Ordinary experience and the epoché: Husserl and Heidegger versus Rosen (and Cavell)

In various publications, Stanley Cavell and Stanley Rosen have emphasized the philosophical importance of what they both call “the ordinary.” They both contrast their recovery of “the ordinary” with traditional philosophy, including the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In this paper, I address Rosen’s claims in particular. I argue that Rosen turns the real situation on its head. Contra Rosen, it is not the case that the employment of Husserl’s epoché distorts the authentic voice of “the” ordinary—a voice that is clearly audible only from within everyday life. For (pace both Cavell and Rosen) there is no single “voice” of the ordinary: There are many such “voices,” not all of which are to be relied upon. Therefore, if we want to achieve an adequate grasp of ordinary experience, and Rosen does want this, we precisely need the epoché to curtail the misleading messages of certain other “voices of the ordinary.” Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, this positive evaluation of the Husserlian epoché finds support in Heidegger’s writings from the twenties. I argue that Heidegger, too, believed that the epoché was an indispensable tool for the philosophical attempt to capture ordinary experience.     

Be-ing (you 有) and non-be-ing (wu 無) in the Dao De Jing

This essay questions the meaning of be-ing (you 有) and non-be-ing (wu 無) in the DDJ with regard to the root-source (benyuan 本源) meaning of dao. I first explore the meaning of dao as the dark non-be-ing, revealing the connotations of the distinction between dao and things (daowuqufen 道物區分) by comparison with some forms of Western metaphysics. The meaning of non-be-ing is elaborated in terms of the dynamic meanings of xu 虚 and chong 沖; The play between be-ing and non-be-ing is explored through the lens of yin and yang qi thinking. Qi thinking determines the mutually manifest and mutually interpretive characteristic of be-ing and non-be-ing. Be-ing and non-be-ing thus understood is an ever-flowing and mutually transforming process that penetrates the different levels of dao, things and humans. In the last part I investigate the meaning of “Be-ing comes from non-be-ing”.     

Perception of the standard and the reversed Müller-Lyer figures in pigeons (Columba livia) and humans (Homo sapiens)

The authors compared perception of the standard and reversed Müller-Lyer figures between pigeons (Columbia livia) and humans (Homo sapiens). In Experiment 1, pigeons learned to classify 6 lengths of target lines into "long" and "short" categories by pecking 2 keys on the monitor, ignoring the 2 brackets so placed that they would not induce an illusion. In the test that followed, all 3 birds chose the "long" key more frequently for the standard Müller-Lyer figures with inward-pointing brackets (><) than for the figures with outward-pointing brackets (<>). The subjects' responses were accountable by neither overall lengths of the figures nor horizontal gaps between the 2 brackets. For the reversed figures, effects of the brackets were absent. These results suggested that the pigeons perceived the standard Müller-Lyer illusion but not the reversed one. Experiment 2 confirmed that humans perceived both types of the illusion. Pigeons and humans may perceive the same illusory figures in different ways.     

Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety’s (Recent) Discontents

Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second, specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in order to block the kind of luck with which knowledge was argued to be incompatible. What I’ll show here is that the modal account of luck offers a plausible story at the first stage and leads naturally to equally plausible lines to take at the second and third stages, at which a safety condition on knowledge is squarely motivated. There are, however, recent challenges—advanced by Jonathan Kvanvig (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 272–281, 2008); Kelly Becker (2007); and Jennifer Lackey (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2):255–267, 2008), among others—to the plausibility of the safety-based anti-luck project I’ve sketched here at each of its three stages of development. Once I’ve made precise the challenges, I’ll show why none implies that we abandon the commitments of the safety-based anti-luck project at any of its stages. What we should conclude, then, is that a safety-condition on knowledge is motivated by independently defensible accounts of (1) what luck is; and (2) just how knowledge should be thought incompatible with it.     

Unskilled and unaware--but why? A reply to Krueger and Mueller (2002)

J. Kruger and D. Dunning (1999) argued that the unskilled suffer a dual burden: Not only do they perform poorly, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller (2002) replicated these basic findings but interpreted them differently. They concluded that a combination of the better-than-average (BTA) effect and a regression artifact better explains why the unskilled are unaware. The authors of the present article respectfully disagree with this proposal and suggest that any interpretation of J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller's results is hampered because those authors used unreliable tests and inappropriate measures of relevant mediating variables. Additionally, a regression-BTA account cannot explain the experimental data reported in J. Kruger and D. Dunning or a reanalysis following the procedure suggested by J. Krueger and R. A. Mueller.     

