“Not See,Not Hear,Not Speak”: Preschoolers Think They Cannot Perceive or Address Others Without Reciprocity

A curious phenomenon in early social-cognitive development has been identified: Preschoolers deny that they can see others who cannot also see them (Russell, Gee, & Bullard, 2012). The exclusive focus on vision has suggested that this effect is limited to gaze, but children’s negations might reflect a broader phenomenon that extends to vocal communication. In Experiment 1 (N = 24), 3- to 4-year-olds were asked if they could see an agent whose eyes were covered, hear an agent whose ears were covered, and speak to an agent whose mouth was covered. In all cases, negative responses were more frequent than in a control condition in which the facial area was unoccluded. Experiment 2 (N = 24) provided evidence that children’s negations did not result from a misunderstanding of the questions. The findings suggest that young children apply a principle of reciprocal relatedness that is not limited to gaze.     

“Not Thinking” Helps Reasoning

Despite previous research suggesting that participants’ negative and positive emotions can impair and facilitate reasoning performance, a recent study proposes that the emotional content of the mood induction materials may not be crucial in eliciting these phenomena—deontic selection task performance is as poor when these materials are neutral as when they are negative (Perham and Oaksford 2006). We extend this finding to syllogistic reasoning performance. Participants in the mood induction conditions (negative and neutral) verbally described their experiences in relation to twenty negative or neutral words whereas participants in the control condition received no such mood induction. Subsequent syllogistic reasoning performance was significantly poorer for both mood induction conditions yet only those in the negative mood induction condition showed a significant increase in anxiety. Results imply that the key mechanism involved in the impairment derives from the production of irrelevant thoughts and that these need not be linked to a positive or negative mood, thus “not thinking” may actually help the reasoning process.     

It’s Not About Technology

It is argued that the question “Can we trust technology?” is unanswerable because it is open-ended. Only questions about specific issues that can have specific answers should be entertained. It is further argued that the reason the question cannot be answered is that there is no such thing as Technology simpliciter. Fundamentally, the question comes down to trusting people and even then, the question has to be specific about trusting a person to do this or that.     

Why Not Interfere With Nature?

Advocates of an environmental ethic frequently claim that what makes an ethical theory truly and uniquely environmental is its commitment to the principle that environmental wholes such as species, ecosystems, and biotic communities are morally considerable. The prevailing view is that our primary duty towards these wholes is to respect their integrity, stability, and beauty, and that the best way to do this is to leave them alone, not interfere with them, and let nature follow its own course. But is that correct? Why should be refrain from interfering with nature? There are two ways an environmentalist might try to justify an exceptionaless, prima facie principle of noninterference. First, she might claim that there is a contingent but universal connection between human interference and ecosystemic harm. There is also an epistemic variant of this view. When faced with a decision concerning whether to interfere with an ecosystem, there will always be overwhelming reasons for thinking that interference will be harmful, regardless of the specific circumstances. Send, there might be some conceptual connection between interference and harm to ecosystems. For example, if the well-being of an ecosystem is identified with its wildness, and wildness is understood as the absence of human intervention or manipulation, then any human interference necessarily detracts from an ecosystem's wildness and thereby has a detrimental effect on its well-being. In this paper I examine these justifications in detail and argue that none can support an exceptionaless principle of noninterference.     

How to Individuate Universals—Or Not

In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland (2013) extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property.     

When Can Attention Not Be Divided?

Humans can guide simple concurrent and seemingly independent movements of digits between hands, but it is shown here that they find it impossible to do this with digits within a hand. This inability demonstrates a basic characteristic of the relation between attention and the control of the skeletal musculature: Mechanisms that are available to provide the illusion of concurrent and independent guidance of separate movements between hands are not available within a single-hand control system. There is no reason to believe that the inability to divide focal attention in the guidance of two concurrent controlled activities, as exemplified in the example of within-hand movements, does not also extend to nonmotor processes.     

Rapid averaging? Not so fast!

Previous research suggests that sets of similar items are represented using a rapid averaging mechanism that automatically extracts statistical properties within 50 ms. However, typically in these studies, displays are not masked, so it is possible that the sets are available for longer than this duration. In the present study, using masked displays, we (a) tested a newly proposed strategy for extracting the mean size of a set of circles, and (b) more precisely evaluated the time course of rapid averaging. The results indicate that when viewing conditions are poor, performance can be explained by assuming that observers rely on information from previous trials. In this study, observers required at least a 200-ms exposure time in order to derive the average size of a set of circles without relying on information from previously-viewed sets, suggesting that rapid averaging is not as fast as previously assumed and, therefore, that it may not be an automatic process.     

When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?

Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning.     

Not “Not ‘Better Never to Have Been’”: A Reply to Christine Overall

Philosophia - In her Why Have Children?, Christine Overall takes issue with my anti-natalist arguments that it is better never to come into existence. She provides three criticisms of my arguments...     

Why Me? Why Not Me?

The decision to undergo BRCA testing is very complex and emotionally laden. This decision can be further complicated by the loss of a mother at an early age. The following personal account by a genetic counselor discusses the testing process and the struggle to accept the results and reframe one’s self-identity. The sensitive nature of this testing and the implications for other family members is explored.     

“Cannot” Implies “Not Ought”

I argue for a version of “ought” implies “can”. In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima facie ought to do A at T’, then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T’. In support of this principle, I have argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought to do some alternative action – such as get help or do the promised action later; nor can we explain the phenomenon of necessary enablers or the phenomenon of more stringent prima facie obligations overriding less stringent ones in cases where the agent cannot fulfill both.     

Qualia: They’re Not What They Seem

Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing that qualia have the features are epistemically on a par with reasons for believing that ways things seem have the features, and you know that ways things seem do not have the features, then those reasons cannot justify your belief that qualia have the features. I argue that the reasons are epistemically on a par in this way.     

Not “Filed Away as Finally Dealt With”

This essay considers some historical, clinical, and personal dimensions of Sandor Ferenczi's contributions to psychoanalysis. It uses a clinical framework to develop a new perspective of the Freud–Ferenczi relation (and of its impact on the development of psychoanalysis), which despite smoldering conflict, persisted for twenty-five years and was Freud's longest-lasting intimate friendship. A case is made for the open, undefensive, experience-drenched basis of Ferenczi's work to assure its continuing usefulness to the psychoanalyst of today, which, as is demonstrated, can lead in surprising directions.     

Marginalisation Is Not Unbearable. Is It Even Undesirable?

Marginalised movements in psychology and psychotherapy tend to retain their identity, and the writings of their founders continue to exercise an influence. Once absorbed into the mainstream the identity is lost, and the founders are relegated to the forgotten past. Movements are kept marginalised when they are at odds with the central, untested assumptions (the hard core) of the mainstream. Many of REBT's insights have already been assimilated by the mainstream, which is currently an alliance between experimental psychology and CBT. But the mechanistic hard core of the mainstream is at odds with normative assumptions about self-worth held by REBT. As long as that continues REBT is likely to remain marginalised, but will keep its most significant insights.