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1.
H. E. Baber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(4):377-392
Critics suggest that without some “objective” account of well-being we cannot explain why satisfying some preferences is,
as we believe, better than satisfying others, why satisfying some preferences may leave us on net worse off or why, in a range
of cases, we should reject life-adjustment in favor of life-improvement. I defend a subjective welfarist understanding of
well-being against such objections by reconstructing the Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a preferentist account of well-being.
According to the proposed account preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs
contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful,
that is, compatible with a range states that satisfy further actual or nearby possible preferences. The proposed account solves
the problem of adaptive preference. Individuals whose preferences are “deformed” are satisfied with fruitless states of affairs,
which constrain their options so that they are incapable of satisfying a wide range of nearby possible preferences—preferences
they “could easily have had.” Recognizing the value of capabilities as well as actual attainments allows us to explain why
individuals who satisfy “deformed” or perverse preferences may not on net benefit from doing so. More fundamentally, it explains
why some states are, as Sen suggests, bad, awful or gruesome while others are good, excellent or superb without appeal to
any objective account of value. 相似文献
2.
Robert F. GarnettJr. 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(5):437-447
In this paper, I employ the pioneering works of Nussbaum, Sen, Saito, and Walker, in conjunction with the U.S. tradition of
academic freedom, to outline a capability-centered vision of undergraduate education. Pace Nussbaum and Walker, I propose
a short list of learning capabilities to which every undergraduate student should be entitled. This working definition of
undergraduate education offers a starting point for discussion and experimentation. I employ it here to engage the current
controversy in U.S. colleges and universities over the nature, value, and legitimacy of undergraduate students’ academic freedoms.
In contrast to the anti-indoctrination emphasis of David Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights, I argue that students’ academic freedoms can be more effectively secured through the articulation of “essential freedoms
for liberal learning” whose principal focus is not the behavior or political affiliations of teachers but the intellectual
needs and circumstances of students. 相似文献
3.
Caroline Sarojini Hart 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(5):391-402
Amartya Sen’s capability approach creates an evaluative space within which individual well-being is considered in ways that diverge from dominant utilitarian views. Instead of measuring well-being based on the accumulation of wealth and resources by individuals and nations, the capability approach focuses on the opportunities (capabilities) an individual has to choose and pursue a life they have reason to value. The capability space is introduced with an explanation of Sen’s evaluative framework. It is claimed that conceptions of well-being are inextricably linked to our values and views of what constitutes justice, the ‘good life’ and notions of human flourishing. The paper invites philosophical reflection on how the capability approach can inform the development of a research paradigm that furthers our understandings of individual well-being and human flourishing. A specific focus is given to what more can be done to assist children and young people in making the best of their situation in negotiating a valued life for themselves in which they can flourish. 相似文献
4.
Rosa Terlazzo 《Journal of Global Ethics》2014,10(2):183-198
Although the problem of adaptiveness plays an important motivating role in her work on human capabilities, Martha Nussbaum never gives a clear account of the controversial concept of adaptive preferences on which she relies. In this paper, I aim both to reconstruct the most plausible account of the concept that may be attributed to Nussbaum and to provide a critical appraisal of that account. Although her broader work on the capabilities approach moves progressively towards political liberalism as time passes, I aim to show that her account of adaptive preferences continues to maintain her earlier commitment to perfectionism about the good. I then distinguish between two obligatory kinds of respect for persons, which I call, respectively, primary and secondary recognition respect. This distinction allows us to see that her perfectionist account of adaptive preferences allows her to show persons primary but not secondary recognition respect. Ultimately, I claim that an acceptable account of adaptive preferences must succeed in showing persons both types of respect. I conclude with some preliminary remarks on what such an account might look like. 相似文献
5.
Marybeth Shinn 《American journal of community psychology》2015,55(3-4):243-252
What makes for a good life? The capabilities approach to this question has much to offer community psychology, particularly with respect to marginalized groups. Capabilities are freedoms to engage in valued social activities and roles—what people can do and be given both their capacities, and environmental opportunities and constraints. Economist Amartya Sen’s focus on freedoms and agency resonates with psychological calls for empowerment, and philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s specification of requirements for a life that is fully human provides an important guide for social programs. Community psychology’s focus on mediating structures has much to offer the capabilities approach. Parallels between capabilities, as enumerated by Nussbaum, and settings that foster positive youth development, as described in a National Research Council Report (Eccles and Gootman (Eds) in Community programs to promote youth development. National Academy Press, Washington, 2002 ) suggest extensions of the approach to children. Community psychologists can contribute to theory about ways to create and modify settings to enhance capabilities as well as empowerment and positive youth development. Finally, capabilities are difficult to measure, because they involve freedoms to choose but only choices actually made or enacted can be observed. The variation in activities or goals across members of a setting provides a measure of the capabilities that the setting fosters. 相似文献
6.
