The persuasive effects of framing messages on fruit and vegetable consumption according to regulatory focus theory

According to Regulatory Focus theory (RFT), outcomes in persuasive messages can be framed in four different ways, as gains, non-gains, losses or non-losses. In study 1, the persuasiveness of all four frames was compared and the presence/absence effect that was expected on the basis of the feature-positive effect was verified: Statements about present outcomes (gain, loss) were more persuasive than those about absent outcomes (non-gain, non-loss). However, this study failed to support the prediction that a gain-framed message would be more persuasive than a loss-framed message when promoting a prevention behaviour. Study 2 was designed to examine the latter finding. It was hypothesised that the threat posed by the loss-framed message in study 1 was too low to elicit a defensive reaction. Therefore, in study 2, the personal relevance of the gain and the loss framed message was manipulated. Consistent with predictions, the gain-framed message was more persuasive than the loss-framed message, but only when the message was personalised to increase self-relevance. Moreover, the effect was due to a significant drop in persuasion in the loss condition, probably caused by a defensive reaction. These data shed a new light on the findings of past framing studies.     

The persuasive effects of framing messages on fruit and vegetable consumption according to regulatory focus theory

According to Regulatory Focus theory (RFT), outcomes in persuasive messages can be framed in four different ways, as gains, non-gains, losses or non-losses. In study 1, the persuasiveness of all four frames was compared and the presence/absence effect that was expected on the basis of the feature-positive effect was verified: Statements about present outcomes (gain, loss) were more persuasive than those about absent outcomes (non-gain, non-loss). However, this study failed to support the prediction that a gain-framed message would be more persuasive than a loss-framed message when promoting a prevention behaviour. Study 2 was designed to examine the latter finding. It was hypothesised that the threat posed by the loss-framed message in study 1 was too low to elicit a defensive reaction. Therefore, in study 2, the personal relevance of the gain and the loss framed message was manipulated. Consistent with predictions, the gain-framed message was more persuasive than the loss-framed message, but only when the message was personalised to increase self-relevance. Moreover, the effect was due to a significant drop in persuasion in the loss condition, probably caused by a defensive reaction. These data shed a new light on the findings of past framing studies.     

Influence of deontological versus consequentialist orientations on act choices and framing effects: when principles are more important than consequences

A long tradition in decision making assumes that people usually take a consequentialist perspective, which implies a focus on the outcomes only when making decisions. Such a view largely neglects the existence of a deontological perspective, which implies that people are sensitive to moral duties that require or prohibit certain behaviors, irrespective of the consequences. Similarly, recent research has also suggested that people holding “protected values” (PVs) show increased attention to acts versus omissions and less attention to outcomes. The present research investigates the role of deontological versus consequentialist modes of thought and of PVs on framing effects and act versus omission choices. In a modification of Tversky and Kahneman's ( 1981 ) risky choice framing paradigm, we manipulated the framing of the outcomes (positive, negative), as well as whether the certain outcome was associated with an act or inaction. The main results suggest that act versus omission tendencies are linked to deontological focus and PVs. Framing effects, on the other hand, are driven by a consequentialist focus. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing the Lewinsky Affair: Third-Person Judgments by Scandal Frame

Recent studies have documented a “third-person effect” whereby people are found to judge others as more influenced than themselves by the mass media. Meanwhile, contemporary research on issue framing has demonstrated the powerful role of mass media in shaping people's political judgments. But are the perceptual judgments that define third-person effects sensitive to how the media frame an issue? Two studies investigated this question in the context of the Lewinsky-Clinton scandal, one in late August 1998 and the other during spring 1999. Several hundred undergraduates in each study were randomly assigned to one of two media frames. In the 1998 study, the political scandal was depicted as a matter of sexual indiscretion by the president or as legal wrongdoing; in the 1999 study, the recently concluded impeachment process was depicted as the consequence of partisanship or of Clinton's actions. The participants’ judgments of media influence on themselves and on the public were then recorded. The results show that third-person effects were sensitive to issue framing, but change occurred primarily in participants’ judgments about their own vulnerability to media influence.     

Attributions in a Spiritual Healing Context: An Archival Analysis of a 1920s Healing Movement

Research on religious attributions has been limited by a preoccupation with disentangling “religious” from “naturalistic” attributions and a failure to capture the attributions that people make in response to meaningful events. Thirty years of research has shown that even under optimum conditions religious attributions are rare compared to naturalistic ones. This research draws on unique archival materials comprising letters written to the Panacea Society containing self‐reported effects of a spiritual healing treatment based on water‐taking practices. This analysis examined attributions over time among a sample of letter writers (N = 19) from the 1920s using the Leeds Attributional Coding System to examine patterns of attributions that correspondents made in response to improvement and worsening of health outcomes. In line with previous research, religious attributions were more common for positive outcomes than negative outcomes. Contrary to previous research, religious attributions accounted for the majority of attributions made compared with nonreligious attributions. We discuss the implications for future research in studying attributions in real‐life meaningful settings and in expanding the repertoire of attributions to include religious ritual and community.     

