Early Sartre on Freedom and Ethics

This paper offers a revisionary interpretation of Sartre's early views on human freedom. Sartre articulates a subtle account of a fundamental sense of human freedom as autonomy, in terms of human consciousness being both reasons‐responsive and in a distinctive sense self‐determining. The aspects of Sartre's theory of human freedom that underpin his early ethics are shown to be based on his phenomenological analysis of consciousness as, in its fundamental mode of self‐presence, not an object in the world (Section 1). Sartre has a multi‐level theory of the reasons‐sensitivity of consciousness. At one level, consciousness's being alive to reasons is a matter of the affective perception of values and disvalues as features of phenomenal objects (Section 2). This part of his theory, a development of Scheler's, is, however, situated within a broader phenomenological analysis resulting in the claim that the ultimate reasons acknowledged by consciousness neither are nor justifiably could be values adequately presentable as intentional objects. Consciousness's ultimate reasons are, in this sense, not given by the world but by itself (Section 3). Section 4 reconstructs and assesses Sartre's argument that consciousness cannot rationally have an ultimate end other than self‐transparent (‘authentic’) freedom itself.     

Leadership and the management of conflicts in diverse groups: Why acknowledging versus neglecting subgroup identity matters

Past research suggests that reactions to an authority's decision are most influenced by treatment quality when individuals value their relationship with the authority and the group s/he represents. The present experiments examine how institutional recognition of self‐relevant identities (implicit in Study 1 and explicit in Study 2) affects the relationship between treatment quality and reactions to the delivery of a negative outcome by an outgroup authority. The overall pattern of results suggests that treatment quality affects reactions to the decision only when the common identity shared with the authority and a subgroup identity that distinguishes one from the authority are both recognized. Possible mechanisms for the observed effect are discussed along with implications for the dual identity approach to conflict resolution. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Diachronic agency and practical entitlement

As diachronic agents, we deliberate and decide in the present to perform future courses of action. Such future‐directed decisions normally enjoy a distinctive species of rational authority over subsequent thought and action. But what is the nature of this authority, and what underwrites its normative force? In this paper, I argue that our answer to this question must begin by situating future‐directed deciding within an intrapersonal model of cross‐temporal influence. The role of future‐directed deciding (and intending), then, is not to generate a novel decision‐based reason for action, but instead to preserve a certain positive normative status over time. I develop an entitlement approach to decisional authority, according to which an agent who rationally decides to ? enjoys a practical entitlement, rather than a reason‐based practical justification, to ? at the appointed time. This entitlement is underwritten, I argue, by the warrant‐preserving nature of the sequence taking an agent from deliberation to subsequent action.     

Conceptualising ‘Authority’

Abstract

This paper attempts a conceptualisation of authority intended to be useful across all areas where the concept is relevant. It begins by setting off authority against power, on the one hand, and respect, on the other, and then spells out S₁’s authority as consisting in S₂’s voluntary action performed in the belief that S₁ would approve of it. While this definition should hold for authority generally, a distinction is made between three different kinds of authority according to what grounds them: personal, acquired and bestowed authority. Authority thus defined is then used as an example to argue that there is a kind of property that is response-dependent (R-D), but, consisting in all and only a response, is ontologically different from both secondary qualities and value judgments. While secondary qualities are interactive in that they depend on both the object and the perceiver and on what they are like, genuinely R-D qualities depend ontologically and metaphysically only on the responder. And while value judgments require a concept, R-D qualities require an action as a response. It is hoped that this metaphysical underpinning might be helpful in the discussion of authority in other areas of philosophy and beyond.     

Purity and danger in the solar temple

Based on research conducted in Québec, this study explores the shape of the social life, apocalyptic ideology and authority structure of the Ordre du Temple Solaire (OTS) or Solar Temple within the framework of Mary Douglas's typology of ‘group and grid’. The pollution fears and purity rituals of this controversial new religious movement are analysed as an important factor in their decision to orchestrate a religiously‐motivated mass suicide/homicide, explained in their suicide documents as a ‘transit’ (a magical feat of soul travel) to the Star Sirius. Douglas's insights into how the human body becomes a ‘natural symbol’ for small, persecuted groups, mirroring the social body and the vulnerability of its exits and entrances vis‐à‐vis the surrounding culture, are applied to the alternative patterns of sexuality and parenting in the OTS. It is suggested that the magical aspect of the mass suicide expressed a concern for purity and for protecting the boundaries of their community. It is also suggested that the ritual homicides in Morin Heights resemble the ‘witch‐hunts’ characteristic of Douglas's ‘small society’ that conceives of itself as the perfect, impermeable vessel.     