The Paradox of Wuwei? Yes (and No)

This essay considers P. J. Ivanhoe's critical challenge to Slingerland's analysis of wuwei(‘effortless action’). While I agree with Ivanhoe that we should do more work to embody and understand the concept of wuwei, I will defend Slingerland's notion that wuwei involves paradox—particularly in the cases of Zhuangi and Laozi. The present essay is not a defense of the specifics of Slingerland's analysis. Nonetheless, this essay focuses on defending the notion of paradox. Ivanhoe offers an alternative view of wuwei, one that sees the paradox as a riddle. I argue that this kind of formulation would frame the problem of wuwei in an unhelpful manner. I offer several novel ways of overcoming, or at least qualifying, the experience of paradox that seems to be at play in nondoing.     

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

When, what, and whom to watch? Quantifying attention in ravens (Corvus corax) and jackdaws (Corvus monedula)

Complex social life requires monitoring of conspecifics. The amount and focus of attention toward others has been suggested to depend on the social relationships between individuals. Yet there are surprisingly few experiments that have tested these assumptions. This study compared attention patterns toward conspecifics in two corvid species, ravens (Corvus corax) and jackdaws (Corvus monedula). Birds were confronted with affiliated and non-affiliated conspecifics engaged in foraging and object manipulation. Visual access to the model bird was provided through two observation holes, which allowed measurement of exactly how often and for how long observers watched the other. Overall, ravens were more attentive to conspecifics than were jackdaws. Moreover, only ravens showed higher interest toward food-related than object-related behaviors of the model and toward close affiliates than non-affiliates by increasing the duration rather than the frequency of looks. These results are in accordance with predictions derived from the species' foraging biology and suggest that the facultative social, but highly manipulative, ravens use and value information from others differently than do the obligate social jackdaws.     

The response of guide dogs and pet dogs (Canis Familiaris) to cues of human referential communication (pointing and gaze)

The study raises the question of whether guide dogs and pet dogs are expected to differ in response to cues of referential communication given by their owners; especially since guide dogs grow up among sighted humans, and while living with their blind owners, they still have interactions with several sighted people. Guide dogs and pet dogs were required to respond to point, point and gaze, gaze and control cues of referential communication given by their owners. Results indicate that the two groups of dogs do not differ from each other, revealing that the visual status of the owner is not a factor in the use of cues of referential communication. Both groups of dogs have higher frequencies of performance and faster latencies for the point and the point and gaze cues as compared to gaze cue only. However, responses to control cues are below chance performance for the guide dogs, whereas the pet dogs perform at chance. The below chance performance of the guide dogs may be explained by a tendency among them to go and stand by the owner. The study indicates that both groups of dogs respond similarly in normal daily dyadic interaction with their owners and the lower comprehension of the human gaze may be a less salient cue among dogs in comparison to the pointing gesture.     

Xunzi and the primitivists on natural spontaneity (xìng 性) and coercion

This article explores two opposing views from Warring States China concerning the value of human natural spontaneity (hereafter xìng 性) and large-scale government coercion. On the one hand, the Ruist (Confucian) philosopher Xunzi championed a comprehensive and coercive ethical, political, and social system or Way (dào 道) that he believed would lead to social order and moral cultivation while opposing people’s xìng. On the other hand, the authors of roughly books 8–10 of Zhuangzi, the primitivists, criticized a Way bearing a striking resemblance to Xunzi’s on the grounds that it seriously harms people by opposing their xìng. I argue that the primitivists offer compelling reasons for Xunzi to modify his own Way regarding its relationship with xìng, though their own proposed alternative Way is not very attractive. I conclude with a brief discussion of one primitivist-inspired alternative view found in the Lü Shi Chun Qiu, which plausibly suggests that one way of respecting people’s xìng is by offering them opportunities to explore their natural abilities.     

