Development of Strategic Norms in Groups

In his classic norm formation research, Sherif (1935) demonstrated convergence in group members' judgments of ambiguous perceptual stimuli. In the present study, we investigated convergence in group members' strategic orientations for solving problems, specifically riskiness and conservatism. According to Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1998), people in a “promotion focus” (who are sensitive to the presence and absence of positive outcomes and who desire accomplishments) adopt risky strategies for solving problems, whereas people in a “prevention focus” (who are sensitive to the absence and presence of negative outcomes and who desire security) adopt conservative strategies. Using a modified version of Sherif's classic paradigm, we introduced a subtle manipulation to induce promotion vs prevention focus in three-person groups working on a multitrial recognition memory task. We found evidence that group members' responses converged and that this convergence was associated with a directional bias in strategic orientation (i.e., promotion groups were riskier than prevention groups). Implications of these results for understanding shared reality in groups were discussed.     

The role of the input on the development of the LC bias: A crosslinguistic comparison

Previous studies have described the existence of a phonotactic bias called the Labial–Coronal (LC) bias, corresponding to a tendency to produce more words beginning with a labial consonant followed by a coronal consonant (i.e. “bat”) than the opposite CL pattern (i.e. “tap”). This bias has initially been interpreted in terms of articulatory constraints of the human speech production system. However, more recently, it has been suggested that this presumably language-general LC bias in production might be accompanied by LC and CL biases in perception, acquired in infancy on the basis of the properties of the linguistic input. The present study investigates the origins of these perceptual biases, testing infants learning Japanese, a language that has been claimed to possess more CL than LC sequences, and comparing them with infants learning French, a language showing a clear LC bias in its lexicon. First, a corpus analysis of Japanese IDS and ADS revealed the existence of an overall LC bias, except for plosive sequences in ADS, which show a CL bias across counts. Second, speech preference experiments showed a perceptual preference for CL over LC plosive sequences (all recorded by a Japanese speaker) in 13- but not in 7- and 10-month-old Japanese-learning infants (Experiment 1), while revealing the emergence of an LC preference between 7 and 10 months in French-learning infants, using the exact same stimuli. These crosslinguistic behavioral differences, obtained with the same stimuli, thus reflect differences in processing in two populations of infants, which can be linked to differences in the properties of the lexicons of their respective native languages. These findings establish that the emergence of a CL/LC bias is related to exposure to a linguistic input.     

If we have the will,there will be a way: regulatory focus as a group identity

Based on social identity theory and regulatory focus theory, we predicted that promotion and prevention strategies can be part of the identity of a group (i.e., collective regulatory focus) which in turn influences the behavior and experienced emotions of individual group members. We conducted two experiments to test this prediction. After assessing participants' personal regulatory focus preference, collective regulatory focus was induced by showing participants group mottos, allegedly chosen by other members of their group, that either voiced a promotion or a prevention strategy preference. Both experiments yielded evidence for our prediction in that the collective regulatory focus shifted the behavior of individual group members on a signal detection task towards promotion‐ (liberal bias) or prevention‐ (conservative bias) consistent behavior and influenced the emotions they experienced. Experiment 2 further substantiated our group identity rationale by showing that these effects were especially strong for high identifiers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The response dynamics of preferential choice

The ubiquity of psychological process models requires an increased degree of sophistication in the methods and metrics that we use to evaluate them. We contribute to this venture by capitalizing on recent work in cognitive science analyzing response dynamics, which shows that the bearing information processing dynamics have on intended action is also revealed in the motor system. This decidedly “embodied” view suggests that researchers are missing out on potential dependent variables with which to evaluate their models—those associated with the motor response that produces a choice. The current work develops a method for collecting and analyzing such data in the domain of decision making. We first validate this method using widely normed stimuli from the International Affective Picture System (Experiment 1), and demonstrate that curvature in response trajectories provides a metric of the competition between choice options. We next extend the method to risky decision making (Experiment 2) and develop predictions for three popular classes of process model. The data provided by response dynamics demonstrate that choices contrary to the maxim of risk seeking in losses and risk aversion in gains may be the product of at least one “online” preference reversal, and can thus begin to discriminate amongst the candidate models. Finally, we incorporate attentional data collected via eye-tracking (Experiment 3) to develop a formal computational model of joint information sampling and preference accumulation. In sum, we validate response dynamics for use in preferential choice tasks and demonstrate the unique conclusions afforded by response dynamics over and above traditional methods.     

