Meaning is Not a Reflex: Context Dependence of Spatial Congruity Effects

In two experiments, Brookshire, Ivry, and Casasanto (2010) showed that words with positive and negative emotional valence can activate spatial representations with a high degree of automaticity, but also that this activation is highly context dependent. Lebois, Wilson‐Mendenhall, and Barsalou (2015) reported that they “aimed to replicate” our study but found only null results in the “Brookshire et al. replication” conditions. Here we express concerns about three aspects of this paper. First, the study was not an attempt to replicate ours; it was a different study that adapted our method. Second, Lebois et al. did not accurately represent our theoretical position. Third, Lebois et al.’s main conclusion, that spatial congruity effects depend on the task context, was not supported by their data. Despite these concerns, we agree with Lebois et al.'s overall message that spatial aspects of words' meanings are activated differently in different contexts. This was a main conclusion of our study as well.     

Robustness of the rule-learning effect in 7-month-old infants: A close,multicenter replication of Marcus et al. (1999)

We conducted a close replication of the seminal work by Marcus and colleagues from 1999, which showed that after a brief auditory exposure phase, 7-month-old infants were able to learn and generalize a rule to novel syllables not previously present in the exposure phase. This work became the foundation for the theoretical framework by which we assume that infants are able to learn abstract representations and generalize linguistic rules. While some extensions on the original work have shown evidence of rule learning, the outcomes are mixed, and an exact replication of Marcus et al.'s study has thus far not been reported. A recent meta-analysis by Rabagliati and colleagues brings to light that the rule-learning effect depends on stimulus type (e.g., meaningfulness, speech vs. nonspeech) and is not as robust as often assumed. In light of the theoretical importance of the issue at stake, it is appropriate and necessary to assess the replicability and robustness of Marcus et al.'s findings. Here we have undertaken a replication across four labs with a large sample of 7-month-old infants (N = 96), using the same exposure patterns (ABA and ABB), methodology (Headturn Preference Paradigm), and original stimuli. As in the original study, we tested the hypothesis that infants are able to learn abstract “algebraic” rules and apply them to novel input. Our results did not replicate the original findings: infants showed no difference in looking time between test patterns consistent or inconsistent with the familiarization pattern they were exposed to.     

Gender Differences in the Measurement of Creative Problem‐Solving

Despite significant scholarly attention, the literature on the existence and direction of gender differences in creativity has produced inconsistent findings. In the present paper, we argue that this lack of consensus may be attributable, at least in part, to gender‐specific inconsistencies in the measurement of creative problem‐solving. To explore this possibility, we empirically tested assumptions of multiple‐group measurement invariance using samples borrowed from four recent studies that assessed creative problem‐solving (J.D. B arrett et al., 2013; K.S. H ester et al., 2012; D.R. P eterson et al., 2013; I.C. R obledo et al., 2012). Across the four samples, apparent gender differences emerged on all three components of S.P. B esemer & K. O 'Q uin's (1999) three‐facet model of creativity (i.e., quality, originality, and elegance) such that, on average, females appeared to exhibit higher baseline levels of creativity. However, in light of violations of measurement invariance assumptions across genders found in these samples, comparisons such as these may not ultimately be appropriate. Although the underlying factor structure and factor loadings on a unitary creativity factor were consistent across gender (i.e., weak factorial invariance), measurement in‐equivalence assumptions were violated at the subfacet level (i.e., strong factorial invariance). Implications of these findings for understanding gender differences in creative problem‐solving are discussed.     

How to help: Can more active behavioral measures help transcend the infant false-belief debate?

The use of looking time procedures for the claim that infants understand other's false-beliefs has drawn criticism. In response, Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009) have argued for the use of a more active behavioral measure involving children's willingness to help others. However, the current study challenges Buttelmann et al.’s response on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Theoretically, Buttelmann et al. take a mindreading framework for granted and are thus committed to the same type of “rich” interpretations that have accompanied infant looking procedures more broadly. Methodologically, the current study challenges Buttelmann et al.’s interpretation that children were using the adult's false-belief to determine how to help in this paradigm. To test our alternative perspective, mentalistic and non-mentalistic interpretations of preschooler's helping behavior were compared. In the original study, the adult's false-belief was conflated with the playing of a trick. When these two factors were separated, children's helping behavior was not consistent with the adult's false-belief. Second, when the situation was characterized in terms of a hiding scenario (instead of playing a trick), older children altered their helping behavior accordingly. Together, these results provided evidence that children in the active-helping paradigm did not use the adult's false-belief to determine how to help and that the broader social situation is an important variable for understanding other's actions. In conclusion, the use of more active behavioral measures alone does not resolve the controversy that has played out with respect to infant looking procedures. Instead, any adequate methodological modifications must be accompanied by theoretical considerations as well.     

