Experiencing malevolent voices is associated with attentional dysfunction in psychotic patients

Inattention in people with schizophrenia is common. However, there has been little research on the association between inattention and auditory hallucinations. The aim of the study was to investigate how inattention is affected by beliefs about voices as benevolent and malevolent and perceived control of voices. A total of 31 patients who experienced auditory hallucinations and who met the criteria for schizophrenia or other psychosis completed the attention subscale of the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS) and the Connors’ Continuous Performance Test II (CCPT‐II). The revised Beliefs About Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ‐R) was used to assess malevolent and benevolent beliefs about voices, and severity of auditory hallucinations (the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales; PSYRATS) was used to assess perceived control of voices and frequency of voices. Levels of depression (the Beck Depression Inventory; BDI), anxiety (the Beck Anxiety Inventory; BAI), severity of overall psychiatric symptoms (the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale; BPRS), and severity of negative symptoms (SANS) were assessed to control for their potential confounding effects. The relations between the variables were explored with correlations and multiple hierarchical regression analyses. The results indicated that more malevolent, but not more benevolent, beliefs about voices predicted lower levels of attention, independently of general psychiatric symptoms and various other psychotic symptoms such as frequency of and perceived control of voices. These findings suggest an important relationship between malevolent beliefs about voices and levels of inattention. The possible impact of changing beliefs about voices to improve attentional functioning is discussed.     

The unity of consciousness in pre-psychotic states. A phenomenological analysis / La unidad de la conciencia en estados pre-psicóticos. Un análisis fenomenológico

This paper explores the way in which the phenomenon called delusional moods — an alteration of consciousness that characterizes the moment that precedes the adoption of delusional beliefs — would challenge the claim that consciousness is necessarily deployed as an experiential unity. After exploring three basic characterizations of the unity of consciousness, it is concluded that during delusional moods only some of them are completely altered. Finally, after complementing the analysis with the examination of some psychotic states, it is concluded that, from the three dimensions of the unity of consciousness that are explored, only one seems to be fundamental.     

“It’s like a charge – either fuses you or burns you out”: an interpretative phenomenological analysis of extreme mental states in meditation context

Meditation, an ancient Eastern spiritual practice, is increasingly being practised in the West where its benefits for mental and physical health have been established. Extreme mental states that can be encountered in the context of meditation have also been reported and often have been labelled as psychosis or spiritual emergency. This study aimed for more nuanced understanding of the phenomena. Interpretative phenomenological analysis was employed to explore the meaning-making of three meditation teachers from different philosophical traditions. The teachers described phenomenology of various extreme mental states, explained their nature according to their traditions and discussed ways of helping persons who experience these. Significance was given to having a spiritual teacher to provide guidance and support. The study highlights the importance of acknowledging the diverse understandings of the phenomena and cultivating a non-judgemental attitude towards it, which could help clinicians and meditation teachers work together to support persons experiencing these.     

Is there an optimal factor structure of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale in patients with first‐episode psychosis?

The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) is the most widely used scale to assess a variety of symptoms in patients with schizophrenia and other psychoses. The factor structure of the PANSS has been examined with confirmatory factor analyses in several studies, but not in a well‐defined first‐episode psychosis sample. The aim of this paper is to examine the statistical fit of five different PANSS models in a first‐episode, non‐affective psychosis sample. Confirmatory factor analyses were performed on PANSS data (n = 588). A main criterion for best fit was defined as the Expected Cross Validation Index (ECVI). No tested model revealed an optimally satisfactory model fit index. The Wallwork/Fortgang five‐factor model demonstrated the most optimal psychometric properties. The corresponding subscales of all evaluated five‐factor models were strongly intercorrelated. The Wallwork/Fortgang five‐factor model was found to be statistically and clinically ideal among patients with first‐episode psychosis. Therefore, we recommend this model in forthcoming studies among patients with first‐episode psychosis. However, to prevent the loss of clinically valuable information on an item level, we do not recommend removing any items from the original form. Our study also implies that the specific choice of model will not have a substantial effect on outcome results in studies on the course and outcome in first‐episode psychosis.     

New interpretative styles: Progress or contamination? Psychoanalysis and phenomenological psychopathology1

Psychoanalysis has started to recoup, often quite implicitly, a more phenomenological stance, ever since psychoanalysts have started working with borderline and psychotic patients. As many of these patients have commonly been through traumatic experiences, psychoanalysts have been using an approach that questions the role of traditional psychoanalytical interpretation and pays more attention to the patient's inner conscious experiences; this approach is characteristic of a specifi c form of contemporary psychiatry: phenomenological psychopathology, founded by Karl Jaspers in 1913 and developed into a form of psychotherapy by Ludwig Binswanger, with his Daseinsanalyse. If what we could call a phenomenological ‘temptation’ has been spreading over psychoanalysis, so too has a psychoanalytical ‘temptation’ always been present in phenomenological psychopathology. In fact, even though this branch of psychiatry has led us towards a deeper understanding of the characteristics of psychotic being‐in‐the‐world, its therapeutic applications have never been adequately formalised, much less have they evolved into a specifi c technique or a structured psychotherapeutic approach. Likewise, phenomenological psychotherapy has always held an anaclitic attitude towards psychoanalysis, accepting its procedures but refusing its theoretical basis because it is too close to that of the objectifying natural sciences. Psychoanalytic ‘temptation’ and phenomenological ‘temptation’ can thus be considered as two sides of the same coin and outline a trend in psychoanalytic and phenomenological literature which points out the fundamental role of the patient's inner conscious experiences in the treatment of borderline and psychotic patients.     

