Neural markers of subordinate‐level categorization in 6‐ to 7‐month‐old infants

Subordinate‐level category‐learning processes in infants were investigated with ERP and looking‐time measures. ERPs were recorded while 6‐ to 7‐month‐olds were presented with Saint Bernard images during familiarization, followed by novel Saint Bernards interspersed with Beagles during test. In addition, infant looking times were measured during a paired‐preference test (novel Saint Bernard vs. novel Beagle) conducted at the conclusion of ERP recording. Slow wave activity corresponded with learning a familiarized category at the subordinate and basic levels, whereas Negative central (Nc) and P400 components were linked with novel category preference. The results provide the first evidence identifying the neural markers of subordinate‐level categorization observed in looking‐time tasks conducted with infants. Moreover, when considered in conjunction with prior research investigating the neural markers of basic‐level categorization in infants, the findings indicate that (1) slow wave and Nc components of infant ERP waveforms are general markers for processes of category learning on the one hand and novel category preference on the other, (2) novel category preference for a contrast category at the basic and subordinate levels have the Nc component in common, but novel category preference at the subordinate level is accompanied by an additional P400 component, a finding in keeping with the notion that subordinate‐level categorization is governed by mechanisms supplementary to those underlying basic‐level categorization, and (3) slow wave activity associated with subordinate‐level learning followed that associated with basic‐level learning by approximately 200 ms, a result in accord with a coarse‐to‐fine scheme for the emergence of category partitioning.     

Normative Social Role Concepts in Early Childhood

The current studies (N = 255, children ages 4–5 and adults) explore patterns of age‐related continuity and change in conceptual representations of social role categories (e.g., “scientist”). In Study 1, young children's judgments of category membership were shaped by both category labels and category‐normative traits, and the two were dissociable, indicating that even young children's conceptual representations for some social categories have a “dual character.” In Study 2, when labels and traits were contrasted, adults and children based their category‐based induction decisions on category‐normative traits rather than labels. Study 3 confirmed that children reason based on category‐normative traits because they view them as an obligatory part of category membership. In contrast, adults in this study viewed the category‐normative traits as informative on their own (not only as a cue to obligations). Implications for continuity and change in representations of social role categories will be discussed.     

Selective copying of the majority suggests children are broadly “optimal‐” rather than “over‐” imitators

Human children, in contrast to other species, are frequently cast as prolific “over‐imitators”. However, previous studies of “over‐imitation” have overlooked many important real‐world social dynamics, and may thus provide an inaccurate account of this seemingly puzzling and potentially maladaptive phenomenon. Here we investigate this topic using a cultural evolutionary approach, focusing particularly on the key adaptive learning strategy of majority‐biased copying. Most “over‐imitation” research has been conducted using consistent demonstrations to the observer, but we systematically varied the frequency of demonstrators that 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children observed performing a causally irrelevant action. Children who “over‐imitate” inflexibly should copy the majority regardless of whether the majority solution omits or includes a causally irrelevant action. However, we found that children calibrated their tendency to acquire the majority behavior, such that copying did not extend to majorities that performed irrelevant actions. These results are consistent with a highly functional, adaptive integration of social and causal information, rather than explanations implying unselective copying or causal misunderstanding. This suggests that our species might be better characterized as broadly “optimal‐” rather than “over‐” imitators.     

The vocabulary spurt predicts the emergence of backward semantic inhibition in 18‐month‐old toddlers

The current study examines the relationship between 18‐month‐old toddlers’ vocabulary size and their ability to inhibit attention to no‐longer relevant information using the backward semantic inhibition paradigm. When adults switch attention from one semantic category to another, the former and no‐longer‐relevant semantic category becomes inhibited, and subsequent attention to an item that belongs to the inhibited semantic category is impaired. Here we demonstrate that 18‐month‐olds can inhibit attention to no‐longer relevant semantic categories, but only if they have a relatively large vocabulary. These findings suggest that an increased number of items (word knowledge) in the toddler lexical‐semantic system during the “vocabulary spurt” at 18‐months may be an important driving force behind the emergence of a semantic inhibitory mechanism. Possessing more words in the mental lexicon likely results in the formation of inhibitory links between words, which allow toddlers to select and deselect words and concepts more efficiently. Our findings highlight the role of vocabulary growth in the development of inhibitory processes in the emerging lexical‐semantic system.     

