The dreaming mind-brain: a Jungian perspective

In this paper I discuss the nature and role of dream and the dreaming process in Jungian clinical practice in the light of neuroscience. Insights from contemporary neuroscience support rather than contest Jung's view that emotional truth, not censorship or disguise, underpins the dreaming process. I use clinical material to illustrate how work with dreams within the total interactive experience of the analytic dyad enables the development of the emotional scaffolding necessary for the development of 'mind'. Large scale evidence-based research reveals that dreaming is caused by brain activity during sleep that is both biochemically and regionally different from that of waking states. Recent imaging studies confirm that dreams are the mind's vehicle for the processing of emotional states of being, particularly the fear, anxiety, anger or elation that often figure prominently. Dream sleep is understood as also being the guardian of memory, playing a part in forgetting, encoding and affective organization of memory. In the clinical section of the paper I let a series of dreams speak for themselves, revealing the emotionally salient concerns of the dreamer, weaving past and present, transference and reality together in a way that demonstrates the healthy attempt of the brain-mind to come to terms with difficult emotional experience from the past. The dreams become dreamable as part of the meaning-making process of analysis.     

Emotion perception from a componential perspective

The common conceptual understanding of emotion is that they are multi-componential, including subjective feelings, appraisals, psychophysiological activation, action tendencies, and motor expressions. Emotion perception, however, has traditionally been studied in terms of emotion labels, such as “happy”, which do not clearly indicate whether one, some, or all emotion components are perceived. We examine whether emotion percepts are multi-componential and extend previous research by using more ecologically valid, dynamic, and multimodal stimuli and an alternative response measure. The results demonstrate that observers can reliably infer multiple types of information (subjective feelings, appraisals, action tendencies, and social messages) from complex emotion expressions. Furthermore, this finding appears to be robust to changes in response items. The results are discussed in light of their implications for research on emotion perception.     

Event perception as a control process for visual awareness

ABSTRACT

We present evidence demonstrating that the structure of everyday events guides attention to and representation of visual properties. Incidental change detection increases dramatically at the boundaries between events, whereas individuals are largely unaware of the sequence of actions within a single event. Observers demonstrate a limited capacity for representing events, and inducing cognitive load by presenting two simultaneous events decreases detection of sequence errors. These studies support emerging evidence that the event perception network operates as a control process that guides attention and awareness in real-world settings.     

Event structure in perception and conception

Events can be understood in terms of their temporal structure. The authors first draw on several bodies of research to construct an analysis of how people use event structure in perception, understanding, planning, and action. Philosophy provides a grounding for the basic units of events and actions. Perceptual psychology provides an analogy to object perception: Like objects, events belong to categories, and, like objects, events have parts. These relationships generate 2 hierarchical organizations for events: taxonomies and partonomies. Event partonomies have been studied by looking at how people segment activity as it happens. Structured representations of events can relate partonomy to goal relationships and causal structure; such representations have been shown to drive narrative comprehension, memory, and planning. Computational models provide insight into how mental representations might be organized and transformed. These different approaches to event structure converge on an explanation of how multiple sources of information interact in event perception and conception.     

Attention and perception: An information-integration perspective

Attentional effects in perceptual processing are analyzed within a framework of a fuzzy logical model of perception. The recognition of a pattern is conceptualized as involving three stages of processing: featural evaluation, integration of features, and pattern classification. The model predicts no loss of resolution when multiple sources of information are integrated to recognize a perceptual event. This model is contrasted with a single-channel model in which only one source of information can be recognized at a time. The task involves a relatively novel situation of speech perception by ear and eye. No attentional decrement is observed when observers process both auditory and visual speech specifying a single speech event. This result contrasts with previous studies showing a loss when attention has to be divided between different events along auditory and visual modalities. The different results are interpreted in terms of the number of events that have to be processed. Processing two different modalities leads to an attentional decrement when the two inputs specify different events whereas no attentional decrement occurs when these inputs are integrated to recognize a single event. A distinction is made between detection that requires only the evaluation of a single source of information and recognition that requires the evaluation and integration of multiple sources of information. The current framework is also used to discuss previous empirical and theoretical work and the issue of early versus late selection.     

Multiple audience problem: a strategic communication perspective on social perception

Examined how communicators send mixed messages containing an explicit surface content and a covert hidden content. In Study 1, Ss wrote constrained essays presenting either an introverted or extraverted personality. Although authors reported manipulating essay credibility and readers reported relying on credibility to make their judgments, readers succumbed to correspondence bias. In Studies 2 and 3, Ss again prepared either constrained essays (Study 2) or constrained videotapes (Study 3) and included in them a hidden message that would be understood by only their friends but not by strangers. Observers then read these essays or watched these videotapes. Friends detected and decoded the hidden messages, whereas strangers did not. We discuss these findings in terms of social perception and strategic communication.     

The mind-brain relationship: the emergent self

This paper explores the mind-brain relationship, using insights from contemporary neuroscience. It seeks to investigate how our brains become who we are, how subjective experience arises. In order to do this some explanation is given of the basic concepts of how the brain produces our subjective mental life. Current neuropsychological and neurobiological understanding of early brain development, memory, emotion and consciousness are explored. There is also an attempt at mapping the mind-brain-self relationship from a uniquely Jungian perspective. Clinical material is included in order to show the relevance of these insights to our work in the consulting room, arguing the value of the affect-regulating, relational aspects of the analytic dyad that forge new neural pathways through emotional connection. Such experience forms the emotional scaffolding necessary for the emergence of reflective function.     

