Idealization in unitarian metaphysics

The aim of the paper is to propose an understanding of idealization in terms of Nowak’s unitarian metaphysics. Two natural interpretations of the procedure are critically discussed and rejected as inadequate. The first account of idealization is unable to explain why idealized factors cease to exert influence on the investigated magnitude. The second account of idealization solves this problem but does so at the cost of blurring the distinction between idealization and abstruction. Moreover, it faces the consequence that the process of idealization instead of leading to a sharper understanding of phenomena will normally result in making the picture more and more probabilistic. I propose a third account of idealization in unitarian terms that solves all three problems.     

The physiological and psychological grounds of Ptolemy's visual theory: Some methodological considerations

Until fairly recently, Ptolemy's Optics has been regarded as an exercise in what would today be called physical optics, its focus purportedly upon ray-geometry. In terms of methodology, therefore, the Optics has generally been regarded as a model of applied mathematics. The purpose of this essay is to show that this textbook interpretation is not only excessively restrictive but fundamentally misguided. As will become clear in the course of this essay, in fact, Ptolemy's primary goal in the Optics was to frame a comprehensive and coherent account of visual perception, not to explain the physics of radiation. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Idealizing,Abstracting, and Semantic Dispositionalism

Abstract: According to certain dispositional accounts of meaning, an agent's meaning is determined by the dispositions that an idealized version of this agent has in optimal conditions. We argue that such attempts cannot properly fix meaning. For even if there is a way to determine which features of an agent should be idealized without appealing to what the agent means, there is no non‐circular way to determine how those features should be idealized. We sketch an alternative dispositional account that avoids this problem, according to which an agent's meaning is determined by the dispositions that an abstract version of this agent has in optimal conditions.     

Analytic Idealizations and the Disavowed: Winnicott,His Patients,and Us

This paper explores the dynamics of mutual idealization within the analytic dyad. While the subject of idealization is not a new one, very little has been written about the analyst's own participation in patients' idealizations or her vulnerability to idealizing the patient. I use both published and unpublished materials to muse about coconstructed idealizations as they appear to have coalesced in Winnicott's treatment of Masud Khan and Harry Guntrip. Because the notion that we might be involved in being idealized by our patients—or in idealizing them—collides with our professional vision, we tend to be highly resistant to acknowledging these dynamics and often turn to denigration when they are unmasked. I argue for the ubiquity of idealization's dynamics and against the demonization of Winnicott.     

Thought processes,Loneliness and Anxiety. Experimental and psychoanalytical investigations into creative thinking

The author questions whether Kernberg's suggestion that the interaction between splitting and other defence mechanisms—such as primitive idealization, omnipotence, devaluation and denial [disavowal]—gives an adequate psychodynamic explanation of borderline personality structures. The author shows that the assumption of a splitting mechanism provokes contradictions and that primitive idealization, omnipotence, devaluation and disavowal cannot be seen as genuine defence mechanisms. He argues that primitive idealization is a type of reaction formation and that the omnipotence of these patients can be put down to identification with the idealized ego-functions of their objects. He also maintains that the clinical phenomena can be understood as the outcome of a combination of an “equiparant” and “disequiparant” isolation, displacement, projection and primitive idealization, making the concept of splitting as an explanatory device superfluous.     

Approximations, Idealizations, and Models in Statistical Mechanics

In this paper, a criticism of the traditional theories of approximation and idealization is given as a summary of previous works. After identifying the real purpose and measure of idealization in the practice of science, it is argued that the best way to characterize idealization is not to formulate a logical model – something analogous to Hempel's D-N model for explanation – but to study its different guises in the praxis of science. A case study of it is then made in thermostatistical physics. After a brief sketch of the theories for phase transitions and critical phenomena, I examine the various idealizations that go into the making of models at three difference levels. The intended result is to induce a deeper appreciation of the complexity and fruitfulness of idealization in the praxis of model-building, not to give an abstract theory of it.     

Response to Phillips,Hopkins, and Berman

Adam Phillips asks why we need to engage in professional policing. He exceeds my own professional comfort zone when he suggests that a great thing about psychoanalysis is that “it does not necessarily make people better.” I make a plea for a measure of professional idealism that takes account of the analyst's power. In her discussion, Linda Hopkins provides fascinating anecdotes that support my ideas about Masud Khan's analysis. Hopkins also argues for the value of idealization in therapeutic process, noting that I excessively emphasize its problematics. I agree with Hopkins's perspective and muse about why my paper reads otherwise. Emanuel Berman distinguishes institutional from individual idealizations and argues for the value of the latter while underscoring the difference between de-idealization and devaluation. I query the inevitably problematic nature of institutional idealizations.     