Proneness to hallucinations and delusions in a non‐clinical sample: Exploring associations with metacognition and negative affect

Commonly, individuals prone to hallucinations and delusions hold dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and report higher levels of negative affect, yet, these associations have not been clearly investigated in non‐clinical samples due to the failure to control for high intercorrelations between variables. The aim of the current study was to investigate how hallucination and delusion proneness are associated with dysfunctional metacognitions and negative affect. A cross‐sectional sample of 715 students free from psychiatric diagnoses (M_age = 28.1 years, SD = 10.9, range 18–65) completed the Launay‐Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS‐R); Peters et al. Delusion Inventory (PDI‐21); Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS‐21); and the Metacognition Questionnaire (MCQ‐30). Findings that participants who were prone to both hallucinations and delusions reported elevated levels of negative affect support the need for targeted mental health treatment for individuals who experience psychological distress related to their hallucinatory and delusional experiences. While metacognition beliefs of need to control thoughts and cognitive self‐consciousness, along with the anxiety and stress DASS‐21 subscales appeared as significant cross‐sectional predictors of proneness to hallucinations and delusions, only metacognitions demonstrated any notable predictive value for delusion proneness. This finding questions the role of metacognitions in determining hallucination and delusion proneness in non‐clinical samples.     

Phenomenology and psychophysics

Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat “inner” states, including both qualia and intentional states, as “theoretical posits” of either folk or scientific psychology. This article argues that phenomenology in fact plays a very different role in the most mature part of psychology, psychophysics. Methodologically, phenomenology plays a crucial role in obtaining psychophysical results. And more importantly, many psychophysical data are best interpreted as reporting relations between stimuli and phenomenological states, both qualitative and intentional. Three examples are used to argue for this thesis: the Weber–Fechner laws, the Craik-O’Brien–Cornsweet effect, and subjective contour figures. The phenomenological properties that play a role here do so in the role of data that ultimately constrain theoretical work (in this case theory of vision), and not as theoretical posits.     

Connecting neurosis and psychosis: the direct influence of emotion on delusions and hallucinations

Diagnostic classification systems contain a core divide between neurosis and psychosis, leading to their separate study and treatment. The basis for the separation of the disorders is outlined and reassessed. It is argued that the empirical evidence does not support such a sharp distinction between neurosis and psychosis. The frequent occurrence of emotional disorder prior to and accompanying psychosis indicates that neurosis contributes to the development of the positive symptoms of psychosis. Psychological theories and experimental evidence concerning the influence of emotion on the content and form of delusions and hallucinations are therefore reviewed. It is argued that in many cases delusions are a direct representation of emotional concerns, and that emotion contributes to delusion formation and maintenance. The content of hallucinations less often directly expresses the emotional concerns of the individual, but emotion can trigger and contribute to the maintenance of hallucinatory phenomena, although how this occurs is not well understood. It is concluded that study needs to be made of the interaction between psychotic and neurotic processes in the development of delusions and hallucinations, and that neurotic and psychotic disorders may have common maintenance processes.     

Transmitting delusional beliefs in a hypnotic model of folie à deux

Folie à deux is the transference of delusional ideas from one ‘primary’ individual to one or more ‘secondary’ individuals (Lasègue & Falret, 1877). However, it is difficult to investigate experimentally because often only one patient is identified as delusional. We investigated whether hypnosis could model the experiences of the secondary in this delusion. Our primary was a confederate, who displayed two delusional beliefs and attempted to transmit them to hypnotised subjects. We manipulated the status of the confederate so that they were portrayed as either “credible” or merely “interesting”. Many high hypnotisable individuals adopted the confederate’s beliefs and confabulated evidence in support of them. Also, subjects who interacted with a credible confederate extended their delusions beyond those displayed by the confederate. We discuss the strengths and limitations of this approach and suggest ways to improve the validity of this model.     

Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs

Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by an imposter or another patient with schizophrenia believes that “The Organization” painted the shops on a street in red and green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness, (2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a significant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufficient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content, but harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail and show that they should be rejected after all.     

How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations

Verbal hallucinations are often associated with pronounced feelings of anxiety, and it has also been suggested that anxiety somehow triggers them. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological or ‘personal-level’ account of how it does so. We show how anxious anticipation of one’s own thought contents can generate an experience of their being ‘alien’. It does so by making an experience of thinking more like one of perceiving, resulting in an unfamiliar kind of intentional state. This accounts for a substantial subset of verbal hallucinations, which are experienced as falling within one’s psychological boundaries and lacking in auditory qualities.