Evolutionary psychology and rational-emotive theory: Time to open the floodgates

Main tenets, issues, and controversies for evolutionary psychology (EP), particularly its cognitive aspects, are introduced, clarified, and applied to the theory and philosophy of rational-emotive therapy (RET). Specifically, key concepts in EP are applied to Ellis' genetic postulate for cognitive demandingness and grandiosity, and are incorporated into Ruth's (1992) RET evolutionary proposal. The following issues are examined for demanding and grandiose thinking: nature (genetic) vs. nurture (learned), plasticity vs. unmodifiability, acquisition ease and modification-elimination difficulty, natural inseparability of cognition and emotion, natural inseparability of cognitive content and process, social selection pressures and the human psyche, competitive individualism vs. natural self-interest, evolutionary counter-balancing and false mutually exclusive dichotomies, epigenetic rules and Darwinian algorithms, current adaptions vs. ancestral remnants, child and adult adaption, Darwinism vs. Lamarckism, and ethical considerations.William J. Ruth, Ph.D., Staff Psychologist and Practicum Supervisor. School PsychologistPrivate Practice and Independent Research, Hartsdale, NY.     

What is so important about completing lives? A critique of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation

Ruth Tallman has recently offered a defense of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation [1]. According to Tallman, this principle calls for prioritizing adolescents and young adults between 15–40 years of age. In this article, I argue that Tallman’s defense of the modified youngest first principle is vulnerable to important objections, and that it is thus unsuitable as a basis for allocating resources. Moreover, Tallman makes claims about the badness of death for individuals at different ages, but she lacks an account of the loss involved in dying to support her claims. To fill this gap in Tallman’s account, I propose a view on the badness of death that I call ‘Deprivationism’. I argue that this view explains why death is bad for those who die, and that it has some advantages over Tallman’s complete lives view in the context of scarce resource allocation. Finally, I consider some objections to the relevance of Deprivationism to resource allocation, and offer my responses.     

On Three Dogmas of Normativity

Ruth Chang argues against three dogmas of normativity. Her argument, as least about the first two, is defensible, but defensible on a naturalistic account of normativity that she may not find congenial.     

General-purpose content

In this paper, I consider the objection, raised by Radu Bogdan, that a teleological theory of content is unable to ascribe content to a general-purpose, doxastic system. I begin by giving some attention to the notion of general-purpose representation, and suggest that this notion can best be understood as what I term "interest-independent" representation. I then outline Bogdan's objection in what I take to be its simplest form. I attempt to counter the objection by explaining how a teleologist might ascribe content in a particular case - the case of a perceptual judgement whose content is learned. I reject the idea that the teleologist can appeal to the way in which the subject has used the judgement, or its constituent concepts, in the past, on the grounds that it is possible for the subject to produce judgements and concepts that never help her to satisfy any of her interests. Instead, my account depends on the idea that the process of learning is regulated by a mechanism whose function is to produce a harmony between the information carried by perceptual judgements and the way in which they are used in inference.     

Commitment and Reasons – A Comment on Ruth Chang, ‘Three Dogmas of Normativity’

Ruth Chang has argued convincingly that we must recognize that some choices will not involve strict, univocal comparison of options. How, then, can such choices be made well? Chang suggests that commitment is a fundamental way of ‘putting one's very self’ behind a normative consideration, thereby ‘endow[ing] that consideration with the normativity of a reason’. This view challenges what Chang deems to be three dogmas of normativity, and the current comment critically assesses the relation of her view to the first and third of these dogmas. I suggest some alternative ways of thinking about these dogmas, which enable us to see how her work might uncover a fourth dogma, and which can, I believe, lend strength to a position very close to Chang's.     

Can Doctors Maintain Good Character? An Examination of Physician Lives

Can doctors maintain good character? This paper shifts the focus from patient care to ethical considerations that bear on the physician and impact her as a person. By decentering patient care, the paper highlights certain factors that habituate a particular way of reasoning that is not conducive to inculcating good character. Such factors include, standards of professionalism, being influenced by external monitors, and emphasis on adherence to guidelines. While such factors may benefit patients, they often adversely affect the character of physicians.     

It's Not a Story

This writing presents a firsthand account of living with the certain knowledge that you can't rely on your brain the way you used to. Epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, brain tumor—what do these words really mean day by day, moment by moment? The author blends poetry and prose in her account of forging a new relationship with her own brain. Activities that were once routine are now difficult and even dangerous. No longer is her brain a silent partner as she navigates the debilitating, embarrassing, and occasionally humiliating symptoms of her disease. Can I really get through this shower? How much help do we need today, Brain? Mindfulness practice helps the author become more aware of her moment-by-moment experience. Her therapist prods her to dig into her own story, but the author resists. She resists and yet she shares her story that may not be a story.     

