Defending Priority Views from the Gunk/Junk Argument

Recently, Jonathan Tallant has argued that we should reject priority views, which hold that some objects are fundamental and others are dependent. Tallant’s argument relies on two proposed mereological possibilities: a gunky world, where everything has a proper part, and a junky world, where everything is a proper part. In this paper, I criticise Tallant’s argument and argue that neither of these possibilities threaten priority views per se; at most, they threaten only particular forms of priority views that contain a certain independently controversial assumption. First, I defend priority pluralism against the gunk argument: the genuine conceivability of gunk can be plausibly doubted on the basis of a certain principle concerning metaphysical possibility, and even if this principle is false, the possibility of a gunky world poses no devastative problem for pluralism per se because it can be considered to be consistent with nonatomism. Second, I defend priority monism against the junk argument: the possibility of a junky world poses no devastative problem for monism per se because it can be considered to be consistent with nonholism in a twofold sense. Finally, I show that even monism as defined as genuinely holistic can be plausibly defended against the junk argument once the claim of the possible nonexistence of the maximal whole is reinterpreted based on the priority-based conception of existence.     

Understanding phenomenological differences in how affordances solicit action. An exploration

Affordances are possibilities for action offered by the environment. Recent research on affordances holds that there are differences in how people experience such possibilities for action. However, these differences have not been properly investigated. In this paper I start by briefly scrutinizing the existing literature on this issue, and then argue for two claims. First, that whether an affordance solicits action or not depends on its relevance to the agent’s concerns. Second, that the experiential character of how an affordance solicits action depends on the character of the concern to which it is relevant. Concerns are conceived of as bodily forms of responsiveness, and solicitations are experienced through this responsiveness. The main aim of this paper is to make clear that an understanding of experiential differences in solicitations has to be based on a phenomenological appreciation of how one experiences one’s responsiveness to those solicitations. In the remainder of the paper I show how such a phenomenological appreciation reveals several characteristics of our responsiveness and I briefly explore three of them: valence, force and mineness. In the final section I discuss the self-referentiality of affordances in light of the current proposal, and argue that this self-referentiality is broader than is typically acknowledged.     

On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism about Truth Predicates

A familiar view concerning sentences about the ethical or comical is that they are not truth-apt – not capable of being true or false. Against this view Peter Geach famously noted that such sentences may figure in true (or false) conditionals and so must thereby be truth-apt. In response to Geach's argument, Crispin Wright proposed a pluralism about truth predicates, a pluralism which sees Geach's conditional clauses as being true in a sense that avoids realism about the entities involved. I defend Wright's proposal against an interesting recent attack by Christine Tappolet, and show that, pace Tappolet, Wright's proposed pluralism is compatible with the Tarskian idea that validity is necessary truth-preservation.     

Normalcy and the Contents of Philosophical Judgements

Abstract

Thought experiments as counterexamples are a familiar tool in philosophy. Frequently understanding a vignette seems to generate a challenge to a target theory. In this paper I explore the content of the judgement that we have in response to these vignettes. I first introduce several competing proposals for the content of our judgement, and explain why they are inadequate. I then advance an alternative view. I argue that when we hear vignettes we consider the normal instances of the vignette. If the normal instance of the vignette exhibits a counter-instance, the vignette constitutes a challenge to the target theory. I argue that this proposal shows how responses to vignettes are an ordinary, everyday judgement, and I explain how the proposal avoids the problems generated by competing theories. Finally, I argue this ‘normalcy proposal’ most naturally accords with our understanding of the method.     

A League of Their Own? Evaluating Justifications for The Division of Sport into ‘Enhanced’ and ‘Unenhanced’ Leagues

Cheating through the use of illegal performance enhancements (such as doping) is a persistent problem in sport. It has been suggested that one response to this problem is to separate sport into two parallel leagues. One league would resemble sport as it is currently practised – i.e. with restrictions on use of particular enhancements – and the other would not possess these restrictions, allowing those that wish to use currently illegal enhancements to do so. In this paper I articulate the ‘two leagues’ proposal further and subject it to critical scrutiny. The proposal fails. It does so by failing to address conceptual confusion regarding enhancement use in sport; by replicating in the new league the current problems associated with enhancement-based cheating; and by creating new problems. In an attempt to revive it I describe other possible justifications for the proposal, based on its promotion of personal autonomy, and rights-based justifications. These fail, with the exception of a group right claiming provision of the enhanced league as a participatory good. I conclude that this latter use of the proposal is the only sensible one, but it nevertheless faces significant obstacles.     

