Regret as autobiographical memory

We apply an autobiographical memory framework to the study of regret. Focusing on the distinction between regrets for specific and general events we argue that the temporal profile of regret, usually explained in terms of the action–inaction distinction, is predicted by models of autobiographical memory. In two studies involving participants in their sixties we demonstrate a reminiscence bump for general, but not for specific regrets. Recent regrets were more likely to be specific than general in nature. Coding regrets as actions/inactions revealed that general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to inaction while specific regrets were as likely to be due to action as to inaction. In Study 2 we also generalised all of these findings to a group of participants in their 40s. We re-interpret existing accounts of the temporal profile of regret within the autobiographical memory framework, and outline the practical and theoretical advantages of our memory-based distinction over traditional decision-making approaches to the study of regret.     

Is regret for inaction relatively self‐enhancing?

Previous accounts of regret suggest that people report greater regret for inaction than for action because the former is longer lasting and more painful than the latter. We suggest instead that the tendency for people's greatest regrets to concern inaction more than action may be due to the relatively self‐enhancing nature of regrets for inaction. In Study 1 we asked people to think about their greatest recent regret and to code it as being due to action or inaction. In Study 2 participants described their greatest regret from across their entire life. In both studies we observed an inaction effect only amongst individuals high in self‐esteem (HSE). In Study 2 we found that the inaction effect was confined to HSE people whose greatest regret was personal in nature. These results support the claim that regret for inaction is relatively self‐enhancing and suggest that the inaction effect found in real‐life regrets may be due, in part at least, to the self‐enhancement goals of HSE individuals. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Buyer's remorse or missed opportunity? Differential regrets for material and experiential purchases

Previous research has established that experiential purchases tend to yield greater enduring satisfaction than material purchases. The present work suggests that this difference in satisfaction is paralleled by a tendency for material and experiential purchases to differ in the types of regrets they elicit. In 5 studies, we find that people's material purchase decisions are more likely to generate regrets of action (buyer's remorse) and their experiential purchase decisions are more likely to lead to regrets of inaction (missed opportunities). These results were not attributable to differences in the desirability of or satisfaction provided by the two purchase types. Demonstrating the robustness of this effect, we found that focusing participants on the material versus experiential properties of the very same purchase was enough to shift its dominant type of regret. This pattern of regret is driven by the tendency for experiences to be seen as more singular--less interchangeable--than material purchases; interchangeable goods tend to yield regrets of action, whereas singular goods tend to yield regrets of inaction.     

Cultural grounding of regret: regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

Cultural grounding of regret: Regret in self and interpersonal contexts

The purpose of this study was to explore cultural similarities and differences in regret, focusing on distinctions between interpersonal and self-situations, and between action and inaction regrets. Japanese and American undergraduates were asked to describe regrets experienced in interpersonal and self-situations. We found that both situational and cultural contexts influenced the likelihood of regretting inactions over actions. Participants were more likely to recall inaction regrets in self-situations than in interpersonal situations, and that the likelihood of recalling inaction regrets was more pronounced for Americans than for Japanese. Furthermore, we examined the intensity of the regret. Whereas American students experienced regret as intense as that of Japanese students in self-situations, Japanese students experienced regret more strongly than American students in interpersonal situations. Detailed content analysis also showed that individuals experienced regret in ways consistent with cultural values. The situational and cultural grounding of regret is discussed.     

When experienced regret refuses to fade: Regrets of action and attempting to forget open life regrets

The emotional experience of regret often persists rather then fading over time. The present experiment with 101 student participants investigated whether recollecting life regrets of action, construing life regrets as psychologically open, or attempting to forget versus remember regret-related thoughts interfered with the fading of affect over a two-week interval. Results showed that regrets of action failed to show a fading affect pattern. In addition, disappointment failed to fade for regrets of inaction construed as open. Experienced regret failed to fade for regrets construed as open followed by attempts to forget regret-related thoughts. Intrusive and avoidant thoughts co-occurred with the latter disruptions in fading affect. Discussion concerns the causal relationship of memory and fading affect, and the different processes underlying fading of affect for discrete emotions.     

