Inflated perceptions of responsibility and obsessive-compulsive symptoms

In Salkovskis' [Salkovskis, P. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: a cognitive-behavioural analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28, 571-588; Salkovskis P. (1989) Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of intrusive thoughts in obsessional problems. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 677-682] cognitive model for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), inflated perception of responsibility is highlighted as the critical feature that maintains the disorder. In the current study, the relationship between responsibility and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms was examined. Specifically, three measures of responsibility were evaluated for their psychometric properties. These measures were then used to test Salkovskis's model by examining the relationships among pervasive responsibility, automatic thoughts related to causing harm, and OC symptom severity. Findings provide partial support for the validity and reliability of the measures and for the model as a whole. Based on regression analyses, data support that pervasive responsibility significantly contributes to the prediction of OC symptoms. Furthermore, this relationship appears to be mediated by automatic thoughts related to causing harm in OCD contexts.     

Cognitive Beliefs Across the Symptom Dimensions of Pediatric Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Type of Symptom Matters

The cognitive model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) posits that dysfunctional cognitive beliefs are crucial to the onset and maintenance of OCD; however, the relationship between these cognitive beliefs and the heterogeneity of OCD symptoms in children and adolescents remains unknown. We examined how the major belief domains of the cognitive model (inflated responsibility/threat estimation, perfectionism/intolerance of uncertainty, importance/control of thoughts) and dysfunctional metacognitions were related to OCD symptoms across the following dimensions: doubting/checking, obsessing, hoarding, washing, ordering, and neutralization. Self-report ratings from 137 treatment-seeking youth with OCD were analyzed. When cognitive beliefs and symptom dimensions were analyzed in tandem, inflated responsibility/threat estimation and dysfunctional metacognitions were uniquely related to doubting/checking, obsessing, and hoarding and perfectionism/intolerance of uncertainty to ordering. Cognitive beliefs explained a large proportion of variation in doubting/checking (61%) and obsessing (46%), but much less so in ordering (15%), hoarding (14%), neutralization (8%), and washing (3%). Similar relations between cognitive beliefs and symptom dimensions were present in children and adolescents. Cognitive beliefs appear to be relevant for pediatric OCD related to harm, responsibility, and checking, but they do not map clearly onto contamination and symmetry-related symptoms. Implications for OCD etiology and treatment are discussed.     

Responsibility for believing

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible.     

Inflated responsibility and perseverative checking: the effect of negative mood

This article reports the results of 2 experiments designed to test predictions from the mood-as-input hypothesis on the role of inflated responsibility in perseverative checking. Through the use of an analog checking task in both experiments, the authors showed that perseveration, as indicated by a range of measures relevant to compulsive checking, was affected by a combination of the level of inflated responsibility and the valency of mood at the outset of checking. In particular, inflated responsibility significantly facilitated checking perseveration only in the context of a negative mood and was not a sufficient condition for checking perseveration to occur. These effects of the various configurations of inflated responsibility and mood valency are predicted by the mood-as-input hypothesis.     

Inflated responsibility and the use of stop rules for catastrophic worrying

The present paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test some predictions from a mood-as-input explanation of catastrophic worrying (). In particular, these experiments attempted to identify whether worriers possess characteristics that would contribute to the use of relatively strict 'as many as can' closure rules for catastrophising. Experiment 1 demonstrated that high worriers begin a catastrophising task with higher self-reported levels of responsibility towards fully considering all issues involved, than low worriers. Experiment 2 suggested that inflated responsibility has a causal effect on perseveration at the catastrophising task (rather than being a simple non-causal by-product of excessive worrying), and that inflated responsibility exacerbates catastrophising only in conjunction with negative mood. This suggests a relatively complex relationship between responsibility and mood, where there are mood conditions in which high responsibility does not generate greater persistence than low responsibility. These findings are consistent with predictions from a mood-as-input account of catastrophic worrying, and provide evidence for a putative mechanism that mediates the influence of variables such as inflated responsibility on perseveration.     