Jon Garthoff 《Philosophia》2010,38(4):691-713
There is disagreement among contemporary theorists regarding human well-being. On one hand there are “substantive good” views,
according to which the most important elements of a person’s well-being result from her nature as a human, rational, and/or
sentient being. On the other hand there are “agent-constituted” views, which contend that a person’s well-being is constituted
by her particular aims, desires, and/or preferences. Each approach captures important features of human well-being, but neither
can provide a complete account: agent-constituted theories have difficulty accounting for the normativity of their claims,
and substantive good theories have difficulty accounting for how a person’s actually adopted aims shape what is good for her
and hence what she has reason to do. I articulate and defend a hybrid view that equals these approaches in systematicity and
completeness of explanation yet seeks to surpass them in coherence with our ordinary judgments about what human well-being
consists in. This hybrid view maintains, with agent-constituted theories, that a person’s well-being is (1) significantly
constituted by her actually adopted aims; (2) deeply contingent; (3) agent-relative; (4) significantly dependent on spatially
and temporally remote events; and (5) significantly independent of her experiences. The hybrid view also maintains, with substantive
good theories, that a person’s well-being is (6) in part determined by facts independent of her aims, desires, and preferences;
(7) such that all her aims are subject to critical evaluation and revision; and (8) constituted by her aims only if these
aims are choiceworthy. 相似文献
7.
Rutger Claassen 《European Journal of Philosophy》2017,25(4):1279-1304
The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. Each citizen is entitled to a set of basic capabilities. But which are these? Martha Nussbaum formulated a set of ten central capabilities. Amartya Sen argued they should be selected in a process of public reasoning. Critics object that the Nussbaum‐approach is too perfectionist and the Sen‐approach is too proceduralist. This paper presents a third alternative: a substantive but non‐perfectionist capability theory of justice. It presents a two‐level concept of individual agency as connected to social practices. It then argues basic capabilities are those necessary to for the agency necessary to navigate freely and autonomously between different social practices. 相似文献
8.
Ortrud Leßmann 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(5):449-460
The Capability Approach (henceforth CA) is in the first place an approach to the evaluation of individual well-being and social
welfare. Many disciplines refer to the CA, first and foremost welfare economics, development studies and political philosophy.
Educational theory was not among the first disciplines that took notice of the CA, but has a rising interest in it. This paper
argues that the CA would also profit from looking into educational theory. The first part of the paper shows why and where
educational theory—or more precisely: a theory of learning—is missing in the CA. This is done in three steps: the first section
gives a brief overview of the core concepts of Sen’s CA. Section “Capability and Choosing” focuses on the role of choosing
in the CA. It states the views of Sen and Nussbaum on choosing and shows the shortcomings in their appreciation of choosing.
In consequence, the third section derives some demands on a theory of learning in the CA. The second part of the paper presents
Dewey’s educational theory on experience as a possible starting point when looking for a learning theory that lends itself
to the integration in the CA. Section “Opportunity of Choosing, Experience and Education” introduces Dewey’s conception of
experience, freedom of the learner, conditions of experience and education. Section “Capability and Experience” discusses
how Dewey’s concepts fit into the CA. On the first glance, there are three points in which the CA and Dewey’s concepts match:
the importance of freedom for human life, the role of participation in education and the need to take internal and external
factors as well as their interaction into account in assessing choice situations. This establishes a basis for linking both
theories. Yet, more research is needed to explore the issue further. Section “Conclusion and Outlook” concludes and sketches
the lines for future research. 相似文献
9.
Pablo Gilabert 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(1):39-56
What should our theorizing about social justice aim at? Many political philosophers think that a crucial goal is to identify
a perfectly just society. Amartya Sen disagrees. In The Idea of Justice, he argues that the proper goal of an inquiry about justice is to undertake comparative assessments of feasible social scenarios
in order to identify reforms that involve justice-enhancement, or injustice-reduction, even if the results fall short of perfect
justice. Sen calls this the “comparative approach” to the theory of justice. He urges its adoption on the basis of a sustained
critique of the former approach, which he calls “transcendental.” In this paper I pursue two tasks, one critical and the other
constructive. First, I argue that Sen’s account of the contrast between the transcendental and the comparative approaches
is not convincing, and second, I suggest what I take to be a broader and more plausible account of comparative assessments
of justice. The core claim is that political philosophers should not shy away from the pursuit of ambitious theories of justice
(including, for example, ideal theories of perfect justice), although they should engage in careful consideration of issues
of political feasibility bearing on their practical implementation. 相似文献
10.