后悔的一致性模型:理论和证据

重新检验Ｇｉｌｏｖｉｃｈ和Ｍｅｄｖｅｃ的后悔时间性模型。该模型认为,与假设思维有关的短期后悔的研究结果相反,人们日常生活中最大的后悔（长期后悔）多是“不做”而不是“做”的后悔。该文认为这一理论上的矛盾来自于双方对“做／不做”概念以及“做－不做”规律适用范围的不同理解。该研究使用这一新的分类方法,发现和短期后悔一样,至少一半的长期后悔来自于“状态改变”的后悔。这此基础上提出后悔的一致性模型,认为长期     

Action/inaction regret as a function of severity of loss

Two studies were conducted to examine whether people who experience severe losses tend to regret their failures to act more than people that experience less severe losses. Two time points were considered, after the event (short term), and a year later (long term). In Study 1, participants responded to scenarios depicting losses varying in degree of severity. As hypothesized, protagonists in the heavy loss cases were attributed with more regrets of omission (inaction) both in the short and in the long term. In the less severe loss scenarios, action regrets decreased significantly in the long term. In Study 2, one of the severe loss scenarios from Study 1 was presented with a less severe outcome. As expected, participants generated more inaction regrets in the severe loss version. Severity of loss influenced the preference for omission regrets in both studies for the short term and the long term. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

后悔内容的影响因素研究：基于中美的初步比较

后悔内容的研究由于缺乏理论总结长期处于后悔研究的主流之外。Roese和Summerville（2005）通过元分析发现美国人的后悔出现在12个生活领域,在此基础上,他们提出解释后悔内容的机会理论,该理论的核心观点是机会导致了后悔。而Beike、Markman和Karadogan（2009）的观点刚好相反,他们认为失去的机会才会产生后悔。我们将中国人的后悔和美国人的后悔进行比较后,发现中国人后悔出现的生活领域和美国人既有相似性也有差异。该结果提示,除了（失去的）机会之外生活领域的重要性可能也是解释后悔内容的一个重要因素     

Regret and Behavior: Comment on Zeelenberg and Pieters

Zeelenberg and Pieter's (2007) regret regulation theory 1.0 offers a synthesis that brings together concepts spanning numerous literatures. We have no substantive disagreement with their theory, but instead offer 3 observations to further aid regret researchers studying consumer decision making. First, the overall arch of any regret theory must be situated within an understanding of behavior regulation. Second, the distinction between regrets of action versus inaction is best understood in terms of motivational implications, particularly with regard to Higgin's (1998) distinction between promotion and prevention focus. Third, the opportunity principle offers a particularly clear means of summarizing the regulatory consequences of the regret experience. Regret is an emotion pivotal for decision making, and its cognitive underpinning has and continues to be elucidated in research focusing on counterfactual thinking.     

Sex differences in regret: all for love or some for lust?

Few sex differences in regret or counterfactual thinking are evident in past research. The authors discovered a sex difference in regret that is both domain-specific (i.e., unique to romantic relationships) and interpretable within a convergence of theories of evolution and regulatory focus. Three studies showed that within romantic relationships, men emphasize regrets of inaction over action (which correspond to promotion vs. prevention goals, respectively), whereas women report regrets of inaction and action with equivalent frequency. Sex differences were not evident in other interpersonal regrets (friendship, parental, sibling interactions) and were not moderated by relationship status. Although the sex difference was evident in regrets centering on both sexual and nonsexual relationship aspects, it was substantially larger for sexual regrets. These findings underscore the utility of applying an evolutionary perspective to better understand goal-regulating, cognitive processes.     

Hot as hell! The self-conscious nature of action regrets

Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman (1998) have shown that real-life regrets for actions and inactions correspond to different emotional states. When people regret something they have done they experience painful “hot” emotions such as disgust or guilt, whereas when the regret is about a failure to act they rather experience wistful emotions. In four questionnaire studies, we have tested the hypothesis that regrettable actions elicit a particular subcategory of these hot emotions: the self-conscious emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, embarrassment, remorse, and anger toward oneself). These studies used different methodologies and all converged to show that self-conscious emotions were the only hot emotions to be systematically greater for action regrets than for inaction regrets. A similar pattern was observed for judgments of responsibility and morality. We emphasize the theoretical and methodological implications of these results in the discussion.     

To do or not to do: desirability and consistency mediate judgements of regret.

In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were inconsistent with decision nakers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were consistent with decision makers' orientation. they were desirable and produced less regret than did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret.     