Mere acceptance produces apparent attitude in the Implicit Association Test

Two experiments examined mere acceptance effects in the Implicit Association Test (IAT). They tested whether accepting a stimulus as conforming to a rule produces responding consistent with positive attitude in the IAT. In Experiment 1, accepted stimuli were more easily categorized with pleasant personality characteristics than rejected stimuli; they were preferred according to the logic of the IAT. Accepted word stimuli were also responded to faster overall, suggesting that it was easier to make the accept than the reject response. In Experiment 2, numerical stimuli that conformed to a rule showed the same IAT preference effect over non-confirming stimuli, even when the rule conforming stimuli were more difficult to categorize. Three sources of this apparent preference for rule-conforming stimuli are considered: (1) the semantic relatedness of the concepts “accept” and “pleasant” on the one hand, and “reject” and “unpleasant” on the other; (2) that rejected non-category members are more salient (‘pop-out’) and thus are more easily categorized with the more salient unpleasant personality characteristics; or (3) that accepting rule-conforming stimuli is experienced as a pleasant event. Regardless of the mechanism underlying the mere acceptance effect, the IAT can produce apparent preferences for stimuli towards which participants have no positive attitude.     

Context effects on emotional and aesthetic evaluations of artworks and IAPS pictures

In the arts emotionally negative objects sometimes can be positively judged. Defining an object as art possibly yields specific changes in how perceivers emotionally experience and aesthetically judge a stimulus. To study how emotional experiences (joy, anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and shame ratings, plus facial EMG) and aesthetic judgements (liking ratings) are modulated by an art context (“This is an artwork”) as compared to non-art reality context (“This is a press photograph”) participants evaluated IAPS pictures and veridical artworks depicting emotionally positive and negative content. In line with the assumption that emotional distancing is an essential feature of the art experience we found that positive emotional reactions were attenuated (joy, M. zygomaticus activation) in an art compared to non-art context. However, context had little influence on negative emotional reactions (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, shame, and M. corrugator activation) suggesting that these are similar in art and non-art. Importantly, only artworks of emotionally negative content were judged more positively in an art context — thus liked more. This study, in accordance with the assumption of a distanced aesthetic mode, shows that an art context fosters appraisal processes that influence emotional experiences, allowing to judge negative stimuli aesthetically more positively — thus suppressing the immediacy of emotional stimulus content.     

The effects of managerial regulatory fit priming on reactions to explanations

We investigated the interactive effects of regulatory focus priming and message framing on the perceived fairness of unfavorable events. We hypothesized that individuals’ perceptions of fairness are higher when they receive a regulatory focus prime (promotion versus prevention) that is congruent with the framing of an explanation (gain versus loss), as opposed to one that is incongruent. We also hypothesized that these effects are mediated by counterfactual thinking. Three studies revealed that primed regulatory fit (promotion/gain or prevention/loss) led to higher levels of justice perceptions than regulatory misfit (promotion/loss or prevention/gain). Additionally, “could” and “should” counterfactuals partially mediated the relationship between regulatory fit and interactional justice (Study 3).     

Pushing mom away: Embodied cognition and avoidant attachment

The objective of this research was to examine embodied psychological defense—the way in which defensive processes are manifest in basic motor responses. Forty-one participants were instructed to physically push or pull a lever in response to lexical stimuli presented on a computer display. Participants who were relatively avoidant with respect to attachment were faster to push the lever away from themselves when presented with the word “mom.” These results suggest that basic avoidant motives are automatically primed when attachment-related stimuli are processed, and that these tendencies manifest themselves in basic, motor-specific ways.     

Impact of regulatory focus on ambiguity aversion

Although prior research has shown that some people prefer a risky to an ambiguous option, this study further proposes that people's regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention) might influence their ambiguity aversion. Three experiments have tested whether people with promotion focus showed less ambiguity aversion than those with prevention focus: The first experiment revealed that, compared with chronically promotion‐focused individuals, prevention‐focused subjects preferred a risky to an ambiguous option. In the second experiment, priming of the subjects' goal orientations led to similar results. Experiment 3 demonstrated that participants showed less ambiguity aversion for the expected performance of an investment product representative of promotion (e.g., a stock fund) rather than one representative of prevention (e.g., a bond fund). In other words, people showed less preference for a bond fund when the probability distribution of its expected performance was unknown than when it was known, whereas they showed less preference difference between known and unknown probability distributions for the expected performance of a stock fund. This study has integrated research pertaining to regulatory focus and ambiguity aversion, and the results have confirmed that the impact of regulatory focus on ambiguity aversion is robust across different methods and decision tasks. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The closeness-communication bias: Increased egocentrism among friends versus strangers

People commonly believe that they communicate better with close friends than with strangers. We propose, however, that closeness can lead people to overestimate how well they communicate, a phenomenon we term the closeness-communication bias. In one experiment, participants who followed direction of a friend were more likely to make egocentric errors—look at and reach for an object only they could see—than were those who followed direction of a stranger. In two additional experiments, participants who attempted to convey particular meanings with ambiguous phrases overestimated their success more when communicating with a friend or spouse than with strangers. We argue that people engage in active monitoring of strangers’ divergent perspectives because they know they must, but that they “let down their guard” and rely more on their own perspective when they communicate with a friend.     