Andrea Bianchi 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):237-249
Everyone knows what David Lewis’ possible worlds are, what role they play in his account of possibility and necessity, and
Saul Kripke’s criticisms. But what, instead, are Kripke’s possible worlds, and what role do they play in his account of possibility
and necessity? The answers are not so obvious. Recently, it has even been claimed that, contrary to what is standardly assumed,
Kripke’s approach to modality has not always been consistently metaphysical. In particular, an interpretation of the famous
passage in the preface to Naming and Necessity with Kripke’s discussion of the dice example has been put forward, according to which he purports there to clarify the modal
notions in terms of that of possible world, model-theoretically construed, in a way which is reminiscent of Carnap’s. In this
paper, I shall point out some internal difficulties of this interpretation, and offer a different one, according to which
in the dice passage Kripke is trying, consistently with his metaphysical approach, to legitimize the technically useful notion
of possible world starting from modal notions, to be accounted for in another way (arguably, in an essentialistic framework).
My final goal, however, will be philosophical elucidation rather than mere exegesis. Indeed, I am interested in shedding some
light on what possible worlds might possibly be, if something like Kripke’s metaphysical approach is on the right track. 相似文献
11.
Meyers C 《Science and engineering ethics》2004,10(2):269-276
Much of the work in professional ethics sees ethical problems as resulting from ethical ignorance, ethical failure or evil
intent. While this approach gets at real and valid concerns, it does not capture the whole story because it does not take
into account the underlying professional or institutional culture in which moral decision making is imbedded. My argument
in this paper is that this culture plays a powerful and sometimes determinant role in establishing the nature of the ethical
debate; i.e., it helps to define what are viable action options, what is the organization’s genuine mission, and what behaviors
will be rewarded or criticized. Given these conclusions, I also argue that consulting ethicists need more than an understanding
of ethics theory, concepts and principles; they also need a sufficiently rich understanding of organizational culture and
a willingness and an ability to critique that culture.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting,
New Orleans, 2003. 相似文献
12.
《Journal of Global Ethics》2013,9(1):68-79
This article argues that political liberalism, of the type formulated by John Rawls and Charles Larmore and further developed in Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach, is superior to more comprehensive political views both in domestic and in global affairs. Perfectionist liberalism as advocated by John Stuart Mill and Joseph Raz attempts to erase existing religions and replace them with the religion of utility or autonomy. This is wrong, because in the ethico-religious environment of reasonable disagreement that we inhabit all comprehensive forms of political morality pose a threat to people's liberty and equality. Only thin and narrow conceptions of value like the ones suggested by Rawls, Larmore, Sen, and Nussbaum can guarantee the respect for diversity that is needed in a pluralistic world. Although Rawls famously failed to extend this idea from domestic to transnational matters, the argument of the article is that not only do the principles of political liberalism apply to global matters, but that the reasons why they apply to global affairs are even more compelling transnationally than they are domestically. 相似文献
13.
Jay Drydyk 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(1):23-38
In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen argues for an approach to justice that is comparative and realization-based rather than transcendental and institutional.
While Sen’s arguments for such an approach may not be as convincing as he thought, there are additional arguments for it,
and one is that it provides a unique and valuable platform on which an account of justice as a virtue of social and political
actors (including institutions and social movements) can be built. Hence new dimensions of comparison are opened up: some
actors are better disposed and more successful than others at leading social change in the direction of greater justice. The
main objective of this article is to use the capability approach to construct such an account. Six dimensions of acting justly
are identified: (1) reducing capability shortfalls; (2) expanding capabilities for all; (3) saving the worst-off as a first
step towards their full participation in economy and society, (4) which is also to be promoted by a system of entitlements
protecting all from social exclusion; while (5) supporting the empowerment of those whose capabilities are to expand; and
(6) respecting ethical values and legitimate procedures. I conclude by sketching some underlying moral psychology. 相似文献
14.
Henry S. Richardson 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(4):419-462
Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining
to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to
deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for
the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view,
one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue.
Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device
for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation
that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets
of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a
kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues,
but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles.
This extension to Rawls’s device clearly departs to some extent from his intentions; but the paper argues that the ideal of
reciprocity, which might be thought to pose the biggest obstacle to applying his social-contract device to issues pertaining
to the severely disabled (those who are not capable of being cooperative members of society), is not an independently essential
commitment of his mature social-contract view, central though it was to Rawls’s thought in the 1950s. 相似文献
15.