Effects of relational transgressions on idealization of and disillusionment with one's romantic partner: A three‐wave longitudinal study

In this three‐wave study (n = 121 couples), we tested whether one couple‐member's relational transgressions (high and low severity) at Wave 1 predicted less idealization on warmth and competence traits and greater disillusionment by the partner at the next two waves. It was hypothesized that (a) greater frequency of the target partner's severe transgressions in 1 month would be needed to reduce how much the other partner idealized the target in the competence domain, (b) higher frequency of even relatively less severe transgressions would lower the partner's idealization of the target in the warmth domain, and (c) any transgressions would raise perceivers' disillusionment. Longitudinal analyses (controlling for earlier idealization and disillusionment) substantially supported predictions.     

Remarks on Bolzano's Conception of Necessary Truth

This essay presents a new interpretation of Bolzano's account of necessary truth as set out in §182 of the Theory of Science. According to this interpretation, Bolzano's conception is closely related to that of Leibniz, with some important differences. In the first place, Bolzano's conception of necessary truth embraces not only what Leibniz called metaphysical or brute necessities but also moral necessities (truths grounded in God's choice of the best among all metaphysical possibilities). Second, in marked contrast to Leibniz, Bolzano maintains that there is still plenty of room for contingency even on this broader conception of necessity.     

AQUINAS ON ATTACHMENT, ENVY, AND HATRED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

This essay examines Aquinas's discussions of hatred in Summa Theologica I‐II, Q. 29 and II‐II, Q. 34, in order to retrieve an account of what contemporary theorists of the emotions call its cognitive contents. In Aquinas's view, hatred is constituted as a passion by a narrative pattern that includes its intentional object, beliefs, perceptions of changes in bodily states, and motivated desires. This essay endorses Aquinas's broadly “cognitivist” account of passional hatred, in line with his way of treating passions in general. I suggest that Aquinas's account of hatred's arising out of attachment is compelling. However, I also argue that if Aquinas's treatment of hatred is to help us understand the phenomenon of hate, where classes of people are abominated for an identity they bear, and to avoid equating an oppressor's hatred with that of the oppressed for the oppressor, the cognitive pathway to hatred must be broader than through envy.     

The Doubling Undone? Double Effect in Recent Medical Ethics

Abstract

This article treats recent bioethical discussions of double effect reasoning (DER), offering a summary account of DER and construing it as rooted in a sensible view of what is central to someone's identity as a moral agent. It then treats objections raised in recent years by Judith Thomson, Alison McIntyre, and Frances Kamm against familiar ways of applying DER to certain controversies within medical ethics, especially, that over physician-assisted suicide. After detailing, interpreting, and attempting to rebut the challenges from these philosophers, who are especially interesting because their criticisms of DER come from allies in DER's struggle against consequentialist reasoning, the essay engages DER's contribution to a recent dispute over treatment of patients in what is called ‘persistent vegetative state.’ Near its end, the paper sketches several possible points of entry to DER and sources of justification for it. The essay concludes by indicating a connection between these paths and its opening idea of moral identity.     

External Freedom in Kant's Rechtslehre: Political,Metaphysical1

External freedom is the central good protected in Kant's legal and political philosophy. But external freedom is perplexing, being at once freedom of spatio‐temporal movement and a form of noumenal or ‘intelligible’freedom. Moreover, it turns out that identifying impairments to external freedom nearly always involves recourse to an elaborated system of positive law, which seems to compromise external freedom's status as a prior, organizing good. Drawing heavily on Kant's understanding of the role of empirical ‘anthropological’information in constructing a Doctrine of Right, or Rechtslehre, this essay offers an interpretation of external freedom that makes sense of its simultaneous spatio‐temporality, dependence on positive law, intelligibility (or ‘noumenality’), and a priority. The essay suggests that this account of Kantian external freedom has implications both for politics and for the metaphysics of everyday objects and institutions.     

Chisholm's Legacy on Intentionality

Abstract: The problem of intentionality, or how mind and language can take things in the world as “intentional objects,” engaged Chisholm throughout his philosophical career. This essay reviews and discusses his seminal contributions on this problem, from his early work in “Sentences about Believing” and Perceiving during the 1950s to his last and most mature account in The First Person, published in 1981 . Chisholm's final view was that de se reference, or a subject's directly taking himself as an intentional object, is fundamental and primitive, and that all other forms of intentional reference, such as de re and de dicto, can be understood on the basis of de se intentionality. The essay ends with a discussion of the worry that this account might lead to what may be called “intentional solipsism,” the proposition that the self is the only genuine object of intentional reference.     