Self‐Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority1

Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self‐knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts, no such person could fail to possess self‐knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of what appear to be true attributions of such failures. While the core idea behind Davidson's and Burge's accounts appears ioadequate to this task, I argue that it can be deployed in such a way as to deliver the desired result. What makes this possible is that two attitude‐types can differ as follows: the self‐knowledge required for an utterance to be a Oing that p is different from the self‐knowledge required for it to be a Ψfing that p.     

Implicit motives and basic psychological needs

The present article starts with discussing similarities and differences between conceptualizations of human needs in self‐determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan [1985], Intrinsic motivation and self‐determination in human behavior; Deci & Ryan [2000], Nebraska symposium on motivation: Perspectives on motivation) and motive disposition theory (MDT; McClelland, Human motivation, 1985). The second section focuses on the two‐process model of psychological needs (Sheldon [2011], Psychological Review, 118: 552), which aims to integrate the two approaches, whereas the third section highlights some aspects of both theories that are still decoupled or even contradictory, but nevertheless still have a high potential to be linked. These three aspects are (a) the noncorresponding concepts of implicit power motive (MDT) and basic need for autonomy (SDT); (b) the differentiation of needs into hope and fear components, which is theoretically embedded in MDT, but not in SDT; and (c) MDT researchers’ differentiation into an implicit and explicit motivational system, which is not included in SDT. Particularly, the last section highlights the potential for areas in which further integration is possible, which provides a foundation for comprehensive and exciting research on human motivation.     

Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot be the Whole Story

States are believed to be the paradigmatic instances of legitimate political authority. But is their prominence justified? The classic concept of state sovereignty predicts the danger of a fatal deadlock among conflicting authorities unless there is an ultimate authority within a given jurisdiction. This scenario is misguided because the notion of an ultimate authority is conceptually unclear. The exercise of authority is multidimensional and multiattributive, and to understand the relations among authorities we need to analyse this complexity into its different aspects. Instead of ultimate authorities we can have actors endowed with superior authority over others in one regard, but not necessarily in another. And this limited superiority is sufficient for resolving conflicts. There is no need for ultimate authorities. Having discarded the notion of sovereignty we can embrace a different conception of legitimate authority, one that is not interested in the pedigree of actors, but in their capacity to serve its subjects. If states wish to retain their central role in the domain of political authority, they will have to earn it.     

Children's judgments about their own self‐knowledge: The role of disclosure to other

Previous research has suggested that children of 5/6 years fail to understand that they are the authority on their own self‐knowledge. That is, when asked questions like, ‘Who knows best when you are feeling tired?’, they tend to cite their mother rather than themselves. Here we report a study that, rather than asking about generalities (‘Who knows best what you are thinking?’), presented 5‐, 7‐ 9‐ and 11‐year‐children with hypothetical vignettes about specific circumstances in which they were described as either disclosing or not disclosing a specified state to their mother. Children were subsequently asked to judge who would best know the state. Over all age groups children were significantly more likely to identify themselves as authorities on their own self‐knowledge when states had not been disclosed to mother than when they had. However, in the case of disclosed states, young children (though not older ones) asserted that, ‘mum knows best’. These findings are interpreted as suggesting not that young children entirely fail to understand first person authority, but instead that they make the relatively sophisticated assumption that mothers' interpretive competence is greater than their own.     

Construction and maintenance of parent–child relationships: Bidirectional contributions from the perspective of parents

The purpose of the present study was to investigate parents' perspectives of parent and child contributions to the construction and maintenance of the parent–child relationship. Twenty‐four mothers and fathers, with a child between 4‐ to 7‐years‐old, completed an open‐ended interview in which they described their parent–child relationship and commented on how they and their child strengthen, damage, and repair the relationship. Findings indicated that parents described their parent–child relationship with relatively similar emphasis on elements of authority, companionship, and intimacy. Parents reported that they were most likely to strengthen the parent–child relationship by interacting with their child in the companionship domain, whereas their overuse of power or authority and non‐responsiveness temporarily created damage in the relationship. Parents reported that their children were most likely to strengthen the relationship by complying with parent requests and engaging in companionate interactions, whereas not complying or challenging parent directives created relational tension. Parents indicated that both they and their children were most likely to repair interactional errors by restoring intimacy (e.g. apology, communication, or affection). Results are discussed from a framework of multiple relationship domains consisting of the interplay of vertical and horizontal dimensions of power. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Freedom and poverty in the Kantian state

The coercive authority of the Kantian state is rationally grounded in the ideal of equal external freedom, which is realized when each individual can choose and act without being constrained by another's will. This ideal does not seem like it can justify state‐mandated economic redistribution. For if one is externally free just as long as one can choose and act without being constrained by another, then only direct slavery, serfdom, or other systems of overt control seem to threaten external freedom. Yet Kant endows the freedom‐based state with considerable powers of economic redistribution. I argue that recent commentary has misunderstood both Kant's account of why poverty is a form of freedom‐threatening dependence and the extent of the Kantian state's powers for remedying poverty. Criticizing Arthur Ripstein and the Kantianism of the “Toronto‐School,” I argue that the most salient notion of dependence at issue within the Kantian framework is not the direct control of the choice‐making capacities of another but asymmetrical influence in a power relationship. For Kant, poverty is fundamentally a problem of structural disempowerment.     

Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought

Abstract

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher‐kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city‐state. I call the second set of arguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher‐kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical city‐state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.     

Human action and virtue in Descartes and Spinoza

In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, by which human actions are evaluated as virtuous or good on the basis of their motivational forces rather than their consequences. I will show further that both philosophers identify virtue qua free action with the highest good (summum bonum), and thus with that which is to be sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything preferable to it.     

Personal Authority and Its Relationship to Marital Satisfaction

SUMMARY

This article reports the findings of a study which investigated the relationship between personal authority (PA) and marital satisfaction (MS). Personal authority is a developmental psy-chosocial stage of life in which the individual terminates the hierarchical boundaries between themselves and their parents, takes full responsibility for their decisions and behaviors, and begins to relate to all other human beings, including parents, as peers. Although it can take a lifetime of purposeful effort to maintain PA, it is assumed that it can be obtained somewhere between the fourth and fifth decades of life (Bray, 1987). lb test the effects of PA on reported levels of MS, fifty-eight married couples filled out the Personal Authority in the Family System Questionnaire, to measure each indi-vidual's level of PA, and the Marital Satisfaction Scale, Form-C to measure rates of satisfaction within the marital relationship. Results demontrate a clear positive relationship between PA and MS (beta = .28, P < .05)     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

Power and the origins of unhappiness: Working with individuals

Evidence that the ‘ultimate repressed’ in our understanding of emotional distress is power can be gleaned even from Freud's writing. This is a form of repression which community psychology is well placed to lift. Impossible though it is to stand outside the ‘apparatus of power’ (and, therefore to give a complete analysis of it), we cannot achieve an accurate account of the causes of human unhappiness without taking its operations into account as fully as possible. The psychological therapies do have an implicit notion of will power, but this serves only to distract our attention from the external, material nature of power. We have to be careful, moreover, not to ‘psychologize’ power by trying to turn it into an internal attribute to be ‘switched on’ by an essentially mysterious process of ‘empowerment’. We need to specify empirically the types of power that contribute to ‘clinical’ distress and give an account of ‘therapy’ in terms of the powers to which it has access (recognizing also that these are limited).     

Who is Authorized to Do Applied Ethics? Inherently Political Dimensions of Applied Ethics

A standard view in ethics is that ethical issues concern a different range of human concerns than does politics. This essay goes beyond the long-standing dispute about the extent to which applied ethics needs a commitment to ethical theory. It argues that regardless of the outcome of that dispute, applied ethics, because it presumes something about the nature of authority, rests upon and is implicated in political theory. After internalist and externalist accounts of applied ethics are described, “mixed” approaches are considered that contain inevitable political dimensions. A feminist alternative, Walker’s metaethic of responsibility, shows that authority is best understood as relational and that situations of unequal power are therefore often the places where applied ethics arises. Furthermore, in a democratic society, commitments to democracy should shape the account of authority, and, thus, the nature of applied ethics as well.     

Performance‐Appraisal Beliefs of Chinese Employees in Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta

Working adults from Hong Kong (HK; N=102) and the Pearl River Delta (PRD; N=96) participated in a Chinese‐language, 20‐item, structured interview. The interview addressed five topics: performance criteria, implementation of the appraisal, factors attributed to performance, methods of feedback, and concerns about the use of performance appraisal (PA) at work. Results indicated that most respondents believe that PA facilitates communication between superiors and subordinates, that effective performance is a function of each individual's internal attributes (which may include aspects external to the workplace), and that feedback should be direct and frank, communicated by someone with authority and power. These results are consistent with the beliefs of people living in societies characterized as high in Confucian dynamism. We discussed implications of the findings for the use of PA in Chinese enterprises in HK and PRD.     

Non‐instrumental voice and extra‐role behaviour

The instrumental power associated with voicing opinions to an authority was manipulated to observe the effects upon subsequent discretionary, extra‐role behaviours. In two experiments, the provision of non‐instrumental voice increased extra‐role behaviours above a no voice condition. Experiment 2 also showed that this relationship was mediated by procedural‐justice perceptions, but not respect from, or social identification with, the group. The implications of these data for current theory, as well as the possible moderating role of social identification, are discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.