On the problem of the meaning of life in ��Chinese Philosophy��

The goal of “(modern) Chinese Philosophy” established during the period of the May 4th Movement is to reestablish the meaning of life for Chinese people. However, because it takes the approach of interpreting Chinese thinking through a Western lens, thus forming a discourse pattern of “Chinese A is Western B,” which is only capable of manifesting Western culture, “Chinese Philosophy” is made logically impossible as the ideological source from which modern Chinese thinkers could construct the meaning of life. The ideological source of the still lasting traditional lifestyle is Yili Xue 义理学 (The Learning of Righteousness and Principles); whereas that of modern life, which was established as an imitation of the West, is Western culture. Neither of them takes “Chinese Philosophy” as its ideological source. Therefore, “Chinese Philosophy” is excluded from the construction of the meaning of life, and falls into the dilemma of life meaning.     

On “The private life of the psychotherapist” and the psychology of caring

This paper is an extended book review of The private life of the psychotherapist by James Guy, an associate professor of psychology at Biola University. This review discusses the joys, stresses and realities of being a therapist. After an overview of joining, remaining in, and retiring from the profession, the next sections deal with the relation between the core skills of psychotherapy as a generic form and the psychological consequences that they are likely to produce.     

Can phronesis save the life of medical ethics?

There has been a growing interest in casuistry since the ground breaking work of Jonsen and Toulmin. Casuistry, in their view, offers the possibility of securing the moral agreement that policy makers desire but which has proved elusive to theory driven approaches to ethics. However, their account of casuistry is dependent upon the exercise of phronesis. As recent discussions of phronesis make clear, this requires attention not only to the particulars of the case, but also to the substantive goods at stake in the case. Without agreement on these goods attention to cases is unlikely to secure the productive consensus that Jonson and Toulmin seek.     

Has the sanctity of life law ‘gone too far’?: analysis of the sanctity of life doctrine and English case law shows that the sanctity of life law has not ‘gone too far’

The medical profession consistently strives to uphold patient empowerment, equality and safety. It is ironic that now, at a time where advances in technology and knowledge have given us an increased capacity to preserve and prolong life, we find ourselves increasingly asking questions about the value of the lives we are saving. A recent editorial by Professor Raanan Gillon questions the emphasis that English law places on the sanctity of life doctrine. In what was described by Reverend Nick Donnelly as a “manifesto for killing patients”, Professor Gillon argues that the sanctity of life law has gone too far because of its disregard for distributive justice and an incompetent person’s previously declared autonomy. This review begins by outlining the stance of the sanctity of life doctrine on decisions about administering, withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment. Using this as a foundation for a rebuttal, a proposal is made that Professor Gillon’s assertions do not take the following into account:

1. 1)
   A sanctity of life law does not exist since English Common Law infringes the sanctity doctrine by tolerating quality of life judgements and a doctor’s intention to hasten death when withdrawing life-prolonging treatment.
    
2. 2)
   Even if a true sanctity of life law did exist:

   1. a)
      The sanctity of life doctrine allows for resource considerations in the wider analysis of benefits and burdens.
       
   2. b)
      The sanctity of life doctrine yields to a competent person’s autonomous decision.
       
    

This review attempts to demonstrate that at present, and with the legal precedent that restricts it, a sanctity of life law cannot go too far.     

The art of ethics as the art of wise life in the concept of Józef Tischner

Studies in East European Thought - The article examines Tischner’s views on the meaning of ethics in human life. Tischner opposes positions that treat ethics as a set of recommendations...     

Incognito or not? the patient's subjective experience of the analyst's private life

This paper examines the meaning for the patient of the analyst's personal life and personality which are ostensibly banished from the consulting room. The therapist has a not‐always‐so‐secret “secret life”; that the patient is supposed to “not know”; about. Yet, more or less unconscious perceptions, impressions, and fantasies about extratherapeutic aspects of the analyst are omnipresent and significantly color the psychoanalytic enterprise.

