The dreaming mind-brain: a Jungian perspective

In this paper I discuss the nature and role of dream and the dreaming process in Jungian clinical practice in the light of neuroscience. Insights from contemporary neuroscience support rather than contest Jung's view that emotional truth, not censorship or disguise, underpins the dreaming process. I use clinical material to illustrate how work with dreams within the total interactive experience of the analytic dyad enables the development of the emotional scaffolding necessary for the development of 'mind'. Large scale evidence-based research reveals that dreaming is caused by brain activity during sleep that is both biochemically and regionally different from that of waking states. Recent imaging studies confirm that dreams are the mind's vehicle for the processing of emotional states of being, particularly the fear, anxiety, anger or elation that often figure prominently. Dream sleep is understood as also being the guardian of memory, playing a part in forgetting, encoding and affective organization of memory. In the clinical section of the paper I let a series of dreams speak for themselves, revealing the emotionally salient concerns of the dreamer, weaving past and present, transference and reality together in a way that demonstrates the healthy attempt of the brain-mind to come to terms with difficult emotional experience from the past. The dreams become dreamable as part of the meaning-making process of analysis.     

Event structure in perception and conception

Events can be understood in terms of their temporal structure. The authors first draw on several bodies of research to construct an analysis of how people use event structure in perception, understanding, planning, and action. Philosophy provides a grounding for the basic units of events and actions. Perceptual psychology provides an analogy to object perception: Like objects, events belong to categories, and, like objects, events have parts. These relationships generate 2 hierarchical organizations for events: taxonomies and partonomies. Event partonomies have been studied by looking at how people segment activity as it happens. Structured representations of events can relate partonomy to goal relationships and causal structure; such representations have been shown to drive narrative comprehension, memory, and planning. Computational models provide insight into how mental representations might be organized and transformed. These different approaches to event structure converge on an explanation of how multiple sources of information interact in event perception and conception.     

Multiple audience problem: a strategic communication perspective on social perception

Examined how communicators send mixed messages containing an explicit surface content and a covert hidden content. In Study 1, Ss wrote constrained essays presenting either an introverted or extraverted personality. Although authors reported manipulating essay credibility and readers reported relying on credibility to make their judgments, readers succumbed to correspondence bias. In Studies 2 and 3, Ss again prepared either constrained essays (Study 2) or constrained videotapes (Study 3) and included in them a hidden message that would be understood by only their friends but not by strangers. Observers then read these essays or watched these videotapes. Friends detected and decoded the hidden messages, whereas strangers did not. We discuss these findings in terms of social perception and strategic communication.     

The mind-brain relationship: the emergent self

This paper explores the mind-brain relationship, using insights from contemporary neuroscience. It seeks to investigate how our brains become who we are, how subjective experience arises. In order to do this some explanation is given of the basic concepts of how the brain produces our subjective mental life. Current neuropsychological and neurobiological understanding of early brain development, memory, emotion and consciousness are explored. There is also an attempt at mapping the mind-brain-self relationship from a uniquely Jungian perspective. Clinical material is included in order to show the relevance of these insights to our work in the consulting room, arguing the value of the affect-regulating, relational aspects of the analytic dyad that forge new neural pathways through emotional connection. Such experience forms the emotional scaffolding necessary for the emergence of reflective function.     

Pigeon pattern perception: limits on perspective invariance

Two experiments are reported in which the response of pigeons to perspective transformations of a pattern target was measured. In the first experiment an alphabet letter was taken as the pattern target (the 'positive') and the response to its perspective transforms was compared to the response to nontarget letters ('negatives') over the course of discrimination training. In the second experiment irregular quadrilaterals were used as positives and the responses to slight perspective deformations of the prototypes were compared to the responses to random transformations of the same magnitude under steady-state conditions. The amount of differential responding depended on the type of transformation. There was no differential response to targets rotated in the picture plane or around the horizontal axis in either experiment. There was differential response to small reductions and enlargements of the target. There was also differential response to translated targets, and this was seen irrespective of the amount of displacement. Results from targets rotated around the vertical axis were erratic, some target-plus-angle combinations elicited differential responding, but most did not. The erratic responses are attributed to symmetries in pattern elements that were abstracted as critical features. Pigeons therefore exhibit no true rotation invariance, limited size invariance, and complete shift invariance. It is argued that size invariance, but not position invariance, may depend on prior exposure to the alternatives.     

Frames of reference in unilateral neglect and visual perception: a computational perspective

Neurological patients with unilateral neglect fail to orient and respond to stimuli on one side, typically the left. A key research issue is whether neglect is exhibited with respect to the left side of the viewer or of objects. When deficits in attentional allocation depend not merely on an object's location with respect to the viewer but on the object's intrinsic extent, shape, or movement, researchers have inferred that attention must be operating in an object-based frame of reference. Simulations of a view-based connectionist model of spatial attention prove that this inference is not logically necessary: Object-based attentional effects can be obtained without object-based frames. The model thus explains away troublesome phenomena for view-based theories of object recognition.     

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes--cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data.     

