Big Gods,historical explanation,and the value of integrating the history of religion into the broader academy

This article discusses critiques raised by historians of religion concerning Ara Norenzayan's Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), offering some defense of Norenzayan's position, but also discussing in detail the more substantive challenges. It concludes with some reflections on the current position of the history of religion within the Academy, and an argument for why large-scale explanatory projects and interdisciplinary collaboration should be part of the future of our field.     

CHALLENGES,OPPORTUNITIES, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A RENEWED PROGRAM IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

This is an introduction to the Symposium on “The New Scientific Study of Religion Moving On.” The introduction briefly indicates why the cognitive science of religion (CSR) needs re-evaluation. It subsequently gives an overview of the contributions of the symposium's articles.     

Where angels fear to tread: neurophenomenology and the matter of belief

The article explores Manuel Vásquez’ treatment of cultural neurophenomenology within the broader context of his non-reductionist methodology. By paying particular attention to the context of Tibetan Buddhist monks in disapora – the primary subjects of neurophenomenological research – it is suggested that Vásquez’ neurophenomenology is not as culturally mediated as he claims. His treatment may undermine his larger contention that politics shape both religious experience and the scholarly methodologies used to explore them.     

文化演化的认知视角——从个体社会学习出发探究文化动态性

文化演化是多学科共同关心的文化研究主题。文化演化的认知视角是心理学家切入该研究主题的一种方式, 它着眼于社会文化环境中的个体认知, 研究个体在社会学习过程中对文化信息的加工、改变、记忆与提取。文化演化的认知视角借用达尔文生物演化理论, 涉及文化传承、创新、选择三个子领域, 提出了文化演化的三原则: 遗传、变异、选择。文化传承的路径包括模仿和教导, 类型分为工具性与习俗性文化传承; 文化创新具有层次性, 人类特有的累积性文化演化建立在文化创新的基础之上, 体现了文化创新的代际传递; 基于行为生态学和人类认知机制的文化选择造成了文化信息的差异化适应。未来研究可以从研究概念、研究思路、研究方法三方面推进认知视角下的文化演化研究, 探索更高层次的文化创新, 扩展文化演化的前因变量, 结合新技术加深对文化演化的理解; 发挥文化演化对文化心理学研究的助推作用, 研究文化混搭、个性心理特征对文化演化的影响。     

RELIGION IS EASY,BUT SCIENCE IS HARD … UNDERSTANDING McCAULEY'S THESIS

Robert N. McCauley's new book Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not (2011) presents a new paradigm for investigating the relationship between science and religion by exploring the cognitive foundations of religious belief and scientific knowledge. McCauley's contention is that many of the differences and disagreements regarding religion and science are the product of distinct features of human cognition that process these two domains of knowledge very differently. McCauley's thesis provides valuable insights into this relationship while not necessarily leading to a dismissive view of theology or religious belief. His paradigm allows the research lens to focus on cognitive differences in processing scientific versus religious information and the important role of automatic, unconscious, and intuitive cognitive processes in understanding both the natural and supernatural worlds.     

RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS EVOLUTIONARY ADAPTATIONS

Scholars employing an evolutionary approach to the study of religion and religious beliefs search for ultimate explanations of the origin, propagation, and persistence of religious beliefs. This quest often pairs in debate two opposing perspectives: the adaptationist and “by‐product” explanations of religion and religious beliefs. The majority of scholars prefer the by‐product approach, which is agnostic and even doubtful of the usefulness of religious beliefs. Despite this pervasive negativity, it seems unwarranted to deny the great usefulness of religious beliefs—particularly concerning their past utility. Instead, adaptationist explanations of religion and religious beliefs must be re‐established as interesting and useful approaches to the study of religious beliefs.     