Perceptual Learning of Intonation Contour Categories in Adults and 9‐ to 11‐Year‐Old Children: Adults Are More Narrow‐Minded

We report on rapid perceptual learning of intonation contour categories in adults and 9‐ to 11‐year‐old children. Intonation contours are temporally extended patterns, whose perception requires temporal integration and therefore poses significant working memory challenges. Both children and adults form relatively abstract representations of intonation contours: Previously encountered and novel exemplars are categorized together equally often, as long as distance from the prototype is controlled. However, age‐related differences in categorization performance also exist. Given the same experience, adults form narrower categories than children. In addition, adults pay more attention to the end of the contour, while children appear to pay equal attention to the beginning and the end. The age range we examine appears to capture the tail‐end of the developmental trajectory for learning intonation contour categories: There is a continuous effect of age on category breadth within the child group, but the oldest children (older than 10;3) are adult‐like.     

“THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF EXPERTS”: IN DEFENSE OF THE “ELITES” OF THE SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION DEBATE

This article takes a critical stance on John H. Evans's 2018 book, Morals Not Knowledge: Recasting the Contemporary U.S. Conflict between Religion and Science. Highlighting the significance of the book for the science‐and‐religion debate, particularly the book's emphasis on moral questions over knowledge claims revealed in social‐scientific studies of the American public, I also suggest that the distinction between the “elites” of the academic science‐and‐religion field and the religious “public” is insufficiently drawn. I argue that various nuances should be taken into account concerning the portrayal of “elites,” nuances which potentially change the way that “conflict” between science and religion is envisaged, as well as the function of the field. Similarly, I examine the ways in which the book construes science and religion as distinct knowledge systems, and I suggest that, from a theological perspective—relevant for much academic activity in science and religion—there is value in seeing science and religion in terms of a single knowledge system. This perspective may not address the public's interest in moral questions directly—important as they are—but nevertheless it fulfils the academic function of advancing the frontiers of human knowledge and self‐understanding.     

Language Reflects “Core” Cognition: A New Theory About the Origin of Cross‐Linguistic Regularities

The underlying structures that are common to the world's languages bear an intriguing connection with early emerging forms of “core knowledge” (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), which are frequently studied by infant researchers. In particular, grammatical systems often incorporate distinctions (e.g., the mass/count distinction) that reflect those made in core knowledge (e.g., the non‐verbal distinction between an object and a substance). Here, I argue that this connection occurs because non‐verbal core knowledge systematically biases processes of language evolution. This account potentially explains a wide range of cross‐linguistic grammatical phenomena that currently lack an adequate explanation. Second, I suggest that developmental researchers and cognitive scientists interested in (non‐verbal) knowledge representation can exploit this connection to language by using observations about cross‐linguistic grammatical tendencies to inspire hypotheses about core knowledge.     

Overestimation of Knowledge About Word Meanings: The “Misplaced Meaning” Effect

Children and adults may not realize how much they depend on external sources in understanding word meanings. Four experiments investigated the existence and developmental course of a “Misplaced Meaning” (MM) effect, wherein children and adults overestimate their knowledge about the meanings of various words by underestimating how much they rely on outside sources to determine precise reference. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that children and adults show a highly consistent MM effect, and that it is stronger in young children. Study 3 demonstrates that adults are explicitly aware of the availability of outside knowledge, and that this awareness may be related to the strength of the MM effect. Study 4 rules out general overconfidence effects by examining a metalinguistic task in which adults are well calibrated.     