A direct replication: Unconscious arithmetic processing

Across two experiments involving four presentation times in total, Sklar et al. (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109, 2012, 19614) found that complex subtraction equations can be solved without awareness of the equations. These findings challenge the current position that consciousness is necessary for performing abstract, rule-following tasks. Given the important implications of their work, we aimed to directly replicate Sklar's findings using a larger sample (n = 94) from a different population. Using continuous flash suppression, we investigated if people were able to solve an equation after subliminal (1,300 ms) exposure to it. We found evidence of unconscious subtraction consistent with Sklar et al., albeit the effect is weak. Critical review of our results and implications for further research are discussed.     

Interaction and social cognition: A comment on Auvray et al.’s perceptual crossing paradigm

The past few years have seen the emergence of interaction as a central topic within social cognition research. This has involved an increasing interest in the development of ecological, interactive contexts for the empirical study of social cognition, and also in theoretical reflection upon the relationship between interaction and social cognition. One particularly prominent contribution to this trend has been Auvray et al., 2006, June 23, Auvray et al., 2009 minimalist perceptual crossing experiment (as well as follow-up studies conducted by Di Paolo, Ezequiel, Rohde and Iizuka (2008) and Froese and Di Paolo, 2010, Froese and Di Paolo, 2011a). The experiment provides an elegant illustration of the complexity of the relationship between social cognition and the interactive settings in which it usually occurs, and has proven to be a fruitful basis for the articulation of theoretical options for conceptualizing that relationship. In this contribution, we criticize one particular theoretical option that has recently been advanced by theorists working within the enactivist tradition (e.g. De Jaegher et al., 2010, Froese and Di Paolo, 2010), who maintain that the results of the experiment corroborate the claim that interaction can play a constitutive role in social cognition. We disagree that the results of the experiment support this claim, and defend the more moderate interpretation that the role of interaction in this experiment is best conceived as that of providing scaffolding for social judgments and thereby simplifying the tasks performed by the individual participants.     

Brief report: Publications from mainland China,Hong Kong,and Taiwan in behavioral journals 1980–2021

Research involving international research communities has been advocated in the field of behavior analysis (Dymond et al., 2000; Martin et al., 2016). The purpose of the present study was to report the status of behavioral research in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, in terms of number of publications, types of research, and frequency of collaboration with international researchers. Fifteen behavioral journals were selected from the list by Cooper et al. (2020). These were searched by hand to find publications conducted in or authored by researchers from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan dating from each journal's inception to December 2021. The earliest publication we found appeared in 1980 in The Psychological Record. Over the following four decades (1980–1989; 1990–1999; 2000–2009; 2010–2021), the number of publications per decade increased dramatically and continues in recent years to rise. Publications include research reports, review papers, and conceptual articles, with the majority being basic research reports published in Behavioral Processes. Approximately half the publications involve collaboration with international researchers, mostly in North America. Implications for behavioral research, practice, and policy in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are discussed.     

Re‐examination of Oostenbroek et al. (2016): evidence for neonatal imitation of tongue protrusion

The meaning, mechanism, and function of imitation in early infancy have been actively discussed since Meltzoff and Moore's (1977) report of facial and manual imitation by human neonates. Oostenbroek et al. (2016) claim to challenge the existence of early imitation and to counter all interpretations so far offered. Such claims, if true, would have implications for theories of social‐cognitive development. Here we identify 11 flaws in Oostenbroek et al.'s experimental design that biased the results toward null effects. We requested and obtained the authors’ raw data. Contrary to the authors’ conclusions, new analyses reveal significant tongue‐protrusion imitation at all four ages tested (1, 3, 6, and 9 weeks old). We explain how the authors missed this pattern and offer five recommendations for designing future experiments. Infant imitation raises fundamental issues about action representation, social learning, and brain–behavior relations. The debate about the origins and development of imitation reflects its importance to theories of developmental science.     