宗教研究的认知科学新取向

宗教认知科学是新近出现的从认知和进化的角度研究宗教的分支学科。主要有认知副产物和社会适应两种理论。认知副产物理论认为宗教信仰是人类认知倾向的副产物;社会适应理论认为宗教信仰促进群体的团结合作,是一个精巧的社会适应机制,有助于群体的自然选择。两种理论引发了系列的实验研究,由于宗教认知科学仍处于理论研究向实证研究的过渡阶段,未来需统一概念,加强实验范式的建立,更多地借助认知科学的方法和工具开展实证研究。     

Culture,religion, and the underlying value dimensions of the metapersonal self-construal

The metapersonal self-construal (MPS) is presented in the context of a three-factor model of self-construal that is grounded in the literature on culture and values. The MPS is an understanding of the self as profoundly interconnected with all humanity and nature. It is distinct from the independent and interdependent self-construals and may emerge from one's cultural, religious, or spiritual background. Relating self-construal with a structural model of values, Study 1 indicated that while the independent and interdependent self-construals marked each end of a continuum, the MPS was associated with a unique cluster of values centred around universalism. Studies 2 and 3 found support for the predicted effects of membership in Buddhist groups and identification with Aboriginal culture on MPS. These results support the MPS as a unique understanding of the self that reflects surrounding beliefs and values. Implications for understanding the relationship between spirituality and well-being are discussed.     

CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Cognitive explanations of religious beliefs propose an evolutionary past in which humans had to possess certain cognitive adaptations to survive. The aim of this article is to show that some cognitive accounts may overvalue the putative role of cognition. One such cognitive idea is an assumption that cognition has been evolutionarily shaped only, or most importantly, in the Pleistocene. This idea seems common among writers on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), but is mistaken. Cognition has been shaped throughout evolution. Another idea is that components of religion could not have been produced by natural selection (the hypothesis that religion is a by-product). But the article suggests that there are some domains in the field of religion and religious components that could be acquired and transmitted despite or even against alleged cognitive biases. The aim of this article is to argue for an extended approach that combines a cognitive account with functional naturalistic approaches, including an adaptationist one. Such distinction could imply that cognition is not functional. Obviously, this is not the case since cognition is the process of knowing, and surely knowledge is functional. However, the main argument for such a distinction lies in the key idea of the cognitive account that as far as cognition is functional and adaptive, religious components are not. Functionalism or “adaptivism” concerning cognition contradicts functionalism concerning religion. Numbers of scholars who consider themselves part of CSR seem also to consider both cognition and religion adaptive. However, in regard to components of religion, their adaptive, functional power is only secondary. The article concludes that the study of religion—as the study of cultural evolution in general—should include a pluralistic methodology combining cognitive and evolutionary accounts with the specificity of cultural evolution.     

ARE EVOLUTIONARY/COGNITIVE THEORIES OF RELIGION RELEVANT FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION?

Biological theories of religious belief are sometimes understood to undermine the very beliefs they are describing, proposing an alternative explanation for the causes of belief different from that given by religious believers themselves. This article surveys three categories of biological theorizing derived from evolutionary biology, cognitive science of religion, and neuroscience. Although each field raises important issues and in some cases potential challenges to the legitimacy of religious belief, in most cases the significance of these theories for the holding of religious beliefs is not very great.     

Hume and cognitive science: The current status of the controversy over abstract ideas

In Book I, Part I, Section VII of the Treatise, Hume sets out to settle, once and for all, the early modern controversy over abstract ideas. In order to do so, he tries to accomplish two tasks: (1) he attempts to defend an exemplar-based theory of general language and thought, and (2) he sets out to refute the rival abstraction-based account. This paper examines the successes and failures of these two projects. I argue that Hume manages to articulate a plausible theory of general ideas; indeed, a version of his account has defenders in contemporary cognitive science. But Hume fails to refute the abstraction-based account, and as a result, the early modern controversy ends in a stalemate, with both sides able to explain how we manage to speak and think in general terms. Although Hume fails to settle the controversy, he nevertheless advances it to a point from which we have yet to progress: the contemporary debate over abstract ideas in cognitive science has stalled on precisely this point.     

Myths, models, and metaphors: Religion as model and the philosophy of science

Clifford Geertz's widely-used paper ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, makes the claim that ‘the importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve … as a source of general, yet distinctive conceptions of the world, the self and the relations between them …—its model of aspect—and of rooted, no less distinctive “mental” dispositions—its model for aspect’. However, apart from a highly critical article by Nancy Frankenberry and Hans Penner (1999) little attempt has been made to investigate this understanding of religion as model. This paper briefly considers the validity of Frankenberry and Penner's criticism and investigates possible applications of the elaborate analysis of models and metaphors in the philosophy of science since the time of Mary Hesse to the analysis of religious phenomena.     