Feminist Radical Empiricism,Values, and Evidence

Feminist epistemologies consider ways in which gender (among other social factors) influences knowledge. In this article, I want to consider a particular kind of feminist empiricism that has been called feminist radical empiricism (where the empiricism, not the feminism, is radical). I am particularly interested in this view's treatment of values as empirical, and consequently up for revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Proponents of this view cite the fact that it allows us to talk about certain things such as racial and gender equality as objective facts: not just whether we have achieved said equality in our society, but whether we are, in fact, all equal. I will raise the concern that the way in which they model the role of values in epistemology may be a problematic idealization of the open‐mindedness of human agents. In some cases, resistance to value‐change cannot be diagnosed as a failure to respond adequately to evidence. If so, the strategy of empirically testing our values that some feminist radical empiricists suggest may not be as useful a tool for social change as they think.     

Communication,Punishment, and Virtue

This essay suggests that while Antony Duff's model of criminal punishment as secular penance is pregnant with possibilities for theological reception and reflection, it proceeds by way of a number of separations that are brought into question by the penitential traditions of Christianity. The first three of these—between justice and mercy, censure and invitation, and state and victim, constrain the true communicative character of his account of punishment. The second set of oppositions, between sacrament and virtue, interior character and external action, and formal and moral reconciliation, subject the model of state punishment as secular penance to problematic liberal and libertarian constraints. A postsecular analogy, outlining a theology of the invitational nature of divine judgment, and drawing on Thomas Aquinas's account of penance as both sacrament and virtue, is proposed.     

Modeling,Truth, and Philosophy

Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into account the idealized nature of our familiar conception of truth.     

Domination and Dialogue in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception

Merleau-Ponty's claim in Phenomenology of Perception (1962) that the anonymous body guarantees an intersubjective world is problematic because it omits the particularities of bodies. This omission produces an account of “dialogue” with another in which I solipsistically hear only myself and dominate others with my intentionality. This essay develops an alternative to projective intentionality called “hypothetical construction,” in which meaning is socially constructed through an appreciation of the differences of others.     

Maternal intrusion: Its roots and consequences

Abstract

Behind an intrusive mother’s view of her actual child lies a disproportionate, hidden desire to revive an ideal relationship with a perfect mother. The resulting image of an idealized child then becomes a strategic aspect of the mother’s own identity, representing an idealized figure from her own past. As the mother’s idealization is disturbed by the reality of the child, the mother experiences the situation between herself and the baby as “pathological,” that is, disruptive to her. She then attempts to repair the idealization by resisting any change in the status of her relationship to her child, even as the child grows older. Her rigidity in this regard necessarily excludes a paternal presence that could challenge or change the mother–infant idealized dyad. The mother’s orientation is also contradictory to, and acts as a resistance to, psychoanalytic therapeutic interventions, which aim at any “change.”     

MY FATHER,MYSELF

This essay presents material from the second analysis of an offspring of two Holocaust survivors, each of whom lost a child during the war. The first analysis (Kogan 2003 ) focused primarily on the patient's relationship with her mother. This second analysis revolves around the elaboration of the complex and painful father–daughter relationship, centering on the events surrounding the death of the patient's father. The discussion includes an exploration of the father's deferred action on account of his Holocaust trauma, which he passed on to the next generation; the break in the idealized paternal representation; and the daughter's identification with her father's disavowed aggressive aspects. It also examines some of the unique transference and countertransference problems that arose, mainly because patient and analyst belonged to the same traumatized large group.     

POLITICAL LIBERALISM,BASIC LIBERTIES,AND LEGAL PATERNALISM

This essay argues that neutral paternalism (NP) is problematic for antiperfectionist liberal theories. Section 2 raises textual evidence that Rawlsian liberalism does not oppose and may even support NP. In section 3, I cast doubt on whether NP should have a place in political liberalism by defending a partially comprehensive conception of the good I call “moral capacity at each moment,” or MCEM, that is inconsistent with NP. I then explain why MCEM is a reasonable conception on Rawls's account of reasonableness. In section 4, I handle concerns that showing NP fails the test of Rawlsian public justification is a nonstarter since NP does not threaten any of our basic liberties. I sketch an argument that, if this is so, the burden is on political liberalism to defend its particular account of basic liberties, since MCEM is reasonable on Rawlsian grounds. More precisely, MCEM is a conception that challenges the way Rawls characterizes basic liberties; that is, his list of basic liberties should be more inclusive by political liberalism's own structural commitments, including Rawls's “liberal principle of legitimacy.” On this revised account, political liberalism can mount a strong opposition to hard legal paternalism.