What is the nature of the mind's pattern-recognition process?

If we look at the human mind as a pattern-recognition device, what is the nature of its pattern-recognizing? And how does it differ from the majority of pattern-recognition methods we have collectively devised over the decades? These broad philosophical questions emerge from the studies of chess thought, and we propose that a major task of the mind is to engage in “experience recognition” (Linhares & Freitas, 2010). One of the basic tenets of that proposal is that pattern recognition, in cognitive science and related disciplines, does not accurately reflect human psychology. As an example, the well-known article by Chase and Simon, “perception in chess”, and the benchmark cognitive computational models of chess, by Gobet et al. were criticized. Lane and Gobet (2011) provide serious skepticism concerning some of those arguments, and here we take the opportunity to respond and expand the theoretical constructs of “experience recognition”. We postulate that the mind's pattern-recognizing process holds the following properties: it is a highly path-dependent process; it prioritizes internal encodings; it is a self-organizing process in constant change; and it constructs its future information-processing pathways by continuously recognizing the possibilities that lie within the adjacent possible.     

Why cannot reasons change your moral decisions? Because they are not persuasive enough: A comment on Stanley et al. (2018)

Stanley et al. (2018) found that the consideration of reasons rarely induced people to change their moral decisions. We challenged this article by assuming what caused such a null or weak effect was that the persuasiveness of reasons provided to oppose the initial decisions was not strong enough. To verify our assumption, this study used Stanley et al.’s (2018) experimental paradigm and manipulated the levels of persuasiveness of reasons. The results revealed (1) that not only strong opposing reasons but also weak affirming reasons could induce changes in moral decision-making and increase decision confidence after altering the decisions; (2) that people with a weak decision confidence tended to change their initial decisions after evaluation of reasons; and (3) that people who maintained their decisions after considering weak opposing reasons enhanced rather than reduced their decision confidence. Overall, these findings demonstrated that moral decision change was a composite outcome of the interaction among reason type, reason persuasiveness and initial decision confidence and that low-quality argumentation had a boomerang effect on moral persuasion. This study re-lifted the role of rational reasoning in moral decision-making and revising, thus posing important amendments to Stanley et al.’s (2018) findings.     

Children's judgements of social withdrawal behaviours

Ding et al. (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol., 2015; 33, 159–173) demonstrated that Chinese children discriminate between the three subtypes of social withdrawal: Shyness, unsociability, and social avoidance. This commentary on the Ding et al.'s paper highlights the need to further explore the following: (1) children's understanding of the implications of being shy, unsociable, or socially avoidant, including assessing these which we know are associated with outcomes for socially withdrawn children; (2) what additional subtypes might exist naturally within the Chinese culture; and (3) consider the implications of social withdrawal on children's developing social skills.     

Grammatical Processing of Spoken Language in Child and Adult Language Learners

This article presents a selective overview of studies that have investigated auditory language processing in children and late second-language (L2) learners using online methods such as event-related potentials (ERPs), eye-movement monitoring, or the cross-modal priming paradigm. Two grammatical phenomena are examined in detail, children’s and adults’ processing of German plural inflections (Lück et al. Brain Res 1077:144–152, 2006; Hahne et al. J Cognitive Neurosci 18:121–134, 2006; Clahsen et al. J Child Language 34:601–622, 2007) and language learners’ processing of filler-gap dependencies in English (Felser C, Roberts L Second Language Res 23:9–36, 2007; Roberts et al. J Psycholinguist Res 36:175–188, 2007). The results from these studies reveal clear differences between native and nonnative processing in both domains of grammar, suggesting that nonnative listeners rely less on grammatical parsing routines during processing than either child or adult native listeners. We also argue that factors such as slower processing speed or cognitive resource limitations only provide a partial account of our findings.     

