宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

Being good to look good: Self-reported moral character predicts moral double standards among reputation-seeking individuals

Moral character is widely expected to lead to moral judgements and practices. However, such expectations are often breached, especially when moral character is measured by self-report. We propose that because self-reported moral character partly reflects a desire to appear good, people who self-report a strong moral character will show moral harshness towards others and downplay their own transgressions—that is, they will show greater moral hypocrisy. This self-other discrepancy in moral judgements should be pronounced among individuals who are particularly motivated by reputation. Employing diverse methods including large-scale multination panel data (N = 34,323), and vignette and behavioural experiments (N = 700), four studies supported our proposition, showing that various indicators of moral character (Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) predicted harsher judgements of others' more than own transgressions. Moreover, these double standards emerged particularly among individuals possessing strong reputation management motives. The findings highlight how reputational concerns moderate the link between moral character and moral judgement.     

What Makes Hypocrisy? Folk Definitions,Attitude/Behavior Combinations,Attitude Strength,and Private/Public Distinctions

Past research has rarely examined what makes behaviors appear more or less hypocritical. This work expands our understanding, identifying and exploring factors contributing to perception of hypocrisy. An initial study surveyed participants’ definitions of the concept. Experiments 2a/2b then demonstrate that attitude–behavior inconsistency is viewed as most hypocritical, followed by attitude-attitude and behavior-behavior inconsistency. Experiments 3 and 4 examined how perception of hypocrisy depends on attitude strength, communication method, and whether attitudes/behaviors are privately or publicly held/enacted. We conclude that hypocrisy is perceived as strongest when attitudes are publicly imposed on others in an attempt to appear morally superior.     

Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.     

« Dire une chose et en faire une autre » : de la déclaration de liberté dans le paradigme de l'hypocrisie induite

According to induced hypocrisy paradigm, participants were led to advocate a pro-attitudinal position (commitment step), such as to respect the driving rules. Subsequently they were made mindful of their own transgressions (mindfulness step). Afterwards, the target-behavior was administered: spending time in a safety road association. We manipulated the declaration of freedom either within the mindfulness step (study 1), either at the twice steps (study 2). Results indicated that declaration of freedom increased the hypocritical effect. Implications for further research in the area of hypocrisy are discussed.     

Abstraction increases hypocrisy

Four studies show that an abstract view on moral issues increases moral hypocrisy. In Experiment 1, participants who were directly instructed to take a more abstract view on a moral issue judged the immoral behavior of others more severely than their own immoral behavior, but participants with a concrete view did not. Experiments 2 and 3 induced an abstract view in an indirect manner, by manipulating temporal distance toward the dilemma. In Experiment 4 abstractness was manipulated completely independent from the moral dilemma, by inducing an abstract or a concrete mindset. In all four studies, abstractness consistently increased hypocrisy. The last study also shows that the effect of abstractness on hypocrisy is mediated by the degree of moral flexibility. Together, these studies show that hypocrisy is directly determined by the focus that people have when making a moral judgment.     

道德虚伪：一种机会主义的适应策略

道德虚伪在个体层面是指人们言行不一, 在人际层面是指人们持有双重标准。心理学家通常从道德动机、认知失调以及精神分析的角度考察道德虚伪。诱发道德虚伪通常会促使个体做出跟他们公开承诺相一致的行为。作为一种机会主义的适应策略, 道德虚伪可能起源于群体适应情境下的自我谋利需要, 带有欺骗他人和自欺的特点。除了情绪、权力等因素之外, 未来研究需要考察自恋、羞耻、社会操纵能力、情商、文化因素对道德虚伪的影响。     

Being better than others but otherwise perfectly normal: Perceptions of uniqueness and similarity in close relationships

The current research addresses individuals' self-generated thoughts regarding their own and others' relationships, examining the ways in which perceptions of uniqueness and similarity are manifested in judgments regarding own and others' responses to dissatisfying incidents. Consistent with the uniqueness bias, participants characterized their own relationships by a greater number of constructive responses and a smaller number of destructive responses relative to characterizations of others' relationships. Moreover, external raters judged own constructive responses to be more constructive than others' constructive responses. Consistent with the similarity bias, external raters judged items describing others' responses to be less frequently occurring and more extreme than their own responses. Also, this research revealed support for the claim that the similarity bias is more pronounced for destructive responses than for constructive responses. A recall task corroborated these findings, revealing very good recall for destructive responses enacted by others and poor recall for destructive responses enacted by oneself.     

Dissonance averted: Self-concept organization moderates the effect of hypocrisy on attitude change

The current work explored how self-concept representation affects how experiencing dissonance results in changing one’s attitudes in response to acknowledging hypocrisy. We found a relation between self-complexity and attitude change after admitting past hypocritical actions. Specifically, people lower in self-complexity changed their attitudes to bring them more in line with their transgressions (presumably to quell the especially strong feelings of unpleasantness resulting from their acknowledging behavior-belief discrepancies) whereas those greater in self-complexity showed more bolstering of their attitudes following hypocrisy. This relation between self-complexity and attitude change following hypocrisy was eliminated when participants were given a chance to reaffirm their sense of personal value and integrity through other means (i.e., self-affirmation). Implications for how self-concept representation may play a role in moderating a number of psychological phenomena, ranging from goal attainment to stereotype threat, are discussed.     

Letting people off the hook: when do good deeds excuse transgressions?

