Are the states underlying implicit biases unconscious? – A Neo-Freudian answer

Many philosophers as well as psychologists hold that implicit biases are due to unconscious attitudes. The justification for this unconscious-claim seems to be an inference to the best explanation of the mismatch between explicit and implicit attitudes, which is characteristic of implicit biases. The unconscious-claim has recently come under attack based on its inconsistency with empirical data. Instead, Gawronski, Hoffman, and Wilbur (2006) analyze implicit biases based on the so-called Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model, according to which implicit attitudes are phenomenally conscious and accessible. The mismatch between the explicit and the implicit attitude is explained by the Cognitive Inconsistency Approach (CIA) (as I will call it): implicit attitudes are conscious but rejected as basis for explicit judgments because the latter lead to cognitive inconsistency with respect to other beliefs held by the subject. In this paper, I will argue that the CIA is problematic since it cannot account for the fact that implicit attitudes underlying implicit biases typically are unconscious. I will argue that a better explanation of the attitude-mismatch can be given in terms of a Neo-Freudian account of repression. I will develop such an account, and I will show how it can accommodate the merits of the APE model while avoiding the problems of the CIA.     

Implicit Bias,Moods, and Moral Responsibility

Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals' moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals' partial awareness of their implicit biases makes them (partially) morally responsible for them. I argue by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods.     

Defining agency after implicit bias

Recent findings in empirical psychology show that implicit biases can affect behavior in ways that are difficult to control deliberatively. Doris argues that findings like these constitute a threat to agency, if agency is defined as the ability to reflectively, deliberatively direct one’s actions. I argue, however, that implicit biases pose no fundamental threat to agency since they can be brought under indirect deliberative control, whereby deliberative, reflective actions put in place automatic processes that automatically inhibit unwanted biases. Since automatic processes can be thus used to achieve deliberatively, reflectively endorsed goals, agency should be defined as the ability to act in line with reflectively endorsed goals, whether by deliberative or automatic processes.     

Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI

In this paper I critically examine the notion of explanation used in artificial intelligence in general, and in the theory of belief revision in particular. I focus on two of the best known accounts in the literature: Pagnucco’s abductive expansion functions and Gärdenfors’ counterfactual analysis. I argue that both accounts are at odds with the way in which this notion has historically been understood in philosophy. They are also at odds with the explanatory strategies used in actual scientific practice. At the end of the paper I outline a set of desiderata for an epistemologically motivated, scientifically informed belief revision model for explanation.     

Implicit attitudes and the social capacity for free will

In this paper I ask what implicit attitudes tell us about our freedom. I analyze the relation between the literature on implicit attitudes and an important subcategory of theories of free will—self-disclosure accounts. If one is committed to such a theory, I suggest one may have to move to a more social conceptualization of the capacity for freedom. I will work out this argument in five sections. In the first section, I discuss the specific theories of free will that are central to this paper. In the second section, I will show that implicit-bias research raises questions about people’s capacities to exercise (these specific understandings of) free will. In the third section, I will consider how an individual may overcome these failures and argue that the individual ability for self-regulation is significantly limited. One could stop here and conclude that free will is a limited capacity. But I argue that this conclusion would be too hastily drawn. I will instead continue to ask what would be required for free will. By discussing how failures of free will are due to social structures and may be therefore repaired by changing social structures in section 4, I will arrive at an alternative conclusion about the capacity for free will in section 5.     

抑郁的内隐认知与治疗

认知模型认为抑郁个体存在认知加工的偏向,但是,相对于外显认知,抑郁的内隐认知研究较少。现有研究表明：抑郁个体沉迷于特定的内隐认知偏向：抑郁个体倾向于注意环境中的负性刺激;在概念驱动内隐记忆测验中表现出偏向;更可能呈现出无望感的内隐态度。内隐认知可能是抑郁个体维持抑郁的重要因素,在治疗中,可采用知觉内隐认知、扩展功能失调思维记录、记忆日志和增进注意控制等认知技术改变抑郁患者的内隐认知偏向。     

Differences in Anglo and Asian Australians' explicit and implicit prejudice and the attenuation of their implicit in-group bias

Research has shown that not only are minority groups capable of possessing implicit and explicit prejudice but that the study of their attitudes provides unique insight into the nature of prejudice. The current study found that in an Australian context, Asian participants displayed significantly less implicit prejudice and significantly greater explicit prejudice than their Anglo counterparts. This finding provided further evidence of the dissociation of explicit and implicit attitudes, specifically in regard to their predication. In addition, the attenuation of the implicit prejudice of both the Anglo majority and Asian minority group members was investigated. Brief exposure to positive out-group exemplars was found to attenuate the implicit bias of Asian but not Anglo participants, suggesting that this technique may be contingent upon more fundamental prejudice-reducing measures and providing further support that the undermining of implicit biases requires long-term, effortful processes.     