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.     

Where Have All the Psychoanalytic Patients Gone? They're Still Here

Abstract

I develop my argument concerning the question of where have all the patients gone in a sequence of three parts. First, I indicate, very briefly, the nature of the issue and the array of confluent socioeconomic causes—as they are usually outlined—that are held responsible for it. Then I take up the remedy for this problem posed by Arnold Rothstein in his book (1998). which is the trigger to this series of invited commentaries, and I indicate how I both appreciate the merits of his proposal to recast the issue as much as possible within a psychological framework, amenable to psychoanalytic influence, and nonetheless feel his approach to be based on a one-sided, and to that extent, a limited and flawed assessment of the problem, and therefore an only partially useful remedial perspective. And lastly, 1 offer an alternative view of the internal historical developments in psychoanalysis that have played their complementary role in the evolution of this perceived “crisis” and the alteration of perspectives, based on my account of our contending current viewpoints on the nature of the relationship between psychoanalysis and its derivative psychoanalytic psychotherapies, that can perhaps promise a more effective counter to the crisis, despite the multiple external socioeconomic developments that are usually accorded causative primacy and that no doubt are indeed formidable.     

The Hard Problem & Its Explanatory Targets

Two decades in, whether we are making any progress towards solving, or even explaining away, what David Chalmers calls (1995) the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness is as controversial as ever. This paper aims to argue that there are, in actual fact, two explanatory targets associated with the hard problem. Moreover, this in turn has repercussions for how we assess the explanatory merits of any proposed solution to the problem. The paper ends with a brief exposition of how the present distinction goes beyond similar ones already made by respondents to Joseph Levine's (1983) explanatory gap.     

Success semantics: the sequel

The aim of this paper is to reinterpret success semantics, a theory of mental content, according to which the content of a belief is fixed by the success conditions of some actions based on this belief. After arguing that in its present form, success semantics is vulnerable to decisive objections, I examine the possibilities of salvaging the core of this proposal. More specifically, I propose that the content of some very simple, but very important, mental states, the immediate mental antecedents of action, can be explained in this manner.     

Calling Solomon’s Bluff: Ethics,Aspect-Perception and the Unity of the Tractatus

In this paper, I consider how we ought to read the aspect-perception passages in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) in the light of its ethics. I engage with a recent proposal, of Genia Schönbaumsfeld's, that we should replace the TLP account of aspect-perception with that which Wittgenstein puts forward in the Philosophical Investigations (PI). I show that, far from helping us to grasp the ethical vision contained in the TLP, this proposal obscures it. I go on to draw some conclusions from this as to how to read the TLP in its relation to Wittgenstein's other work.     

The turn to the local: the possibility of returning health care to the community

It is not too early to suggest that the attempts to place medical cae in private hands (through group insurance arrangements) has not fulfilled its promise--or better, the promises that were made for it. Yet history has not been kind to plans to make government the single payer, and the laudable progress in medical technology has placed high-technology medical care beyond the reach of most private budgets. In this paper I suggest that the major problem of the U.S. health care system as presently conceived is a failure of legitimacy, and I put forward a proposal that purports to solve that problem. The proposal is to localize health care, on the model of a public school system, on the argument that such localization will answer most of the questions of legitimacy at the core of the private insurance imbroglio, provide a brake for medical costs, while preserving our ability to take advantage of the most advanced medical interventions. I present some initial arguments for the proposal, but await its proof in the dialogue emerging as the present insurance system collapses.     

Grounding-based formulations of legal positivism

The goal of this paper is to provide an accurate grounding-based formulation of positivism in the philosophy of law. I start off by discussing some simple formulations, based on the ideas that social facts are always either full or partial grounds of legal facts. I then raise a number of objections against these definitions: the full grounding proposal rules out possibilities that are compatible with positivism; the partial grounding proposal fails, on its own, to vindicate the distinctive role that is played by social facts within positivist accounts of law. Then, I present a more adequate and insightful formulation capable of solving their problems, which crucially relies on a robust notion of a social enabler. Finally, I model inclusive and exclusive positivism on the resulting template, and set out the advantages of the ground-enablers proposal.