Three studies examined when and why an actor's prior good deeds make observers more willing to excuse--or license--his or her subsequent, morally dubious behavior. In a pilot study, actors' good deeds made participants more forgiving of the actors' subsequent transgressions. In Study 1, participants only licensed blatant transgressions that were in a different domain than actors' good deeds; blatant transgressions in the same domain appeared hypocritical and suppressed licensing (e.g., fighting adolescent drug use excused sexual harassment, but fighting sexual harassment did not). Study 2 replicated these effects and showed that good deeds made observers license ambiguous transgressions (e.g., behavior that might or might not represent sexual harassment) regardless of whether the good deeds and the transgression were in the same or in a different domain--but only same-domain good deeds did so by changing participants' construal of the transgressions. Discussion integrates two models of why licensing occurs.     

Reducing Road Rage: An Application of the Dissonance‐Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness1

Recent research ( Takaku, 2001; Takaku, Weiner, & Ohbuchi, 2001 ) tested and supported the hypothesis that injured parties' motivation to forgive their wrongdoers could be enhanced through inducing hypocrisy‐dissonance by making the injured parties aware of their own past wrongdoing. The present study tested and supported the model's applicability to people's road‐rage experiences by showing that individuals who were aware of their own past reckless driving generated more hypocrisy‐induced dissonance, more positive attributions, and less negative emotional reactions than individuals who were not aware of their own past reckless driving. Implications for future research and possible applications of the model in reducing road rage are discussed.     

Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy

In the current article the authors examined the impact of specific emotions on moral hypocrisy, the tendency among people to judge others more severely than they judge themselves. In two studies, they found that (a) anger increased moral hypocrisy, (b) guilt eliminated moral hypocrisy, and (c) envy reversed moral hypocrisy. In particular, these findings were observed in two domains. In Study 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas describing unethical behavior and rated how acceptable it would be if others engaged in the unethical behavior, or alternatively, if they themselves engaged in the unethical behavior. In Study 2, participants were asked how much they would like to donate to research on cancer, or alternatively, how much they think others should donate. The results demonstrate that specific emotions influence moral decision making, even when real money is at stake, and that emotions of the same valence have opposing effects on moral judgment.     

The perceived impact of tax and regulatory changes

People believe that shared events, events that impact everyone to the same degree, will nonetheless impact them more than others. Across four studies we examined whether this impacts people's reactions to proposed changes to tax and regulatory policies. We found that participants thought that tax (Study 1a and 1b) and regulatory (Study 2) changes would have more of an impact on their own lives than on the lives of people in their same financial situation. We then examined whether these findings are the product of a broad focalism bias or its narrower relative, egocentrism. Because we observed the bias both when participants were asked about their own financial situation or that of someone else, the former appears to be the better explanation (Study 3). We discuss the implications of this bias for people's willingness to embrace policy proposals designed to advance the common good.     

Asymmetries in perceptions of self and others' hypocrisy: Rethinking the meaning and perception of the construct

This article examines how people recall and describe instances of hypocrisy in their own and others' behavior. Participants (N = 302) provided two written examples. The first example recalled a time when someone called the participant a hypocrite, whereas the other recalled an instance when the participant perceived someone else's behavior as hypocritical. The first goal of the study was to discover if real‐world examples of hypocrisy reflect only mere inconsistency, consistent with the construct's narrow use in psychology, or if they contain other distinctive defining features. A typology was used to code the examples, based loosely on Crisp and Cowton's philosophical distinction between four forms of hypocrisy: direct inconsistency, pretense, blame, and complacency. The second goal was to uncover reliable actor–observer differences in perceptions of hypocrisy. Results indicated that the four forms occur in real‐world examples of both self and others' hypocrisy. Interestingly, a new fifth form, indirect inconsistency, emerged from the data, adding nuance to the initial hypothesis. Finally, several actor–observer differences in perceptions of hypocrisy arose and are discussed. The results indicate that hypocrisy is a much more complicated phenomenon than previously considered and provide the impetus for new areas of research. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame

Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception‐making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and thereby a rejection of the equality of persons, which we argue grounds the standing to blame others.     

Age differences in forgivingness: The role of transgression frequency and intensity

The present study examined age differences in the disposition to forgive others and the role of interpersonal transgression frequency and intensity. Data from a representative cross-sectional sample of Swiss adults (N = 451, age: 20–83 years) were used. Participants completed a self-report measure of forgivingness and indicated whether and how intense they have experienced different types of interpersonal transgressions during the past 12 months. Results indicate that older adults were, on average, more willing to forgive others than younger adults. Frequency and intensity of transgressions were negatively related with age. Moreover, the results show that transgression frequency and intensity explained, in part, age differences in forgivingness. Future directions concerning the meaning of age differences in forgivingness are discussed.     

Guilty feelings, targeted actions

Early investigations of guilt cast it as an emotion that prompts broad reparative behaviors that help guilty individuals feel better about themselves or about their transgressions. The current investigation found support for a more recent representation of guilt as an emotion designed to identify and correct specific social offenses. Across five experiments, guilt influenced behavior in a targeted and strategic way. Guilt prompted participants to share resources more generously with others, but only did so when those others were persons whom the participant had wronged and only when those wronged individuals could notice the gesture. Rather than trigger broad reparative behaviors that remediate one's general reputation or self-perception, guilt triggers targeted behaviors intended to remediate specific social transgressions.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.