Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale

One trend in recent work on topic of the multiple realization of psychological properties has been an emphasis on greater sensitivity to actual science and greater clarity regarding the metaphysics of realization and multiple realization. One contribution to this trend is Bechtel and Mundale’s examination of the implications of brain mapping for multiple realization. Where Bechtel and Mundale argue that studies of brain mapping undermine claims about the multiple realization, this paper challenges that argument.     

Species of Realization and the Free Energy Principle

This paper examines, for the first time, the relationship between realization relations and the free energy principle in cognitive neuroscience. I argue, firstly, that the free energy principle has ramifications for the wide versus narrow realization distinction: if the free energy principle is correct, then organismic realizers are insufficient for realizing free energy minimization. I argue, secondly, that the free energy principle has implications for synchronic realization relations, because free energy minimization is realized in dynamical agent-environment couplings embedded at multiple time scales.     

Multiple realization and methodological pluralism

Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a foundation of the “antireductionist consensus.” More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic grounds, as well as on more “metaphysical” grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for multiple realization. I take up the reorganization involved in language dysfunctions to deal with questions concerned with multiple realization and neural plasticity. Beginning with Broca’s case for localization and the nineteenth century discussion of “reorganization,” and returning to more recent evidence for neural plasticity, I argue that, in the end, there is substantial support for multiple realization in cognitive systems; I further argue that this is wholly consistent with a recognition of methodological pluralism in cognitive science.     

Marr,Mayr, and MR: What functionalism should now be about

In this review essay on The Multiple Realization Book by Polger and Shapiro, I consider the prospects for a biologically grounded notion of multiple realization (MR) which has been given too little consideration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Thinking about MR in the context of biological notions of function and robustness leads to a rethink of what would count as a viable functionalist theory of mind. I also discuss points of tension between Polger and Shapiro’s definition of MR and current explanatory practice in neuroscience.     

对癫痫的认识及其外科治疗

人们对癫痫的认识及其外科治疗的发展是一个漫长而复杂的过程,经历高潮、低谷的更迭。科技进步使人们对癫痫正确认识,也使治疗手段更趋于多样化、个性化。     

Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization

Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain. It is not altogether impossible that such a state will be found... . But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis. (Putnam 1967/1975, p. 436)

The belief that mental states are multiply realized is now nearly universal among philosophers, as is the belief that this fact decisively refutes the identity theory. I argue that the empirical support for multiple realization does not justify the confidence that has been placed in it. In order for multiple realization of mental states to be an objection to the identity theory, the neurological differences among pains, for example, must be such as to guarantee that they are of distinct neurological kinds. But the phenomena traditionally cited do not provide evidence of that sort of variation. In particular, examples of neural plasticity do not provide such evidence.     

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as ‘the subset view’ of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers.     

循证医学的实践与医学研究的方法

循证医学的问世为医学家进行临床科研提供了新的思维和新的方法。英国前瞻性糖尿病研究关于强化血糖控制和血压控制能减少Ⅱ型糖尿病并发症危险性的成果;西苏格兰冠心病预防研究、北欧辛伐他湘生存研究所揭示的降脂治疗在冠心病一级预防、二级预防中的作用;高血压最佳治疗国际性研究阐明了严格降压对于防治肾脏并发症等成果。充分显示了人们在社会实践中获得取认识,又用这一认识能动地改造客观世界的全过程。     

企业诚信及其实现机制——以“海尔”为例

诚信是伦理关系范畴,作为企业来说,既要诚信于顾客,也要诚信于内部员工和外部同行。并且,企业诚信品质的形成和企业诚信的实现不是一蹴而就的,它需要企业内外部各种力量和手段的协调和支撑。     

Self‐Realization and Owing to Others: An Indirect Constraint?

Abstract

The relationship between self‐realization, and so what I really wholeheartedly endorse and owe to myself, and morality or what we owe to others is normally thought of as antagonism, or as a pleasant coincidence: only if I am indebted to such relations as my fundamental projects that I care wholeheartedly about does morality have a direct connection to self‐realization. The aim of this article is to argue against this picture. It will be argued that the structure of self‐realization and the caring activity involved commits the person to values that are beyond the object of his wholehearted caring, in a way that might just pave the way to morality.     

