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1.
It has become a popular view among non-reductive physicalists that it is possible to devise empirical tests generating evidence for the causal efficacy of the mental, whereby the exclusion worries that have haunted the position of non-reductive physicalism for decades can be dissolved once and for all. This paper aims to show that these evidentialist hopes are vain. I argue that, if the mental is taken to supervene non-reductively on the physical, there cannot exist empirical evidence for its causal efficacy. While causal structures without non-reductive supervenience relations can be conclusively identified in ideal discovery circumstances, it is impossible, in principle, to generate evidence that would favour models with mental causation over models without. Ascribing causal efficacy to the mental, for the non-reductive physicalist, is a modelling choice that must be made on the basis of metaphysical background theories or pragmatic maxims guiding the selection among empirically indistinguishable models.  相似文献   

2.
Jaegwon Kim once refrained from excluding distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient physical cause of the effect (Kim, 1984 Kim, J. (1984). "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9, p. 257270.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]). At that time, Kim also refrained from excluding distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect (Kim, 1988 Kim, J. (1988). Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12, 225239.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar], 1989 Kim, J. (1989). Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives, 3, 77108.[Crossref] [Google Scholar]). More recently, he has excluded distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient cause of the effect, since the physical cause is individually sufficient for the effect (Kim, 2005 Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]). But there has been, to this point, no parallel shift in the explanatory realm, such that distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect are excluded since the physical explanation is objectively complete. In this paper I consider, defend, and apply this update to the principle of explanatory exclusion—an update, which, in the final analysis, demonstrates a significant advantage that non-reductive physicalism has over reductive physicalism.  相似文献   

3.
According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the causal exclusion problem.  相似文献   

4.
Summary  A combination of process and counterfactual theories of causation is proposed with the aim of preserving the strengths of each of the approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. The basis for the combination, or hybrid, view is the need, common to both accounts, of imposing a stability requirement on the causal relation.  相似文献   

5.
Many photographs seem to be images of absences: for instance, a photograph of a shadow seems to be an image of an absence, as shadows are plausibly thought of as being absences of light. Absence photography is puzzling, however, as, first, it is a common idea that photographs can only be images of things that have caused them, and, second, it is unclear whether absences can cause anything. In this paper, I look at various ways to unravel the puzzle. Along the way, I also hope to cast some light on the idea that photography is a causal medium.  相似文献   

6.
This paper is an opinionated overview of major developments in philosophy of mind during the past seventy years, with emphasis on the issue of mental causation. Its most prominent positions all embrace a broadly “naturalistic” or “materialistic” conception of human beings, and of mentality and its place in nature. Included in this paper are discussions of analytical behaviorism, the psychophysical identity theory, functionalism, multiple realizability and strong multiple realizability, supervenience, the causal exclusion problem, phenomenal mental states, wide content, contextualist causal compatibilism, agentive phenomenology, and the agent-exclusion problem.  相似文献   

7.
This paper is a dialogue between Thalia Wheatley and Terence Horgan. Horgan maintains that philosophy is a broadly empirical discipline, and that philosophical theorizing about how concepts work treats certain intuitions about proper concept-usage as empirical data. He holds that the possibility of strong multiple realizability undermines the psychophysical identity theory. He holds that the concept of causation is governed by implicit contextual parameters, and that this dissolves Kim’s problem of “causal exclusion.” He holds that the concept of free will is governed by implicit contextual parameters, and that free-will attributions are often true, in typical contexts, even if determinism is true. Thalia Wheatley holds that the concept of multiple realizability hinges on the level of abstraction discussed and that neuroscientific data does not yet support multiple realizability of mental states from specific, high resolution brain states. She also holds that compatibilism redefines the concept of free will in ways that bear little resemblance to the common understanding―that of being free to choose otherwise in the moment. She maintains that this folk understanding is incompatible with the brain as a physical system and is not rescued by concepts of context and capacity.  相似文献   

8.
Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind is often understood as the claim that the mind has a part that is eternal. I appeal to two principles that Spinoza takes to govern parthood and causation to raise a new problem for this reading. Spinoza takes the composition of one thing from many to require causal interaction among the many. Yet he also holds that eternal things cannot causally interact, without mediation, with things in duration. So the human mind, since it is the idea of a body existing in duration, cannot have an eternal part. In order to solve this problem, I propose an aspectual reading of Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind: the mind itself is eternal, under one of its aspects.  相似文献   

9.
ABSTRACT

Previous research has demonstrated repeatedly that the mental rotation of human-like objects can be performed more quickly than the mental rotation of abstract objects (a body analogy effect). According to existing accounts, the body analogy effect is mediated by projections of one’s own body axes onto objects (spatial embodiment), and the mental emulation of the observed body posture (motoric embodiment). To test whether motoric embodiment facilitates the mental rotation of human-like objects, we conducted an experiment using a snake-like object that had its own body axes but would be difficult to emulate. Twenty-four participants performed the mental rotation of snake-shaped cubes with or without a snake face as well as human-shaped cubes with or without a human face. Results showed that the presence of a face increased mental rotation speeds for both human-shaped and snake-shaped cubes, confirming both the human-body and snake analogy effects. More importantly, the snake analogy effect was equal to the human-body analogy effect. These findings contradict the motoric embodiment account and suggest that any object that can be regarded as a unit facilitates holistic mental rotation, which in turn leads to improved performance.  相似文献   