Pigeon pattern perception: limits on perspective invariance

Two experiments are reported in which the response of pigeons to perspective transformations of a pattern target was measured. In the first experiment an alphabet letter was taken as the pattern target (the 'positive') and the response to its perspective transforms was compared to the response to nontarget letters ('negatives') over the course of discrimination training. In the second experiment irregular quadrilaterals were used as positives and the responses to slight perspective deformations of the prototypes were compared to the responses to random transformations of the same magnitude under steady-state conditions. The amount of differential responding depended on the type of transformation. There was no differential response to targets rotated in the picture plane or around the horizontal axis in either experiment. There was differential response to small reductions and enlargements of the target. There was also differential response to translated targets, and this was seen irrespective of the amount of displacement. Results from targets rotated around the vertical axis were erratic, some target-plus-angle combinations elicited differential responding, but most did not. The erratic responses are attributed to symmetries in pattern elements that were abstracted as critical features. Pigeons therefore exhibit no true rotation invariance, limited size invariance, and complete shift invariance. It is argued that size invariance, but not position invariance, may depend on prior exposure to the alternatives.     

Event files: feature binding in and across perception and action

The primate brain codes perceived events in a distributed fashion, which raises the question of how the codes referring to the same event are related to each other. Recent findings suggest that they are integrated into 'object files', episodic bindings of object-related information. However, the problem of integrating distributed codes is not restricted to perception but applies to action planning and sensorimotor processing as well. Here I argue that the brain addresses these problems by creating multi-layered networks of bindings - 'event files' - that temporarily link codes of perceptual events, the current task context, and the actions performed therein. These bindings produce systematic but often surprising and counter-intuitive interactions between, and impairments in, perception and action planning.     

Frames of reference in unilateral neglect and visual perception: a computational perspective

Neurological patients with unilateral neglect fail to orient and respond to stimuli on one side, typically the left. A key research issue is whether neglect is exhibited with respect to the left side of the viewer or of objects. When deficits in attentional allocation depend not merely on an object's location with respect to the viewer but on the object's intrinsic extent, shape, or movement, researchers have inferred that attention must be operating in an object-based frame of reference. Simulations of a view-based connectionist model of spatial attention prove that this inference is not logically necessary: Object-based attentional effects can be obtained without object-based frames. The model thus explains away troublesome phenomena for view-based theories of object recognition.     

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing. On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning. On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task. We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference. Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes--cognitive structures we call event codes. We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data.     

Higher mind-brain development in successful leaders: testing a unified theory of performance

This study explored mind-brain characteristics of successful leaders as reflected in scores on the Brain Integration Scale, Gibbs’s Socio-moral Reasoning questionnaire, and an inventory of peak experiences. These variables, which in previous studies distinguished world-class athletes and professional classical musicians from average-performing controls, were recorded in 20 Norwegian top-level managers and in 20 low-level managers—matched for age, gender, education, and type of organization (private or public). Top-level managers were characterized by higher Brain Integration Scale scores, higher levels of moral reasoning, and more frequent peak experiences. These multilevel measures could be useful tools in selection and recruiting of potential managers and in assessing leadership education and development programs. Future longitudinal research could further investigate the relationship between leadership success and these and other multilevel variables.     

A discussion of the mind-brain problem

In this paper Popper formulates and discusses a new aspect of the theory of mind. This theory is partly based on his earlier developed interactionistic theory. It takes as its point of departure the observation that mind and physical forces have several properties in common, at least the following six: both are (i) located, (ii) unextended, (iii) incorporeal, (iv) capable of acting on bodies, (v) dependent upon body, (vi) capable of being influenced by bodies. Other properties such as intensity and extension in time may be added. It is argued that a fuller understanding of the nature of forces is essential for the analysis of the mind-brain problem. The relative autonomy and indeterministic nature of mind is stressed. Indeterminism is treated in relation to a theorem of Hadamard. The computer theory of mind and the Turing test are criticized. Finally the evolution of mind is discussed.     

Risk perception for acquaintance sexual aggression: A social-cognitive perspective

Beliefs that people hold about sources of harm and their personal susceptibility to harm have been shown to play an important role in their subsequent self-protection. With respect to acquaintance sexual aggression, women generally report low levels of perceived personal risk and, thus, low level preparedness to prevent or protect against this form of threat. In order to develop effective resistance efforts, a more complete understanding is needed of factors that shape perception of risk and how these factors are likely to influence—both positively and negatively—women's risk reduction and self-protection. This article addresses this need by reviewing recent literature on risk perception and identifying relevant applications of theory and findings to women's perception of risk for acquaintance sexual aggression.     

Motivation in person perception: role of the other's perspective

In previous studies (G. Steins & R. A. Wicklund, 1993, 1996, 1997; R. A. Wicklund & G. Steins, 1996), perspective-taking depended on the interplay between 2 variables--(a) press (the relationship intensity between perceiver and perceived person) and (b) conflict. In the absence of conflict, perspective-taking was positively related to press; in the presence of conflict, perspective-taking was negatively related to press. In the present 3 studies, involving samples of German students, the author conducted a detailed exploration of the motivational impact of press on perspective-taking: In the 1st study, she measured press via the participant's wish to deal with the other person; in the 2nd study, via the perceiver's preoccupation with the target; and in the 3rd study, she defined press as a general tendency of some participants to become absorbed in other individuals. All 3 studies included elements of conflict. The results further supported the perspective-taking model and improved the understanding of the influence of motivation in person perception.