     

Choosing your poison and the time of a killing

The problem of the time of a killing is often cited as providing grounds for rejecting the action identification thesis favoured by Anscombe and Davidson. In this paper I make three claims. First, I claim that this problem is a threat to the action identification thesis because of two assumptions the thesis makes: since the thesis takes actions to be a kind of doings, it has to assume that agents’ doings last as long as their actions and vice versa. Second, I claim that not making both of these assumptions necessarily leads to another problem, the problem of the acting dead. This means that any theory of action has to choose its poison and face either one of these unresolved problems. Third, I claim that the solution to the problem of the time of a killing can be found by heeding linguistic arguments that ‘kill’ cannot mean ‘cause to die,’ as is commonly assumed, but instead has to have a more complex meaning. I discuss an alternative, more complex proposal and show how it allows us to keep the action identification thesis, fits colloquial usage of ‘kill’ and deals with the problem of the time of a killing.     

Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals

The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.     

Holism about value: some help for invariabilists

G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper is an attempt to show how invariabilism might be filled out in ways that allow its proponents to answer their conditionalist opponents. The main point consists in identifying how some amount of extrinsic part-value may contribute to whole-value that is nevertheless intrinsic. This enables an invariabilist to explain how the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of its intrinsic part-values, without abandoning the Moorean doctrine that intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties (the proposal is nevertheless consistent with the view that invariabilist and conditionalist accounts might exist side by side). I finish with a brief explanation of how the main proposal could help construct invariabilist accounts of particular organic unities, looking beyond the more general argument they have with conditionalists.     

Dialectical pluralism: A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology

A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology called dialectical pluralism is proposed in this paper. It is argued that this approach provides an effective and efficient basis for scientific progress in psychology. Three primary components of dialectical pluralism are developed. First, drawing on Royce's constructive dialectics, it is contended that tension between competing theories should be sustained in the hope of producing evaluative or integrative solutions. Second, the unity-disunity debate in psychology is reframed as a continuum and it is argued that oscillating periods of convergent and divergent pluralism would provide a productive model for scientific progress. Finally, intercontextualism is discussed as the underlying philosophical foundation for dialectical pluralism. This alternative to both mainstream psychology's positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as competing positions that may be more contextualist in orientation, is expounded as the justification for this new conceptualization. In particular, the limits of a methodological unity based on positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as of a pragmatic pluralism based on contextualist foundations, are both addressed by intercontextualism. As a result, dialectical pluralism may provide a middle ground between these two distinctive factions within psychology, while alleviating the fragmentation of the discipline.     

Polytopes as vehicles of informational content in feedforward neural networks

Localizing content in neural networks provides a bridge to understanding the way in which the brain stores and processes information. In this paper, I propose the existence of polytopes in the state space of the hidden layer of feedforward neural networks as vehicles of content. I analyze these geometrical structures from an information-theoretic point of view, invoking mutual information to help define the content stored within them. I establish how this proposal addresses the problem of misclassification and provide a novel solution to the disjunction problem, which hinges on the precise nature of the causal-informational framework for content advocated herein.     

SOME WAYS EMERGING ADULTS ARE SHAPING THE FUTURE OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE

This article addresses how the field of religion and science will change in the coming decades by analyzing the attitudes of emerging adults (ages 18–30). I first present an overview of emerging adulthood to set the context for my analysis, especially highlighting the way in which emerging adults find themselves “in between” and in an “age of possibilities," free to explore a variety of options and thus often become “spiritual bricoleurs." Next, I expand on how a broadening pluralism in emerging adult culture changes both the conversation of “religion and science,” on one hand, and the locus for their interaction on the other. In the third section, I address the question of whether there exists a consensus view of how to relate religion and science. Paradoxically, though 18–30‐year‐olds perceive that there is conflict between science and religion, they personally endorse collaboration or independence. Finally, I draw conclusions for practitioners and theorists.     

Why logical pluralism?

This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The present paper aims to improve this situation by looking at a promising case study and drawing general lessons about the kind of evidence that would support logical pluralism. I argue that the best motivation for logical pluralism will ultimately be rooted in certain kinds of performative data.

     

Objectivity and reliability

Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths, realistically construed – i.e. construed, roughly, as being true relevantly independent of minds and languages, when interpreted at face-value. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his ‘metaphysical pluralism’ can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.