Biopsychosocial etiology of obsessions and compulsions: an integrated behavioral-genetic and cognitive-behavioral analysis

Accumulating evidence suggests that particular kinds of dysfunctional beliefs contribute to obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. Three domains of beliefs have been identified: (a) perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty, (b) overimportance of thoughts and the need to control thoughts, and (c) inflated responsibility and overestimation of threat. These beliefs and OC symptoms are both heritable. Although it is widely acknowledged that OC symptoms probably have a complex biopsychosocial etiology, to our knowledge there has been no previous attempt to integrate dysfunctional beliefs and genetic factors into a unified, empirically supported model. The present study was an initial step in that direction. A community sample of monozygotic and dizygotic twins (N = 307 pairs) completed measures of dysfunctional beliefs and OC symptoms. Structural equation modeling was used to compare 3 models: (a) the belief causation model, in which genetic and environmental factors influence beliefs and OC symptoms, and beliefs also influence symptoms; (b) the symptom causation model, which is the same as (a) except that symptoms cause beliefs; and (c) the belief coeffect model, in which beliefs and OC symptoms are the product of common genetic and environmental factors, and beliefs have no causal influence on symptoms. The belief causation model was the best fitting model. Beliefs accounted for a mean of 18% of phenotypic variance in OC symptoms. Genetic and environmental factors, respectively, accounted for an additional 36% and 47% of phenotypic variance. The results suggest that further biopsychosocial investigations may be fruitful for unraveling the etiology of obsessions and compulsions.     

The Relationship Between Automatic Thoughts and Irrational Beliefs Predicting Anxiety and Depression

Cognitive behavioral approaches differ in their views on core cognitions and their hypothesized role in the etiology of depression and anxiety. The present study provides empirical evidence regarding the relationship between irrational beliefs and components of automatic thoughts and their role in the etiology of depression and anxiety. The present study utilized newer and improved questionnaires to assess components of irrational belief. Based on prior research by Safren et al. (Cogn Ther Res 24(3):327–344, 2000), a three-factor structure of the combined automatic thought questionnaires were utilized to measure components of automatic thoughts as they relate to depression and anxiety. Factor analytical methods were utilized to confirm the factor structure of the irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts components. Advanced path modeling was utilized to model the relationship between irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts in predicting anxiety and depression. The study used a sample of N = 542 undergraduate psychology students during stressful exam times. Results indicated that the irrational belief Demandingness represents a primary factor, followed by the secondary irrational beliefs as proposed by Rational Emotive Behavioral Theory. Selfdowning beliefs were fully mediated by depressive automatic thoughts in the case of depressive affect. Low frustration tolerance contributed unique variance to anxious and depressive affect that was not fully mediated by automatic thoughts. Results from the present study add empirical evidence that irrational beliefs indeed represent core and intermediary beliefs that lead to specific automatic thoughts, which is congruent with cognitive behavioral theory as proposed by Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy.     

Are "obsessive" beliefs specific to OCD?: a comparison across anxiety disorders

Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) assign a central role to maladaptive beliefs about threat, uncertainty, importance and control of thoughts, responsibility, and perfection. Previous research has demonstrated that such beliefs relate to specific OCD symptoms in a theoretically meaningful way. The aim of the present study was to determine whether these beliefs are endorsed more strongly by OCD patients than by those with other anxiety disorders. Eighty-nine adult OCD patients, 72 anxious control (AC) patients, and 33 nonclinical control (NCC) participants completed a measure of obsessive beliefs as well as measures of depression and trait anxiety. Compared to NCCs and ACs, OCD patients more strongly endorsed beliefs related to threat estimation, tolerance of uncertainty, importance and control of thoughts, and perfectionism, but not inflated responsibility. Using revised, condensed subscales, OCD patients differed from ACs on beliefs about perfectionism and certainty and about importance and control of thoughts, but not on beliefs about threat estimation and inflated responsibility. When controlling for depression and trait anxiety, the OCD and AC group did not differ on most belief domains, except for a belief that it is possible and necessary to control one's thoughts. Results are discussed in light of evolving cognitive-behavioral theories that highlight appraisals of thought control and the use and effectiveness of varying thought control strategies.     

Moral Disengagement Through Displacement of Responsibility: The Role of Leadership Beliefs

The present study examined the relationship between a person's leadership beliefs and the propensity to justify his or her unethical behavior by shifting responsibility to those people in leadership positions who ordered or condoned the behavior. Theoretical support for this relationship comes from the moral disengagement branch of social cognitive theory, which proposes that one cognitive mechanism people employ to justify unethical behavior involves displacing responsibility for their action onto someone else ( Bandura, 1999b ). The study's results revealed that leadership self‐efficacy, affective and noncalculative motivation to lead, and shared orientation toward leadership were related to moral disengagement through the displacement of responsibility.     