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Abstract

The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often generate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the logical inference. Recent research, however, shows that in some instances belief judgments take longer, are more prone to error and are more affected by cognitive load. One interpretation is that some logical inferences are available automatically and require intervention in order to respond according to beliefs. In two experiments, we investigate the effortful nature of belief judgments and the automaticity of logical inferences by increasing the inhibitory demands of the task. Participants were instructed to judge conclusion validity, believability and either font colour or font style, to increase the number of competing responses. Results showed that conflict more strongly affects judgments of believability than validity and when inhibitory demands are increased, the validity of an argument impacts more on belief judgments. These findings align with the new Parallel Processing model of belief bias.     

Exploring Message Framing Outcomes When Systematic,Heuristic, or Both Types of Processing Occur

Mixed findings have emerged in message framing studies, even when such studies employ the same general type of framing, such as goal framing. This article attempts to show that by extending the heuristic–systematic model‐based explanation of message framing effects to incorporate conditions that may prompt both systematic and heuristic processing, this theory may accommodate some of the aberrant findings. The research reported shows that by varying a message issue's risky implications and its personal relevance, 2 factors that potentially influence the type of processing people employ, systematic, heuristic, or concurrently both types of processing were evoked and influenced people's judgments, causing alternative patterns of message framing effects to occur. The results offer insight into how each of these types of processing can affect message framing outcomes, and they imply that certain seemingly aberrant findings in the literature can be reconciled with this extended theory.     

员工对企业社会责任的差异化反应:基于归因理论的阐释

企业社会责任归因是指个体对企业践行社会责任背后的动机进行主观推理和判断的过程与结果, 也是影响企业社会责任发挥积极作用的关键因素。通过梳理以往研究, 从个体、领导及组织三个层面总结了影响员工企业社会责任归因的因素, 同时从社会交换和组织认同视角深入剖析企业社会责任归因对员工态度和行为的影响及作用机理。未来研究可以进一步明晰不同企业社会责任归因的独特影响因素与作用效果, 基于归因理论探索企业社会责任归因的形成机制, 同时研究多种因素对企业社会责任归因的影响, 考察归因对企业社会责任公平启发机制的影响, 并基于中国情境开展本土化研究。     

On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability

In 7 different studies, the authors observed that a large number of thinking biases are uncorrelated with cognitive ability. These thinking biases include some of the most classic and well-studied biases in the heuristics and biases literature, including the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, base-rate neglect, "less is more" effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-cost effect, and certainty effects that violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In a further experiment, the authors nonetheless showed that cognitive ability does correlate with the tendency to avoid some rational thinking biases, specifically the tendency to display denominator neglect, probability matching rather than maximizing, belief bias, and matching bias on the 4-card selection task. The authors present a framework for predicting when cognitive ability will and will not correlate with a rational thinking tendency.     

Necessary versus sufficient causal schemata: Attributions for achievement in difficult and easy tasks

Previous research on Kelley's schemata for multiple sufficient and multiple necessary causes has failed to examine the hypothesis that a schema influences both predictions of an event and attributions of its causes. This research examined the effects of the difficulty of a hypothetical exam on predictions of exam grades, and on attributions of ability and effort. Exam difficulty influenced both the pattern of judgments of grades and reported beliefs in multiple necessary versus multiple sufficient causes. Contrary to the predictions of the schema theory, exam difficulty had little influence on the pattern of attributions of ability and effort. Kelley's concept of a causal schema is reinterpreted in terms of current views of human judgment, and the possible implications of the data for the interpretations of a causal schema are examined. The results question the assumption that attributions are based on beliefs about how causes combine to determine an effect, and suggest further research on the relationship between predictions and attributions.     

Protected values: No omission bias and no framing effects

Previous studies have suggested that people holding protected values (PVs) show a bias against harmful acts, as opposed to harmful omissions (omission bias). In the present study, we (1) investigated the relationship between PVs and acts versus omissions in risky choices, using a paradigm in which act and omission biases were presented in a symmetrical manner, and (2) examined whether people holding PVs respond differently to framing manipulations. Participants were given environmental scenarios and were asked to make choices between actions and omissions. Both the framing of the outcomes (positive vs. negative) and the outcome certainty (risky vs. certain) were manipulated. In contrast to previous studies, PVs were linked to preferences for acts, rather than for omissions. PVs were more likely to be associated with moral obligations to act than with moral prohibitions against action. Strikingly, people with strong PVs were immune to framing; participants with few PVs showed robust framing effects.     

Effects of Question-Wording Style and Research Context on Attributions for Success and Failure

Although a substantial body of research exists concerning the patterns of causal attributions that are made to explain achievement outcomes, relatively little attention has been paid to the effects that measurement techniques have on the attributions they elicit. Two methodological factors—question-wording style and research context—were hypothesized to affect the results of attribution studies. Participants made informational (e.g., "How hard did you try?") and causal (e.g., "To what extent was effort a cause of your outcome?") attributions to outcomes in either an experimental (anagram-task) or natural (classroom-examination) research context. Significant outcome effects were found for (a) informational but not causal attributions to ability and to the task and for (b) attributions to ability in the natural but not in the experimental context. The implications of these findings for attribution theory and research are discussed.     