Guilty feelings and the guilt trip: Emotions and motivation in migration and transnational caregiving

This paper explores experience of 'guilt' as a motivating emotion in the migrant process. Data are drawn from two major research projects with a focus on Italian transnational families comprising adult migrant children living in Australia and their ageing parents in Italy. Findings confirm Baumeister et al.'s (1994) three broad functions of guilt as relationship-enhancing; a tool for exerting influence over others; and a mechanism for alleviating inequities in relationships. The analysis extends this social relational understanding of guilt by locating it within the broader context of cultural processes to argue that a moral obligation to return is implicit in the migration process.     

Stigmatized‐Identity Cues and Consumer Applications Revisited

This article responds to thoughtful commentaries provided by Lamberton (2019–this issue) and Wooten & Rank‐Christman (2019—this issue) on Chaney, Sanchez, & Maimon (2019—this issue), an article in which we discussed the implications of social psychological research on stigmatized‐identity safety cues for consumer behavior. In Chaney, et al. (2019–this issue), we contend that stigmatized‐identity cues can signal belonging to marginalized groups via the ideological assumptions made about companies. In this article, we first clarify our definition of stigmatized identities beyond the limitation assumed by Wooten & Rank‐Christman (2019—this issue). In addition, we join the conversation regarding when cues lead to divergent responses in social groups. We also consider how using identity cues can “backfire” and the importance of using marketing goals to assess the extent to which strategies using such cues succeeded. Lastly, we integrate Lamberton's (2019–this issue) framework of dignity architecture and related empirical findings to discuss some of the challenges of research on stigmatized‐identity cues.     

Reducing cognitive complexity in a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task

The confusion/non-consequential thinking explanation proposed by Newstead, Girotto, and Legrenzi (1995) for poor performance on Wason's THOG problem (a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task) was examined in three experiments with 300 participants. In general, as the cognitive complexity of the problem and the possibility of non-consequential thinking were reduced, correct performance increased. Significant but weak facilitation (33-40% correct) was found in Experiment 1 for THOG classification instructions that did not include the indeterminate response option. Substantial facilitation (up to 75% correct) was obtained in Experiment 2 with O'Brien et al.'s (1990) one-other-THOG classification instruction. In Experiment 3, a revised version of O'Brien et al.'s pre-test problem format also led to substantial facilitation, even with the use of the standard three-choice THOG classification instruction. These findings are discussed in terms of Newstead et al.'s theoretical proposal and possible attentional factors.     

An analysis of instructor- and tablet-presented conditional discriminations: Fidelity and rapidity

Matching-to-sample arrangements are commonly used to teach conditional discriminations. In these arrangements, instructors must systematically arrange instruction to ensure that a learner's response comes under the intended sources of stimulus control. Given the multitude of instructional considerations, the instructors' procedural fidelity has been a significant concern. Recently, LeBlanc et al. found that brief training and access to enhanced data sheets produced high levels of fidelity with experienced service providers. The current study extended LeBlanc et al. by examining the effects of a similar training on the fidelity and instructional pacing by participants with and without previous experience. The participants' performance was also compared when using a flashcard or binder (i.e., printed) arrays and relative to a tablet-delivered instructional program. High levels of fidelity were observed following training, although pacing was slow. Slight differences in performance were observed across comparison arrays; nevertheless, the tablet-based program outperformed instructors.     

Personal attitudes toward time: The relationship between temporal focus,space‐time mappings and real life experiences

What influences how people implicitly associate “past” and “future” with “front” and “back?” Whereas previous research has shown that cultural attitudes toward time play a role in modulating space‐time mappings in people's mental models (de la Fuente, Santiago, Román, Dumitrache & Casasanto, 2014), we investigated real life experiences as potential additional influences on these implicit associations. Participants within the same single culture, who are engaged in different intermediate‐term educational experiences (Study 1), long‐term living experiences (Study 2), and short‐term visiting experiences (Study 3), showed their distinct differences in temporal focus, thereby influencing their implicit spatializations of time. Results across samples suggest that personal attitudes toward time related to real life experiences may influence people's space‐time mappings. The findings we report on shed further light on the high flexibility of human conceptualization system. While culture may exert an important influence on temporal focus, a person's conceptualization of time may be attributed to a culmination of factors.     

Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?

Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy—an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr(h ₁ & h ₂|e) > Pr(h ₁|e). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h ₁ & h ₂ is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h ₁ alone. Consequently, they suggest that people are tracking this confirmation relation when they commit conjunction fallacies. I offer three experiments testing the merits of Crupi et al.’s account specifically and confirmation-theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy more generally. The results of Experiment 1 show that, although Crupi et al.’s conditions do seem to be causally linked to the conjunction fallacy, they are not necessary for it; there exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 show that Crupi et al.’s conditions, and those offered by other confirmation-theoretic accounts of the fallacy, are not sufficient for the fallacy either; there exist cases that meet all three of CFT’s conditions in which subjects do not tend to commit the fallacy. Additionally, these latter experiments show that such confirmation-theoretic conditions are at best only weakly causally relevant to the presence of the conjunction fallacy. Given these findings, CFT’s account specifically, and any general confirmation-theoretic account more broadly, falls short of offering a satisfying explanation of the presence of the conjunction fallacy.     

A Theory of Bayesian Groups

A group is often construed as one agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) require group credences to undergo Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever individual credences undergo Bayesian revision based on this information. To obtain a fully Bayesian group, one should often extend this requirement to non‐public or even private information (learnt by not all or just one individual), or to non‐representable information (not representable by any event in the domain where credences are held). I propose a taxonomy of six types of ‘group Bayesianism’. They differ in the information for which Bayesian revision of group credences is required: public representable information, private representable information, public non‐representable information, etc. Six corresponding theorems establish how individual credences must (not) be aggregated to ensure group Bayesianism of any type, respectively. Aggregating through standard averaging is never permitted; instead, different forms of geometric averaging must be used. One theorem—that for public representable information—is essentially Russell et al.'s central result (with minor corrections). Another theorem—that for public non‐representable information—fills a gap in the theory of externally Bayesian opinion pooling.     

Mentoring Relationship Quality and Maltreated Children's Coping

Coping strategies are believed to protect against the harmful effects of maltreatment on children's psychosocial outcomes. Caregivers are thought to be critical in helping children develop adaptive coping strategies, yet many maltreated children have poor and/or insecure relationships with their parents. A quality relationship with a caring, non‐parental adult (e.g., a mentor), however, may be one strategy to promote healthy coping among maltreated children. Children (N = 154) in this study participated in a mentoring and skill‐based program for maltreated preadolescents placed in foster care. Hierarchical regression was used to assess the association between children's reports of their relationship with their mentor at the end of the intervention and four coping strategies (i.e., Active, Support‐seeking, Avoidance, and Distraction) 6 months following the intervention, while accounting for baseline coping strategies and other demographic factors. Above and beyond the covariates, better mentoring relationship quality was associated with children's greater use of Active and Distraction coping 6‐month post‐intervention. Mentoring relationship quality was not significantly associated with children's Avoidance or Support‐seeking coping. The findings suggest that mentoring programs may be a fruitful approach to improving vulnerable children's coping skills. Healthy coping is hypothesized to protect against the harmful effects of maltreatment and to promote resilience in the face of multiple stressors (Banyard & Williams, 2007 ; Boxer & Sloan‐Power, 2013; Cicchetti & Rogosch, 2009). It remains unclear, however, how best to promote positive coping among maltreated children, who are disproportionately exposed to numerous adverse childhood experiences (Raviv, Taussig, Culhane & Garrido, 2010). Theories of coping emphasize the importance of coping socialization through quality parent–child relationships (Kliewer et al., 2006; Skinner & Wellborn, 1994 ). Unfortunately, many maltreated children are exposed to poor quality and/or inadequate caregiving (Baer & Martinez, 2006), which may place them at risk for engaging in unhealthy or inappropriate forms of coping. It is reasonable to expect that positive relationships with other non‐parental adults (e.g., mentors) would affect coping behaviors given the positive impact that quality relationships have on a myriad of emotional and behavioral child outcomes (DuBois, Portillo, Rhodes, Silverthorn & Valentine, 2011; Keller & Pryce, 2012; Thomson & Zand, 2010 ). Because children in foster care often transition in and out of schools and home environments, a quality relationship with a mentor (a consistent presence in the child's life) may be well suited to promote healthy coping strategies.