Help-seeking and paranormal beliefs in adherents of mainstream religion,alternative religion,and no religion

This study explored the relationship between help-seeking and adherence to mainstream religion (Christianity, Judaism and Islam), alternative religion (for example, New Age spiritual belief and Paganism) and no religion (including agnosticism and atheism). Four-hundred and fourteen participants completed an online survey which included questions on demographics, help-seeking beliefs and paranormal beliefs (a modified form of the Paranormal Beliefs Scale was used). Previous research had explored adherence to various religions and compared aspects of help-seeking and paranormal beliefs separately. Comparisons were made between basic theoretical differences in belief (e.g., monotheism vs. polytheism vs. rationalism) and help-seeking beliefs. Implications of this research for therapeutic practice are discussed.     

Memories, fantasies, archetypes: an exploration of some connections between cognitive science and analytical psychology

The value of cognitive science as a means of investigating psychodynamic theory and practice is discussed and the limitations of this approach are described. Research findings from cognitive science are drawn on to clarify the nature of memory, which is seen to be a mixture of reproduction and reconstruction and the concepts of true and false memory are explored in this light. The part played by implicit memory and internal working models in producing transference is also examined. New ways of conceptualizing fantasy, which describes it as another facet of internal working models, and the role of transgenerational transmission of attachment patterns in creating internal working models are explored. The nature of archetypes is considered in the light of cognitive science research and a minimalist model is proposed, in which they can be likened to image schemas, that is, primitive conceptual structures that exist in a form which can never be experienced directly or indirectly.     

DEFINING “RELIGION” AS NATURAL: A CRITICAL INVITATION TO ROBERT McCAULEY

Previous critics have argued that Robert McCauley defines religion and science selectively and arbitrarily, cutting them to fit his model in Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. McCauley has responded that final definitions are “overrated” and that artificial distinctions can serve an important role in naturalistic investigation. I agree with this position but argue that a genealogy of the category of religion is crucial to the methodology that McCauley describes. Since the inherent ambiguity of religion will undermine any essential claims about its cognitive naturalness, I invite McCauley to consider how his research might investigate scientific and religious cognition in new terms.     

Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science

In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.     

EMIL BRUNNER REVISITED: ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION,THE IMAGO DEI,AND REVELATION

This article aims at a constructive and argumentative engagement between the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and philosophical and theological reflection on the imago Dei. The Swiss theologian Emil Brunner argued that the theological notion that humans were created in the image of God entails that there is a “point of contact” for revelation to occur. This article argues that Brunner's notion resonates quite strongly with the findings of the CSR. The first part will give a short overview of the CSR. The second part deals with Brunner's idea of the imago Dei and the “point of contact.” The third and final part of the article outlines a model of revelation that is in line with Brunner's thought and the CSR. The aim of this article is to show how the naturalistic methodology of the CSR provides a fertile new perspective on several theological issues and thereby enriches theological reflection.     

Austrian MEPs: between privatisation and politicisation of religion

This contribution investigates the role of religion in the work and attitudes of Austrian members of the European Parliament (MEPs). It is based on the Austrian results of a large-scale survey of MEPs, RelEP, and on the analysis of parliamentary questions. The study argues that the attitudes of Austrian MEPs to religion are characterised by two seemingly contradictory phenomena: the privatisation and the politicisation of religion. The privatisation of religion expresses itself in the MEPs’ refusal to disclose information about their religiosity and in the absence from the political agenda of topics related to the role of churches and majority religions within European societies. By contrast, human rights abuses against Christian minorities abroad, the religious dimension of Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union and the difficulties of integrating Islam in Europe are all highly politicised topics. In short, the religion of the Other is politicised, while the religion of the majority is privatised. In this context, it is the attribution of religious belonging to the Other which serves the symbolic function of drawing identity boundaries, whereas the Self is envisaged as secular.