The Bias of Crowds: How Implicit Bias Bridges Personal and Systemic Prejudice

As public awareness of implicit bias has grown in recent years, studies have raised important new questions about the nature of implicit bias effects. First, implicit biases are widespread and robust on average, yet are unstable across a few weeks. Second, young children display implicit biases indistinguishable from those of adults, which suggests to many that implicit biases are learned early. Yet, if implicit biases are unstable over weeks, how can they be stable for decades? Third, meta-analyses suggest that individual differences in implicit bias are associated weakly, although significantly, with individual differences in behavioral outcomes. Yet, studies of aggregate levels of implicit bias (i.e., countries, states, counties) are strongly associated with aggregate levels of disparities and discrimination. These puzzles are difficult to reconcile with traditional views, which treat implicit bias as an early-learned attitude that drives discrimination among individuals who are high in bias. We propose an alternative view of implicit bias, rooted in concept accessibility. Concept accessibility can, in principle, vary both chronically and situationally. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that most of the systematic variance in implicit bias is situational. Akin to the “wisdom of crowds” effect, implicit bias may emerge as the aggregate effect of individual fluctuations in concept accessibility that are ephemeral and context-dependent. This bias of crowds theory treats implicit bias tests as measures of situations more than persons. We show how the theory can resolve the puzzles posed and generate new insights into how and why implicit bias propagates inequalities.     

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS ACQUIRED SECOND NATURE

Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the naturalness of religious belief in at least three ways; religious beliefs are adaptive; religious beliefs are the product of cognitive biases; and religious beliefs are the product of content biases. I argue that all three ideas can be integrated in a predictive coding framework where religious belief is learned and hence not caused by the internal architecture of the mind. I argue that the framework makes it doubtful that there are modular cognitive mechanisms for religious beliefs and that the human mind has a fixed proneness for religious belief. I also argue that a predictive coding framework can incorporate a larger role for cultural processes and allows for more flexibility.     

Disgusted but not afraid: Feelings toward same-sex kissing reveal subtle homonegativity

Overt sexual prejudice is declining, but heterosexuals who report little to no prejudice may still harbor subtle biases against gay men and lesbians. We examined implicit prejudice in a sample of 37 heterosexual college students who reported little or no sexual prejudice, using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) and psychophysiological measures of affect. Skin conductance, heart rate, and facial electromyographic responses were recorded as participants viewed photos of mixed- and same-sex couples kissing and rated them on valence, arousal, and disgustingness. Sexual prejudice was evident in implicit (AMP) ratings and explicit ratings of valence and disgustingness, but not in psychophysiological responses. Results suggest that implicit prejudice harbored by young adults who endorse low levels of sexual prejudice is more cognitively than emotionally based, unlike the fear-based reactions commonly described for racism. Limitations and future directions for research are discussed.     

Knowledge‐first functionalism

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.     

Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity

In this paper I will argue that Boghossian's explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical principles through implicit definitions commits a transmission of warrant-failure. To this end, I will briefly outline Boghossian's account, followed by an explanation of what a transmission of warrant-failure consists in. I will also show that this charge is independent of the worry of rule-circularity which has been raised concerning the justification of logical principles and of which Boghossian is fully aware. My argument comes in two steps: firstly, I will argue for the insufficiency of Boghossian's template which is meant to explain how a subject can acquire a warrant for logical principles. I will show however that this insufficiency of his template can be remedied by adopting what I call the Disquotational Step. Secondly, I will argue that incorporating this further step makes his template subject to a transmission of warrant-failure, assuming that certain rather basic and individually motivated principles hold. Thus, Boghossian's account faces a dilemma: either he adopts the Disquotational Step and subjects his account to the charge of a transmission of warrant-failure, or he drops this additional step leaving the account confronted with explaining the gap that has previously been highlighted. I will then suggest various rejoinders that Boghossian might adopt but none of which—I will argue—can resolve the dilemma. Lastly, I will raise and briefly discuss the question whether this worry generalizes to other accounts, such as Hale and Wright's that aim to explain our knowledge of logic and/or mathematics in virtue of implicit definitions.     