Neuropsychological Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Behavioral Approach System (BAS) Assessment: A Shortened Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire Version (SPSRQ–20)

This research was designed to investigate the items and factor structure of the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ) proposed by Torrubia, Avila, Moltó, and Caseras (2001 Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L. and Lushene, R. E. 1970. Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory., Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.  [Google Scholar]), as a measure of the behavioral inhibition system and behavioral activation system in Gray's reinforcement sensitivity theory. Recent studies that analyzed this instrument by exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis suggest the need for structural refinement. The Spanish version of the SPSRQ was analyzed by exploratory and confirmatory procedures in calibration (n = 2,102) and validation (n = 746) independent samples. In addition, convergent and discriminant validity was evaluated with the Zuckerman–Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire (Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Teta, Joireman, &; Kraft, 1993 Torrubia, R. and Tobeña, A. 1984. A scale for the assessment of susceptibility to punishment as a measure of anxiety: Preliminary results. Personality and Individual Differences, 5: 371–375. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), the Impulsiveness, Venturesomeness and Empathy Inventory (S. B. G. Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, &; Allsopp, 1985 Eysenck, S. B. G., Pearson, P. R., Easting, G. and Allsopp, F. J. 1985. Age norms for impulsiveness, venturesomeness and empathy in adults. Personality and Individual Differences, 6: 613–619. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) the Neuroticism, Extraversion and Openness Five Factor Inventory (Costa &; McCrae, 1992 Costa, P. T. and McCrae, R. R. 1992. NEO–PI–R professional manual: Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO–PI–R) and NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO–FFI), Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.  [Google Scholar]), and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scales (Barratt, 1985 Ball, S. and Zuckerman, M. 1990. Sensation seeking, Eysenck's personality dimensions and reinforcement sensitivity in concept formation. Personality and Individual Differences, 11: 343–355. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Results showed the robustness of a 20-item structure of the SPSRQ, with satisfactory fit adjustment, validity, and reliability. The findings are discussed in terms of the better functioning and sound psychometric properties of the SPSRQ 20-item version for Gray's personality theory.     

Validation of the French version of Brandtstädter and Renner's Tenacious Goal Pursuit (TGP) and Flexible Goal Adjustment (FGA) scales

IntroductionDespite the potential usefulness of the TGP/FGA scales (Brandtstädter and Renner, 1990) for studying the way people adapt with age, there is little psychometric evidence supporting the validity of the construct of either scale.ObjectiveThe aim of the study was to develop a French version of Brandtstädter's TGP/FGA scales in order to provide a self-report measure for French people in the field of gerontology.MethodTwo studies involving 677 participants were conducted to evaluate the construct validity, reliability and convergence validity of these scales.ResultsIn accordance with Brandtstädter, two factors emerged from the exploratory factorial analysis (study 1): tenacious goal pursuit and flexible goal adjustment. However, 10 items were removed because of factorial loadings. A confirmatory factor analysis (study 2) of the 20 remaining items corroborated a two-factor uncorrelated model of the TGP/FGA scales. The simplified subscales showed good internal consistency. As expected, higher scores on the TGP/FGA scales were correlated with good life satisfaction, greater control and less depression. Finally, the TGP scale was negatively related to age, but the FGA was not.ConclusionThe French adaptation of the TGP/FGA scales was shown to possess satisfactory psychometric properties and may therefore be a valuable instrument for researchers and clinicians who are interested in exploring adaptive processes in the maintenance and promotion of personal well-being.     

Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941): mysticism and worship

This article focuses on some themes in the work of Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941). It is now over a century since she began work on the first version of Mysticism (1911). She was a pioneer not only in the study she undertook for this book, but in the specifically Christian theology she was bold enough to work out from it, with Christ in person the paradigm mystic. The Latin Mass of her day she deemed both as recapitulating Christ's own experience, as well as re-presenting the stability and growth of his ‘Body’ present at the Eucharist. Once recommitted to the Church of England in 1921, at a time of liturgical revision and in a deeply troubled political era, her concentration on Christ's sacrifice led her to embrace pacifism as the world lurched towards World War II. Her theological work, summed up in her final major book Worship (1936), reveals her continuing preoccupation with the question of how Christology integrates with liturgy, and therefore with the living of a distinctively Christian life.     

Stocks and losses, items and interference: A reply to Oberauer and Süß (2000)

Results of a recent study of spatial working memory are presented in support of the claim by Jenkins and her colleagues (Jenkins, Myerson, Hale, &; Fry, 1999) that secondary tasks produce larger interference effects in individuals with higher simple spans than in individuals with lower simple spans. Because spans and interference effects were assessed independently, this study refutes the claim by Oberauer and Süß (2000) that the relation between span and interference effect size is merely an artifact of regression to the mean. In contrast with the present findings, Oberauer and Süß did not find evidence of larger interference effects in higher span individuals, but the reason for this may be straightforward: The secondary tasks that they used did not produce significant interference. Recent findings by Logie and his colleagues indicate that phonological similarity and word length effects are larger in individuals with higher word spans (Logie, Della Sala, Laiacona, Chalmers, &; Wynn, 1996). These results, those of Jenkins, Myerson, et al. (1999), and the results reported here suggest that, across individuals, the absolute effect size for many manipulations that decrease memory span is an increasing function of simple span.     