Multiple pathways to inflated responsibility beliefs in obsessional problems: possible origins and implications for therapy and research.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the possible origins of an inflated sense of responsibility which occupies an important place in the cognitive theory of obsessive compulsive disorder (Rachman, S. (1993). Obsessions, responsibility, and guilt. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 149-154. Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive Problems: A cognitive-behavioural analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23 (5), 571-583). Clinical experience and consideration of current cognitive conceptualisations of obsessions and obsessive compulsive disorder suggest a number of possibilities, each of which is described after a brief introduction to the concept itself. While there are reasons to believe that some general patterns can be identified, the origins of obsessional problems are best understood in terms of complex interactions specific to each individual.     

Blaming the Kids: Children's Agency and Diminished Responsibility

Children are less blameworthy for their beliefs and actions because they are young. But the relationship between development and responsibility is complex. What exactly grounds the excuses we rightly give to young agents? This article presents three distinct arguments for children's diminished responsibility. Drawing on significant resources from developmental psychology, it rejects views which base the normative adult/child distinction on children's inability to participate in certain kinds of moral communication or to form principled self‐conceptions which guide their actions. The article then argues that children's responsibility ought to be diminished because (and to the degree that) they are less competent at using features of their moral agency to meet social demands. This ‘normative competence’ view is philosophically defensible, supported by research in developmental psychology, and provides us with a method to evaluate whether things like peer pressure are relevant to responsibility.     

The Relationship Between Parent and Child Dysfunctional Beliefs About Sleep and Child Sleep

Cognitive theories emphasise the role of dysfunctional beliefs about sleep in the development and maintenance of sleep-related problems (SRPs). The present research examines how parents’ dysfunctional beliefs about children’s sleep and child dysfunctional beliefs about sleep are related to each other and to children’s subjective and objective sleep. Participants were 45 children aged 11–12 years and their parents. Self-report measures of dysfunctional beliefs about sleep and child sleep were completed by children, mothers and fathers. Objective measures of child sleep were taken using actigraphy. The results showed that child dysfunctional beliefs about sleep were correlated with father (r = 0.43, p < 0.05) and mother (r = 0.43, p < 0.05) reported child SRPs, and with Sleep Onset Latency (r = 0.34, p < 0.05). Maternal dysfunctional beliefs about child sleep were related to child SRPs as reported by mothers (r = 0.44, p < 0.05), and to child dysfunctional beliefs about sleep (r = 0.37, p < 0.05). Some initial evidence was found for a mediation pathway in which child dyfunctional beliefs mediate the relationship between parent dysfunctional beliefs and child sleep. The results support the cognitive model of SRPs and contribute to the literature by providing the first evidence of familial aggregation of dysfunctional beliefs about sleep.     

Inflated responsibility in obsessive-compulsive disorder: Psychometric studies of a semiidiographic measure

An excessive sense of responsibility has been attributed a key role in recent models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This study presents the development and initial validation of the Responsibility Questionnaire. Three hundred ninety-seven volunteer adults participated in the study. The Responsibility Questionnaire demonstrated adequate stability over a 6-week interval. Correlation analysis showed that responsibility was significantly related to obsessive-compulsive symptoms, thought suppression, irrational beliefs, and obsessional thoughts. Results are discussed in terms of current models of OCD and the implications for future research.This study was conducted by the first author under the supervision of the second author in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Maîtrise de Psychologie degree at Université Laval. The first author was supported by les Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l'Aide à la Recherche.     

Dimensionality of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ)

The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ) is a self-report measure in development by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG), who studies cognitive aspects of obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). The aim of this paper was to evaluate the dimensionality of the OBQ in students (n = 995). Two models were tested in a confirmatory framework, corresponding to the OCCWG's (a) original six subscales (87 items), and (b) more recent three subscales (44 items). Both models fit the present data poorly; thus, an exploratory analysis was undertaken. Results revealed one large factor that is relevant, but not unique, to OCD, and three factors that are conceptually consistent with the OCCWG's recent three: (a) distorted beliefs about one's own thoughts, (b) perfectionism, and (c) inflated responsibility. Convergent and divergent validity analyses of the present OBQ factors generally supported the preceding interpretations. Readers are referred to the work of the OCCWG for revisions to the OBQ.     