Moreover the analyst as a person generally plays a critical and underacknowledged role in the patient's experience of the endeavor. Constructing multiple overlapping images of the analyst and of the analytic relationship, the patient discovers himself or herself in the matrix of these relationships with various images of the analytic other. The analysand is motivated to make sense of the analyst as wholly as possible, the better to place into context the analyst's interventions. The patient's resulting view of the analyst's subjective experience acts as a lens that filters and subtly alters the meaning of the analyst's communications.

I illustrate these points by relating my work with a patient whose dreams uncannily picked up on a (consciously) unknown aspect of my private life—my having a handicapped son. The treatment thereafter centered on the patient's identification with my child (as someone “disabled") and on the meaning of her having dreamt something so personal about her therapist.     

Is the good life characterized by self-control? Perceived regulatory success and judgments of life quality

To what extent do people view self-control as central to achieving a healthy, high-quality life? While scientific evidence strongly supports the notion that self-control is associated with successful adaptation and optimal functioning, we examine whether individuals connect this trait with positive outcomes. In Study 1, participants rated the likelihood that an individual with high self-control (or self-esteem) would experience good health and a high-quality life. Studies 2–3 experimentally portrayed a target person as high or low in self-control (and self-esteem) before participants rated the target on an array of positive outcomes. Across studies, self-control was perceived as less strongly connected with a high-quality life than self-esteem. Mediation analyses suggest that people link self-esteem (but not self-control) with healthy behaviors that, in turn, lead to superior perceived physical and psychological health. While self-esteem is strongly associated with lay concepts of the good life, the importance of self-control may be comparatively under-recognized.     

From the “metaphysics of the individual” to the critique of society: on the practical significance of Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life

This essay explores the practical significance of Michel Henry??s ??material phenomenology.?? Commencing with an exposition of his most basic philosophical intuition, i.e., his insight that transcendental affectivity is the primordial mode of revelation of our selfhood, the essay then brings to light how this intuition also establishes our relation to both the world and others. Animated by a radical form of the phenomenological reduction, Henry??s material phenomenology brackets the exterior world in a bid to reach the concrete interior transcendental experience at the base of all exteriority. The essay argues that this ??counter reduction,?? designed as a practical orientation to the world, suspends all traditional parameters of onto(theo)logical individuation in order to rethink subjectivity in terms of its transcendental corporeality, i.e., in terms of the invisible display of ??affective flesh.?? The development of this ??metaphysics of the individual?? anchors his ??practical philosophy?? as he developed it??under shifting accents??throughout his oeuvre. In particular, the essay brings into focus Henry??s reflections on modernity, the industry of mass culture and their ??barbaric?? movements. The essay briefly puts these cultural and political areas of Henry??s of thinking into contact with his late ??theological turn,?? i.e., his Christological account of Life and the (inter)subjective self-realization to which it gives rise.     

Beyond the heritability of life satisfaction – The roles of personality and twin-specific influences

In a behavior genetic design, we investigated individual differences in life satisfaction and its relation to personality with respect to both internal and external influences. We questioned the absence of shared environment and examined the specific contribution of additive and non-additive genetic influences. We also tested for twin-specific environmental influences in a total sample of 1308 dyads including identical and fraternal twins, siblings, mother–child and grandparent–child pairs. The results showed substantial shared environmental influences on life satisfaction that varied between twins and non-twins, supporting twin-specific environmental influences. Additive and non-additive genetic influences on life satisfaction were completely shared with personality. The remaining variance could be explained by unique non-shared environmental influences for life satisfaction independent of personality.     

Is defining life pointless? Operational definitions at the frontiers of biology

Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research.     

Jivacide,Zombies and Jivanmuktas: the meaning of life in the Bhagavad Gitā

In discussing the meaning of life in the Bhagavad Gitā two obvious questions arise: first, what is the meaning of ‘the meaning of life'?, and second, how does that meaning apply to the Bhagavad Gitā? In Part I of this brief paper I will attempt to answer the first question by focusing on one of the common meanings of that phrase; in Part II, I will apply that very common meaning to the Bhagavad Gitā; and in the third and final part, I will point to a puzzle, the paradox of the jivanmukta, that would seem to follow from the discussion in the first two parts of this paper.

My own feeling is that the concept of ‘the meaning of life’ is a Western invention [1]. This being so, perhaps it would be wise to probe for that concept and its meaning among Western authors. We turn first, then, to one ancient writer, Aristotle of Stagira, and conclude Part I with a modern writer also concerned with the meaning of life, Albert Camus.     