W(h)ither the Mainline? Trends and Prospects

Total membership in mainline Protestant denominations has been declining for half a century. Sharp decreases in the late 1960s and early 1970s were followed by more modest losses for the next 25 years, with sharper declines returning at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Analysis of denominational data on the components of change reveals two major factors linked to the most recent drop: departures of schismatic congregations in five denominations that have liberalized gay- and lesbian-related policies, and fewer individuals joining mainline denominations. Furthermore, child baptism rates are dropping and, in at least one denomination, the ratio of child professions of faith to child baptisms a decade earlier has fallen faster than membership over the past 13 years. These findings are largely consistent with previous research using national survey data that shows low fertility in the mainline, a drop in transfers into the mainline from more conservative churches, and general increases in the percent of the U.S. population with no religious affiliation. Together, the evidence strongly suggests continued mainline membership losses for the indeterminate future.     

Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and 2-year-old children (Homo sapiens) understand double invisible displacement?

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and young children (Homo sapiens) have difficulty with double invisible displacements in which an object is hidden in two nonadjacent boxes in a linear array. Experiment 1 eliminated the possibility that chimpanzees' previous poor performance was due to the hiding direction of the displacement device. As in Call (2001), subjects failed double nonadjacent displacements, showing a tendency to select adjacent boxes. In Experiments 2 and 3, chimpanzees and 24-month-old children were tested on a new adaptation of the task in which four hiding boxes were presented in a diamond-shaped array on a vertical plane. Both species performed above chance on double invisible displacements using this format, suggesting that previous poor performance was due to a response bias or inhibition problem rather than a fundamental limitation in representational capacity.     

Are associative and propositional processes qualitatively distinct? Comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006)

The authors comment on B. Gawronski and G. V. Bodenhausen's (2006) associative-propositional evaluation model of implicit and explicit attitudes by examining the claims that (a) truth value is attached to propositions but not to associations; (b) pattern activation is qualitatively different from syllogistic structure of arguments; and (c) Pavlovian conditioning may be propositional, whereas evaluative conditioning is not. They conclude that despite surface dissimilarities between implicit and explicit attitudes both may be mediated by the same underlying process.     

“Why do (don't) you ask?” transference and the desire (not) to know

One of the criterial distinctions of psychoanalysis is its renunciation of indoctrination through suggestion. In spite of the fact that psychoanalysis is both an organized body of knowledge and a disciplined form of interpersonal influence, it regards an analyst who tells the analysand what to think or do as essentially doing harm by substituting a new form of prejudice and alienation for the preexisting form he is attacking. Even though an analyst regards his knowledge of psychoanalytic theory as adequate at a general level, this "truth" is not an adequate mode of discourse with an individual. Why not? It is a fact that analysands often do not accept an analyst's idea. However, the fundamental problematic of clinical psychoanalysis comes precisely at the point that the analysand would accept the analyst's idea, involving the distinction between a properly psychoanalytic cure and a transference cure. Psychoanalytic theory itself holds that unreflective incorporation of another's idea about oneself comes at the expense of autonomous and spontaneous self-revelation. Despite its resolute pursuit of new truths, the aim of psychoanalysis is less concerned with attaining specific ideas about unrecognized conflicts than it is with achieving a general attitude--that self-understanding requires a capacity to admit dubious and unwanted ideas and feelings that symptoms, dreams, and free associations bring to light. This "psychoanalytic" attitude permits a new type of discourse in which the person recognizes himself or herself through expression, rather than parrotting the analyst's (or others') words, or continuing rigidly to hide the truth of desire for oneself. In the long run, psychoanalysis offers to correct a primary misunderstanding: that one can acquire a comprehensively true image of oneself. As Barratt (1988) emphasizes, this transformation is tantamount to a change in personal epistemology for the analysand and a change in epistemological theory for the culture as a whole. In our culture, most analysts and lay people alike take for granted that the ego is an agent that is to be integrated and strengthened in order to direct one's life. Likewise, the unconscious is commonly regarded as a type of savage alter ego that must be mastered by the ego. According to Lacan's critique, the ego is a snare and a delusion for the patient, however highly commended by society it may be, because its very essence is to furnish the illusion of enduring self-knowledge.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)