Examining the effects of group‐based instruction on emergent second‐language skills in young children

The present study evaluated the emergence of second‐language intraverbals in typically developing young children following a small‐group teaching intervention. Choral responding was employed with a group of 6 primary school children (5‐6 years old) to teach first‐language tacts (e.g., “What is this in English?” [“Hospital”]) and related second‐language tacts (e.g., “What is this in Welsh?” [“Ysbyty”]). A multiple‐probe design across stimulus sets was used to evaluate subsequent emergence of untrained first‐to‐second‐language derived intraverbals (e.g., “What is hospital in Welsh?” [“Ysbyty”]) and untrained second‐to‐first‐language intraverbals (e.g.,”What is ysbyty in English?” [“Hospital”]). Data indicated that the choral responding intervention produced robust increases in derived intraverbal relations for 3 of the 6 participants.     

Psychological processes in young bullies versus bully‐victims

Some children who bully others are also victimized themselves (“bully‐victims”) whereas others are not victimized themselves (“bullies”). These subgroups have been shown to differ in their social functioning as early as in kindergarten. What is less clear are the motives that underlie the bullying behavior of young bullies and bully‐victims. The present study examined whether bullies have proactive motives for aggression and anticipate to feel happy after victimizing others, whereas bully‐victims have reactive motives for aggression, poor theory of mind skills, and attribute hostile intent to others. This “distinct processes hypothesis” was contrasted with the “shared processes hypothesis,” predicting that bullies and bully‐victims do not differ on these psychological processes. Children (n = 283, age 4–9) were classified as bully, bully‐victim, or noninvolved using peer‐nominations. Theory of mind, hostile intent attributions, and happy victimizer emotions were assessed using standard vignettes and false‐belief tasks; reactive and proactive motives were assessed using teacher‐reports. We tested our hypotheses using Bayesian model selection, enabling us to directly compare the distinct processes model (predicting that bullies and bully‐victims deviate from noninvolved children on different psychological processes) against the shared processes model (predicting that bullies and bully‐victims deviate from noninvolved children on all psychological processes alike). Overall, the shared processes model received more support than the distinct processes model. These results suggest that in early childhood, bullies and bully‐victims have shared, rather than distinct psychological processes underlying their bullying behavior.     

“Hearing voices”: Auditory hallucinations as failure of top‐down control of bottom‐up perceptual processes

Auditory hallucination is a key characteristic of schizophrenia that seriously debilitates the patient, with consequences for social engagement with others. Hallucinatory experiences are also observed in healthy individuals in the general population who report “hearing voices” in the absence of an external acoustic input. A view on auditory hallucinations and “hearing voices” is presented that regards such phenomena as perceptual processes, originating from speech perception areas in the left temporal lobe. Healthy individuals “hearing voices” are, however, often aware that the experience comes from inner thought processes, which is not reported by hallucinating patients. A perceptual model can therefore, not alone explain the difference in the phenomenology of how the “voices heard” are attributed to either an inner or outer cause. An expanded model is thus presented which takes into account top‐down cognitive control, localized to prefrontal cortical areas, to inhibit and re‐attribute the perceptual mis‐representations. The expanded model is suggested to be empirically validated using a dichotic listening speech perception paradigm with instructions for top‐down control of attention focus to either the right or left side in auditory space. It is furthermore suggested to use fMRI to validate the temporal and frontal lobe neuronal correlates of the cognitive processes involved in auditory hallucinations.     

The effect of adults' eating on young children's acceptance of unfamiliar foods

Adults presented unfamiliar foods to 14- to 20- and 42- to 48-month-old children individually in their homes. More children put the food in their mouths when the adults also were eating than when the adults simply were offering the food. More children put food in their mouths when their mothers were the source than when the source was a friendly adult “visitor”. However, even when alone with a child, the visitor's eating elicited reliably more tasting. Analysis of requesting behavior indicated that the adults' eating aroused a desire to eat in the children. There were no consistent sex differences or interactions between sex of visitor and sex of child in children's food acceptance. There was a suggestion that younger children were more affected by repeated offerings than were older children. It is concluded that a relatively “low level” form of observational learning—“social facilitation”—can account for the data.     