Adult Attachment and Motivated Attention to Social Images: Attachment-Based Differences in Event-Related Brain Potentials to Emotional Images

Differences in adult attachment may concord with differences in social perception. The present study aimed to measure neural activity associated with the presentation of visual social stimuli. In an affective oddball paradigm, event-related brain potentials were recorded while participants viewed negative, positive, and neutral images of people and categorized them according to valence. Brain response amplitudes were examined across valence categories and across attachment groups. Results revealed differences between anxious and avoidant groups in “emotion bias”. The avoidant group displayed a bias towards more neural activation in response to negative compared to positive images. The anxious group trended in the opposite direction. Results are discussed in terms of possible attachment-based differences in motivated attention to social stimuli.     

Social comparison and confidence: When thinking you’re better than average predicts overconfidence (and when it does not)

A common social comparison bias—the better-than-average-effect—is frequently described as psychologically equivalent to the individual-level judgment bias known as overconfidence. However, research has found “Hard–easy” effects for each bias that yield a seemingly paradoxical reversal: Hard tasks tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average perceptions, whereas easy tasks tend to produce underconfidence and better-than-average effects. We argue that the two biases are in fact positively related because they share a common psychological basis in subjective feelings of competence, but that the “hard–easy” reversal is both empirically possible and logically necessary under specifiable conditions. Two studies are presented to support these arguments. We find little support for personality differences in these biases, and conclude that domain-specific feelings of competence account best for their relationship to each other.     

Dual identities in intergroup contact: Group status and size moderate the generalization of positive attitude change

To explore the effects of various categorization strategies on intergroup bias within and beyond a contact situation, two experiments were conducted involving groups of different size and/or status that worked together on a cooperative task. Three categorization strategies (decategorization, recategorization, and dual identity) were compared, and bias was measured through symbolic reward allocations to people who were and were not actually encountered. In Experiment 1 (N = 129), we varied group size (minority or majority) and found that it affected bias within the contact situation—minority groups were more biased than majority groups. All of the categorization strategies limited bias and they did so equally well. Outside the contact situation, however, only the recategorization and dual identity strategies limited bias. In Experiment 2 (N = 156), we varied both group status (low or high) and group size. Both of these variables affected bias within the contact situation—high status groups were more biased than low status groups, and minority groups were again more biased than majority groups. Once again, all three categorization strategies limited bias and they did so equally well. Outside the contact situation, however, an interaction among the independent variables was observed. For minority groups, only the dual identity strategy limited bias, but none of the categorization strategies limited bias for majority groups.     

Using emotional cues in a discrimination learning task: Effects of trait emotional intelligence and affective state

Individuals may differ in their ability to learn the significance of emotional cues within a specific context. If so, trait emotional intelligence (EI) may be associated with faster cue learning. This study (N = 180) tested whether trait EI predicts faster learning of a critical cue for discriminating “terrorists” from “non-terrorists”, using virtual-reality heads as stimuli. The critical cue was either facial emotion (positive or negative), or a neutral feature (hat size). Cognitive ability and subjective state were also assessed. Participants were faster to learn with an emotive cue. Surprisingly, high trait EI was correlated with poorer performance, especially early in learning. Subjective distress was also associated with impaired learning to emotive cues.     

Lack of an Attention Bias Away From Relatively Negative Faces in Dysphoria Is Not Related to Biased Emotion Identification

Eye-tracking-based attention research has consistently shown a lack of a normative attentional bias away from dysphoric face stimuli in depression, characterizing the attention system of non-depressed individuals. However, this more equal attention allocation pattern could also be related to biased emotion identification, namely, an inclination of depressed individuals to attribute negative emotions to non-negative stimuli when processing mood-congruent stimuli. Here, we examined emotion identification as a possible mechanism associated with attention allocation when processing emotional faces in depression. Attention allocation and emotion identification of participants with high (HD; n = 30) and low (LD; n = 30) levels of depression symptoms were assessed using two corresponding tasks previously shown to yield significant findings in depression, using the same face stimuli (sad, happy, and neutral faces) across both tasks. We examined group differences on each task and possible between-task associations. Results showed that while LD participants dwelled longer on relatively positive faces compared with relatively negative faces on the attention allocation task, HD participants showed no such bias, dwelling equally on both. Trait anxiety did not affect these results. No group differences were noted for emotion identification, and no between-task associations emerged. Present results suggest that depression is characterized by a lack of a general attention bias toward relatively positive faces over relatively negative faces, which is not related to a corresponding bias in emotion identification.     