10.
ABSTRACT

The publication of the revised edition of Place and Experience provides the occasion to discuss Malpas’ original account of place, and its role in a proper account of the central features of human minds. The first edition is a groundbreaking work on the embodiment and embeddedness of human minds, that prefigures more recent developments of a now established field of research on embodied minds: so-called E accounts. In this paper, I address three issues in Malpas’ book that I found problematic at times and unclear at others, and argue that E- accounts, or better, a particular rendering of them, can better dissolve. These interrelated issues are: 1. the use of the idea of mental representations to understand location and orientation; 2. the claim that non-human animals have ‘environments’ but lack ‘worlds’, 3. the use of two exclusive vocabularies, the physical and the mental, for describing cognition. I thus question such ideas, associated with traditional accounts of cognition, which not only are responsible for some of the gravest criticisms such accounts have received, but seem inadequate to Malpas’ characterization of minds as placed. My recommendation is to take a step back from the traditional framework, and allow ourselves to simply move forward.  相似文献   

11.
12.
13.
Mangarevan traditionally contained two numeration systems: a general one, which was highly regular, decimal, and extraordinarily extensive; and a specific one, which was restricted to specific objects, based on diverging counting units, and interspersed with binary steps. While most of these characteristics are shared by numeration systems in related languages in Oceania, the binary steps are unique. To account for these characteristics, this article draws on—and tries to integrate—insights from anthropology, archeology, linguistics, psychology, and cognitive science more generally. The analysis of mental arithmetic with these systems reveals that both types of systems entailed cognitive advantages and served important functions in the cultural context of their application. How these findings speak to more general questions revolving around the theoretical models and evolutionary trajectory of numerical cognition will be discussed in the 6 .  相似文献   

14.
Nesselroade and Molenaar presented the ideographic filter as a proposal for analyzing lawful regularities in behavioral research. The proposal highlights an inconsistency that poses a challenge for behavioral research more generally. One can distinguish a broadly Humean approach from a broadly non-Humean approach as they relate to variables and to causation. Nesselroade and Molenaar rejected a Humean approach to latent variables that characterizes them as nothing more than summaries of their manifest indicators. By contrast, they tacitly accepted a Humean approach to causes characterized as nothing more than summaries of their manifest causal effects. A non-Humean treatment of variables coupled with a Humean treatment of causation creates a theoretical tension within their proposal. For example, one can interpret the same model elements as simultaneously representing both variables and causes. Future refinement of the ideographic filter proposal to address this tension could follow any of a number of strategies.  相似文献   

15.
不确定情境中的决策心理——适应与认知   总被引:18,自引:3,他引:18  
不确定情境中的决策问题广受经济学家和心理学家关注,但他们对人的决策行为有不同的解释。该简要回顾了经济学和心理学视野中的决策理论,包括预期效用理论、主观预期效用理论和前景理论。主要介绍了“生态理性”观对人的决策心理的研究,着重介绍了研究发现的几种启发式策略,如“一个理由策略”,并探讨了他们在人适应过程中的作用。中最后分析了决策问题的研究现状。  相似文献   

16.
大学生对心理健康必备能力认知的年级与性别特点   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
林依  罗良  张日昇 《心理科学》2006,29(3):704-707,683
本研究以200名大学生为被试,以访谈及问卷的方式对大学生心理健康必备能力的认知特点进行了调查研究,在大学生心理健康必备能力认知结构模型的基础上,对大学生心理健康必备能力认知的年龄与性别特点进行了研究。结果表明:大学生对心理健康必备能力的认知得分在自我调控、社会应对、学习和人际交往四个因子上没有显著的年级和性别主效应;在“社会应对”和“学习”两个维度上,性别和年级存在显著的交互作用,进一步分析发现,二年级男生在“社会应对”方面能力的认知得分显著高于女生,在“学习”维度上,一年级女生得分显著高于男生。  相似文献   

17.
自我的内隐社会认知研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
自我的内隐社会认知研究具备坚实的理论基础,又有严格的实证研究方法,可以促进自我理论的深入发展。目前,内隐社会认知的自我研究已经成为自我研究的新生力量。文章最后对该取向的意义和趋势作了展望。  相似文献   

18.
The developmental psychologies of Dewey and Vygotsky are often brought together, or even assimilated, by contemporary constructivist and social constructivist theories, including sociocultural approaches. These theories broadly subscribe to the naturalistic philosophical paradigm dominating educational research. Nevertheless, they are incompatible, as expressed from the outset in their antagonistic conceptions of the relationship between human development and biological evolution. This article proposes a comparative analysis of the meaning of key concepts such as sign, meaning, mind, consciousness, will, personality or freedom in Dewey's and Vygotsky's texts, and contrasts their respective interpretations of human choice and the mind-body problem. On this basis, the fundamental issue of mental causation appears at the core of the divergences between Dewey and Vygotsky's theories of human thought.  相似文献   

19.
20.
In this study, we demonstrate a previously unknown finding that mindful learning can improve an individual’s spatial cognition without regard to gender differences. Thirty-two volunteers participated in the experiment. Baselines for spatial ability were first measured for the reaction time on the mental rotation task. Next, the participants were randomly assigned to either a mindful or mindless learning condition. After learning, the mental rotation task showed that those in the mindful learning condition responded faster than those in the mindless learning condition. This study provides promising evidence for applying mindful learning to education.  相似文献   

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