做会后悔还是不做会后悔?——自我调节模式对不作为惯性的影响

从消费者的不作为惯性反应差异出发,探讨运动模式和评估模式的消费者在错过第一次合意机会、面对第二次次优机会时购买可能性的差异及原因。通过3个研究发现,相比评估模式的消费者而言,运动模式的消费者具有更高的二次购买可能性。在自我调节模式影响次优购买可能性的过程中,预期后悔起到重要的中介作用。此外,研究还发现,当第二次次优机会中提供了与第一次机会中的产品类似但不同的替代产品时,运动模式和评估模式消费者之间的购买可能性差异消失了。     

Regret appraisals, age, and subjective well-being

This study examined whether regrets are associated with age and subjective well-being in a sample of 176 participants ranging in age 19 to 82 years. Participants were asked to name unattained goals or events which they currently regret, and appraise these along a number of dimensions such as changeableness and consequences. The results showed that those who appraised their regret-related goals or events as having an impact on their present lives, reported a lower level of life satisfaction and more physical symptoms than those who appraised their regrets as having less consequence. There were also age differences in the regret appraisals. The older adults evaluated their regret-related goals or events as being less likely to change than did the younger adults.     

Regret, Valuation, and Inaction Inertia

In three experiments we sought to determine the cause of the “inaction inertia” effect, which occurs when bypassing an initial opportunity decreases the likelihood that a subsequent similar action will be taken. Experiment 1 required some participants to estimate their likelihood of buying shoes as a function of the magnitude and geographical location of an earlier forsaken bargain; others estimated their amount of regret over failing to take advantage of the bargain. The inverse relation between regret and propensity to buy strongly implicated regret as the cause of inaction inertia. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that experienced regret over having missed an earlier bargain rather than anticipated regret over paying too much for the subsequent purchase was the source of our participants' inaction inertia. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through a mediational analysis that those who had missed a large bargain placed a significantly lower value on the subsequent purchase opportunity than those who earlier had missed a more modest bargain. This difference in valuation, along with experienced regret, are two factors which play a significant mediational role in the inaction inertia effect.     

Regret resolution, aging, and adapting to loss

Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that people who have unresolved regrets experience lower levels of well-being than do those who resolve their regrets. In this study, the authors examined the role of regret resolution during bereavement by assessing whether (a) regret resolution would aid in adapting to the death of a loved one and (b) older adults would be more successful at resolving their bereavement-related regrets than would younger adults. Mixed models were run with longitudinal data from an age-heterogeneous sample of 147 men and women who were eventually bereaved after providing care for a loved one through a hospice. As expected, regret resolution contributed to adjustment as indicated by postloss patterns of depressive symptoms, well-being, and rumination; further, older adults were more likely to resolve their regrets than were younger adults. Implications for encouraging regret resolution early in bereavement are discussed.     

Inaction Inertia in the Stock Market1

Based on the inaction inertia effect, it was hypothesized that investors who missed an opportunity to leave a “bear market” will be less likely to sell the stock at a later opportunity when facing a grave loss. Participants in a stock‐market computer game were given an opportunity to sell their stock for a moderate gain. Having missed this initial opportunity and now facing a grave loss, these participants were less likely to sell their stock compared to participants whose potential loss was not as grave, or compared to participants facing the same magnitude of loss who had no previous opportunity to leave the market. Analysis of the time spent by participants on reading relevant information concerning the stock market suggests that this tendency toward continued inaction was not the result of careful deliberation over market trends. The results are discussed in terms of counterfac‐tual thinking and anticipated regret.     

To accept or not to accept a job offer: Examining inaction inertia in an organizational context

The purpose of this research was to investigate inaction inertia in a job offer context. Across two studies, we examined the influence of two situational factors (Study 1) and one dispositional factor (Study 2) on inaction inertia in a job offer context. Participants were asked to imagine they had to pass up an initial offer in which they were interested, but that they received a similar but less attractive offer (lower salary) later. Study 1 findings revealed participants in the loss‐framed condition were more likely to accept the second offer than participants in the neutral condition only when they were asked to imagine they were switching careers, versus being laid off. Study 2 results showed that maximizing tendency significantly and negatively predicted the likelihood to accept the second job offer. Exploratory analyses revealed that anticipated regret did not mediate the relationships between any of the factors and inaction inertia, suggesting that anticipated regret was not the causal mechanism underlying the occurrence of inaction inertia in the current research. Overall, this research shed light on the ways inaction inertia may be experienced in a job offer context.