possibility of annihilation through technological advances in warfare. The possibility of human annihilation, then, muffled Freud’s meliorism. Freud’s ‘muffled meliorism’, however, was not a quiet commitment to viewing technology as something good. Ultimately, Freud steered a middle course between techno-advocacy and techno-antagonism. The technologies of science, like the discoveries of psychoanalysis, were tools for humans that could be used for human betterment or, as war showed, for human degeneration.     

Linear representation of temporal location and Stevens’s law

Ss were asked to indicate points 1 week, 7 months, 3 years, and 9 years in the past and future on two time lines representing birth to present and present to death. Data for 90 college-age Ss fit a psychophysical power function following Stevens’s law. with negatively accelerated growth indicating proportionately greater linear representation of periods nearer to the present. Variability was greater for the representations of the future than of the past, with monotonic increases in variability as distance from the present increased.     

Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument

The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.

The Frege-Geach Problem and Blackburn’s Expressivism

Philosophia - Blackburn has outlined a formal account for moral expressivism, and we argued that the moral Frege-Geach problem can be solved formally by appending two rules for the boo-operator...     

N. A. Vasil’ev’s Logic and the Problem of Future Random Events

The solution of the problem of the future random events truth is considered in Vasil’ev’s logic. N. A. Vasil’ev graded the logic according to two levels—the level of facts, i.e. time fixed events, and the level of notions or rules, governing these facts. The mathematical construction previously suggested for imaginary Vasil’ev’s logic, extends to the early variant of his logic—a logic of notions. In the paper, we investigate the meaning of problematic and uncertain assertions introduced by Vasil’ev. As a result, we developed a model of Vasil’ev’s logic of facts that resolves also the truth problem of future random events. The imaginary logic has also been extended to the level of notions, and the law of the excluded eighth is gotten in it. The correspondence between Vasil’ev’s terms “some” and “all” and modern quantifiers is discussed.     

Aquinas’s Miracles and the Luciferous Defence: The Problem of the Evil/Miracle Ratio

Miracles and the problem of evil are two prominent areas of research within philosophy of religion. On occasion these areas converge, with God’s goodness being brought into question by the claim that either there is a lack of miracles, or there are immoral miracles. In this paper I shall highlight a second manner in which miracles and the problem of evil relate. Namely, I shall give reason as to why what is considered to be miraculous may be dependent upon a particular response to the problem of natural evil. To establish this claim, I shall focus upon Aquinas’s definition of a miracle and a particular free-will defence, the Luciferous defence.

An experimental check on Stevens’s explanation of the partition paradox by successive doubling and bisecting

Scaling methods based on direct estimation of sensory ratios and intervals give discrepant results (the partition paradox). Stevens’s explanation of this discrepancy was tested here. Given a psychological magnitude, ψ, observers were required to select a magnitude 2ψ, and subsequently to bisect the interval between ψ and 2ψ. Stevens’s hypothesis predicts that the bisected psychological magnitude falls between 1.41ψ and 1.50ψ. The hypothesis is not substantiated, since a bisected magnitude of 1.55ψ was obtained. Furthermore, observers had to bisect the interval between ψ and an imagined magnitude of 2ψ. The results show that observers are able to producereliably both a visual and a representational double.     

A Reply to Szabó’s “Descriptions and Uniqueness”

Szabó (2000) follows Heim (1982,1983) in viewing familiarity, rather thanuniqueness, as the essence of the definitearticle, but attempts to derive bothfamiliarity and uniqueness implicationspragmatically, assigning a single semanticinterpretation to both the definite andindefinite articles. I argue that if there isno semantic (conventional) distinction betweenthe articles, then there is no way to derivethese differences between them pragmatically.     

Gemmules and Elements: On Darwin’s and Mendel’s Concepts and Methods in Heredity

Inheritance and variation were a major focus of Charles Darwin’s studies. Small inherited variations were at the core of his theory of organic evolution by means of natural selection. He put forward a developmental theory of heredity (pangenesis) based on the assumption of the existence of material hereditary particles. However, unlike his proposition of natural selection as a new mechanism for evolutionary change, Darwin’s highly speculative and contradictory hypotheses on heredity were unfruitful for further research. They attempted to explain many complex biological phenomena at the same time, disregarded the then modern developments in cell theory, and were, moreover, faithful to the widespread conceptions of blending and so-called Lamarckian inheritance. In contrast, Mendel’s approaches, despite the fact that features of his ideas were later not found to be tenable, proved successful as the basis for the development of modern genetics. Mendel took the study of the transmission of traits and its causes (genetics) out of natural history; by reducing complexity to simple particulate models, he transformed it into a scientific field of research. His scientific approach and concept of discrete elements (which later gave rise to the notion of discrete genes) also contributed crucially to the explanation of the existence of stable variations as the basis for natural selection.     

Sosa’s Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism

Philosophia - This paper aims to show that Sosa’s theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to...