Realization and Multiple Realization,Chicken and Egg

A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain the proper way to understand the relation between realization and multiple realization.     

Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?

The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a “second wave” of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second wave of challenges provides important aid and comfort to reductionists. In this paper, however, I provide reasons for thinking it does not. This is not to the detriment of psychoneural reductionism because, as I also argue here, and unrecognized by the current non-reductive orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, one key argument among the first wave of criticisms of the multiple realization argument has never been adequately rejoined.     

The multiple realization book

In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible.     

The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization

Proponents of the subset account of property realization commonly make the assumption that the summing of properties entails the summing of their forward-looking causal features. This paper seeks to establish that this assumption is false. Moreover, it aims to demonstrate that without this assumption the fact that the subset account captures an entailment relation—which it must if it is to be of any use to non-reductive physicalism—becomes questionable.     

音乐、时间与人的存在--对儒家"成于乐"的现代理解

也子曾经说过：“兴于诗,立于礼,成于乐”。这就是说,一个人只有通过音乐才能真正完成自身,成为一个真正成熟了的人,但是,究竟为什么呢？本文试图回 一问题,论文的观点是,音乐使人摆脱了以视觉为中心的空间视野,把人的完成安置在时间的视域中,这样,“成于乐”就意味着成为一个“即从即成”（即始始终）的“时者”（时间人）。因此,“成于乐”也就是说人的存在成为一项永远都不能完成和终结,到死都在寻求某种新的开始的无尽的事业,换言之,通过“成于乐”,人的存在获得了时间性的维度。     

Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion

Leibniz has long faced a challenge about the coherence of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths in his philosophy. In this paper, I propose and examine a new way to save genuine contingency within a Leibnizian framework. I conclude that it succeeds in formally solving the problem, but at unbearable cost. I present Leibniz's challenge by considering God's choice of the best possible world (Sect. 2). God necessarily exists and necessarily chooses to actualize the best possible world. The actual world therefore could not be different, for if it were different it would be a distinct and inferior world and hence would not be created. In Section 3, I defend Leibniz from this challenge. I argue that, while it is necessary for God to choose to create the best possible world, it is not necessary for any world to be the best possible. This is because the criterion for judging perfection can itself be contingent. Different criteria will judge different worlds as the best. Thus it is necessary for God to create the best, but not necessary which is the best. Distinguishing between possible worlds in Leibniz's sense and in the modern sense allows a fuller exposition of this position. There are worries that can arise with the claim that the criterion of perfection is contingent. I consider two of the most pressing (Sect. 4). The first argues that the criterion is in God's understanding and hence is necessary; the second alleges that a contingent criterion of perfection violates Leibniz's cherished Principle of Sufficient Reason. These worries are well grounded, and examining them reveals a deep incompatibility between this solution and Leibniz's metaphysical views. I conclude that there is a real solution available, but that it is unacceptable to Leibniz or a Leibnizian. The search for a genuine solution that is genuinely Leibnizian goes on.     

Multiple Realization,Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States

The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.     

医生专家责任的法理分析

随着医患关系发展的多样化、复杂化,以及法律对医生专家责任规定的疏漏,医生和患者都面临着巨大的经济和精神压力。因此,明确医生专家责任的法律属性,分析专家责任的构成要件,探讨责任实现形式,建立责任转移方式以及责任限制制度,对于明确医生的权利义务,缓和医患关系,稳定医疗秩序,具有一定的现实意义。     

项目反应理论多级记分模型参数估计的实现

项目反应理论中参数估计程序的实现,一直是研究现代测量理论的学者们关注的问题。该研究从理论上探讨了多级模型参数估计的实现途径,并模拟了5批不同数量及分布情形的项目及被试参数,生成相应的原始得分矩阵,对自编程序及国际流行的相关程序进行了严格的比较校验,验证结果证明本程序具有精确、稳定的性能,并且发现被试量太少将影响参数估计的精确性及稳定性