In search of the nonconscious sources of goal pursuit: Accessibility and positive affective valence of the goal state

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that the mere priming of the representation of a goal state motivates people to pursue this state to the extent that it is associated with positive affect. In Experiment 1, all participants completed an affective priming task in which the goal concept of “socializing” was primed and tested for positive valence. Subsequently, they were given an instrumental task which provided the opportunity to pursue that state. It was established that participants put more effort in the task to attain the primed goal state when the implicitly assessed affective valence of the state was more positive. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these effects by showing that a stronger association of the goal state with positive affect—as assessed by the EAST—led to more effort to attain the state, but only when “socializing” was primed.     

Teachers' and education students' perceptions of and reactions to children with and without the diagnostic label "ADHD"

Thirty-four elementary school teachers and 32 education students from Canada rated their reactions towards vignettes describing children who met attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptom criteria that included or did not include the label “ADHD.” “ADHD”-labeled vignettes elicited greater perceptions of the child's impairment as well as more negative emotions and less confidence in the participants, although it also increased participants' willingness to implement treatment interventions. Ratings were similar to vignettes of boys versus girls; however, important differences in ratings between teachers and education students emerged and are discussed. Finally, we investigated the degree to which teachers' professional backgrounds influenced bias based on the label “ADHD.” Training specific to ADHD consistently predicted label bias, whereas teachers' experience working with children with ADHD did not.     

Modality differences in timing and temporal memory throughout the lifespan

The perception of time is heavily influenced by attention and memory, both of which change over the lifespan. In the current study, children (8 yrs), young adults (18–25 yrs), and older adults (60–75 yrs) were tested on a duration bisection procedure using 3 and 6-s auditory and visual signals as anchor durations. During test, participants were exposed to a range of intermediate durations, and the task was to indicate whether test durations were closer to the “short” or “long” anchor. All groups reproduced the classic finding that “sounds are judged longer than lights”. This effect was greater for older adults and children than for young adults, but for different reasons. Replicating previous results, older adults made similar auditory judgments as young adults, but underestimated the duration of visual test stimuli. Children showed the opposite pattern, with similar visual judgments as young adults but overestimation of auditory stimuli. Psychometric functions were analyzed using the Sample Known Exactly-Mixed Memory quantitative model of the Scalar Timing Theory of interval timing. Results indicate that children show an auditory-specific deficit in reference memory for the anchors, rather than a general bias to overestimate time and that aged adults show an exaggerated tendency to judge visual stimuli as “short” due to a reduction in the availability of controlled attention.     

Unfair treatment and self-regulatory focus

Ample correlational evidence exists that perceived unfair treatment is negatively related to well-being, health, and goal striving but the underlying process is unclear. We hypothesized that effects are due in part to contextual priming of prevention focus and the negative consequences of chronic prevention-focused vigilance. Indeed, reasonable responses to unfair treatment—to avoid situations in which it occurs or if this is not possible, confront it head on—fit prevention self-regulatory focus response patterns. Results from three experiments support this notion. Priming stigmatized social category membership heightened students’ prevention (not promotion) focus (n = 117). Priming non-stigmatized social category membership (i.e., white) did not change prevention focus (n = 46). Priming prevention (not promotion) increased perceptions of unfair treatment (and aroused prevention-relevant fight or flight responses) in response to a negative ambiguous job situation among low and moderate income adults (n = 112).     

Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot

People see themselves as less susceptible to bias than others. We show that a source of this bias blind spot involves the value that people place, and believe they should place, on introspective information (relative to behavioral information) when assessing bias in themselves versus others. Participants considered introspective information more than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves, but not others. This divergence did not arise simply from differences in introspective access. The blind spot persisted when observers had access to the introspections of the actor whose bias they judged. And, participants claimed that they, but not their peers, should rely on introspections when making self-assessments of bias. Only after being educated about the importance of nonconscious processes in guiding judgment and action—and thereby about the fallibility of introspection—did participants cease denying their relative susceptibility to bias.