Measuring the quality of life: Why,how and what?

In this paper three questions concerning quality of life in medicine and health care are analysed and discussed: the motives for measuring the quality of life, the methods used in assessing it, and the definition of the concept. The purposes of the study are to find an ethically acceptable motive for measuring the quality of life; to identify the methodological advantages and disadvantages of the most prevalent current methods of measurement; and to present an approach towards measuring and defining the quality of life which evades the difficulties encountered and discussed. The analysis comprises measurements both in the clinical situation concerning individual patients and in research concerning whole populations. Three motives are found for evaluating the quality of human life: allocation of scarce medical resources, facilitating clinical decision making, and assisting patients towards autonomous decision making. It is argued that the third alternative is the only one which does not evoke ethical problems. As for the methods of evaluation, several prevalent alternatives are presented, ranging from scales of physical performance to more subtle psychological questionnaires. Clinical questionnaires are found to fail to provide a scientific foundation for universally measuring the quality of life. Finally, the question of definition is tackled. The classical distinction between need-based and want-based theories of human happiness is presented and discussed. The view is introduced and defended that neither of these approaches can be universally preferred to the other. The difficulty with the need approach is that it denies the subjective aspects of human life; whereas the problem of the want approach is that it tends to ignore some of the objective realities of the human existence. In conclusion, it is argued that the choice of methods as well as definitions should be left to the competent patients themselves — who are entitled, if they so wish, to surrender the judgement to the medical personnel. Technical factors as well as the requirements of respect for autonomy and informed consent support this conclusion.     

How stable is happiness? Using the STARTS model to estimate the stability of life satisfaction

A common interpretation of existing subjective well-being research is that long-term levels of well-being are almost completely stable. However, few studies have estimated stability and change using appropriate statistical models that can precisely address this question. The STARTS model (Kenny & Zautra, 2001) was used to analyze life satisfaction data from two nationally representative panel studies. Results show that 34-38% of the variance in observed scores is trait variance that does not change. An additional 29-34% can be accounted for by an autoregressive trait that is only moderately stable over time. Thus, although life satisfaction is moderately stable over long periods of time, there is also an appreciable degree of instability that might depend on contextual circumstances.     

Visual adaptation of the perception of “life”: Animacy is a basic perceptual dimension of faces

One critical component of understanding another’s mind is the perception of “life” in a face. However, little is known about the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying this perception of animacy. Here, using a visual adaptation paradigm, we ask whether face animacy is (1) a basic dimension of face perception and (2) supported by a common neural mechanism across distinct face categories defined by age and species. Observers rated the perceived animacy of adult human faces before and after adaptation to (1) adult faces, (2) child faces, and (3) dog faces. When testing the perception of animacy in human faces, we found significant adaptation to both adult and child faces, but not dog faces. We did, however, find significant adaptation when morphed dog images and dog adaptors were used. Thus, animacy perception in faces appears to be a basic dimension of face perception that is species specific but not constrained by age categories.     

Supernaturalist analytic existentialism: Critical notice of Clifford Williams’ Religion and the meaning of life

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - In this critical notice of Clifford Williams’ Religion and the meaning of life, I focus on his argumentation in favour of the moderate...     

New Age Witchcraft? Popular spell books and the re-enchantment of everyday life

Witchcraft is entering mainstream culture through movies, magazines, websites, novels, and spell books. This paper examines a small number of popular spell books to investigate the effects of popularisation on the beliefs and practices of Witchcraft. I interrogate the debate about Witchcraft's relationship to the New Age to identify characteristics that might be present in a popularised Witchcraft. The characteristics include: the self-ethic, a this-worldly orientation, holism, evolutionary development and ephemeral participation. I argue that popularised Witchcraft has some New Age characteristics, but that other interesting trends include the re-enchantment of everyday life and the sacralisation of the sensuous through love spells, body confidence spells, and material prosperity spells. Spell books provide a technology of the self for young women. I argue that the paraphernalia of New Age Witchcraft are a site in which central contemporary identity issues are contested.