Do Parental Influences Matter? A Reply to Halverson

ABSTRACT Halverson (1988) raises many objections to the retrospective method, but only some of them are applicable to our study (McCrae & Costa, 1988), further, Halverson fails to distinguish between random error and bias in retrospective data We argue that retrospective accounts can provide one useful source of evidence when the probable effects of biases are taken into account The small associations between recalled parent-child relations and adult personality that we reported were probably exaggerated rather than masked by retrospective bias, we took this into account in reaching our conclusions Rather than dismiss the method, psychologists should question the entrenched belief that child-rearing is a major determinant of adult personality
Tram up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it—Proverbs 22 6     

心理疾病内隐污名：来自单类内隐联想测验的证据

以61名大学生为被试,采用三个独立的单类内隐联想测验（SC-IAT）考察心理疾病内隐污名的构成及其内隐效应。结果发现：（1）在认知评价、情感反应、行为倾向及其三者合并的4个SC-IATs中,被试在相容任务上的反应时均显著快于不相容任务;（2）总的SC-IAT和三个独立SC-IAT的内隐效应显著;（3）65.27%的被试的内隐效应值大于0,表现出对心理疾病患者负面的内隐态度;（4）研究采用的心理疾病内隐污名SC-IAT具有较好的信、效度指标。研究表明,被试倾向于将心理疾病与消极词联结在一起,心理疾病污名的内隐效应显著;心理疾病内隐污名包括自动化的负面认知、消极情感反应和歧视倾向。     

Are good salespeople born or made? A new perspective on an age-old question: implicit theories of selling ability

Considering implicit theories in a sales context can provide a framework for better understanding salesperson motivation and behavior. The current research develops, tests, and examines the relevance of an Implicit Theories of Selling Ability (ITSA) measure, which measures the extent to which a person believes selling is an incremental (made) ability versus an entity (born) ability. After pre-testing the ITSA measure, two studies found an unfavorable pattern of outcomes associated with an entity belief of selling ability, consistent with research in other domains. Experimental validity for ITSA is demonstrated, thus supporting a direct relationship between ITSA and sales-relevant constructs, and suggesting manipulation of ITSA as a potential training intervention. This research extends past sales research on implicit theories by developing a sales-specific implicit theories measure and by examining goal orientations and behavior within the social-cognitive model (SCM). Conceptualizing sales performance behaviors from this SCM perspective reveals important considerations for both researchers and practitioners regarding salesperson hiring, training, and placement.     

Filial Obligations: A Comparative Study

The nature of the special obligation that a child has towards her parent(s) is widely discussed in Confucianism. It has also received considerable discussion by analytic commentators. This essay compares and contrasts the accounts of filial obligation found in the two philosophical traditions. The analytic writers mentioned above have explored filial obligations by relating them to other special obligations, such as obligations of debt, friendship, or gratitude. I examine these accounts and try to uncover the implicit assumptions therein about the scope and nature of such filial obligations. I then similarly examine Confucian filial obligations (CFOs) by relating them to these other special obligations of debt, gratitude, and so on. My findings are used to highlight crucial differences in the scope and conception of filial obligations in these two traditions.     

隐含因果关系影响代词解决的研究进展

动词的隐含因果关系会影响代词的解决,对阅读因果复句的研究表明,隐含因果关系发生作用的时程可能在阅读过程中即时发生,也可能在读者读完整个句子后才发生作用,对此有焦点假设、整合假设和混合假设.不同的研究者支持不同的假设.未来研究的方向将进一步探讨不同的动词、不同的读者对隐含因果关系发生作用时程的影响.     

Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief

In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is (a) suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, (b) sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and (c) independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies (that also deal with potential belief sets), show the problems they suffer from, and suggest that belief states should be represented by unary revision functions that take sequences of inputs. Three concepts of coherence implicit in current theories of belief change are distinguished: synchronic, diachronic and dispositional coherence. Diachronic coherence is essentially identified with what is known as conservatism in epistemology. The present paper elaborates on the philosophical motivation of the general framework; formal details and results are provided in a companion paper.     

Measuring implicit intergroup biases

Implicit intergroup biases are automatically activated prejudices and stereotypes that may influence judgments of others on the basis of group membership. We review evidence on the measurement of implicit intergroup biases, finding: implicit intergroup biases reflect the personal and the cultural, implicit measures vary in reliability and validity, and implicit measures vary greatly in their prediction of explicit and behavioral outcomes due to theoretical and methodological moderators. We then discuss three challenges to the application of implicit intergroup biases to real‐world problems: (1) a lack of research on social groups of scientific and public interest, (2) developing implicit measures with diagnostic capabilities, and (3) resolving ongoing ambiguities in the relationship between implicit bias and behavior. Making progress on these issues will clarify the role of implicit intergroup biases in perpetuating inequality.