Motivation in person perception: role of the other's perspective

In previous studies (G. Steins & R. A. Wicklund, 1993, 1996, 1997; R. A. Wicklund & G. Steins, 1996), perspective-taking depended on the interplay between 2 variables--(a) press (the relationship intensity between perceiver and perceived person) and (b) conflict. In the absence of conflict, perspective-taking was positively related to press; in the presence of conflict, perspective-taking was negatively related to press. In the present 3 studies, involving samples of German students, the author conducted a detailed exploration of the motivational impact of press on perspective-taking: In the 1st study, she measured press via the participant's wish to deal with the other person; in the 2nd study, via the perceiver's preoccupation with the target; and in the 3rd study, she defined press as a general tendency of some participants to become absorbed in other individuals. All 3 studies included elements of conflict. The results further supported the perspective-taking model and improved the understanding of the influence of motivation in person perception.     

A discussion of the mind-brain problem

In this paper Popper formulates and discusses a new aspect of the theory of mind. This theory is partly based on his earlier developed interactionistic theory. It takes as its point of departure the observation that mind and physical forces have several properties in common, at least the following six: both are (i) located, (ii) unextended, (iii) incorporeal, (iv) capable of acting on bodies, (v) dependent upon body, (vi) capable of being influenced by bodies. Other properties such as intensity and extension in time may be added. It is argued that a fuller understanding of the nature of forces is essential for the analysis of the mind-brain problem. The relative autonomy and indeterministic nature of mind is stressed. Indeterminism is treated in relation to a theorem of Hadamard. The computer theory of mind and the Turing test are criticized. Finally the evolution of mind is discussed.     

Higher mind-brain development in successful leaders: testing a unified theory of performance

This study explored mind-brain characteristics of successful leaders as reflected in scores on the Brain Integration Scale, Gibbs’s Socio-moral Reasoning questionnaire, and an inventory of peak experiences. These variables, which in previous studies distinguished world-class athletes and professional classical musicians from average-performing controls, were recorded in 20 Norwegian top-level managers and in 20 low-level managers—matched for age, gender, education, and type of organization (private or public). Top-level managers were characterized by higher Brain Integration Scale scores, higher levels of moral reasoning, and more frequent peak experiences. These multilevel measures could be useful tools in selection and recruiting of potential managers and in assessing leadership education and development programs. Future longitudinal research could further investigate the relationship between leadership success and these and other multilevel variables.     

The dramaturgic perspective: Implications for the study of person perception

The major theoretical contributions to the study of attribution, those of Heider (1958), Kelley (1967) and Jones and Davis (1965) have worked from the assumption that person perception is analogous to object perception and scientific investigation. Goffman's dramaturgic analysis of the social self provides an alternative framework for addressing the problem of how we perceive and understand the behaviour of others. In this paper, I explore the implications of the dramaturgic perspective for the study of person perception and discuss the ways in which it diverges from the traditional approach to attribution. In addition, I present an alternative account of the Fundamental Attributional Error that arises in light of Goffman's dramaturgic analysis.     

Pictorial perspective: perception of size, linear, and texture perspective in children and adults

Perception of size, linear, and texture perspective was investigated in third-grade and sixth-grade children and in college adults in three separate studies. A matching task required the observer to choose from a set of four alternative real scenes the correct match for the test stimulus, which was either a picture or a real scene. Correct performance required that the subject utilize perspective information for both size and distance distance relations. Erroneous choices available to the subject indicated errors in size judgement, in distance judgment, or in both simultaneously. View was either restricted at the correct station point or was free, with head motion. There were no significant effects of grade level. For all three groups, mean percent correct was nearly 100% with the real-scene test stimuli, and significantly below the chance level with the picture test stimuli. Errors in size judgment occurred most frequently, indicating that the geometrically correct rate of perspective convergence was too rapid to be seen by the subjects as perceptually acceptable. With size-perspective information alone, the number of size plus distance errors also increased significantly. There was no significant effect of viewing condition.     

Weakening the robustness of perspective: Evidence for a modified theory of compensation in picture perception

Viewed from the center of projection, a perspective picture presents the pictorial depth information of a scene. Knowing the center of projection, one can reconstruct the depicted scene. Assuming another viewpoint is the center of projection will cause one to reconstruct a transformed scene. Despite these transformations, we appreciate pictures from other viewpoints. The compensation hypothesis states that the visible picture surface allows observers to compensate for transformations by locating the center of projection and experiencing pictorial space from there. We show that observers neither completely compensate for nor experience transformations of space as geometry would predict. We propose a modified compensation hypothesis according to which different degrees of visibility of the picture surface invoke different degrees of compensation.     

Magnification rate of objects in a perspective image to fit to our perception

Abstract: A landscape photograph may give a different impression from that formed at the real scene, with respect to the size and distance of objects. Researchers have reported that the perceived sizes and distances of objects in a photograph are not identical to those in a real space. In order to develop a method to create a graphic image that is close to our visual impression as seen in the real space, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, we examined how the magnification rate of the perceived size to the object size on the retina varied with the viewing distance (range was from 1 m to 10 m). In Experiment 2, we examined whether transformation based on the magnification rate is effective for creating an image that matches the perceived size of the object at the scene. Our results indicate that the magnification rate is useful for transforming the perspective image to match our perception of the objects regardless of the viewing distance.