“Spacious Enough to Receive What Came to Me”: An Interview with Naomi Ruth Lowinsky

Naomi Ruth Lowinsky tells the story of how synchronicity and a bad dream flung her into a Jungian analysis, how her experiences as a young woman in India opened her to the Jungian Weltanshauung, and how analysis gave her access to her passionate and absorbing inner life. She speaks about her relationship to inner figures—her muse, her ancestors—and how they continue to influence her life and writing.     

Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons

What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons.     

Debating brain drain: Three objections that complicate the picture

In my contribution to this brain drain debate sparked by Brock and Blake’s book, Debating Brain Drain, I respond only to Brock’s position, and raise three objections which I suggest complicate the picture that she sketches. First, I take issue with the way in which she frames the moral question, namely by limiting her focus to what home countries may legitimately do to address the problems associated with the brain drain. I argue that the way in which she frames the question has important ideological consequences, because she does not adequately account for the larger context, in particular, by leaving out the moral obligations of the host countries who are the main beneficiaries of the brain drain. My second objection is rooted in the distinction between technical knowledge and practical knowledge found in the work of Habermas – an important distinction which gets obscured in Brock’s analysis in precisely the kind of ideological ways that Habermas was concerned about. She namely attempts to solve what are mainly practical (political) problems through purely instrumental, technical means. Several distortions accompany this fundamental confusion. My third point of critique has to do with the problem that an ethics of care (an ethics of responsibility and obligation) encounters within a liberal paradigm strongly shaped by an ethics of rights. Drawing on the work of Kroeger-Mappes, I argue that Brock arbitrarily singles out a group of people and holds them to an ethics of care which is strictly supererogatory within her own liberal paradigm.     

THE OBJECTIVITY OF OBLIGATIONS IN DIVINE MOTIVATION THEORY: On Imitation and Submission

To support her divine motivation theory of the good, which seeks to ground ethics in motives and emphasize the attractiveness of morality over against the compulsion of morality, Linda Zagzebski has proposed an original account of obligations which grounds them in motives. I argue that her account renders obligations objectionably person‐relative and that the most promising way to avoid my criticism is to embrace something quite close to a divine command theory of obligation. This requires her to combine her desired emphasis on the imitation of God with a contrasting emphasis on submission to God. I conclude that her divine motivation theory of the good, if it is to have an adequate account of obligation, is dependent on a divine will or divine command theory of obligation.     

Moral Sentimentalism

In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a Kripkean reference-fixer theory of the role of feelings of approval and disapproval in moral judgment.     

The meaning of the h-index

The h-index originates from the assumption that the number of citations received by a scientist is a better indicator of the relevance of his or her work than the number of papers he or she publishes or the journals where they are published. It takes into account the number of papers published and the citations to those papers in a balanced way, and thus is useful to make comparisons between scientists. The present paper addresses the most frequent questions about the h-index. Specifically, it explains its origin, its advantages compared to other indices, the factors that can influence it (e.g. age, field of knowledge, topic of research and language of publication), its variants, and the injustices it may lead to. In short, this paper provides a clear exposition of the hoped-for role of the h-index in the evaluation of scientists: that it serves as a useful complement to other indicators that are more subjective, and that it contributes to the progress of science by aiding decision-making on allocation of research resources in a more effective way, and on rewarding researchers who contribute to scientific progress in a more fair way.     

Guirlanda's question

Abstract

Ruth was an attractive, single woman in her late 30s, well-placed at the executive level of a large corporation. When she had been offered the job a couple of years before beginning analysis with me, it had seemed to her like a dream come true. She would have the opportunity to work at the top levels of a large company, report to the president, and earn a sizeable salary. Best of all, the company was embarking on a major transformation of its internal structure. This was an old, established organization that badly needed to change its outmoded ways, introduce new technology, and re-educate its middle-level managers. Now, there would be change: Creativity and new ideas were highly prized by the president, and a top-flight consultant had been hired to “shake things up.”     

Cognitive Processing Therapy With an Older Woman Veteran During COVID-19: A Case Study

With advances in technology, telehealth has become an acceptable way of conducting psychotherapy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, telehealth and ways to modify treatments for delivery via telehealth have become increasingly important. Researchers and clinicians have issued recommendations on providing telehealth-based care in response to the COVID-19 global pandemic. However, recommendations are limited for audio only telephone-based care, which may be the only option for specific clients. This is a case study of an older adult who completed Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) for military sexual trauma. Halfway through her treatment, COVID-19 resulted in transitioning from in-person services to a virtual format. Client X did not have video capabilities aside from her cell phone, and it was determined she would complete treatment via telephone-based sessions. Client X’s outcome data is presented, and the reductions in her PTSD and depressive symptoms provide preliminary support suggesting that telephone-based care may be an acceptable method of receiving CPT. Recommendations for telephone-based CPT are provided.     

First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement

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Ontology and Teleofunctions: A Defense and Revision of the Systematic Account of Teleological Explanation

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