Self‐Interests and Beliefs: Predictors of Mothers’ Views of Child Care1

Mothers (N= 270) completed questions related to child care for their children who were between 2 and 6 years of age. They completed a 9‐page questionnaire that included scales used to assess their attachment to their careers, financial need to work, and gender‐role beliefs as predictors of their ratings of the effects of child care on 4 criterion measures. Findings supported the hypothesized model that a mother's needs and her self‐interests and beliefs would influence her ratings of the benefits and costs of child care, her anxiety in leaving her child in child care, and her views of the effects of child care on her child. It is suggested that future research should avoid biases that might arise from participant or observer self‐interest and seek more objective approaches to the examination of the impact of child care on children.     

Behavior analysis and the primary prevention of occupational injuries

Contemporary cognitive models of obsessive‐compulsive disorder emphasize the importance of various types of dysfunctional beliefs, such as beliefs about inflated responsibility, perfectionism and the importance of controlling one's thoughts. These beliefs have been conceptualized as main effects, each influencing obsessive‐compulsive symptoms independent of the contributions of other beliefs. It is not known whether beliefs interact with one another in their influence on obsessive‐compulsive symptoms. To investigate this issue, data from 248 obsessive‐compulsive disorder patients were analyzed. Dependent variables were the factor scores on the 4 Padua Inventory subscales. Predictor variables were the factor scores from the 3 factors (inflated responsibility, perfectionism and controlling one's thoughts) of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and their 2‐ and 3‐way interactions. Regression analyses revealed significant main effects; in almost all analyses one or more of inflated responsibility, perfectionism, and controlling one's thoughts factors predicted scores on the Padua factors even after controlling for general distress. There was no evidence that beliefs interact in their effects on obsessive‐compulsive symptoms, thereby providing a relatively unusual instance in which a simpler explanation (main effects only) is just as powerful as a more complex model.     

Are there interactions among dysfunctional beliefs in obsessive compulsive disorder?

Contemporary cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder emphasize the importance of various types of dysfunctional beliefs, such as beliefs about inflated responsibility, perfectionism and the importance of controlling one's thoughts. These beliefs have been conceptualized as main effects, each influencing obsessive-compulsive symptoms independent of the contributions of other beliefs. It is not known whether beliefs interact with one another in their influence on obsessive-compulsive symptoms. To investigate this issue, data from 248 obsessive-compulsive disorder patients were analyzed. Dependent variables were the factor scores on the 4 Padua Inventory subscales. Predictor variables were the factor scores from the 3 factors (inflated responsibility, perfectionism and controlling one's thoughts) of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and their 2- and 3-way interactions. Regression analyses revealed significant main effects; in almost all analyses one or more of inflated responsibility, perfectionism, and controlling one's thoughts factors predicted scores on the Padua factors even after controlling for general distress. There was no evidence that beliefs interact in their effects on obsessive-compulsive symptoms, thereby providing a relatively unusual instance in which a simpler explanation (main effects only) is just as powerful as a more complex model.     

Obsessive beliefs predict cognitive behavior therapy outcome for obsessive compulsive disorder

Cognitive accounts of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) assert that core beliefs are crucial to the development, maintenance, and treatment of the disorder. There are a number of obsessive beliefs that are considered fundamental to OCD, including personal responsibility, threat estimation, perfectionism, need for certainty, importance of thoughts, and thought control. The present study investigated if pretreatment severity of obsessive beliefs, as well as the change in obsessive beliefs following treatment, predicted intensive, residential cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) treatment outcome. A series of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out to investigate the relations between obsessive beliefs and treatment outcome. Results indicated that inflated pretreatment responsibility/threat estimation beliefs were significantly related to less overall obsessive compulsive (OC) symptom reduction at discharge, explaining 2% of the overall variance. Changes in obsessive beliefs broadly, and importance/control of thoughts specifically, were positively related to overall OC symptom reduction at discharge, respectively explaining 18% and 3.6% variance. Results are modestly consistent with a number of theoretical models, which argue that inflated responsibility, threat estimation, and thought control are important to the maintenance and treatment of OCD.     

Semantic Responsibility

Abstract

In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. ‘Being semantically responsible’ is shown to involve the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly encompasses radically different classes of beliefs. In what follows I make those different types explicit, and sketch some implications for naturalisation projects in semantics and for accounts of the (putative) non-conceptual content of perceptual experiences.