What Role for Parental Attributions in Parenting Interventions for Child Conduct Problems? Advances from Research into Practice

The role of parental attributions in parenting interventions has been the subject of intense interest from clinicians and researchers attempting to optimise outcomes in treatments for children with conduct problems. Despite research articulating the many ways parental attributions can influence behavioural parent training (BPT) outcomes, and recognition that addressing parental attributions in treatment is one of the great challenges faced by BPT practitioners, parenting interventions generally do not provide components that explicitly target or focus on changing problematic parental attributions. In this paper, we ask ‘Should parental attributions be included into best practice interventions? If so, how can this be done in a way that improves outcomes without cluttering and complicating the parent training model?’ We review the theoretical and empirical status of our understanding of the role of parental attributions in BPT with reference to three questions: ‘do pre-treatment parental attributions uniquely predict treatment outcomes’; ‘do changes in parental attributions uniquely predict treatment outcomes’; and ‘does targeting parental attributions in BPT affect treatment outcomes’. Our review indicates that existing research supports the importance of focussing on parental attributions for some families in order to maximise treatment outcomes. However, clinical processes for doing this are yet to be identified and specified in a way that would allow for manualised replication and scrutiny in research designs. We finish with a discussion of how these clinical and research challenges could be approached.     

Attributions for negative life events and depression: the role of perceived control

Although perceptions of control occupied a central role in the development of learned helplessness theory, recent helplessness research has not considered controllability judgments when relating attributions to depression. Supporting the importance of this construct, the research discussed in this article found evidence that judgments of control interact with other attributions in predicting depression. Specifically, in a prospective study of stress and well-being in adolescence, internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events attributed to uncontrollable causes were found to be positively related to increases in depression (as predicted by the reformulated helplessness theory), but internal and global attributions for negative events attributed to controllable causes were found to be inversely related to increases in depression. The discussion considers the implications of the findings for understanding the nature of the relation between attributions for naturally occurring life events and depression.     

Framing Effects and Arenas of Choice: Your Money or Your Life?

This paper investigates the consistency of outcome framing effects on choice across two arenas of outcome: human life and money. Past research has yielded notable variability in the magnitude of framing effects. One possible contributor to the variation in magnitude is outcome arena. Past research has varied along this dimension without systematically assessing its effects. Undergraduates (N= 297) responded to three decision scenarios involving either human lives or money in which outcomes were framed either positively or negatively. Based on prospect theory, an interaction between framing and arena was predicted, such that a greater framing effect was expected in the human life arena (i.e., more risky choices were expected when outcomes involved human life than money in the negative frame and the reverse in the positive frame). Results were only partly consistent with this prediction. Regardless of frame, subjects made riskier choices when outcomes involved human lives rather than money. This was not expected for the positive frame. Even though human lives presumably have greater utility than dollars, subjects in the positive framing condition made riskier choices regarding human life than money. Additionally, no overall framing effect was observed. There was a significant sex by frame interaction such that only women exhibited framing effects on choice. This extends the finding of sex differences in framing to the monetary arena. This has important implications for the conduct of future studies on framing as well as for the interpretation of past and future framing research.     

Is there an "I" in "team"? The role of the self in group-serving judgments

Why do people make judgments that favor their groups, attributing outcomes to internal factors to a greater extent when their group succeeds than when their group fails? The present research demonstrates that group-serving judgments serve a self-protective function. In Study 1, participants in team sports competitions made more internal team attributions after experiencing victory than defeat; this group-serving bias was eliminated among those who completed an affirmation of personal values. Study 2 replicated Study 1 and found that affirmed people were less likely to use their self-judgments as an anchor for judgments about the group. Study 2 also found that self-affirmation secured feelings of being a worthy group member, and this was associated with the reduction of group-serving judgments. The present research examines the motivational factors that promote, reduce, link, and separate self-serving and group-serving judgments.     

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief.     

Logic, beliefs, and instruction: a test of the default interventionist account of belief bias

According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically. This finding was observed when instructional set was presented as a between-participants factor (Experiment 1), when instruction was indicated prior to problem presentation by a cue (Experiment 2), and when the cue appeared simultaneously with conclusion presentation (Experiments 3 and 4). The finding also extended to a range of simple and more complex argument forms (Experiment 5). In these latter experiments, belief-based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for default interventionist accounts of belief bias.     

Children's moral judgments of commission and omission based on their understanding of second‐order mental states1

Abstract: Children's moral judgments about acts of commission and omission with negative outcomes were studied based on their understanding of mental states. Children (N = 142) in the first, third, and fifth grades made judgments about four tasks composed of two levels of mental states (first‐order or second‐order) and two types of acts (commission or omission). The results showed that the 7‐year‐olds responded considering only first‐order mental states, but the 9‐ and 11‐year‐olds also used second‐order mental states in their judgments. Whether the acts were commission or omission did not make a difference. These results indicate that children can make moral judgments regarding acts of commission and omission based on an understanding of second‐order mental states by approximately the age of 9 years.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.