THE FATE OF INDEPENDENT THOUGHT IN TRADITIONAL CHINA

China, like a huge dragon, gobbles all in its path. Like a huge vat, dyes all the same color. Sun Jingxuan, A Spector Prowls Our Land (1980)     

SOME PRAGMATIC TENDENCIES IN THE THOUGHT OF WANG YANG-MING

One of the chief benefits to civilization stemming from comparative studies of different philosophical traditions is the possibility of discovering convergences of opinion which offer evidence of continuity in human experience across cultural boundaries and thus provide some measure of corroboration for these opinions. This, of course, is not to say that important divergences of opinion should either be ignored or politely passed over. On the contrary, the more clearly differences are apprehended, the more likely it is that they can be discussed for the purpose of determining whether they may be complementary rather than contradictory. The convergences, however, insofar as we can discover them, should be given the attention they deserve since they transcend boundaries and point in the direction of a deeper unity pertaining not only to this or that particular tradition but to the cause of humanity itself.     

PHILOSOPHY AND SALVATION: THE APOPHATIC IN THE THOUGHT OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

The mystical apotheosis of Schopenhauer's thought is intimately connected to his immanent definition of philosophy. An analysis of the philosophical progression to salvation via aesthetic contemplation, compassion, and asceticism, illuminates Schopenhauer's advocacy of Eckhartian‐style mysticism. Schopenhauer's mysticism, like Eckhart’s, relies on the structures of negation facilitated by a particular metaphysics. Both therein transcend the tradition of theological discourse which holds it possible to construct propositions that express the essence of the divine. That has led to both being associated with atheism. However, in tracing the mechanism by which Schopenhauer's philosophy reaches its mystical apotheosis, it becomes apparent that it would be mistaken to charge him (and Eckhart) with atheism on the basis of an alleged inability to distinguish between an “atheistic non‐existence of God” and a “hyper‐thingness of God”. Rather than attack Schopenhauer in this manner, and hence also Eckhart, it is more appropriate to target their underlying metaphysical preconceptions, which in the case of Schopenhauer, is to take issue with his Critical conception of philosophy.     

ON THE BUDDHIST TRUTHS AND THE PARADOXES IN POPULATION ETHICS

Starting point The starting point of this paper is the following citation concerning the state of contemporary population ethics:

Most discussion in population ethics has concentrated on how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations ‘is better than’ and ‘is as good as’. This field has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. (Arrhenius 2004, 201)

Type of problem The best known and most discussed example shattering our intuitions is Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. This paper explores the potential of the Buddhist Truths to answer the following questions: What is at the source of the Mere Addition Paradox? and Why are paradoxes unavoidable in population ethics?

Results The comparison of classical utilitarian and Buddhist intuitions demonstrates the close tie between intuitions and interests. The perplexing Buddhist intuition about non-existence can be explained (except for metaphysical reasons) by a radically different priority given to survival. The method of measuring the quality of life is not decisive for the existence of paradoxes; the Buddhist axiology changes but does not remove counter-intuitive combinations. If the conflict of interest (quantity versus quality) is described within a two-parameter model, it causes conflicting intuitions; in axiologies that favour quantity (utilitarianism) or quality (perfectionism), the conflicting intuitions inevitably lead to paradoxes. In order to find a compromise, one would have to find a universal interest and a corresponding universal intuition; the obvious candidate to meet this request is sympathy but, since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited. Breaking out of the two-parameter model and accepting the incommensurability of certain qualities threatens the normative claim of population ethics.