Effects of knowledge and development on subordinate level categorization

Children and adults with high, moderate, and low levels of dinosaur knowledge were provided with a series of tasks to determine the relative effects of knowledge and development on subordinate category extension, differentiation, and subsequent revision. As knowledge increased, individuals generated higher proportions of category underextensions and lower proportions of overextensions. Adults, but not children, who were highly knowledgeable about dinosaurs demonstrated similar patterns of extension for unfamiliar categories, suggesting that knowledge transfer is mediated by age-related strategies. Adults at all levels of knowledge were more likely to revise their category extensions than children were. The relation between intelligence and expertise in object domains is considered and a preliminary model of the effects of knowledge and development on skill at categorization is presented.     

A real‐world rational agent: unifying old and new AI

Explanations of cognitive processes provided by traditional artificial intelligence were based on the notion of the knowledge level. This perspective has been challenged by new AI that proposes an approach based on embodied systems that interact with the real‐world. We demonstrate that these two views can be unified. Our argument is based on the assumption that knowledge level explanations can be defined in the context of Bayesian theory while the goals of new AI are captured by using a well established robot based model of learning and problem solving, called Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC). In our analysis we consider random foraging and we prove that minor modifications of the DAC architecture renders a model that is equivalent to a Bayesian analysis of this task. Subsequently, we compare this enhanced, “rational,” model to its “non‐rational” predecessor and a further control condition using both simulated and real robots, in a variety of environments. Our results show that the changes made to the DAC architecture, in order to unify the perspectives of old and new AI, also lead to a significant improvement in random foraging.     

Formation in the Worlds of Theological Education: Moving from “What” to “How”

Abstract. Theological educators in church and academy alike continue to ask, “What is formation for ministry?” Dissatisfaction has increased within all participants of theological education – faculty, students, administrators, pastors, and church professionals. Temporarily postponing the “what” of formation, this article explores the dissatisfaction with formation language in terms of one critical dissonance: the improbable quest for a pastoral identity amidst the observable reality of multiple identities, chosen and imposed. A constructive response crafted by identities‐in‐practice, as configured by disciplined spiritual stewardship, gives both critical and contemplative guidance for a fuller participation by all in Christian formation. Formation then becomes defined with a publicly theological coherence: the “shaping‐being‐shaped” primarily by the Holy in the worlds mutually configured within improvised, risked service.     

Categorization as causal reasoning⋆

A theory of categorization is presented in which knowledge of causal relationships between category features is represented in terms of asymmetric and probabilistic causal mechanisms. According to causal‐model theory, objects are classified as category members to the extent they are likely to have been generated or produced by those mechanisms. The empirical results confirmed that participants rated exemplars good category members to the extent their features manifested the expectations that causal knowledge induces, such as correlations between feature pairs that are directly connected by causal relationships. These expectations also included sensitivity to higher‐order feature interactions that emerge from the asymmetries inherent in causal relationships. Quantitative fits of causal‐model theory were superior to those obtained with extensions to traditional similarity‐based models that represent causal knowledge either as higher‐order relational features or “prior exemplars” stored in memory.     

Seeing Like a Geologist: Bayesian Use of Expert Categories in Location Memory

Memory for spatial location is typically biased, with errors trending toward the center of a surrounding region. According to the category adjustment model (CAM), this bias reflects the optimal, Bayesian combination of fine‐grained and categorical representations of a location. However, there is disagreement about whether categories are malleable. For instance, can categories be redefined based on expert‐level conceptual knowledge? Furthermore, if expert knowledge is used, does it dominate other information sources, or is it used adaptively so as to minimize overall error, as predicted by a Bayesian framework? We address these questions using images of geological interest. The participants were experts in structural geology, organic chemistry, or English literature. Our data indicate that expertise‐based categories influence estimates of location memory—particularly when these categories better constrain errors than alternative (“novice”) categories. Results are discussed with respect to the CAM.