Varelius J 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2003,24(5):363-379
Among the different approaches to questions of biomedical ethics, there is a view that stresses the importance of a patient’s
right to make her own decisions in evaluative questions concerning her own well-being. This approach, the autonomy-based approach
to biomedical ethics, has usually led to the adoption of a subjective theory of well-being on the basis of its commitment
to the value of autonomy and to the view that well-being is always relative to a subject. In this article, it is argued that
these two commitments need not lead to subjectivism concerning the nature of well-being.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
16.
William Sin 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):163-175
How should we assess the burden of moral demands? A predominant assessment is provided by what Murphy calls the baseline of
factual status-quo (FSQ): A moral theory is demanding if the level of agents’ well-being is reduced from the time they begin
to comply perfectly with the theory. The aims of my paper are threefold. I will first discuss the limits of the FSQ baseline.
Second, I suggest a different assessment, which examines moral demands from a whole-life perspective. My view is that even
if agents’ compliance with a moral theory will not cause a substantial reduction to their existing level of well-being, the
total quality of life that they may obtain from complying with this theory may still be lower than what they could have obtained
by following some other moral theories. The third aim of this paper is that, through this investigation, I hope to explicate
the relation between agents’ acceptance of a moral theory and the burden of demands that is created by it. I believe that
we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of moral demands by paying attention to the psychological
development of agents as they accept and internalize a moral theory. 相似文献
17.
Martijn Boot 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(1):7-21
Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification of ‘perfect’ justice is neither necessary nor sufficient.
He replaces ‘perfect’ justice with comparative justice. Comparative justice limits itself to comparing social states with
respect to degrees of justice. Sen’s central thesis is that identifying ‘perfect’ justice and comparing imperfect social states
are ‘analytically disjoined’. This essay refutes Sen’s thesis by demonstrating that to be able to make adequate comparisons
we need to identify and integrate criteria of comparison. This is precisely the aim of a theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s
theory): identifying, integrating and ordering relevant principles of justice. The same integrated criteria that determine
‘perfect’ justice are needed to be able to adequately compare imperfect social states. Sen’s alternative approach, which is
based on social choice theory, is incapable of avoiding contrary, indeterminate or incoherent directives where plural principles
of justice conflict. 相似文献
18.
Mark Bryant Budolfson 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(2):243-259
Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is
a satisfactory solution to the Frege–Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible
even assuming that the Frege–Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically
rational inferences as irrational. Dorr’s argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper
I will show that Dorr’s argument equivocates between two different notions of evidence, and that once this equivocation is noted there is no reason to doubt that non-cognitivism is consistent with the rationality
of such inferences, at least if it is assumed that the Frege–Geach problem can be solved. In particular, I will show that
non-cognitivists can endorse the same explanation of the rationality of such inferences that cognitivists should endorse,
and that there is thus no need for non-cognitivists to offer any sort of idiosyncratic account of the epistemology of such
cases, in contrast to what other commentators on Dorr’s argument have thought. 相似文献
19.
Jennifer S. Hawkins 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(1):61-68
Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts
about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative
perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision
that dooms subjective theories to failure. I suggest that we need to revisit and reinstate certain features of traditional
hedonism, in particular the idea that felt experience plays a role that no theory of welfare can afford to ignore. I then
offer a sketch of a theory that is subjective in my preferred sense and avoids the worst sins of hedonism as well as the problems
generated by the contemporary constraints of subjective theorists. 相似文献
20.
Elizabeth Cripps 《Res Publica》2010,16(1):1-22
Martha Nussbaum has expanded the capabilities approach to defend positive duties of justice to individuals who fall below
Rawls’ standard for fully cooperating members of society, including sentient nonhuman animals. Building on this, David Schlosberg
has defended the extension of capabilities justice not only to individual animals but also to entire species and ecosystems.
This is an attractive vision: a happy marriage of social, environmental and ecological justice, which also respects the claims
of individual animals. This paper asks whether it is one that the capabilities approach can really deliver. Serious obstacles
are highlighted. The potential for conflict between the capability-based entitlements of humans and those of nonhuman animals
or ‘nature’ is noted, but it is argued that this does not constitute a decisive objection to the expanded capabilities approach.
However, intra-nature conflicts are so widespread as to do so: the situation is outside the circumstances of justice as they
are standardly understood. Schlosberg attempts to reconcile such conflicts by re-examining what it means to flourish as a
sentient nonhuman animal. This fails, because of the distinction between flourishing as a species, which often requires predation,
and flourishing as an individual, which is as frequently incompatible with it. Finally, the paper considers how a capabilities
theorist might move beyond such conflicts, identifying two possible strategies (which are not themselves unproblematic) for
reconciling the demands of humans, animals and ecosystems. 相似文献